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1. Introduction 
 
The current state of knowledge about the market for corporate control is extended 
with five essays that look at different facets of value creation in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). The first three essays examine the role of investment banks as 
financial intermediaries advising serial bidders in consecutive acquisitions. The 
three essays presented in chapters 2 to 4 belong to the first research project. The 
second research project with two essays examines tax-related capital structure 
changes of newly acquired subsidiaries.  
The first essay “Tracking M&A advisors’ track record - The positive influence of 
their industry expertise and advisory relationships on serial bidders’ acquisition 
performance” presented in chapter 2 is the initial idea from which the first research 
project emerged. The study investigates comparable to (Servaes & Zenner, 1996), 
(Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003), (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) and (Golubov, Petmezas, & 
Travlos, 2012) whether hiring banks as advisors with greater industry expertise and 
stronger client relationships is beneficial for the serial bidder. The study combines 
the theory of mergers and acquisitions as instruments to restructure and shift assets 
to their most productive use in an industry with the role of investment banks as 
financial intermediaries. Acquisition sequences are means to grow externally by 
integrating the assets of acquired targets. This leads over time to the redeployment 
of assets to the most productive companies with the best investment opportunities. 
Banks’ expertise in acquirers’ and targets’ industries are highly correlated, because 
most M&As occur within an industry. If the serial acquirer hires a bank as advisor 
with an average expertise in the target’s industry of 2.06% the probability of 
54.18% to make a good acquisition decision increases by 2.42%. The cumulative 
abnormal return CAR(-2, 2) is 22.52% larger on average, too. This increase of the 
announcement returns provides an equity gain of 2,458,400 dollar, given a median 
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market value of equity of 878 million dollar two days before the announcement 
and average CAR(-2, 2) of 0.0124. If the advising bank’s target industry advisory 
experience increases by one more deal over the past three years an additional value 
creation of 2,195,000 dollar for the bidder is expected. Compared to an average 
value creation of 10,807,200 dollar in advised and unadvised deals the skills of 
bank advisors pay off for the bidder. The observed practice of CEOs and CFOs to 
invite prospective banks and to award the advisory mandate to the bank with the 
best industry expertise and a good track record in the target’s industry, to hunt 
performance, is economic rational, particularly if the target operates in an industry 
the CEO or CFO are unfamiliar with. Better skilled banks that are more familiar 
with the bidder and more experienced in the target’s industry execute transaction 
on average 77 days faster as well. Finally the likelihood to complete the bid is also 
greater.  
However, deal completion is valuable for the bidder and his shareholders only if 
the transaction is value increasing. The upside potential of positive announcement 
returns and deal completion is one side of a good advisory service skilled banks 
ought to provide. The protection from the downside is the other part of a good 
advisory service. Protection from the downside is necessary for instance if after the 
official deal announcement more bidders enter the contest and drive up the 
acquisition price with an increasing probability of the winning bidder suffering 
from the winner’s curse of overpayment for the target (Boone & Mulherin, 2008). 
A skilled bank ought to help the bidder to structure the bidding and negotiation 
strategy as well as the due diligence process to minimize the threat of overpayment 
caused by the winner’s curse or an ex-ante overestimation of the synergies. 
Avoiding value destroying transactions and completing value creating ones is 
modeled with the dummy GOODADVICE that is one if a bid with a positive 
CAR(-2, 2) is completed or if a bid with a negative CAR(-2, 2) is withdrawn. This 
new measure of acquisition and advisory performance is positively correlated with 
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bank advisors’ expertise and strength of their relationships with bidders. At the 
announcement date the bidder and his advisors do not know perfectly whether the 
deal will create value. The announcement returns however are assumed to reveal 
whether the takeover will create value according to the efficient market hypothesis 
of perfectly rational market participants (Fama E. F., 1970). 
The economic effects are observed while controlling for selection. The study 
controls for selection effects with instrumental variable (IV) fixed effects panel 
regressions in which the advisory choice of no bank advisor, a non-bulge-bracket 
bank, or a bulge-bracket bank is modeled with the Tobit-type selection indicator 
ADVISORCHOICE according to (Vella, 1998) who explains this procedure 
suggested by (Heckman, 1978) and (Hausman, 1978). The Tobit-type selection 
combines the decision whether the deal is advised, modeled by (Kale, Kini, & 
Ryan, 2003) and (Servaes & Zenner, 1996), with the decision whether to hire a 
bulge-bracket or non-bulge-bracket bank modeled by (Golubov, Petmezas, & 
Travlos, 2012) into one model. The econometric models used to correct for Tobit-
type selection in the panel taken from the econometrics and labor economics 
literature extend the methodology of sample selection correction with the classic 
Two-step Heckit estimator of (Heckman, 1976; 1979) suggested by (Li & 
Prabhala, 2007) and used by (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). 
The focus on serial acquisitions is attributed to the potential win-win situation that 
a good acquisition performance supported by skilled bank advice has for the bidder 
and the bank. Banks as partners of serial bidders have not been considered in the 
recent corporate finance literature that examines acquisition sequences (Aktas, 
Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011; Ahern, 2008; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007; Fuller, Netter, 
& Stegemoller, 2002). The bidder benefits from the skilled advice in terms of a 
greater likelihood to make value creating acquisition to exploit his set of 
investment opportunities, the number of profitable acquisition targets. The bank 
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benefits in terms of strengthening its client relationship with the serial bidder who 
might hire the bank in a future transaction with the bank earning the advisory fees 
(McLaughlin, 1990; 1992; Hunter & Walker, 1990).  
This idea of a mutually beneficial bidder-bank relationship leads to the hypothesis 
analyzed in the second essay “The bidder’s selection and retention of his bank 
advisor - Its positive effect on the extension of acquisition sequences and formation 
of a hierarchical investment banking market” presented in chapter 3. If banks 
advice acquirers successfully they learn from the advisory experience, accumulate 
skills and client relationships. The accumulation of skills and relationships leads to 
a separation of the M&A advisory market with the most skilled banks at the top of 
a hierarchy advising the most complex transactions of the most frequent and largest 
bidders. The banks benefit from the higher advisory fees that are determined by the 
deals’ size. The bidders with the best investment opportunities benefit from the 
advisory support to exploit these opportunities over several rounds of interacting 
with bank advisors they hire and retain. The idea of a round based game has been 
formulated theoretically by (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994) and (Anand & 
Galetovic, 2006). The second essay investigates empirically the mechanisms of the 
round based interaction between banks and bidders that is repeated along 
acquisition sequences. It is indeed the case that banks with better advisory skills 
are more likely to be initially hired and then retained as advisors, enabling them to 
accumulate further advisory skills and client relationships. In the end the most 
skilled banks with the strongest client relationships, the bulge-bracket banks, 
dominate the M&A advisory market for large and complex transactions that 
require banks’ expertise.  
If a bank advised one more deal in the target’s industry in the last three years its 
chance to be hired increases by 9.15% in the first step of the circular process or 
repeated game. If a bank advised the bidder in one more bid in the past three years 
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its selection likelihood increases by 33.32% additionally. Reputation matters as 
well, because a standard deviation higher market share increases a bank’s visibility 
in the SDC M&A Top-50 League Tables and advisory market and thus its selection 
probability by 28.26%. To be selected from the set off all banks in the SDC M&A 
universe with 45 to 392 banks per year the unconditional probability is 0.36 
percentage points. To be initially selected improves the advising bank’s 
unconditional probability by 4.53% to be retained as advisor. A more intensive 
client relationship of one more transaction advised in the past three years increases 
a bank’s probability to be retained relatively by 60.47%.  
Being aware of these effects banks also pitch deals to familiar bidders and are 
retained as advisors if the bidder accepts the deal proposal. The interrelatedness 
implies a simultaneous decision of acquisition sequence continuation and advisor 
retention. Familiarity with the acquirer from previously advised deals in terms of a 
standard deviation greater client relationship increases the retention probability in 
the current bid by 11.89% and the unconditional probability of a successor bid of 
66.59% relatively by 5.25%. A standard deviation greater target industry expertise 
increases the retention probability by 27.29% and the probability to continue the 
acquisition sequence by 12.04%. The bank’s advisory relationship strength and 
target industry expertise influence the bidder’s M&A series continuation indirectly 
as well through the probability to be retained, which itself increases the probability 
of a successor deal by 15.65%. Finally retention as familiar advisor improves the 
bank’s expertise in the target industry by 34.47%.  
Going back to the first step of the repeated game the improved expertise increases 
the bank’s probability to be initially selected as M&A advisor among all possible 
bank advisors and then to be retained. Besides the effects of banks’ skills and 
familiarity with the bidders on sequence continuation those bidders with 
profitability investment opportunities above industry average who operate in large 
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industries are in general more likely to make additional acquisitions (Jovanovic & 
Rousseau, 2002; Servaes, 1991; Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989; Klasa & 
Stegemoller, 2007).  
The repeated game starts all over, being a circular process or loop of interrelated 
and simultaneous self-enforcing interactions. Similar to the arguments of (Anand 
& Galetovic, 2006) and (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994) the banks with the 
strongest client relationships and greatest industry expertise move to the top. The 
majority of specialized non-bulge-bracket banks or boutiques compete in a few 
industries at arm’s length. Goldman Sachs advised 4,472 deals in the SDC M&A 
sample and in the final sample of 8,886 bid-bank matches 654 deals. It is followed 
by Merrill Lynch with 514 advised transactions. The Top-10 bank advisors account 
for 3,335 of the 8,886 bid-bank matches, or 37.53%. This is a very high 
concentration among the 274 banks that advise more than one deal in the 
subsample of 8,886 bid-bank matches. 
The analyses of the two hypotheses revealed the econometric problem of double 
selection. In particular bulge-bracket banks are selected or select themselves into 
the largest transactions, which is observed for advised takeovers only. The 
selection problems in the two essays are solved with selection models and 
instrumental variable models for panel data taken from the econometrics and labor 
economics literature. The task however was to apply these models to a simplified 
selection process in a large corporate finance panel, which works well after all. 
Still the problem of double selection in panel data persists and inspired the 
development of a Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data with fixed effects. The 
first research project’s third essay “A Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data 
with fixed effects - An application to bidders’ advisor choice and returns in 
acquisition sequences” presented in chapter 4 develops the econometric model and 
applies it to the panel of serial acquisitions. In the end the Three-step Heckit 
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estimator is an extension of the Two-step Heckit estimator for panel data 
developed by (Wooldridge, 1995). The mathematical derivation of the estimator 
turned out to be simpler than expected, because the first step univariate probit 
regression of the selection equation in the Two-step Heckit estimator is replaced by 
a bivariate probit model with selection of two selection equations. The problem of 
double selection has been discussed in the econometrics and labor economics 
literature since the 1980s, beginning with the development of the idea by (Tunali, 
Behrman, & Wolfe, 1980) and the formalization of the bivariate probit model with 
selection by (van de Ven & van Praag, 1981).  
However, extension of the idea to use bivariate probit models’ inverse mills ratios 
to correct for double selection in large panels with fixed effects is new. The 
derivation of the Three-step Heckit estimator’s properties shows that the Two-step 
Heckit estimator of (Wooldridge, 1995) is just a special case of the more general 
Three-step estimator. If the correlation between the two selection equations 
approaches zero at most one selection equation is significant with the bivariate 
inverse mills ratios converging to the univariate inverse mills ratios of the Two-
step Heckit estimator of (Heckman, 1976; 1979) adapted to panel data by 
(Wooldridge, 1995).  
The Three-step Heckit estimator is flexible and general enough to allow the 
modeling of three types of double selection in panel data. Sequential double 
selection in the first two steps is estimated with the bivariate probit model with 
selection of (van de Ven & van Praag, 1981). Partially observed double selection 
occurring parallel can be estimated with the model of (Poirier, 1980). Finally 
partially observable sequential double selection is estimated with the model of 
(Abowd & Farber, 1982). From all three bivariate probit models bivariate inverse 
mills ratios, or in the case of zero correlation between the selection equations 
univariate inverse mills ratios, are computed and inserted as correction factors in 
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the third step structural equation estimated with fixed effects on the subsample 
affected by selection.  
Applied to the research project’s panel of 30,908 M&As in acquisition sequences 
the particular bank advisor selection turns out to be significant regarding its 
selection effect in the estimation of the bank advisor choices’ effects on serial 
bidders’ returns. Selecting a bank advisor with a one more deal greater target 
industry expertise results in an additional equity gain of 965,800 to 1,668,200 
dollar for the bidder. Hiring a familiar bank as advisor that assisted in one 
additional deal of the serial acquirer in the past three years has an equity effect of 
790,200 to 1,053,600 dollar. Similar to the first essay’s relative economic effects 
choosing a better skilled and familiar bank as advisor is beneficial compared to an 
average equity value creation of 7,463,000 dollar around the acquisition 
announcement. The estimated economic effects corrected for sequential double 
selection in the subsample of 8,886 bidder-bank matches are smaller than the 
economic effects estimated in the first essay. The first essay includes in the sample 
of 31,954 observations the counterfactual of no additional value creation in 
unadvised deals, whereas unadvised deals on average create more value indicated 
by higher announcement returns. 
The three studies share the same sample of 30,908 US M&As from 1979 until 
2006 with 718 investment banks of which 395 appeared in the SDC Top-50 M&A 
League Tables over the 28 year period. Furthermore, the major explanatory 
variables are shared by the three essays as well. The variables’ description is 
combined in table C in the statistical appendix instead of presenting three almost 
identical tables. Tables A and B are also shared between the three essays. The 
primary independent bank variables of the industry expertise and advisory 
relationships strength are shared as well. Nevertheless, the depended variables, 
econometric models and research designs of the three essays differ, because the 
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hypotheses address different issues arising in the assessment of the role of banks as 
serial bidders’ advisors and their influence on value creation. 
Besides the advice of skilled banks that creates value another source of value 
creation in M&As is the optimization of the newly acquired subsidiary’s capital 
structure to save taxes. The second research project looks in two essays in chapters 
5 and 6 at the influence of taxes and tax-related factors unique to M&As on the 
change of newly acquired subsidiary’s capital structure. The first essay “The 
influence of taxes and tax factors on debt shifting in mergers and acquisitions” in 
chapter 5 is a study that examines debt shifting between the acquirer and new 
subsidiary. Former studies of (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2004) and (Huizinga, 
Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) take the structure of the conglomerate with its 
subsidiaries and parent holding at a point in time as given when analyzing taxes’ 
effects on the capital structure. This essay examines the incentives to shift debt 
when the structure of the conglomerate changes by acquiring and including a new 
subsidiary. The takeover is a break in the structure of the enlarged conglomerate 
with adjustments to the capital structure of the newly acquired subsidiary and the 
parent company. To analyze the capital structure adjustments occurring during and 
after the M&A completion year the empirical analysis combines an event study 
with a window of at least (-3, 3) years around the M&A with a capital structure 
panel analysis according to (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). 
The incentives to shift debt are modeled with four constructs according to the tax-
based trade-off theory of (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973), (Miller, 1977), and 
(DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). The first major independent variable is the statutory 
tax rate difference between the bidder and target. The economic effect of a 
standard deviation larger tax rate difference of 0.54 percentage points more 
leverage of the new subsidiary is comparable to the tax effects of debt shifting 
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between subsidiaries found by (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) in the static 
case.  
The tax rate difference is extended to incorporate differences in overall bankruptcy 
risk, collateral and debt carrying capacity, and interest and debt repayment 
capability. The first measure TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A is the tax rate difference 
effect interacted with differences in total assets between the target and acquirer. It 
is the multilateral measure of (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008), to model 
debt shifting between a conglomerate’s subsidiaries, changed into a bilateral 
measure of differences between the new subsidiary and the acquiring conglomerate 
as one entity. Total assets are a general proxy for debt capacity and bankruptcy 
risk. Therefore, the size related tax incentive to shift debt is extend to the collateral 
related tax-tangibles measure TAX_TANGIBLES_T_A. The more tangible assets 
the acquiring parent or taken over target has, the better is its ability to exploit the 
interest tax shield by carrying more debt. Particularly to finance asset growth the 
availability of collateral is significant positively correlated with a higher leverage 
ratio. The ability to pay interest and principal to exploit a comparative tax 
advantage is measured with the tax-profitability measure 
TAX_PROFITABILITY_T_A. The comparative tax-profitability advantage is 
significant only for the shifting of financial debt, long-term and short-term interest 
bearing external debt. The ability to carry more interest-bearing debt is important 
to spread the financial debt used to finance the acquisition within the extended 
conglomerate’s structure to optimize the overall tax-shield and bankruptcy trade-
off. The trade-off theory based tax incentives’ economic effects of 0.40 to 1.91 
percentage points on new subsidiary’s leverage are usually greater than the effect 
of the tax rate difference alone. Except for the profitability related tax incentives to 
shift debt the overall size and tangible assets related debt shifting incentives are 
mostly relevant for the total debt-to-assets ratio only and significantly less relevant 
for adjusted net debt or financial debt. The insight into the debt shifting process is 
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the form of debt shifted within the internal capital market. The debt shifting 
between the newly acquired subsidiary and parent occurs through the accounts 
payable and receivable as a form of trade credit, which is included in the definition 
of total debt and excluded from the definitions of adjusted net debt and financial 
debt. 
Furthermore, the use of holding companies, or “conduits”, by financial investors in 
cross-border acquisitions, particularly to acquire loss-making companies, has an 
economic effect on target’s leverage of 7 to 8 percentage points. The effect in the 
international setting is comparable to the effect observed in German multinationals 
by (Ruf, 2011) and (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010). The analysis of financial 
investors and holdings is difficult, because the analysis is restricted to 2.4% of 
transactions involving holdings. Unrestricted loss compensation of new 
subsidiary’s loss carry forwards has a crowding-out effect on leverage, because it 
reduces the tax shield of debt. After the takeover the new subsidiary’s debt-to-
assets ratio decreases significantly.  
Given that debt shifting between the acquirer and new subsidiary occurs during and 
after the M&A completion year in line with the trade-off theory the question 
remained how fast the capital structure of the new subsidiary is adapted. The 
effects of taxes during the M&A completion year and on the post-merger 
convergence towards a leverage target are analyzed in the second essay “Do firms 
have tax-influenced capital structure targets? Evidence from taken over companies 
that became subsidiaries” presented in chapter 6. Again the analysis combines an 
event study with at least (-3, 3) years around the M&A completion year with a 
target leverage convergence analysis adapted to international private and public 
companies from (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) and (Kayhan & Titman, 2007). 
The tax rate difference between the new subsidiary and parent company drives a 
wedge between observed leverage and its target caused by the tax incentives to 
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shift debt. This debt shifting effect however holds only for underleveraged taken 
over companies that have spare debt capacity left. Nevertheless, the change in the 
tax rate difference, the new subsidiary’s statutory corporate tax rate and its 
leverage target have a significantly positive influence on changes in new 
subsidiary’s leverage during the M&A completion year. The acquirer’s statutory 
tax rate positively influences new subsidiary’s financial leverage change as well, 
because a higher tax rate makes debt financing the acquisition more attractive with 
the financial debt being partly shifted to the new subsidiary. The acquirer’s tax 
effect of approximately 4% on target’s leverage is similar to the average jump of 
4% in acquirer’s leverage caused by debt financing the acquisitions. The analysis 
of the influence of a cash payment by the acquirer on subsidiary’s financial 
leverage with a (Heckman, 1976; 1979) selection models confirms the effect. The 
debt used to finance the cash payment for the new subsidiary is spread evenly 
between the subsidiary and parent company. 
After the M&A completion year the subsidiary’s convergence towards target 
leverage is slower than in previous studies, because approximately only 26% of its 
pre-merger leverage deviation is reversed until the third year after the M&A. This 
convergence speed towards the benchmark is half as fast as the adjustment speed 
of acquirers of 54% to 75% found by (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). After the 
M&A the debt-to-assets ratio of the subsidiary decreases, even though it is usually 
underleveraged before the takeover. The leverage deviation of the new subsidiary 
becomes more negative. These empirical observations are the opposite of the 
findings of (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) and (Ghosh & Jain, 2000) of 
increasing leverage of acquirers and the joint company in the post-merger phase. 
Besides the adjustment speed effects related to tax rates and tax rate differences the 
new subsidiary’s capital structure convergence towards its leverage target is 
influenced by financial acquirers’ employment of holdings. Holding companies are 
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associated with a 4.52 percentage points increase in subsidiary’s leverage during 
the M&A completion year. In the third post-merger year financial acquirers reduce 
the debt shifted to the new subsidiary. The leverage increasing effect caused by 
debt shifting through holdings during the M&A completion year is reversed by a 
faster post-merger adjustment speed until the third year. The analysis of holdings 
by financial investors is again difficult, because financial investors’ deals account 
for 13.4% of all M&As in the sample. The effect of holdings is evident for total 
debt-to-assets, but not for adjusted net debt-to-assets and financial interest-bearing 
debt-to-assets. The conclusion is that the debt shifting through holdings shows up 
on the new subsidiary’s and financial investor’s balance sheets in the accounts 
payable and accounts receivable included in the definition of total leverage. 
Both essays about the tax effects of debt shifting around M&As make use of the 
same panel of 1,844 international and domestic transactions between private and 
public companies. The variables are described in the statistical appendix in tables F 
and G with shared statutory tax rates, capital structure variables, control variables 
of the transaction’s characteristics and inflation as well as the total debt-to-assets, 
adjusted net debt-to-assets and financial debt-to-assets ratios. The annual 
regressions of the leverage target adapted from (Kayhan & Titman, 2007) to 
private and public companies are shown in table H. The next chapters present the 5 
essays. Chapter 7 includes the summary, followed by the econometric appendix 
with derivations and proofs of the Three-step Heckit estimator, the statistical 
appendix and the bibliography. 
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2. Tracking M&A advisors’ track record - The positive influence of their 
industry expertise and advisory relationships on serial bidders’ acquisition 
performance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This study sheds light on the positive influence that bidders’ advising banks have 
on the performance in acquisition series. The analysis is complementary to the 
literature that analyzes acquisition series but has not yet investigated the role of 
investment banks as advisors of serial bidders (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011; 
Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). The empirical 
observation of a positive influence of the advising bank’s industry expertise and 
advisory relationship strength on the returns, completion probability, resolution 
speed and probability to make a good acquisition decision in terms of completing 
value creating deals and withdrawing from value destroying deals differs from the 
at best mixed observations of previous studies. (Bao & Edmans, 2011; Rau, 2000; 
Ismail, 2010; Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003; Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013). If the 
acquirer selects a bank as advisor with an average target industry expertise of 
2.06% the average likelihood of 54.18% to make a good acquisition decision 
increases by 2.42%. The cumulative abnormal return CAR(-2, 2) is on average 
22.52% larger as well, which denotes an equity gain of 2,458,400 dollar compared 
to an average equity increase of 10,807,200 dollar. A greater expertise of the 
advising bank that advised one more deal in the target’s industry in the past three 
years is associated with an additional equity gain of 2,195,000 dollar for the bidder. 
It is economic rational of CEOs and CFOs to hunt performance by selecting banks 
as advisors with a lot of advisory experience and a good track record in their and 
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the target’s industry. This study therefore extends the analyses of (Kale, Kini, & 
Ryan, 2003), (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013) and (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 
2012) who also observe a positive influence of advising investment banks on 
acquirers’ returns and (Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013) who model banks’ 
industry expertise and bank selection. 
in the analysis of bidders’ returns the methodological innovation is the extension of 
the definition what a good advisory performance of a bank advisor is. Maximizing 
the bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is one side of the advisory 
performance. A good advisor ought to protect the bidder from losses as well, for 
instance the winner’s curse in takeover auctions, which is the other side of the 
advisory performance (Boone & Mulherin, 2008). Therefore, the advisory 
performance of supporting the decision whether a value creating deal with a 
nonnegative CAR is completed is extended by the decision to withdraw from a 
value destroying deal with a negative CAR. This measure extends the separate 
measures of (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) and (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 
2012) into a unified one based on the efficient market hypothesis (Fama E. F., 
1970) of the CAR as reaction of rational market participants indicating value 
creation or destruction.   
To analyze the influence of banks’ skills on bidders’ acquisition performance the 
advisory skills of investment banks are not assumed to be represented by an 
indirect measure of reputation, the SDC Top-50 M&A League Table market share 
MS (Rau, 2000; Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013; Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2008; Kale, 
Kini, & Ryan, 2003). The SDC M&A League Table market share is biased against 
smaller banks. The market share of bulge-bracket banks is ten times larger than the 
average market share of non-bulge-bracket banks. Banks also ratchet up their SDC 
League Table market share to look better in the rankings (Derrien & Dessaint, 
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2012). Depending on the approximation of expertise used the perception of 
differences between the types of banks ranges widely.  
Modeling the expertise directly in each industry makes it possible to compare 
bulge-bracket banks, the top-10 banks in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables, 
and non-bulge-bracket banks as intermediaries in the market for corporate control 
(Hunter & Walker, 1990; Andrade & Stafford, 2004). Non-bulge-bracket banks are 
specialized in certain industries and thus advise fewer transactions than bulge-
bracket banks that operate in all industries (Song, Zhou, & Wei, 2013). The 
average industry specific expertise of bulge-bracket banks is only three times 
larger than the average industry expertise of non-bulge-bracket banks. The banks’ 
industry expertise modeled as the fraction of M&As advised in the acquirer’s and 
target’s industries in the previous three years approximates their relative advisory 
experience and access to industry information compared to other banks. This direct 
industry measure of advisory skills is adapted from (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013) 
and (Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013). For each investment bank its industry 
expertise in 49 (Fama & French, 1997) industries and advisory relationship 
strength with the bidders is calculated every year (Benveniste, Busaba, & Wilhelm, 
2002; Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013; Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013; Allen, 
Jagtiani, Peristiani, & Saunders, 2004; Forte, Iannotta, & Navone, 2010). 
The third contribution of this study is the extension of understanding the factors 
that drive performance in acquisition sequences (Ahern, 2008; Aktas, Bodt, & 
Roll, 2009; 2011; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Klasa & Stegemoller, 
2007). The characteristics of the transactions and acquisition experience of the 
bidding company change over the course of successive M&As. The changes of the 
acquirer, target and deal characteristics influence the need for the advisory skills of 
an investment bank as well as the acquisition performance (Fuller, Netter, & 
Stegemoller, 2002). This analysis shows that the building of advisory relationships 
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and the matching of experienced banks with the most frequent serial acquirers is 
efficient in terms of higher returns, better advice, less time to complete or 
withdraw the deal and higher completion probabilities. These empirical 
observations support the neoclassical theory of mergers and acquisitions (Andrade, 
Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; 2004; Harford, 2005; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996; 
Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001). The companies with the largest investment 
opportunity sets, approximated by Tobin’s Q, make acquisitions with higher 
returns, supported by investment banks as financial intermediaries (Lang, Stulz, & 
Walkling, 1989; Hunter & Walker, 1990; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). 
The endogeneity arising from selection along the acquisition series is modeled with 
instrumental variable (IV) fixed effects GLS panel and IV fixed effects probit 
models of the announcement returns, likelihood of good advice, deal completion 
probability and resolution speed (Vella, 1998; Hausman, 1978; Heckman, 1978; 
Wooldridge, 2002e; 2002d). The econometric methods to correct selection biases 
in panel data are explained well by (Wooldridge, 2002d; 2002e). (Vella, 1998) 
provides an excellent overview of the application of selection models to pooled and 
panel data. For robustness checks and comparability to the studies of (Golubov, 
Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012) and (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) pooled Heckman 
Two-step estimators and bivariate probit models with selection are used (Heckman, 
1976; 1979; Greene, 2008a; 2008b). For the analysis a panel of 30,908 bids or 
acquisitions with 31,954 observations, one to six for advised deals, in acquisition 
series of 1 to 98 M&As from 1979 to 2006 by 10,280 bidders is used, which is 
constructed from the SDC M&A database. 
In which way the empirical observations are obtained is subject of the next 
sections. The chapter continues in section 2 with the literature and hypothesis 
development. Section 3 describes the sample selection and data preparation. 
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Section 4 defines the variables. Section 5 includes the univariate analysis. Section 
6 presents the multivariate analyses. Section 7 finishes with the conclusion.  
 
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
The expertise of the advisor is expected to complement the acquisition experience 
of the acquirer who learns to make shareholder value increasing acquisitions 
particularly if his investment opportunity set is large (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 
2011; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). According to (Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007) 
serial acquirers make consecutive acquisitions to exploit growth opportunities 
according to the neoclassical theory of mergers and acquisitions (Andrade & 
Stafford, 2004; Gort, 1969). The targets with the largest synergies and lowest 
transaction costs are acquired first (Ahern, 2008). Therefore, the announcement 
returns are expected to be higher at the beginning of the sequence than at the end 
(Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011; Ahern, 2008; Croci & Petmezas, 2009; Fuller, 
Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). 
If the benefits of an acquirer-advisor relationship with a bank that has industry 
expertise exceed the advisory fees in comparison of doing the acquisitions without 
advice the advisor choice and maintenance of the relationship are beneficial for the 
acquirer (Hunter & Walker, 1990; Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). It follows 
that a greater industry expertise of the financial advisor ought to improve the M&A 
performance by supporting the acquirer in the bidding process and structuring of 
the transaction. These arguments lead to the hypothesis that the advising bank’s 
industry expertise and familiarity with the bidder improves his acquisition 
performance due to bank’s greater advisory skills and access to information in the 
19 
 
acquirer’s and target’s industries, supporting the exploitation of his set of 
investment opportunities. 
Nevertheless, the mixed evidence of the advisory performance of M&A advisors is 
puzzling given their task to reduce the transaction costs, contracting costs and 
information asymmetry between the acquirer and target about the unknown present 
value of the transaction. (Rau, 2000) observed that the market share of an 
investment bank does not depend on the past returns of advised deals, but the 
number of completed deals. Moreover, (Rau, 2000) discovered that acquirers 
advised by bulge-bracket banks earn lower announcement returns and pay higher 
acquisition premia. The empirical observations of (Ismail, 2010) are similar for 
reputable investment banks. In a comparable vain (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003) show 
that the returns are smaller and the speed of completion is slower, while the 
probability of completion similarly to (Rau, 2000) is higher, if a bulge-bracket 
bank is employed as advisor. On the target’s side (Ma, 2005) shows that the 
employment of a reputable financial advisor does not hurt the acquirer, which is 
comparable to the observation of (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). (Servaes & Zenner, 
1996) do not find that the employment of a bank as advisor has an advantage 
compared to seeking advice in-house. (Bao & Edmans, 2011) discovered that the 
performance of M&A advisors with respect to the announcement returns is 
persistent as acquirers do not chase performance. The smaller non-bulge-bracket 
banks have significantly higher persistent returns than bulge-bracket banks. So far 
(Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003), (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013) and (Golubov, 
Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012) are among the few who find a positive effect for the 
acquirer of employing a financial advisor with a relatively better reputation.  
The basic assumption for the employment of an investment bank as advisor is that 
skilled investment banks provide a better matching between the acquirer and 
potential targets according to the arguments of (Hunter & Walker, 1990) and 
20 
 
(McLaughlin, 1990; 1992). Investment banks as financial intermediaries reduce the 
information asymmetry between the acquirer and target in acquisitions. (Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996) argue that besides the information asymmetry the higher the 
transaction costs, arising from the deal’s complexity, and contracting costs of 
potential agency conflicts the more likely is the employment of a financial advisor 
by the acquirer. The task of the advising investment bank is the reduction of these 
costs for the acquirer. (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011) and (Servaes & Zenner, 
1996) argue that experienced acquirers are less likely to need the advice of a bank 
because of their learned ability to reduce these costs themselves. 
The contracting costs arise from potential agency problems such as managerial 
overconfidence, empire building or hubris, and the use of overvalued stock as 
acquisition currency (Roll, 1986; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; 2005b; 2008). 
According to (Cornaggia & Rau, 2002) investment banks are hired to certify the 
value of the acquisition to shareholders that the management is not empire building 
and the M&A creates value. The bank itself has no interest to get involved in 
agency conflicts as such a conflict most likely hurts the bank’s reputation 
(McLaughlin, 1990; 1992). 
This leads to the first selection equation that the probability to employ a bank as 
advisor is increasing in the transaction costs, contracting costs and information 
asymmetry and decreasing in the acquirer’s acquisition experience (Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996). The acquirer’s experience is increasing along the acquisition series 
and reduces the likelihood of successive transaction being advised. Furthermore, 
the more complex the transaction is the more likely is the choice of a more 
reputable investment bank, a bulge-bracket bank, than a less reputable investment 
bank (Song, Zhou, & Wei, 2013; Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). The three-
tier decision of the bid being unadvised, advised by a non-bulge-bracket bank or by 
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a bulge-bracket bank assumes an order of the advisory decision. The second 
selection equation of the order of the advisory decision captures these arguments 
that the probability of a non-bulge-bracket or bulge-bracket bank being the advisor 
is increasing in its past advisory performance as well as the complexity of the 
transaction. The two selection equations incorporate the potential endogeneity in 
the analysis to solve the puzzle of often opposing empirical results. A dataset of 
mergers and acquisitions from 1979 to 2006 is used to analyze the hypothesis and 
selection effects along acquisition sequences. 
 
2.3 Sample preparation and description 
 
To examine the hypothesis the analysis focuses on acquirers that make at least one 
acquisition or more. The sample of mergers and acquisitions with US targets and 
disclosed transaction values is taken from the SDC mergers and acquisitions 
database. The sample selection and data preparation process is summarized in table 
1. The same sample is used in chapters 3 and 4 as well. The distribution of 
transactions in each year, the number of banks in SDC M&A sample A, the SDC 
Top-50 M&A League Tables and observed bank-deal matches are shown in table 
1, too. Sample A includes 61,676 acquisitions or bids before merging with 
Compustat. It is used to calculate the banks’ industry expertise in targets’ and 
acquirers’ industries and the acquirer-advisor relationship strength for each bank 
with each acquirer. After merging with Compustat and CRSP 30,908 acquisitions 
or bids are left from 01/01/1979 to 12/31/2006. 
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Steps in the Process M&As
1. The total SDC M&A sample 208,654
2. Excluding self tenders, recapitalisations and repurchases 188,326
3. Excluding "Creditors", "Investor", "Investors", "Investor Group", 
"Shareholders", "Undisclosed Acquiror", "Seeking Buyer", and "Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan"
166,778
4. Excluding deals with status of "Unknown Status", "Rumor", "Discontinued 
Rumor", "Intended", "Intent withdrawn", "Pending" and "Seeking Target"
143,138
5. Excluding acquisitions/bids with undisclosed transaction values 67,065
6. Excluding individual and financial acquirers 61,713
7. Excluding bids in which the target is the same company as the acquirer 61,676
Sample A before the merging processes, used to compute the industry experience 
and acquirer-advisor relationship strengh variables
61,676
Steps in the Process M&As
8. Complete Compustat annual files from 1976 to 2006 (Industrial North America) 609,162
9. Keeping the consolidated parent with common stock (cic = 1xx) 600,197
10. Keeping company-years with positiv total assets 558,263
Compustat sample before the merging processes, used to compute the industry 
variables in each Fama & French (1997) industry
558,263
11. Deals with Compustat data available for the acquirer, merged by the CUSIP 39,053
Steps in the Process M&As
12. Deals with available announcement returns after merging with CRSP 33,231
Steps in the Process M&As
13. Excluding acquisitions/bids without acquirer's leverage, ROA and Tobin's Q 30,908
Sample for the analysis of acquisitions/bids with anouncement returns 30,908
Thereof unadvised acquisitions/bids (1) 23,068
Thereof advised acquisitions/bids 7,840
Bank matches with the advised acquisitions/bids (2) 8,886
Final sample B of unadvised and bank matched advised M&As (1+2) 31,954
Steps in the Process Issues
14. Debt and equity issues from 1976 to 2006 852,896
15. Excluding issues with missing transaction values 755,267
16. Excluding issues without an underwriter 755,266
Final sample C to calculate the exclusion restriction SCOPE 755,266
Panel E: Preparing the SDC Global Debt & Equity Issues to calculate the exclusion restriction
issues excluded
97,629
1
2,323
8,965
Panel D: Observation elimination after merging with Compustat & CRSP
deals excluded
Panel C: Merging with the CRSP sample
deals excluded
41,934
deals excluded
Table 1: Data preparation and sample statistics
The sample is taken from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database. The sample includes US targets only. The deals included are
M&As (1, 2), spinoffs & splitoffs (4), tender offers (5), minority stake purchases (10), acquisit ions of remaining interest (11),
and privat izations (12). The initial sample of 208,654 deals from 01/01/1979 to 12/31/2008 is reduced by missing Compustat
data as well as incomplete variables. The final sample includes only M&As of corporate acquirers as well as stake purchases. Most
deals without Compustat data involve private acquirers. The final sample includes deals from 01/01/1979 to 12/31/2006. Panel F
includes the major statist ics of the acquisit ion sequences. Panel G reports the distribut ion of the bids and acquisitions over t ime,
the number of advised bids/acquisitions per year, the number of investment banks included in the SDC M&A sample and SDC
M&A League Tables and the actuallyobserved bid-bank matches. 
Panel A: Observation elemination before merging the data with Compustat
deals excluded
23,640
20,328
21,548
76,073
Panel B: Merging with the Compustat sample
5,352
37
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
30,908 --- --- --- --- ---
10,280 --- --- --- --- ---
--- 3.0 2.0 4.0 1 98
--- 499.7 224.0 760.1 0 9289
--- 736.6 369.5 1012.6 0 9289
--- 600.0 305.0 798.6 0 8141
--- 504.5 263.0 705.5 0 6070
--- 438.5 198.5 631.4 0 6177
--- 303.6 135.0 473.6 0 5517
Year
Bids /    
Acquisitions
Advised 
Deals
bid-bank 
matches
Banks in 
SDC 
sample A
SDC M&A 
League 
Table 
Banks (#)
1979 9 6 7 45 20
1980 45 22 23 83 49
1981 289 62 65 136 50
1982 402 68 73 172 50
1983 540 89 95 170 50
1984 615 110 115 164 51
1985 303 111 124 148 50
1986 479 176 193 210 50
1987 482 121 129 242 50
1988 546 167 180 261 50
1989 687 166 194 295 50
1990 646 118 132 256 50
1991 731 112 129 263 50
1992 965 158 167 271 51
1993 1,229 230 282 281 50
1994 1,600 351 398 345 50
1995 1,651 404 438 342 50
1996 1,989 477 515 351 50
1997 2,627 635 710 392 50
1998 2,669 613 681 351 50
1999 2,079 579 642 355 50
2000 1,919 597 695 318 50
2001 1,396 462 537 312 50
2002 1,330 365 407 292 50
2003 1,293 367 413 292 50
2004 1,387 421 494 336 50
2005 1,508 441 531 366 50
2006 1,492 412 517 351 50
Total 30,908 7,840 8,886
Table 1 (cont.): Data preparation and sample statistics
advised and unadvised 
bids/acquisitions
Days between the 1st and 2nd bid in SDC
Days between the 2nd and 3rd bid in SDC
Days between the 3rd and 4th bid in SDC
Days between the 4th and 5th bid in SDC
Days between the 5th and 6th and higher bid in SDC
Number of acquisitions/bids in the final sample
Number of acquirers/bidders in the final sample
Acquisitions per acquirer and sequence 
Days between acquisitions/bids
Panel F: Major acquisition series characteristics in the final sample
bid-bank matches and banks
Panel G: Time series of bids, banks and bid-bank matches
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Sample B with 31,954 observations is larger than the samples of sequences of up to 
five bids used in previous research (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Aktas, 
Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011; Ahern, 2008).  
It follows that the definition of an acquisition sequence is everything in excess of 
one acquisition without any maximum or minimum requirement of the length of 
the acquisition sequence. The time between successive transactions is on average 
500 days and longer than in previous studies (Ahern, 2008; Croci & Petmezas, 
2009). Nevertheless, the pattern of decreasing time gaps between successive bids 
within the acquisition sequence is similar to the pattern observed by (Aktas, Bodt, 
& Roll, 2009; 2011) and predicted by their theory that with increasing acquisition 
experience the acquisitions are made in shorter succession. The average time gap 
of 737 days between the first and second bid decreases to 304 days between sixths 
and later bids. The final sample of 30,908 acquisitions or bids includes 10,280 
different acquirers. M&A announcements of different deals occurring on the same 
day are ordered by their deal number1. The variables used to analyze the influence 
of bank advisors’ expertise on bidders’ performance in acquisition sequences is 
subject of the next section. 
 
2.4 Description of variables 
 
To test the hypothesis the dependent variable shown in table 2 is the cumulative 
abnormal return CAR(-2, 2) calculated with the Beta-1 model using the CRSP 
value weighted index as capital market proxy from 2 days before to 2 days after the 
                                                          
1 One can argue whether to keep deals announced on the same date in the sample. However, there is no 
theoretically sound procedure which deals to exclude and which to retain. The few deals announced on 
the same date with different targets share the same cumulative announcement returns. The deals could 
be considered as one comprehensive deal, but they have different deal characteristics.  
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announcement of the M&A. The Beta-1 model is used to avoid the problem of 
overlapping M&As in the pre-merger estimation period (Aktas, Bodt, & Cousin, 
2007; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). Nevertheless, CARs with event 
windows (-1, 1) and (-3, 3) calculated for each M&A with the CAPM from -270 to 
-21 trading days before the announcement date, to exclude the pre-merger stock 
price run-up period, are used in the sensitivity analysis (Mitchell, Pulvino, & 
Stafford, 2004; Brown & Warner, 1985; 1980). Similar to (Rau, 2000) and (Hunter 
& Jagtiani, 2003) the dummy COMPLETED is 1 if the transaction has been 
completed and the variable RESOLSPEED is the time in days from the 
announcement until the completion or withdrawal of the M&A. A new 
performance measure is the dummy GOODADVICE that is 1 if a bid with a 
nonnegative CAR(-2, 2) is completed or withdrawn in the case of a negative 
CAR(-2, 2) and 0 otherwise. This dummy is a combination of the announcement 
returns and the probability to complete a transaction, which approximate the upside 
of a good M&A decision and advisory performance. Bank advisors also ought to 
protect their clients from losses, which (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) have analyzed 
separately. Furthermore, banks’ concern for their reputation provides incentives 
not to “get the deal done” if deal completion harms their clients (McLaughlin, 
1990). The downside of a negative CAR(-2, 2) refers to the winner’s curse in 
takeovers as well, because after the deal announcement new bidders might enter 
the bidding contest, which can lead to overbidding if the bank advisor and bidder 
cannot adapt the bidding and negotiation strategy accordingly (Boone & Mulherin, 
2008). In unadvised transactions the dummy GOODADVICE models the ability of 
serial acquirers to make good acquisition decisions according the learning 
hypothesis of (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011). The reliance on the 
announcement returns whether the deal will create or destroy value is based on the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis of (Fama E. F., 1970). The assumption is that 
the perfectly rational market participants’ reaction to the announcement is 
indicative of the value created in the proposed transaction.  
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To test the two selection equations whether the M&A is advised, or by which 
advisor type, the dependent variables are ADVISED and ADVISORCHOICE. 
ADVISED is a dummy variable whether the bid or acquisition is advised by at 
least one investment bank and 0 otherwise (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). The ordered 
advisory choice of no advisor (1), a non-bulge-bracket bank (2) or a bulge-bracket 
bank (3) is modeled with the Tobit-type selection indicator ADVISORCHOICE. 
ADVISORCHOICE combines the selection dummy ADVISED of (Kale, Kini, & 
Ryan, 2003) and (Servaes, 1991) with the bulge-bracket or non-bulge-bracket bank 
dummy “Top-tier” of (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012) in one selection 
indicator. ADVISED and ADVISORCHOICE serve as selection indicators in the 
multivariate analysis (Heckman, 1976; 1978; 1979; Vella, 1998). The selection 
models used are explained in detail in econometric appendix E.1. 
The independent variables used to approximate the access of investment banks to 
information in acquirers’ and targets’ industries and to acquirers’ private 
information are adapted and modified from previous research (Benveniste, Busaba, 
& Wilhelm, 2002; Forte, Iannotta, & Navone, 2010; Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 
2013; Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013). The industry expertise as a direct measure of 
advisory skills to reduce transaction costs and access to information to overcome 
information asymmetries is based on the neoclassical theory of M&As. M&As are 
means to shift the assets of an industry to its most productive users with banks as 
intermediaries facilitating the process (Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Gort, 1969; 
Hunter & Walker, 1990). The approximation of the industry expertise is based on 
the M&As advised in the past three years. A larger number of advised M&As is 
associated with more information being available about the advised companies and 
their competitive environment. With more transactions advised the bank learns 
how to advise M&As better by accumulating advisory skills (Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri, 1994).  
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw 31,954 0.0124 0.0043 0.0788 -0.1994 0.3135
GOODADVICE 31,954 0.5418 1.0000 0.4983 0.0000 1.0000
RESOLSPEED 31,757 77.3367 43.0000 103.8303 0.0000 730.0000
COMPLETED 31,954 0.9416 1.0000 0.2346 0.0000 1.0000
ADVISED 31,954 0.2781 0.0000 0.4481 0.0000 1.0000
ADVISORCHOICE 31,954 1.4025 1.0000 0.6995 1.0000 3.0000
IEDA 31,954 0.0213 0.0000 0.0546 0.0000 0.6667
IEDT 31,954 0.0206 0.0000 0.0532 0.0000 0.6574
IEVA 31,954 0.0340 0.0000 0.0960 0.0000 0.9418
IEVT 31,954 0.0331 0.0000 0.0939 0.0000 0.8879
ARSD 31,954 0.0154 0.0000 0.0847 0.0000 1.0000
ARSV 31,954 0.0155 0.0000 0.0854 0.0000 1.0000
MS 31,954 2.7883 0.0000 7.5363 0.0000 94.6000
RELREP 31,954 2.2085 0.0000 11.4739 0.0000 376.0000
PASTBBCAR 31,954 0.0067 0.0000 0.0514 -0.1994 0.3135
PASTBIDDERCAR 31,954 0.0079 0.0000 0.0618 -0.1994 0.3135
PASTCOMPLETED 31,954 0.4736 0.0000 0.4993 0.0000 1.0000
PASTGOODADVICE 31,954 0.2752 0.0000 0.4466 0.0000 1.0000
PASTRESOLSPEED 31,954 35.7533 0.0000 82.2297 0.0000 730.0000
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the bank/advisor variables
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables
T his table reports the sample statist ics of the dependent, bank, bidder and transaction variables. T he variables are
described in table C in the statistical appendix. The continous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1
percentile to exclude outliers.
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
SCOPE 31,954 0.3036 0.0000 0.4598 0.0000 1.0000
DEALS3YEARS 31,954 1.7123 1.0000 2.9486 0.0000 41.0000
LOGME 31,954 20.3974 20.3154 2.1567 15.0841 25.7360
LNIS 31,954 6.6107 6.7719 0.9283 1.6094 7.9491
TobinsQ 31,954 2.1307 1.4492 2.1052 0.7074 16.1560
ITobinsQ 31,954 2.1184 1.8862 0.9232 0.8867 6.2588
ATobinsQ 31,954 0.0124 -0.2253 1.8525 -5.1792 14.9771
ROA 31,954 0.0557 0.0684 0.1473 -1.0911 0.3314
IROA 31,954 -0.0346 0.0075 0.1098 -0.7143 0.1666
AROA 31,954 0.0903 0.0718 0.1661 -1.1947 0.7949
LEVERAGE 31,954 0.2382 0.2060 0.2023 0.0000 0.9980
ILEVERAGE 31,954 0.2645 0.2708 0.0772 0.0752 0.4962
ALEVERAGE 31,954 -0.0263 -0.0532 0.1829 -0.4599 0.8223
DIVERS 31,954 0.4288 0.0000 0.4949 0.0000 1.0000
MAJORITY 31,954 0.9487 1.0000 0.2206 0.0000 1.0000
PUBLIC 31,954 0.2065 0.0000 0.4048 0.0000 1.0000
RDS 31,954 0.2467 0.0692 0.5036 0.0002 3.6040
TADVISORTIER 31,954 0.5352 0.0000 0.7529 0.0000 2.0000
MULTIPLE 31,954 1.0271 1.0000 0.2050 1.0000 8.0000
ANTITAKEOVER 31,954 0.0379 0.0000 0.1909 0.0000 1.0000
FAMILY 31,954 0.0031 0.0000 0.0553 0.0000 1.0000
LITIGATION 31,954 0.0181 0.0000 0.1334 0.0000 1.0000
REGULATORY 31,954 0.2898 0.0000 0.4537 0.0000 1.0000
CROSSBORDER 31,954 0.0612 0.0000 0.2397 0.0000 1.0000
DIVERSIFICATION 31,954 0.5002 0.0000 0.5794 0.0000 3.2189
TOEHOLD 31,954 1.8860 0.0000 10.2811 -0.0300 99.8000
HIGHTECH 31,954 0.2874 0.0000 0.4526 0.0000 1.0000
STOCK 31,954 0.1859 0.0000 0.3891 0.0000 1.0000
CASH 31,954 0.2423 0.0000 0.4285 0.0000 1.0000
MIXED 31,954 0.1951 0.0000 0.3963 0.0000 1.0000
OTHER 31,954 0.0868 0.0000 0.2816 0.0000 1.0000
FIRST 31,954 0.3302 0.0000 0.4703 0.0000 1.0000
SIXTH 31,954 0.2518 0.0000 0.4341 0.0000 1.0000
Table 2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of the bidder variables
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of the transaction variables
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The industry expertise i,k,tIE  of investment bank i  is measured either by the 
number (D) or dollar volume (V) of acquisitions advised with respect to the total 
number of advised acquisitions 1,...,j N= in each of the 1,..., 49k =  (Fama & 
French, 1997) industries in the three years 1t − , 2t − , 3t −  preceding year t  of 
the acquisition or bid. The industry expertise is a relative measure that compares 
the bank’s expertise relative to the expertise of other banks who advised 
acquisitions or bids in the same industry. The industry expertise of bank i  in 
industry k  in year t  measured by the number of deals (D) advised is defined as 
advised_deals advised_deals advised_dealsi,k,t-1 i,k,t-2 i,k,t-3
+ +
advised_industry_deals advised_industry_deals advised_industry_dealsk,t-1 k,t-2 k,t-3
IED =i,k,t 3
 
 
 
 
 
For instance if the advised acquirer is from the ship building industry and the 
advised target is from the transportation industry, the acquisition or bid is counted 
in the year of the announcement once for the ship building industry and once for 
the transportation industry. If the target and the acquirer are advised and from the 
same industry the bid is counted only once for the industry to avoid double 
counting. Double counting is avoided, because an investment bank can advise 
either the target or the acquirer but not both at the same time. The avoidance of 
double counting ensures that an investment bank participating in every advised 
transaction on either the target’s or acquirer’s side has a maximum industry 
expertise of 1. Only bids that are advised on the acquirer side, the target side, or on 
both sides are counted for the number of advised industry deals.  
For instance in 1998 Goldman Sachs had an industry expertise in the ship building 
industry of 0.1111. This is computed by the number of M&As Goldman Sachs 
advised in the preceding year 1997 divided by the number of all advised M&As in 
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the ship building industry in 1997, which is 1/3. Goldman Sachs did not advice any 
deal in the ship building industry in 1996 and 1995. The industry expertise by deals 
(D) of Goldman Sachs in 1998 is ( )GS,Ships,1998IED = 0.3+0+0 /3=0. 1 . The 
normalization with 3 ensures that the industry expertise is a ratio between 0 and 1. 
The maximum industry expertise of 1 corresponds to 100% if Goldman Sachs had 
participated as advisor on the acquirers’ or targets’ sides in all advised deals in the 
ship building industry in the preceding three years. The ratio of 0 to 1 therefore 
approximated the banks’ relative competitiveness by their expertise. The industry 
expertise based on the number (D) of deals or dollar volume (V) in the acquirer’s 
(A) and the target’s (T) industries are IEDA, IEDT, IEVA and IEVT, which are 
shown in table 2. The same variables are used in chapters 3 and 4, too. 
In the final sample IEDT and MS are positively correlated, because bulge-bracket 
banks operate in almost every industry and thus have high rankings in the SDC 
M&A League Tables. Non-bulge-bracket banks are highly specialized on certain 
industries with an on average smaller industry expertise and lower ranking. For 
instance in the (Fama & French, 1997) industry “Aero” of aircraft manufacturing 
the correlation between MS and IED ranges from -0.1446 in 1982 to 0.8405 in 
1998, with an overall correlation of 0.2962. The annual correlation between IED 
and MS per year over all industries ranges from 0.2371 in 1982 to 0.5703 in 2000.  
The calculation of the proxy for the access to the private information i,B,tI  of 
bidder B  of bank i  at time t  is similar to the calculation of the proxy for industry 
expertise. The proxy for the access to bidder information is the advisory 
relationship strength ARS based on the arguments of (Anand & Galetovic, 2006) 
that building relationships by investment banks with bidding companies enables 
banks to get access to their private information. The advisory relationship strength 
is based on the number of M&As bank i  advised with respect to the number of all 
advised M&As the acquirer conducted in the three years preceding the considered 
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bid. In this case the strength of the advisory relationship is a relative measure 
compared to the strength of the advisory relationships the bidder has with other 
banks. The variable for the advisory relationship strength by deals (D) is ARSD. 
For the sensitivity analysis the dollar value (V) based definitions IEVT and ARSV 
of the industry expertise and advisory relationship strength are used. The industry 
expertise and the acquirer-advisor relationship strength variables of the Top-25 
investment banks in the SDC League Tables and sample A are summarized in table 
A in the appendix. The variables are described in table C in the statistical appendix. 
Table A and C are shared with chapters 3 and 4. 
For the sensitivity analysis the bidder’s advising bank’s market share MS as 
reputation proxy is used. In previous studies a higher reputation is associated with 
better investment banking skills (Rau, 2000; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Kale, Kini, 
& Ryan, 2003). The market shares of investment banks is taken from the SDC 
Top-50 M&A League Tables according to (Rau, 2000), (Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 
2008), (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) and (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013). The market 
share MS of investment banks not included in the SDC Top-50 M&A League 
Tables is set to the minimum of 0.1. On the target’s side the bank with the highest 
SDC Top-50 M&A League Table market share is considered to be the lead advisor 
(Carter & Manaster, 1990; Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). Related to the market share 
MS is the relative reputation RELREP, which is the acquirer advisor’s market 
share MS divided by the target advisor’s market share (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). 
If the target does not employ an advisor the variable RELREP is simply the bidder 
advisor’s market share MS. 
Finally the past performance of the M&As advised by banks is modeled 
comparably to (Rau, 2000) and (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003). PASTBBCAR is the 
value weighted CAR(-2, 2) of the bidder’s previous M&A if he was advised by the 
same bank, the bidder-bank matching, or of the previous unadvised deal if no 
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advisor is chosen in the current bid. It is the past CAR(-2, 2) multiplied with the 
dummy whether the CAR(-2, 2) is available. PASTBIDDERCAR is the value 
weighted CAR(-2, 2) of the acquirer’s previous M&A independent of the past 
advisory status. PASTGOODADVICE is 1 if the previous deal advised by the 
same bank that advises the current bid with a nonnegative CAR(-2, 2) was 
completed, or withdrawn in the case of a negative CAR(-2, 2), and 0 otherwise. In 
the case of an unadvised bid PASTGOODADVICE is the dummy GOODADVICE 
of the previously unadvised deal. PASTCOMPLETED and PASTRESOLSPEED 
are defined for the past dummy COMPLETED and past variable RESOLSPEED 
analogously to PASTBBCAR and PASTGOODADVICE. All variables are defined 
in table C in the statistical appendix. 
The calculations of the industry expertise IED, advisory relationship strength ARS, 
market share MS and past performance variables require the tracking and 
controlling of bank mergers and banks’ name changes. The assumption is that 
successor banks inherit the expertise and advisory relationships of their 
predecessors. The ultimate parent bank has inherited all relationships and industry 
expertise of its predecessors. Table B in the statistical appendix includes the 
mergers and name changes of all 395 banks in the SDC Top-50 M&A League 
Tables from 1979 to 2006 together with their 201 ultimate parents as of 
12/31/2006. Table B is use in chapters 3 and 4 as well.  
The methodology to track name changes and bank mergers is similar to 
(Ljungqvist, Marston, & Wilhelm, 2006) and extend by researching the events in 
the Factiva and LexisNexis press database and banks’ websites and annual reports. 
The implicit assumption is that key bankers who embody the experience and 
relationships with clients stay with the bank after mergers, acquisitions or name 
changes (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). The name changes and mergers of banks not 
in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables are not tracked, because sample A 
33 
 
includes 1,854 different banks from 1979 to 2006. The 395 banks in the SDC Top-
50 M&A League Tables advise approximately 75% of all M&As. In the years 2007 
and 2008 of the financial crisis many banks and two leading investment banks, 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns, went bankrupt. According to the press Bear 
Stearns was acquired by JP Morgan while parts of Lehman Brothers were taken 
over by Nomura, KPMG China and others. According to the Federal Depository 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 470 banks went bankrupt from 2007 until the end of 
20122. Tracking their remains is difficult as many key bankers left the industry 
entirely according to the press. Therefore, the sample is truncated after 2006 to 
avoid sample attrition of bankrupt banks (Wooldridge, 2002e). 
The acquisition experience of the acquirer is approximated by the number of bids 
or acquisitions he conducted in the previous three years, measured by the variable 
DEALS3YEARS (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). To be able to conduct M&As the 
bidding company needs the appropriate resources. The return on assets ROA is 
used as an approximation of acquirer’s profitability (Heron & Lie, 2002). 
Opposing the effect of high profitability is high leverage that constraints the 
management in debt financing takeovers. Leverage is modeled with the variable 
LEVERAGE according to (Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007). Besides a larger amount 
of resources being available to spend on acquisitions a larger investment 
opportunity set is associated with more profitable acquisition opportunities 
(Servaes, 1991). The assessment of bidders’ investment opportunities by the 
market is modeled with Tobin’s Q adapted from (Andrade & Stafford, 2004). 
Similarly to all other continuous variables TobinsQ, LEVERAGE and ROA are 
winsorized at the upper and lower 1% percentile.  
                                                          
2 The list of bank insolvencies is available as Excel file on the homepage of the FDIC:  
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
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All mentioned variables measure the individual acquirer’s characteristics. 
According to the neoclassical theory of mergers and acquisitions those companies 
with the highest profitability and largest set of investment opportunities are going 
to acquire less profitable companies (Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Mitchell & 
Mulherin, 1996; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). The size of the set of investment 
opportunities, profitability and leverage are measured relative to the industry 
average as ATobinsQ, AROA and ALEVERAGE. To compute ALEVERAGE the 
required average industry leverage ILEVERAGE is the mean leverage of the 
bidder’s primary (Fama & French, 1997) industry, excluding the bidder’s leverage 
from the mean’s calculation. The average industry Tobin’s Q as ITobinsQ and 
average industry ROA as IROA are similarly defined as ILEVERGE. ALEVERGE 
is then defined as LEVERAGE less ILEVERAGE. AROA and ATobinsQ are 
defined equivalently to ALEVERAGE, with “A” for “abnormal” compared to the 
industry average3. The industry size LNIS is the natural logarithm (LN) of the 
number of companies (IS) in the acquirer’s industry in the year before the bid or 
acquisition (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001; 2002). Finally the size of the bidder is 
controlled with the natural logarithm of the market value of his equity at the end of 
the fiscal year preceding the year of the announcement LOGME (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; 2005). All variable definitions are described in the 
statistical appendix in table C. 
The transaction variables must approximate the transaction’s contracting costs and 
the information asymmetry. The first one is the dummy DIVERS for a diversifying 
acquisition (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). The target’s industry diversification as the 
number of its industries is measured by the continuous variable 
                                                          
3 The Compustat sample of 558,263 company-years includes many positive outliers for Tobin’s Q and 
ROA and negative ones for LEVERAGE that winsorizing by 5% at the upper and lower tail is 
necessary. Manually excluding outlier is somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, a wide winsorizing window is 
chosen, because at 2.5% still Tobin’s Q of 50 and more occurred in the sample. Compustat observations 
with negative total assets are excluded. 
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DIVERSIFICATION (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). The purchase of a company is 
modeled with the variable MAJORITY that is 1 if the acquirer intends to obtain a 
controlling majority of the target company. If the target or acquirer or both are 
operating in high-tech industries and have a large share of assets in immaterial 
intangibles the information asymmetry is high. Whether the M&A is one in high-
tech industries is measured by the dummy HIGHTECH (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). 
The bidder’s access to insider target information is measured by the continuous 
variable TOEHOLD of his ownership stake before the acquisition (Song, Zhou, & 
Wei, 2013; Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). Relatively larger targets have a higher 
bargaining power that increases the transaction costs (Servaes & Zenner, 1996; 
Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005). The 
relative deal size is measured with the continuous variable RDS. The existence and 
consideration of competition from multiple bidders makes the bidding strategy 
more complex, modeled with the variable MULTIPLE (Boone & Mulherin, 2008).  
The last variables modelling the complexity of the transaction are dummy variables 
adapted and extended from (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). The dummy 
ANTITAKEOVER controls for anti-takeover measures (Comment & Schwert, 
1995). The second dummy CROSS-BORDER controls for cross-border deals 
(Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005; Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2008). The third dummy 
REGULATORY models the need of regulatory approval, the fourth one FAMILY 
family ownership, and the fifth LITIGATION a pending litigation against the 
target. (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) show that acquirers’ advisor choice depends on 
targets’ advisors’ tier, which is modelled with the discrete variable 
TADVISORTIER. A hostile acquisition, modeled with the dummy HOSTILE, is 
more complex and increases the costs to overcome the resistance of the target’s 
management (Schwert, 2000). If the target is a public company a bidding process 
for its stock is necessary, modeled with the dummy PUBLIC (Chang S. , 1998). 
The dummies STOCK, CASH, MIXED and OTHER are set to 1 when stock, cash, 
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both or other means of payment are used (Martin, 1996). The payment dummies 
are all zero for observations with missing payment information. Dummies for the 
stages of the acquisition sequences control for factors not directly captured by the 
transaction, bank and bidder variables. The dummy FIRST is 1 if the acquisition or 
bid is the first one of the bidding company in the data set. The dummy SIXTH is 
set to 1 if the transaction is the sixth and later one of the bidding company (Fuller, 
Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). The independent variables are shared with the 
analyses in chapters 3 and 4. The changes of advising banks’, bidders’ and 
transactions’ characteristics are subject of the univariate analyses in the next 
section. 
 
2.5 Univariate analysis of advisor choices and acquisition sequences 
 
The univariate analysis of differences between unadvised, non-bulge-bracket bank 
and bulge-bracket bank advised deals is shown in table 3. The definitions of non-
bulge-bracket and bulge-bracket banks are taken from (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003) 
and (Rau, 2000). A bank is a bulge-bracket bank if it has an annual rank of 10 or 
higher according to its weighted ranks of the last three years in the SDC Top-50 
M&A League Tables. A non-bulge-bracket bank has a weighted rank of 11 or less. 
Banks not appearing in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables but in the SDC 
M&A sample A are labeled as non-bulge-bracket banks. The perceived ranking of 
investment bank i  in each year t  is the sum of the equally weighted ranks of the 
current year 0t =  and the preceding two years 1t −  and 2t − . The formula is 
( )t, i t, i t-1, i t-2, iNewRank = rank +rank +rank 3 . 
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Similar to previous research the returns in bulge-bracket bank advised deals are 
significantly smaller than in unadvised or non-bulge-bracket bank advised M&As 
(Bao & Edmans, 2011). As expected bulge-bracket banks advise larger and more 
profitable, but also higher leveraged, bidders. The transactions’ characteristics 
differ between unadvised, non-bulge-bracket and bulge-bracket bank advised deals 
as well with more complex and relatively larger transactions being more likely 
advised by bulge-bracket banks. The significant differences in the bank, bidder and 
transaction characteristics between the advisory types support the necessity to 
control for selection among these advisory choices.  
Similar to the observations of (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011) and (Fuller, 
Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002) the announcement returns are decreasing along the 
acquisition series, shown in table 4. In later bids more often higher ranking bank 
advisors and particularly familiar ones are hired or retained, which (Sibilkov & 
McConnell, 2013) observe as well. With the hiring and retention of higher ranking 
advisors the average industry expertise, advisory relationship strength, SDC 
League Table market share, relative reputation and past advisory and acquisition 
performance are increasing along the acquisition sequence.  
Serial bidders’ size and acquisition experience increase along their acquisition 
series. Their investment opportunity sets are on average at first larger than the 
industry’s average but fall below the industry average in the third bid or 
acquisition. Nevertheless, serial bidders are more profitable and less leveraged than 
their industry pears, enabling them to make successive acquisitions. The hiring and 
retention of more experienced and familiar banks is likely to be determined by the 
increasing complexity of later acquisitions that become relatively smaller as serial 
acquirers grow in size themselves (Ahern, 2008). Whether these changes in the 
transaction characteristics along the acquisition series accompanied by more 
38 
 
experienced and familiar banks is beneficial for the acquirer is subject of the 
multivariate analyses. 
Acquirer advisor tier unadvised non-bulge-bracket bulge-bracket All Bids t-test t-test
N 23,068 4,911 3,975 31,954 p-value p-value
Variable 1 2 3 1 - 3 = 0 2 - 3 = 0
CAR_(-2, 2)_BETA1_vw Mean 0.0139 0.0113 0.0050 0.0124 0.0000 0.0004
GOODADVICE Mean 0.5501 0.5251 0.5145 0.5418 0.0000 0.1582
RESOLSPEED Mean 62.5488 109.9857 122.4306 77.3367 0.0000 0.0000
COMPLETED Mean 0.9449 0.9379 0.9265 0.9416 0.0000 0.0168
IEDA Mean 0.0000 0.0409 0.1203 0.0213 0.0000 0.0000
IEDT Mean 0.0000 0.0408 0.1156 0.0206 0.0000 0.0000
IEVA Mean 0.0000 0.0384 0.2257 0.0340 0.0000 0.0000
IEVT Mean 0.0000 0.0379 0.2191 0.0331 0.0000 0.0000
ARSD Mean 0.0000 0.0435 0.0699 0.0154 0.0000 0.0000
ARSV Mean 0.0000 0.0435 0.0709 0.0155 0.0000 0.0000
MS Mean 0.0000 2.0798 19.8451 2.7883 0.0000 0.0000
RELREP Mean 0.0000 2.6811 14.4408 2.2085 0.0000 0.0000
PASTBBCAR Mean 0.0084 0.0027 0.0021 0.0067 0.0000 0.2262
PASTBIDDERCAR Mean 0.0083 0.0075 0.0059 0.0079 0.0099 0.1173
PASTCOMPLETED Mean 0.5825 0.1478 0.2443 0.4736 0.0000 0.0000
PASTGOODADVICE Mean 0.3398 0.0839 0.1366 0.2752 0.0000 0.0000
PASTRESOLSPEED Mean 40.2591 18.1594 31.3414 35.7533 0.0000 0.0000
SCOPE Mean 0.2879 0.2997 0.3995 0.3036 0.0000 0.0000
DEALS3YEARS Mean 1.7968 1.3038 1.7270 1.7123 0.0920 0.0000
LOGME Mean 20.1435 20.3757 21.8977 20.3974 0.0000 0.0000
LNIS Mean 6.6044 6.7126 6.5216 6.6107 0.0000 0.0000
TobinsQ Mean 2.1137 2.1754 2.1744 2.1307 0.0460 0.4912
ITobinsQ Mean 2.1045 2.1475 2.1626 2.1184 0.0001 0.2388
ATobinsQ Mean 0.0091 0.0278 0.0118 0.0124 0.4668 0.3430
ROA Mean 0.0525 0.0509 0.0803 0.0557 0.0000 0.0000
IROA Mean -0.0319 -0.0430 -0.0398 -0.0346 0.0000 0.0970
AROA Mean 0.0844 0.0940 0.1201 0.0903 0.0000 0.0000
LEVERAGE Mean 0.2420 0.2091 0.2525 0.2382 0.0014 0.0000
ILEVERAGE Mean 0.2679 0.2489 0.2644 0.2645 0.0036 0.0000
ALEVERAGE Mean -0.0259 -0.0399 -0.0119 -0.0263 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3: Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer and transaction variables by the advisor type
Panel A: Dependent and bank/advisor variables
Table 3 shows the distribution of variables over the types of advisory choices. The last two columns show the t-tests with p-
values and differences between the unadvised (1), non-bulge-bracket  bank advised (2) and bulge-bracket bank (3) advised deals.
Panel B: Bidder variables
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Acquirer advisor tier unadvised non-bulge-bracket bulge-bracket All Bids t-test t-test
N 23,068 4,911 3,975 31,954 p-value p-value
Variable 1 2 3 1 - 3 = 0 2 - 3 = 0
DIVERS Mean 0.4498 0.3604 0.3919 0.4288 0.0000 0.0011
MAJORITY Mean 0.9391 0.9794 0.9665 0.9487 0.0000 0.0001
PUBLIC Mean 0.1348 0.3653 0.4267 0.2065 0.0000 0.0000
RDS Mean 0.1713 0.4632 0.4166 0.2467 0.0000 0.0003
TADVISORTIER Mean 0.3100 0.9597 1.3180 0.5352 0.0000 0.0000
MULTIPLE Mean 1.0126 1.0495 1.0835 1.0271 0.0000 0.0000
ANTITAKEOVER Mean 0.0168 0.0804 0.1074 0.0379 0.0000 0.0000
FAMILY Mean 0.0021 0.0043 0.0070 0.0031 0.0000 0.0399
LITIGATION Mean 0.0075 0.0350 0.0589 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000
REGULATORY Mean 0.2032 0.4970 0.5361 0.2898 0.0000 0.0001
CROSSBORDER Mean 0.0537 0.0872 0.0727 0.0612 0.0000 0.0065
DIVERSIFICATION Mean 0.4293 0.6380 0.7414 0.5002 0.0000 0.0000
TOEHOLD Mean 1.6892 1.7831 3.1553 1.8860 0.0000 0.0000
HIGHTECH Mean 0.2788 0.3221 0.2946 0.2874 0.0203 0.0026
STOCK Mean 0.1572 0.2916 0.2221 0.1859 0.0000 0.0000
CASH Mean 0.2366 0.2429 0.2745 0.2423 0.0000 0.0004
MIXED Mean 0.1625 0.2790 0.2803 0.1951 0.0000 0.4466
OTHER Mean 0.0965 0.0536 0.0719 0.0868 0.0000 0.0002
FIRST Mean 0.3379 0.3470 0.2652 0.3302 0.0000 0.0000
SIXTH Mean 0.2503 0.2004 0.3245 0.2518 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3 (cont.): Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer and transaction variables by the advisor type
Panel C: Transaction variables
Table 3 shows the distribution of variables over the types of advisory choices. The last two columns show the t-tests with p-
values and differences between the unadvised (1), non-bulge-bracket  bank advised (2) and bulge-bracket bank (3) advised deals.
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FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH SIXTH All Bids t-test t-test
Variable N 10,552 5,511 3,515 2,485 1,844 8,047 31,954 1/2 - 5 = 0 1/2 - 6 = 0
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw Mean 0.0179 0.0153 0.0126 0.0125 0.0104 0.0036 0.0124 0.0003 0.0000
GOODADVICE Mean 0.5574 0.5496 0.5346 0.5493 0.5564 0.5136 0.5418 0.4672 0.0000
RESOLSPEED Mean 76.3357 75.5910 75.6621 78.2334 79.4042 79.8034 77.3367 0.1253 0.0111
COMPLETED Mean 0.9321 0.9381 0.9383 0.9485 0.9344 0.9573 0.9416 0.3620 0.0000
ADVISED Mean 0.2614 0.2854 0.2862 0.2966 0.2918 0.2826 0.2781 0.0032 0.0006
ADVISORCHOICE Mean 1.3613 1.3934 1.4097 1.4262 1.4436 1.4429 1.4025 0.0000 0.0000
IEDA Mean 0.0182 0.0204 0.0221 0.0234 0.0247 0.0240 0.0213 0.0000 0.0000
IEDT Mean 0.0181 0.0195 0.0220 0.0220 0.0229 0.0232 0.0206 0.0001 0.0000
IEVA Mean 0.0262 0.0303 0.0344 0.0352 0.0406 0.0446 0.0340 0.0000 0.0000
IEVT Mean 0.0262 0.0300 0.0346 0.0327 0.0390 0.0423 0.0331 0.0000 0.0000
ARSD Mean 0.0000 0.0092 0.0161 0.0212 0.0246 0.0356 0.0154 0.0000 0.0000
ARSV Mean 0.0000 0.0092 0.0161 0.0213 0.0248 0.0360 0.0155 0.0000 0.0000
MS Mean 2.1717 2.5352 2.7440 2.8377 3.2966 3.6579 2.7883 0.0000 0.0000
RELREP Mean 1.9116 2.0385 2.4784 2.3270 2.3756 2.5214 2.2085 0.0480 0.0001
PASTBBCAR Mean 0.0000 0.0127 0.0124 0.0121 0.0112 0.0063 0.0067 0.2039 0.0000
PASTBIDDERCAR Mean 0.0000 0.0192 0.0139 0.0137 0.0119 0.0051 0.0079 0.0006 0.0000
PASTCOMPLETED Mean 0.0000 0.5739 0.6899 0.7183 0.7467 0.7933 0.4736 0.0000 0.0000
PASTGOODADVICE Mean 0.0000 0.3533 0.4074 0.4306 0.4409 0.4388 0.2752 0.0000 0.0000
PASTRESOLSPEED Mean 0.0000 42.4585 48.5516 55.6503 55.3113 61.8276 35.7533 0.0000 0.0000
SCOPE Mean 0.1728 0.2597 0.3141 0.3505 0.3774 0.4694 0.3036 0.0000 0.0000
DEALS3YEARS Mean 0.0000 0.6966 1.2356 1.7404 2.1855 4.7445 1.7123 0.0000 0.0000
LOGME Mean 19.7098 19.9317 20.2171 20.5131 20.6855 21.5949 20.3974 0.0000 0.0000
LNIS Mean 6.5305 6.5548 6.5756 6.5758 6.6113 6.7801 6.6107 0.0003 0.0000
TobinsQ Mean 2.2066 2.2037 2.1086 2.0753 2.0381 2.0293 2.1307 0.0013 0.0000
ITobinsQ Mean 2.0652 2.1235 2.1140 2.1333 2.1284 2.1796 2.1184 0.0032 0.0000
ATobinsQ Mean 0.1414 0.0802 -0.0054 -0.0580 -0.0903 -0.1503 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000
ROA Mean 0.0339 0.0513 0.0614 0.0723 0.0736 0.0755 0.0557 0.0000 0.0000
IROA Mean -0.0284 -0.0324 -0.0348 -0.0349 -0.0341 -0.0443 -0.0346 0.0177 0.0000
AROA Mean 0.0623 0.0838 0.0961 0.1072 0.1078 0.1198 0.0903 0.0000 0.0000
LEVERAGE Mean 0.2194 0.2207 0.2303 0.2412 0.2509 0.2747 0.2382 0.0000 0.0000
ILEVERAGE Mean 0.2627 0.2626 0.2640 0.2655 0.2660 0.2679 0.2645 0.0456 0.0000
ALEVERAGE Mean -0.0433 -0.0419 -0.0338 -0.0243 -0.0151 0.0068 -0.0263 0.0000 0.0000
Panel C: Distribution of the bidder variables
Panel B: Distribution of the bank variables
Table 4: Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer, and transaction variables between the bids
Table 4 shows the distribution of variables over the bids/acquisitions of the acquisit ion sequences. The last column shows the t-tests and p-
values between the first (1) or second (2) and fifths (5) or sixths and higher bids (6). The variables are summarized in table 2 and described
in the stat ist ical appendix in table C.
Panel A: Distribution of the dependent and bank variables
bids in the sequence
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FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH SIXTH All Bids t-test t-test
Variable N 10,552 5,511 3,515 2,485 1,844 8,047 31,954 1 - 5 = 0 1 - 6 = 0
DIVERS Mean 0.4182 0.4242 0.4202 0.4266 0.4387 0.4481 0.4288 0.0500 0.0000
MAJORITY Mean 0.9542 0.9497 0.9462 0.9433 0.9501 0.9432 0.9487 0.2190 0.0003
PUBLIC Mean 0.1724 0.1878 0.2040 0.2040 0.2104 0.2652 0.2065 0.0000 0.0000
RDS Mean 0.3076 0.2758 0.2512 0.2128 0.2111 0.1635 0.2467 0.0000 0.0000
TADVISORTIER Mean 0.4418 0.4936 0.5272 0.5590 0.5857 0.6709 0.5352 0.0000 0.0000
MULTIPLE Mean 1.0223 1.0245 1.0296 1.0217 1.0298 1.0352 1.0271 0.0624 0.0000
ANTITAKEOVER Mean 0.0235 0.0357 0.0367 0.0382 0.0401 0.0580 0.0379 0.0000 0.0000
FAMILY Mean 0.0030 0.0034 0.0037 0.0028 0.0049 0.0022 0.0031 0.1011 0.1496
LITIGATION Mean 0.0158 0.0187 0.0174 0.0177 0.0141 0.0221 0.0181 0.2903 0.0008
REGULATORY Mean 0.2380 0.2593 0.2799 0.2954 0.3118 0.3760 0.2898 0.0000 0.0000
CROSSBORDER Mean 0.0831 0.0686 0.0617 0.0604 0.0521 0.0295 0.0612 0.0000 0.0000
DIVERSIFICATION Mean 0.4601 0.4886 0.5029 0.5386 0.5274 0.5415 0.5002 0.0000 0.0000
TOEHOLD Mean 1.5406 2.0898 2.0169 2.1151 2.1728 2.0058 1.8860 0.0047 0.0007
HIGHTECH Mean 0.2819 0.2999 0.2979 0.2869 0.2777 0.2838 0.2874 0.3531 0.3881
STOCK Mean 0.1757 0.1909 0.1866 0.1710 0.1638 0.2053 0.1859 0.1063 0.0000
CASH Mean 0.2079 0.2419 0.2444 0.2523 0.2619 0.2790 0.2423 0.0000 0.0000
MIXED Mean 0.1966 0.2012 0.2171 0.2020 0.2088 0.1739 0.1951 0.1139 0.0000
OTHER Mean 0.1344 0.0962 0.0765 0.0724 0.0575 0.0337 0.0868 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4 (cont.): Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer, and transaction variables between the bids
Panel D: Distribution of the transaction variables
bids in the sequence
 
2.6 Multivariate analyses of advisor selection and acquisition performance 
 
The multivariate analyses are preceded by the analysis of potential outliers. The 
multivariate outlier analysis is done with the Mahalanobis Distance D² measure 
(Bar-Hen & Daudin, 1995; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998; Mahalanobis, 
1936). The Mahalanobis Distance D² measure is used, because an acquisition or 
bid might not be identified as an outlier with respect to each individual variable. 
The extreme combination of two or more variables however might move the 
observation beyond the sphere of the multivariate normal distribution around the 
centroid. The centroid is the focal point of the average combination of variables, 
the representative observation. The Mahalanobis Distance D² rescales variables 
42 
 
such that the distance of the variables’ values to the centroid becomes measurable 
and comparable on a common scale. No deals are excluded at the 1% and 0.1% 
confidence levels. 
First the selection regressions whether the deal is advised and of the advisor type 
choice are shown in table 5. Comparable to previous observations of (Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996) and (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) a good past acquisition decision of 
the bidder reduces the likelihood that his current bid is advised. More profitable 
bidders with larger investment opportunity sets are more likely to be advised, 
because banks expect to be hired in successive transactions (McLaughlin, 1990; 
1992; Hunter & Walker, 1990). The exclusion restriction SCOPE is significant 
because of bidders’ familiarity from prior underwriter relationships with advising 
banks (Li & Prabhala, 2007; Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). 
Similar to the univariate analysis in table 3 a higher ranking advisor choice is 
associated with more complex and larger transactions. If the target hires a higher 
ranking bank advisor itself, the bidder is more likely to hire a higher ranking bank 
advisor, too. The relatively larger the transaction is compared to the bidder’s 
market value of equity the more likely is he employing a higher ranking advising 
bank as well. Regulatory issues and aspects of the deal that make negotiating more 
complex as well as the method of payment are associated with the selection of a 
bank advisor, particularly a more reputable one, as well. From the analysis in tables 
3 and 5 it follows that one ought to control for the differences in transaction 
characteristics between the advisor choices, which is shown in the following 
analysis. 
The influence of the decision whether to hire a bank as advisor, particularly a non-
bulge-bracket or bulge-bracket bank, given the advising banks’ expertise and 
advisory relationship strength on the announcement returns are estimated in table 
6. Without selection control in fixed effects panel regression (1) the industry 
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expertise is insignificant, which is observed by (Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 
2013) as well. The selection models are explained in econometric appendix E.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit FE panel probit FE panel probit FE panel probit
PASTBIDDERCAR -0.0326
(-0.690)
PASTGOODADVICE -0.2117***
(-28.161)
PASTCOMPLETED -0.2990***
(-39.178)
PASTRESOLSPEED -0.0007***
(-16.078)
TADVISORTIER 0.1478*** 0.1378*** 0.1275*** 0.1467***
(29.485) (28.257) (26.571) (29.403)
SCOPE 0.0246*** 0.0317*** 0.0346*** 0.0274***
(2.736) (3.656) (4.075) (3.072)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0070*** -0.0038** 0.0030** -0.0054***
(-4.384) (-2.499) (2.047) (-3.392)
ATobinsQ 0.0012 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0005
(0.458) (0.007) (-1.486) (0.191)
AROA 0.0982** 0.1161*** 0.1388*** 0.1070***
(2.390) (2.924) (3.574) (2.630)
ALEVERAGE 0.0293 0.0372 0.0512 0.0338
(0.886) (1.164) (1.644) (1.031)
SIXTH -0.0223** -0.0153 0.0134 -0.0128
(-2.252) (-1.598) (1.408) (-1.302)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 6,341.87 6,267.59 6,134.58 6,412.59
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.3317 0.3197 0.3130 0.3242
Chi²-statistic γ=0 332.65 430.14 481.95 414.71
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5 panel A shows the selection regressions whether the deal is advised. The dependent variable is ADVISED. ADVISED is a dummy
(0/1) and 1 if the deal is advised by a bank. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in table C.
The coefficients are the marginal probability effects at the mean. The standard errors of the Chamberlain random effects panel probit
models are based on the observed information matrix (OIM), the inverse Hessian, after maximum likelihood estimation (Efron & Hinkley,
1978). Fixed effects based on the (Mundlak, 1978) version of (Chamberlain, 1980) fixed effects assumption are included but not reported
(Wooldridge, 2002a, 2002b). Year fixed effects and a constant are included but not reported. Diagnostic statistics of the models' Chi2
statistic of significance, the correlation of the fixed effects ci with explanatory variables xit and the Chi
2-statistic of significance of fixed
effects' regressor γ=0 are shown.
Table 5: Regressions of bidders' advisor choice
ADVISED
Panel A: Probit analysis 
whether the deal is advised
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit FE panel probit FE panel probit FE panel probit
DIVERS -0.0135* -0.0113 -0.0086 -0.0144*
(-1.696) (-1.465) (-1.135) (-1.814)
MAJORITY 0.0805*** 0.0740*** 0.0709*** 0.0722***
(4.879) (4.657) (4.563) (4.417)
HOSTILE 0.0946*** 0.0799** 0.0798*** 0.0822**
(2.915) (2.551) (2.601) (2.548)
ANTITAKEOVER 0.0691*** 0.0619*** 0.0536*** 0.0702***
(4.256) (3.981) (3.581) (4.305)
FAMILY 0.0022 0.0039 -0.0068 -0.0033
(0.044) (0.084) (-0.149) (-0.067)
LITIGATION 0.0865*** 0.0896*** 0.0934*** 0.0860***
(3.482) (3.783) (4.050) (3.456)
REGULATORY 0.1129*** 0.1061*** 0.0969*** 0.1117***
(13.856) (13.456) (12.582) (13.767)
CROSSBORDER -0.0998 -0.0581 -0.0271 -0.1055
(-0.955) (-0.579) (-0.284) (-1.011)
TOEHOLD 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0010***
(3.226) (3.968) (4.010) (3.498)
HIGHTECH 0.0077 0.0090 0.0036 0.0075
(0.451) (0.543) (0.221) (0.439)
DIVERSIFICATION 0.0395*** 0.0363*** 0.0364*** 0.0380***
(6.508) (6.208) (6.346) (6.307)
MULTIPLE -0.0391** -0.0308** -0.0210 -0.0360**
(-2.513) (-2.062) (-1.443) (-2.319)
RDS 0.2137*** 0.1915*** 0.1649*** 0.2063***
(23.470) (21.861) (19.500) (22.799)
LNIS 0.0181 0.0265 0.0545** 0.0453
(0.604) (0.927) (1.993) (1.508)
PUBLIC 0.0823*** 0.0732*** 0.0617*** 0.0813***
(9.240) (8.548) (7.401) (9.137)
STOCK 0.1418*** 0.1361*** 0.1263*** 0.1420***
(12.665) (12.597) (11.933) (12.740)
CASH 0.0658*** 0.0668*** 0.0636*** 0.0667***
(7.001) (7.333) (7.094) (7.145)
MIXED 0.1756*** 0.1696*** 0.1574*** 0.1766***
(16.858) (16.745) (15.720) (17.056)
OTHER 0.0868*** 0.0721*** 0.0566*** 0.0809***
(5.492) (4.800) (3.922) (5.180)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 6,341.87 6,267.59 6,134.58 6,412.59
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.3317 0.3197 0.3130 0.3242
Chi²-statistic γ=0 332.65 430.14 481.95 414.71
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5 (cont.): Regressions of bidders' advisor choice
ADVISED
Panel A: Probit analysis 
whether the deal is advised
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel tobit FE panel tobit FE panel tobit FE panel tobit
PASTBIDDERCAR 0.0167
(0.048)
PASTGOODADVICE -1.6054***
(-26.815)
PASTCOMPLETED -2.1699***
(-39.900)
PASTRESOLSPEED -0.0046***
(-14.250)
TADVISORTIER 1.1756*** 1.1254*** 1.0365*** 1.1679***
(31.522) (30.774) (29.311) (31.501)
SCOPE 0.2127*** 0.2682*** 0.2897*** 0.2302***
(3.171) (4.054) (4.490) (3.457)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0484*** -0.0262** 0.0157 -0.0376***
(-3.981) (-2.231) (1.394) (-3.144)
ATobinsQ -0.0136 -0.0223 -0.0473** -0.0185
(-0.705) (-1.184) (-2.563) (-0.968)
AROA 0.7044** 0.8602*** 0.9826*** 0.7762**
(2.239) (2.762) (3.225) (2.483)
ALEVERAGE 0.1799 0.2303 0.2744 0.1994
(0.726) (0.941) (1.150) (0.811)
SIXTH -0.1264* -0.0838 0.0594 -0.0708
(-1.712) (-1.147) (0.825) (-0.964)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 4,332.18 4,552.17 4,875.92 4,415.88
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.2359 0.2309 0.2234 0.2349
Chi²-statistic γ=0 343.35 447.27 523.62 396.17
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5 panel B shows the selection regressions of the advisor choice. The dependent variable is ADVISORCHOICE.
ADVISORCHOICE is 1 if the deal is unadvised, 2 if the lead advisor is a non-bulge-bracket bank and 3 if the lead advisor is
a bulge-bracket bank. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the appendix in table C. The standard errors
of the fixed effects tobit panel regressions are based on the observed information matrix (OIM), the inverse Hessian, after
maximum likelihood estimation (Efron & Hinkley, 1978). Fixed effects based on the (Mundlak, 1978) version of
(Chamberlain, 1980) assumption are included but not reported (Wooldridge, 2002a, 2002b). Year fixed effects and a
constant are included but not reported. Diagnostic statistics of the models' Chi2-statistic of significance, the correlation of
the fixed effects ci with explanatory variables xit and the Chi
2-statist ic of significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are
shown.
Table 5 (cont.): Regressions of the advisor choice
ADVISORCHOICE
Panel B: Tobit regressions of 
advisor choice
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel tobit FE panel tobit FE panel tobit FE panel tobit
DIVERS -0.0884 -0.0733 -0.0472 -0.0921
(-1.478) (-1.240) (-0.816) (-1.549)
MAJORITY 0.5526*** 0.5173*** 0.4784*** 0.5011***
(4.376) (4.139) (3.907) (3.995)
HOSTILE 0.5623*** 0.4575** 0.4656** 0.5076**
(2.662) (2.218) (2.343) (2.423)
ANTITAKEOVER 0.4581*** 0.4171*** 0.3781*** 0.4476***
(4.090) (3.819) (3.601) (4.009)
FAMILY 0.2228 0.2656 0.1728 0.1918
(0.611) (0.748) (0.502) (0.529)
LITIGATION 0.4823*** 0.5259*** 0.4861*** 0.4397***
(2.890) (3.235) (3.096) (2.646)
REGULATORY 0.7927*** 0.7510*** 0.6673*** 0.7818***
(13.143) (12.653) (11.569) (13.020)
CROSSBORDER -0.9432 -0.6638 -0.3991 -0.9235
(-1.229) (-0.878) (-0.547) (-1.203)
TOEHOLD 0.0097*** 0.0111*** 0.0112*** 0.0103***
(4.334) (5.014) (5.244) (4.622)
HIGHTECH -0.0422 -0.0340 -0.0717 -0.0471
(-0.324) (-0.263) (-0.563) (-0.363)
DIVERSIFICATION 0.2439*** 0.2199*** 0.2102*** 0.2321***
(5.451) (4.990) (4.889) (5.222)
MULTIPLE -0.2405** -0.1961* -0.1381 -0.2085**
(-2.279) (-1.905) (-1.393) (-1.985)
RDS 1.1906*** 1.0686*** 0.8857*** 1.1373***
(20.074) (18.414) (15.800) (19.301)
LNIS 0.0579 0.1058 0.3106 0.2248
(0.256) (0.477) (1.451) (0.992)
PUBLIC 0.4989*** 0.4480*** 0.3726*** 0.4928***
(7.685) (7.037) (6.032) (7.614)
STOCK 1.0765*** 1.0530*** 0.9837*** 1.0773***
(12.646) (12.526) (11.978) (12.706)
CASH 0.5369*** 0.5476*** 0.5149*** 0.5420***
(7.447) (7.653) (7.330) (7.562)
MIXED 1.3704*** 1.3446*** 1.2328*** 1.3744***
(17.386) (17.233) (16.140) (17.527)
OTHER 0.7156*** 0.6141*** 0.5127*** 0.6814***
(5.959) (5.217) (4.490) (5.714)
Constant -2.1648** -1.6032 -1.0999 -2.0939**
(-2.127) (-1.643) (-1.199) (-2.086)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 4,332.18 4,552.17 4,875.92 4,415.88
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.2359 0.2309 0.2234 0.2349
Chi²-statistic γ=0 343.35 447.27 523.62 396.17
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5 (cont.): Regressions of the advisor choice
ADVISORCHOICE
Panel B: Tobit regressions of 
advisor choice
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The regression show that the industry expertise by deals of the bidder’s advising 
bank has a significantly positive influence on the bidder’s announcement returns if 
one controls for selection in panel and pooled models. The selection indicator 
ADVISORCHOICE in fixed effects panel regression (3) is insignificant itself but 
positively correlated with industry expertise IEDT and advisory relationships 
strength ARSD that are nonzero in advised deals only (Nijman & Verbeek, 1992; 
Verbeek & Nijman, 1992). Therefore, the endogenous selection indicator 
ADVISORCHOICE is instrumented on the transaction variables shown in table 5 
in instrumental variables (IV) fixed effects panel regression (4). IV panel 
regression (4) shows that the selection of higher ranking bank advisors, which on 
average have a greater industry expertise, is associated with significantly smaller 
announcement returns. The smaller announcement returns in bank advised deals 
are caused by advised deals’ greater complexity and transaction costs, which is 
shown in table 3.  
Controlling for selection with a classic (Heckman, 1976; 1979) pooled selection 
model similar to (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012), (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 
2003) and others regression (5) shows similarly to IV panel regression (4) that 
bidders’ decision to hire a bank advisor and announcement returns are not 
exogenous but related. The empirical observations between the IV panel regression 
and the pooled (Heckman, 1976; 1979) regression differ, because the IV fixed 
effects panel regression takes the time series component of the panel and fixed 
effects into account. The transaction, bidder and advisory characteristics change 
along the acquisition sequence, which is shown in table 4.  
The economic effect of advisors’ average industry expertise in the target’s industry 
of 0.1355 0.0206 0.0028× =  or 0.28 percentage points indicates a 
0.0028 0.0124 0.2251=  or 22.52% larger announcement return. 878,000,000
dollar is the bidders’ median market value of equity two days before the 
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announcement date. The increase in equity value for the average bidder who hires 
an average investment bank is 878,000,000 0.0028 2, 458, 400× =  dollar in 
addition to the average equity increase of 878,000,000 0.0124 10,887, 200× =  
dollar. Hiring a bank that has advised on more deal in the target’s industry in the 
last three years, which increases its average industry expertise IEDT by 0.0185, 
pays for the bidder in terms of a 0.1355 0.0185 0.0025× =  or 0.25 percentage 
points higher announcement return. The one deal greater target industry expertise 
denotes an equity gain of 878,000,000 0.0025 2,195,000× =  dollar for the bidder. 
For the bidder it is beneficial to hire an investment bank as advisor with more 
expertise.  
The significant negative correlation of the advisory relationship strength with the 
bidder’s returns arises from the observation in table 4 that along the acquisition 
sequence the announcement returns decrease whereas the average advisory 
relationship strength increases, because familiar banks are more likely to be hired 
in later acquisitions. (Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, & Saunders, 2004) have found a 
negative bidder-bank relationship as well. In the cross section shown in table 3 the 
advisory relationship strength is stronger for bulge-bracket bank advised deals that 
have smaller returns due to the deal’s greater complexity compared to unadvised 
deals with larger returns and a missing advisory relationship strength, which results 
in a negative correlation of the advisory relationship strength with the returns, too. 
The negative correlation between the advisory relationship and the bidder’s returns 
vanishes if one controls for the advisor choice in IV fixed effects regression (4). In 
regression (2) on the subsample of advised deals the negative correlation of ARSD 
with the CARs vanishes as well. Again controlling for selection is necessary.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES FE panel reg FE panel reg FE panel reg IV panel reg Heckman
IEDT 0.0135 0.0263* 0.0216* 0.1355*** 0.0301***
(1.358) (1.925) (1.729) (4.156) (2.640)
ARSD -0.0142** -0.0091 -0.0137** -0.0080 -0.0144**
(-2.511) (-1.244) (-2.390) (-1.243) (-2.379)
ADVISORCHOICE -0.0011 -0.0167***
(-0.915) (-4.353)
PASTBBCAR_(-2,2) -0.0634* -0.2363*** -0.0634* -0.0632** 0.3288***
(-1.958) (-7.247) (-1.960) (-2.005) (3.913)
ATobinsQ 0.0017** 0.0040** 0.0017** 0.0019** 0.0012
(2.195) (2.287) (2.191) (2.215) (1.332)
AROA -0.0219** -0.0571** -0.0218** -0.0207* -0.0053
(-2.081) (-2.120) (-2.073) (-1.919) (-0.613)
ALEVERAGE -0.0084 -0.0054 -0.0083 -0.0091 0.0165**
(-1.186) (-0.298) (-1.183) (-1.261) (2.387)
LNIS 0.0019 0.0099 0.0019 0.0009 -0.0080***
(0.397) (0.723) (0.385) (0.180) (-6.826)
SIXTH -0.0043** -0.0080* -0.0043** -0.0059*** -0.0047
(-2.403) (-1.696) (-2.420) (-3.326) (-1.433)
LOGME -0.0091*** -0.0129*** -0.0091*** -0.0106*** -0.0058***
(-7.405) (-3.808) (-7.395) (-9.238) (-8.989)
Constant 0.1665*** 0.2049* 0.1681*** 0.2224*** 0.1580***
(3.904) (1.893) (3.945) (5.399) (7.381)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes No No
Instrumented No No No ADVISORCHOICE ADVISED
N 31,954 8,886 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 4,164 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-/F-statistic 7.53 4.92 7.42 272.61 250.91
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of selection 28.32
p-value of selection test 0.0000
Table 6: Regressions of serial bidders' announcement returns
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw
Robust z- & t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6 shows the primary regressions of the announcement returns. The dependent variables are the winsorized CARs
from -2 to +2 trading days around the M&A announcement, calculated with the Beta-1 Model and the CRSP value-
weighted index. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statist ical appendix in table C. The standard
errors of fixed effects panel regressions (1) to (3) and pooled (Heckman, 1976, 1979) model (5) are corrected with the
Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The standard errors of
instrumental variable (IV) fixed effects panel regression (4) are corrected by bootstrapping with 200 repetit ions clustered
by acquirers (Mooney & Duval, 1993; Efron, 1979; Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003). ADVISED in
(Heckman, 1976, 1979) model (5) is instrumented on regression equation (1) in table 5 panel A. ADVISORCHOICE in IV
panel regression (4) is instrumented on regression equation (1) in table 5 panel B. Regression (2) is estimated on the
subsample of advised transactions. Year fixed effects and transaction variables are included but not reported. 
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In line with the neoclassical theory of M&As bidders with many investment 
opportunities compared to their industry make more profitable acquisitions. The 
influence of the past announcement returns on the current bid’s announcement 
returns is positive if controlling for selection with the pooled (Heckman, 1976; 
1979) model. Contrary to (Bao & Edmans, 2011) serial bidders hunt performance, 
because the retention of a bank advisor with a good past performance is beneficial 
for the bidder in the current bid in terms of higher returns. 
In the fixed effects panel regressions the past performance is negatively correlated 
with the current bid’s announcement returns, because over time the announcement 
returns decrease as serial bidders’ exploit their investment opportunities. The most 
profitable targets in the bidders’ sets of investment opportunities are acquired first, 
such that the negative correlation of returns over time is in line with the empirical 
observations of (Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007), (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002) 
and the learning hypothesis of (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011). The difference in 
the regression coefficients between the fixed effects panel regression and the 
pooled (Heckman, 1976; 1979) model are the fixed effects. The serial bidder 
specific and time constant average past bidder-bank CAR(-2,2) of 0.0067 is 
positive, whereas the deviation from the time constant mean captured by the fixed 
effects panel regressions’ coefficients is negative over time. The pooled estimator’s 
regression coefficient captures the positive time constant mean past performance 
and its negative deviation over time, with the positive average effect prevailing 
over its deviation. 
The sensitivity analyses of different specifications of serial acquirers’ cumulative 
abnormal returns are shown in panels A and B of table 7. The empirical positive 
correlation of the bidder’s advising bank’s expertise in the target’s industry with 
the announcement returns is independent of the returns’ computation, and larger 
for CAPM based CARs. Estimating the effect of advising banks on bidders’ returns 
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with pooled (Heckman, 1976; 1979) selection models the empirical observations 
are similar to regression (5) in table 6, with the tables being available upon request. 
The sensitivity analysis of alternative skill and reputation measures shown in table 
8 is comparable to (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). A higher market share MS of the 
acquirer’s advising bank is associated with higher announcement returns if 
selection effects are considered. The economic effect at the mean of market share 
MS of 0.0003 2.7883 0.0008× = to 0.0013 2.7883 0.0036× =  or 0.08 to 0.36 
percentage points is similar to the effect of expertise in the target’s primary 
industry. The positive effect of the tier of the target advisor in the pooled 
(Heckman, 1976; 1979) model is contrary to the effect observed by (Golubov, 
Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). The economic effect, if significant, of hiring an 
advising bank with a larger market share than the target’s advisor (RELREP) is at 
the mean 0.0002 2.2085 0.0004× = or 0.04 percentage points in regression (6). The 
effect is driven by large outliers of few bulge-bracket bank advisors with larger 
market shares MS that are divided by market shares of 0.1 of targets’ non-bulge-
bracket bank advisors.   
The dollar value definitions of expertise IEVT in the target’s industry and advisory 
relationship strength ARSV provide empirical observations similar to the deal 
based definitions if one controls for selection, which is presented in table 9. The 
industry expertise and advisory relationship strength by dollar deal value are more 
skewed towards bulge-bracket banks. The skewness of the variables requires 
controlling of selection more than for the less skewed deal number defined 
variables. 
The alternative approximation of a good advisory performance by the chosen 
investment bank on the bidder’s side with the dummy GOODADVICE exhibits a 
positive correlation with the bank’s industry expertise in the target’s industry as 
well, shown in table 10. A one deal increase in banks’ target industry expertise is 
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associated with a 0.6374 0.0185 0.0118× =  or 1.18 percentage points higher 
probability to receive good advice, or a relative improvement of 
0.0118 0.5418 0.0218=  or 2.18%. A one standard deviation increase in banks’ 
target industry expertise is related to a 0.6374 0.0532 0.0339× = or 3.39 percentage 
points higher probability to receive good advice, or a relative improvement of 
0.0339 0.4983 0.0681=  or 6.81% compared to a standard deviation of 49.83% of 
GOODADVICE. Past good advice by the same investment bank, a higher 
abnormal Tobin’s Q, leverage and profitability are significantly positively 
correlated with the probability to receive good advice, to make a good acquisition 
decision, as well. 
The sensitivity analysis of the correlation of the SDC League Table market share 
MS and RELREP as skill and reputation proxies used in previous studies on 
GOODADVICE is shown in table 11. A one standard deviation increase in the 
acquirer’s advisor’s market share MS is associated with an increase in the 
probability to receive good advice of 0.0072 7.5363 0.0543× =  or a 5.43% 
percentage points improvement, which is compared to the standard deviation of 
GOODADVICE a relative improvement of 0.0543 0.4983 0.1089=  or 10.89%. 
The relative reputation has an economic effect of one standard deviation increase 
of 0.0007 11.4739 0.0080× = or 0.80 percentage points higher probability, which is 
a relative effect of 0.0080 0.4983 0.0161=  or 1.61%. Different to the empirical 
observation of (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) the target advisor’s reputation is mostly 
insignificant. 
The dollar deal value based definition of the industry expertise and advisory 
relationship strength have a similar effect on the probability to complete a value 
increasing transaction or to withdraw from a value destroying deal if one controls 
for selection, which is presented in table 12. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(-1, 1) (-3, 3) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3)
VARIABLES
IEDT 0.1317*** 0.1399*** 0.1218*** 0.1251*** 0.1258***
(4.594) (3.938) (4.448) (4.215) (4.030)
ARSD -0.0027 -0.0111 -0.0037 -0.0081 -0.0121*
(-0.410) (-1.429) (-0.660) (-1.301) (-1.860)
PASTBBCAR_(*,*) -0.0789** -0.0309 -0.0938** -0.0763** -0.0385
(-2.141) (-0.942) (-2.222) (-2.262) (-1.326)
ADVISORCHOICE -0.0169*** -0.0168*** -0.0157*** -0.0154*** -0.0151***
(-5.111) (-4.098) (-4.926) (-4.627) (-4.107)
ATobinsQ 0.0010 0.0016* 0.0010 0.0019** 0.0016*
(1.472) (1.930) (1.578) (2.261) (1.946)
AROA -0.0136 -0.0167 -0.0154* -0.0212** -0.0175
(-1.297) (-1.286) (-1.728) (-2.021) (-1.407)
ALEVERAGE -0.0093 -0.0015 -0.0124** -0.0126* -0.0048
(-1.539) (-0.198) (-1.983) (-1.804) (-0.652)
LNIS -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0017 0.0019 0.0004
(-0.394) (-0.157) (-0.439) (0.399) (0.076)
SIXTH -0.0044*** -0.0059*** -0.0037** -0.0049*** -0.0043**
(-2.732) (-2.953) (-2.408) (-2.756) (-2.436)
LOGME -0.0080*** -0.0133*** -0.0081*** -0.0107*** -0.0134***
(-7.910) (-9.326) (-7.605) (-10.043) (-9.457)
Constant 0.2008*** 0.2974*** 0.1995*** 0.2163*** 0.2855***
(5.920) (6.283) (6.129) (5.651) (6.549)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumented
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 267.31 303.36 201.67 335.29 358.29
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis of alternative CARs
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7 panel A shows the sensit ivity analysis for CARs calculated with the Beta-1 Model. The dependent
variables are winsorized cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) estimated with the Beta-1 model. The CARs differ in
the CRSP index used as market proxy and in the estimation window around the announcement date (t=0).
ADVISORCHOICE serves as selection indicator in the IV panel models and is instrumented on the transaction
variables shown in table 5 panel B (Vella, 1998; Heckman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002a). PASTBBCAR is the CAR,
similar to the dependent variable, of the previous deal advised by the same bank, the bank-bidder pairing, or of the
previous unadvised deal if the current one is unadvised as well. The variables are summarized in table 2 and
described in the statist ical appendix in table C. The standard errors of the IV panel regressions are corrected by
bootstrapping with 200 repetit ions clustered by acquirers (Mooney & Duval, 1993; Efron, 1979; Adkins & Hill,
2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. 
value-weighted equally-weighted
Panel A: Alternative CARs 
based on the Beta-1 Model
ADVISORCHOICE
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3)
VARIABLES
IEDT 0.1343*** 0.1444*** 0.1578*** 0.1255*** 0.1343*** 0.1404***
(4.827) (5.023) (4.828) (4.756) (4.592) (4.664)
ARSD -0.0016 -0.0057 -0.0088 -0.0024 -0.0045 -0.0083
(-0.246) (-0.911) (-1.220) (-0.374) (-0.713) (-1.208)
PASTBBCAR_(*,*) -0.0640* -0.0606* -0.0150 -0.0790** -0.0779** -0.0287
(-1.679) (-1.762) (-0.408) (-2.076) (-2.069) (-0.775)
ADVISORCHOICE -0.0172*** -0.0180*** -0.0193*** -0.0163*** -0.0170*** -0.0175***
(-5.277) (-5.379) (-5.283) (-5.371) (-4.935) (-5.363)
ATobinsQ -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0014* -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0008
(-0.367) (-1.059) (-1.726) (-0.324) (-0.590) (-1.023)
AROA -0.0146* -0.0238** -0.0214* -0.0172** -0.0255** -0.0271***
(-1.738) (-2.281) (-1.871) (-2.001) (-2.521) (-2.607)
ALEVERAGE -0.0067 -0.0081 0.0001 -0.0095* -0.0103 -0.0036
(-1.125) (-1.226) (0.012) (-1.686) (-1.559) (-0.535)
LNIS -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0051 -0.0021 0.0003 -0.0017
(-0.682) (-0.437) (-0.971) (-0.550) (0.055) (-0.335)
SIXTH -0.0034** -0.0041** -0.0038* -0.0027** -0.0030* -0.0022
(-2.422) (-2.530) (-1.930) (-1.963) (-1.790) (-1.211)
LOGME -0.0062*** -0.0077*** -0.0095*** -0.0065*** -0.0079*** -0.0099***
(-6.031) (-7.032) (-7.288) (-6.577) (-6.945) (-7.541)
Constant 0.1720*** 0.1891*** 0.2545*** 0.1719*** 0.1785*** 0.2370***
(5.228) (4.249) (5.609) (5.267) (4.362) (5.947)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumented
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 227.08 279.03 224.98 276.80 259.59 285.17
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 7 (cont.): Sensitivity analysis of alternative CARs
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7 panel B shows the sensitivity analysis for CARs calculated with the CAPM. The dependent variables are winsorized
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) est imated with the CAPM from -270 to -21 trading days before the announcement (t=0). The
CARs differ in the CRSP index used as market proxy and in the estimation window around the announcement date (t=0).
ADVISORCHOICE serves as select ion indicator in the IV panel models and is instrumented on the transact ion variables shown in
table 5 panel B (Vella, 1998; Heckman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002a). PASTBBCAR is the CAR, similar to the dependent variable, of
the previous deal advised by the same bank, the bank-bidder pairing, or of the previous unadvised deal if the current one is
unadvised as well. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in table C. The standard errors
of the IV panel regressions are corrected by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions clustered by acquirers (Mooney & Duval, 1993;
Efron, 1979; Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003). Year fixed effects are included but  not reported. 
value-weighted equally-weighted
Panel B: Alternative CARs 
based on the CAPM
ADVISORCHOICE
 
The simple selection correction whether the deal is advised or not with the biprobit 
model with selection does not control for the effect of skewness of IEVT and 
ARSV and random or fixed effects (Greene, 2008b; 2008a). The selection indicator 
ADVISORCHOICE that distinguishes between non-bulge-bracket bank and bulge-
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bracket bank advised deals is better suited to control for selection and the skewness 
of IEVT and ARSV in the IV probit regressions. The (Mundlak, 1978) fixed 
effects are excluded, because they are highly correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The regression coefficients of the explanatory variables therefore explain 
mostly the bidder specific but time constant effects and less the changes over time. 
A one deal increase in IEVT is expected to increase the probability of a good 
merger decision by 0.2742 0.0146 0.0040× =  or 0.40 percentage points. The 
relative improvement is 0.0040 0.5418 0.0074= or 0.74%. Hiring a bank with a 
one standard deviation better IEVT is likely to improve the probability of good 
advice by 0.2742 0.0939 0.0257× = or 2.57 percentage points. The relative 
improvement compared to the standard deviation is 0.0257 0.4983 0.0517= or 
5.17%. The economic effects are comparable to the deal number based measures of 
the advising bank’s target industry expertise.  
Finally the time until the bid is resolved, withdrawn or completed, and the 
probability of deal completion similar to (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003), (Rau, 2000), 
(Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012), and (Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013) 
is tested with respect to the potentially positive influence of the industry expertise 
of the bidder’s advising bank and the strength of the advisory relationship. Table 
13 shows that more experienced banks who know the bidder better are executing 
the transaction faster. The fact that private transactions are usually announced 
when they are completed is controlled with the dummy PUBLIC (Officer, Poulsen, 
& Stegemoller, 2009). Limiting the analysis to public deals only the effects are 
stronger.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE panel reg Heckman IV panel reg FE panel reg Heckman IV panel reg
MS 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0013***
(0.295) (3.508) (2.982)
TADVISORTIER -0.0002 0.0183*** 0.0018
(-0.276) (3.060) (1.184)
RELREP 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0002***
(1.792) (0.248) (3.169)
ARSD -0.0128** -0.0156*** -0.0010 -0.0135** -0.0129** -0.0040
(-2.291) (-2.619) (-0.130) (-2.438) (-2.146) (-0.628)
PASTBBCAR_(-2,2) -0.0631* 0.3572*** -0.0552 -0.0631* 0.3295*** -0.0615*
(-1.948) (3.917) (-1.623) (-1.948) (3.906) (-1.691)
ADVISORCHOICE -0.0224*** -0.0093***
(-3.114) (-4.115)
ATobinsQ 0.0017** 0.0014 0.0019** 0.0017** 0.0012 0.0019**
(2.198) (1.579) (2.184) (2.210) (1.317) (2.420)
AROA -0.0219** -0.0000 -0.0219* -0.0219** -0.0060 -0.0216*
(-2.088) (-0.003) (-1.943) (-2.089) (-0.699) (-1.848)
ALEVERAGE -0.0084 0.0152** -0.0088 -0.0083 0.0172** -0.0092
(-1.185) (2.173) (-1.260) (-1.181) (2.500) (-1.218)
LNIS 0.0020 -0.0075*** 0.0021 0.0020 -0.0081*** 0.0013
(0.405) (-6.293) (0.436) (0.413) (-6.957) (0.275)
SIXTH -0.0043** -0.0065** -0.0062*** -0.0043** -0.0048 -0.0059***
(-2.419) (-1.975) (-3.424) (-2.410) (-1.457) (-3.276)
LOGME -0.0091*** -0.0073*** -0.0108*** -0.0091*** -0.0056*** -0.0106***
(-7.396) (-10.064) (-8.726) (-7.420) (-8.795) (-8.505)
Constant 0.1646*** 0.1263*** 0.1771*** 0.1649*** 0.1546*** 0.2033***
(3.867) (4.876) (3.777) (3.870) (7.262) (5.093)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Transaction characteristics Yes No No Yes No No
Instrumented No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
F-/Chi²-statistic 7.52 252.56 248.20 7.71 245.87 288.37
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of selection 16.25 26.94
p-value of selection test 0.0001 0.0000
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis of skill and reputation variables
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8 shows the sensitivity analysis of the approximation of skill and reputation by the advisor's market share MS, target advisor's tier
TADVISORTIER and thei relative reputation RELREP. The dependent variables are winsorized cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
estimated with the Beta-1 model over the interval (-2, 2) around the announcement date (t=0). ADVISORCHOICE serves as selection
indicator in IV panel models (3) and (6) and is instrumented on the transaction variables shown in table 5 panel B (Vella, 1998; Heckman,
1978; Wooldridge, 2002a). ADVISED is a dummy and 1 if the deal is advised. ADVISED serves as selection dummy in pooled (Heckman,
1976, 1979) regressions (2) and (5) and is instrumented on the transaction variables used in table 5 panel A. PASTBBCAR is the CAR
similar to the dependent variable of the previous deal advised by the same bank, the bank-bidder pairing, or of the previous unadvised deal
if the current one is unadvised as well. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in table C. The
standard errors of panel regressions (1) and (4) and (Heckman,1976, 1979) regressions (2) and (5) are corrected with the Huber & White
sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The standard errors of IV panel regressions (3) and (6) are corrected 
by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions clustered by acquirers (Mooney & Duval, 1993; Efron, 1979; Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, &
Bender, 2003). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. 
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES FE panel reg FE panel reg FE panel reg IV panel reg Heckman
IEVT 0.0040 0.0154** 0.0062 0.0671*** 0.0224***
(0.707) (2.195) (0.861) (4.524) (3.506)
ARSV -0.0135** -0.0091 -0.0131** -0.0059 -0.0141**
(-2.411) (-1.256) (-2.320) (-0.956) (-2.391)
PASTBBCAR_(-2,2) -0.0635** -0.2359*** -0.0634* -0.0595* 0.3301***
(-1.961) (-7.248) (-1.957) (-1.804) (3.918)
ADVISORCHOICE -0.0006 -0.0158***
(-0.449) (-4.890)
ATobinsQ 0.0017** 0.0040** 0.0017** 0.0019** 0.0012
(2.197) (2.303) (2.195) (2.403) (1.336)
AROA -0.0220** -0.0584** -0.0220** -0.0217** -0.0056
(-2.090) (-2.169) (-2.089) (-2.019) (-0.648)
ALEVERAGE -0.0084 -0.0056 -0.0084 -0.0096 0.0162**
(-1.187) (-0.304) (-1.188) (-1.324) (2.353)
LNIS 0.0020 0.0100 0.0019 0.0012 -0.0081***
(0.403) (0.730) (0.399) (0.258) (-6.905)
SIXTH -0.0043** -0.0080* -0.0043** -0.0060*** -0.0048
(-2.414) (-1.704) (-2.424) (-3.066) (-1.467)
LOGME -0.0091*** -0.0130*** -0.0091*** -0.0106*** -0.0061***
(-7.392) (-3.812) (-7.386) (-9.265) (-9.189)
Constant 0.1658*** 0.2055* 0.1665*** 0.2186*** 0.1639***
(3.889) (1.903) (3.904) (5.439) (7.554)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes No No
Instrumented No No No ADVISORCHOICE ADVISED
N 31,954 8,886 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 4,164 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-/F-statistic 7.52 4.98 7.40 302.76 252.18
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of selection 30.14
p-value of selection test 0.0000
Table 9: Regressions of the announcement returns with expertise measured by deal volume
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw
Robust z- & t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9 shows the regressions of the announcement returns with the industry expert ise and advisory relationship strength
calculated with the deal dollar volume. The dependent variables are the winsorized CARs from -2 to +2 trading days
around the M&A announcement, calculated with the Beta-1 Model and the CRSP value-weighted index. The variables are
summarized in table 2 and described in the statist ical appendix in table C. ADVISORCHOICE serves as select ion indicator
in panel regression (3) (Vella, 1998; Heckman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2002a). The standard errors of fixed effects panel
regressions (1) to (3) and pooled (Heckman, 1976, 1979) regression (5) are corrected with the Huber & White sandwich
est imator clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The standard errors of instrumental variable (IV) panel
regression (4) are corrected by bootstrapping with 200 repet itions clustered by acquirers (Mooney & Duval, 1993; Efron,
1979; Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003). ADVISED in (Heckman, 1976, 1979) regression (5) is
instrumented on the variables in regression (1) in table 5 panel A. ADVISORCHOICE in IV panel regression (4) is
instrumented on the variables in regression (1) in table 5 panel B. Regression (2) is est imated on advised transactions
only. Year fixed effects and transaction variables are included but not reported. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
RE probit 
panel
RE probit 
panel
RE probit 
panel
IV probit biprobit with 
selection
IEDT 0.1224** 0.1565* 0.1323* 0.6374*** 0.1584**
(1.975) (1.858) (1.672) (3.707) (2.198)
ARSD -0.0603 -0.0034 -0.0592 -0.0329 -0.1025**
(-1.635) (-0.071) (-1.589) (-0.735) (-2.158)
PASTGOODADVICE 0.0147** -0.0473** 0.0145** 0.0223** 0.0762***
(2.056) (-2.024) (1.990) (2.399) (2.746)
ADVISORCHOICE -0.0014 -0.0646***
(-0.201) (-3.098)
ATobinsQ 0.0039** 0.0057 0.0039** 0.0035** 0.0028
(2.245) (1.459) (2.245) (2.086) (0.791)
AROA 0.0497** 0.0344 0.0498** 0.0609*** 0.0323
(2.466) (0.711) (2.470) (3.180) (0.780)
ALEVERAGE 0.0295* 0.1096*** 0.0295* 0.0457*** 0.1315***
(1.701) (2.695) (1.700) (2.636) (3.612)
LNIS -0.0127*** -0.0358*** -0.0127*** -0.0171*** -0.0448***
(-3.550) (-4.337) (-3.549) (-5.217) (-6.664)
SIXTH -0.0080 -0.0159 -0.0080 -0.0210** -0.0293*
(-0.888) (-0.819) (-0.889) (-2.485) (-1.680)
LOGME -0.0133*** -0.0195*** -0.0133*** -0.0149*** -0.0179***
(-6.932) (-4.098) (-6.883) (-8.092) (-5.002)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No No No No
Transaction variables Yes Yes Yes No No
Instrumented No No No ADVISORCHOICE ADVISED
N 31,954 8,886 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 4,164 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 475.29 348.02 475.21 308.48 169.29
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.0463 0.2478 0.0464 0.0714
Chi²-statistic of selection 9.68 26.33
p-value of selection 0.0019 0.0000
Table 10 includes the primary analysis of the probability to receive good advice and to make a good acquisit ion
decision. The dependent variable is GOODADVICE. GOODADVICE is 1 if a deal with a nonnegative CAR(-2, 2) is
completed or withdrawn in the case of a negative CAR, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are the marginal
probability effects at  the mean on P(GOODADVICE=1) or P(GOODADVICE=1|ADVISED=1) in (5). The variables 
are summarized in table 2 and described in the statist ical appendix in table C. (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects are
highly correlated with the regressors, causing multicollinearity, and therefore excluded. The standard errors of
random effects probit panel regressions (1) to (3) are based on the observed information matrix (OIM), the inverse
Hessian, after maximum likelihood estimation (Efron & Hinkley, 1978). The standard errors of instrumental
variables (IV) probit regression (4) and biprobit with selection regression (5) are corrected with the Huber & White
sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). ADVISED in biprobit selection model (5) is
instrumented on the variables in regression (2) in table 5 panel A (Greene, 2008a, 2008b). ADVISORCHOICE in IV 
probit regression (4) is instrumented on the variables in regression (2) in table 5 panel B. Regression (2) is
estimated on the subsample of advised transactions only. Year fixed effects and transaction variables are included
but not reported. Diagnostic statist ics of the models' Chi2-statist ic of significance and the correlation of random
effects ci with explanatory variables x it are shown.
Table 10: Regression analysis of GOODADVICE 
GOODADVICE
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
RE probit 
panel
biprobit with 
selection
IV probit RE probit 
panel
biprobit with 
selection
IV probit
MS 0.0008* 0.0011** 0.0072***
(1.788) (2.098) (2.587)
TADVISORTIER -0.0014 -0.0161* 0.0113
(-0.293) (-1.793) (1.300)
RELREP 0.0005* 0.0002 0.0007*
(1.892) (0.652) (1.849)
ARSD -0.0554 -0.0991** 0.0161 -0.0501 -0.0954** -0.0360
(-1.519) (-2.082) (0.270) (-1.396) (-2.022) (-0.758)
PASTGOODADVICE 0.0144** 0.0824*** 0.0160 0.0139* 0.0769*** 0.0276***
(2.011) (2.941) (1.301) (1.950) (2.773) (3.000)
ADVISORCHOICE -0.1048** -0.0241*
(-2.335) (-1.677)
ATobinsQ 0.0039** 0.0031 0.0033* 0.0039** 0.0027 0.0035**
(2.222) (0.869) (1.895) (2.242) (0.770) (2.074)
AROA 0.0491** 0.0213 0.0583*** 0.0491** 0.0288 0.0574***
(2.436) (0.511) (3.033) (2.435) (0.700) (2.998)
ALEVERAGE 0.0296* 0.1310*** 0.0458*** 0.0300* 0.1353*** 0.0486***
(1.703) (3.559) (2.623) (1.727) (3.726) (2.818)
LNIS -0.0127*** -0.0449*** -0.0168*** -0.0129*** -0.0455*** -0.0181***
(-3.542) (-6.622) (-5.060) (-3.578) (-6.801) (-5.503)
SIXTH -0.0082 -0.0304* -0.0235*** -0.0082 -0.0299* -0.0213**
(-0.917) (-1.736) (-2.658) (-0.915) (-1.721) (-2.510)
LOGME -0.0134*** -0.0232*** -0.0167*** -0.0130*** -0.0168*** -0.0152***
(-6.953) (-5.898) (-9.485) (-7.160) (-4.785) (-8.105)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Transaction variables Yes No No Yes No No
Instrumented No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 474.16 188.01 308.98 474.35 164.39 300.31
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.0467 0.1045 0.0469 0.0380
Chi²-statistic of selection 34.21 5.74 24.86 4.25
p-value of selection 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0394
T able 11 includes the sensitivity analysis of different skill and reputation proxies on the probability to receive good advice. T he
dependent variable is GOODADVICE. GOODADVICE is 1 if a deal with a nonnegat ive CAR(-2, 2) is completed or withdrawn in the case
of a negative CAR, and 0 otherwise. T he coefficients are the marginal probability effects at the mean on P(GOODADVICE=1) or
P(GOODADVICE=1|ADVISED=1) in (2) and (5). T he variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in
table C. (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects are highly correlated with the regressors, causing multicollinearity, and therefore excluded. T he
standard errors of random effects probit panel regressions (1) and (4) are based on the observed information matrix (OIM), the inverse
Hessian, after maximum likelihood estimat ion (Efron & Hinkley, 1978). The standard errors of instrumental variable (IV) probit
regression (3) and (6) and biprobit regression with selection (2) and (5) are corrected with the Huber & White sandwich estimator
clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). ADVISORCHOICE in IV probit regressions (3) and (6) is instrumented on the
variables in regression (2) in table 5 panel B. ADVISED in biprobit regressions with select ion (2) and (5) is regressed on the variables in
regression (2) in table 5 panel A (Greene, 2008a, 2008b). Year fixed effects and transact ion variables are included but not reported.
Diagnostic statistics of the models' Chi2-stat istic of significance and the correlation of random effects ci with explanatory variables xit 
are shown. 
Table 11: Regression analysis of GOODADVICE with alternative skill and reputation measures
GOODADVICE
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
RE probit 
panel
RE probit 
panel
RE probit 
panel
IV probit biprobit with 
selection
IEVT 0.0223 0.0427 -0.0006 0.2742*** 0.0445
(0.635) (0.929) (-0.013) (2.697) (1.129)
ARSV -0.0444 0.0088 -0.0494 -0.0201 -0.0938**
(-1.221) (0.184) (-1.340) (-0.435) (-2.004)
PASTGOODADVICE 0.0135* -0.0481** 0.0146** 0.0223** 0.0760***
(1.886) (-2.062) (2.007) (2.296) (2.751)
ADVISORCHOICE 0.0056 -0.0560**
(0.831) (-2.529)
ATobinsQ 0.0039** 0.0057 0.0039** 0.0035** 0.0027
(2.240) (1.462) (2.242) (2.065) (0.780)
AROA 0.0493** 0.0321 0.0490** 0.0585*** 0.0291
(2.448) (0.663) (2.433) (3.052) (0.706)
ALEVERAGE 0.0298* 0.1109*** 0.0299* 0.0457*** 0.1334***
(1.717) (2.726) (1.725) (2.629) (3.663)
LNIS -0.0129*** -0.0362*** -0.0129*** -0.0177*** -0.0454***
(-3.582) (-4.393) (-3.584) (-5.400) (-6.779)
SIXTH -0.0083 -0.0162 -0.0081 -0.0218** -0.0299*
(-0.919) (-0.834) (-0.905) (-2.548) (-1.714)
LOGME -0.0131*** -0.0192*** -0.0132*** -0.0153*** -0.0176***
(-6.779) (-3.971) (-6.823) (-8.542) (-4.865)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No No No No
Transaction variables Yes Yes Yes No No
Instrumented No No No ADVISORCHOICE ADVISED
N 31,954 8,886 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,280 4,164 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 470.99 345.77 472.17 304.82 165.79
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.0469 0.2483 0.0465 0.0702
Chi²-statistic of selection 8.47 26.10
p-value of selection 0.0036 0.0000
Table 12 includes the analysis of the probability to receive good advice using the deal dollar value definitions
IEVT and ARSV. The dependent variable is GOODADVICE. GOODADVICE is 1 if a deal with a nonnegative
CAR(-2, 2) is completed or withdrawn in the case of a negative CAR, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients are the
marginal probability effects at the mean on P(GOODADVICE=1) or P(GOODADVICE=1|ADVISED=1) in (5).
The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in table C. (Mundlak, 1978)
fixed effects are highly correlated with the regressors, causing multicollinearity, and therefore excluded. The
standard errors of random effects panel probit regressions (1) to (3) are based on the observed information
matrix (OIM), the inverse Hessian, after maximum likelihood estimation (Efron & Hinkley, 1978). The
standard errors of instrumental variable (IV) probit regression (4) and biprobit regression with select ion (5) are
corrected with the Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980).
ADVISED in biprobit select ion model (5) is instrumented on the variables in regression (2) in table 5 panel A
(Greene, 2008a, 2008b). ADVISORCHOICE in IV probit regression (4) is instrumented on the variables in
regressions (2) in table 5 panel B. Regression (2) is estimated on the subsample of advised transactions only.
Year fixed effects and transaction variables are included but not reported. Diagnost ic statist ics of the models'
Chi2-statist ic of significance and the correlation of the random effects ci with explanatory variables xit are
shown.
Table 12: Regression analysis of GOODADVICE  using the dollar value definitions IEVT and ARSV
GOODADVICE
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Similarly the completion probability is higher. More profitable serial bidders with 
better investment opportunities make more deals that are resolved faster and more 
often completed. Measuring the skills of advising banks alternatively with their 
SDC M&A League Table market share MS and the tier of the target’s advisor the 
empirical observations are similar to the analysis with IEDT and ARSD, shown in 
table 14. In table 15 it can be seen that the effects of the dollar deal value 
definitions of the industry expertise and advisory relationship strength are similar 
to the deal number based definitions.  
The economic effect of a standard deviation increase in the advising bank’s 
industry expertise IEDT on the resolution speed is 876.7493 0.0532 46.6431− × = −  
days, which is compared to a mean of 77.34 days and a standard deviation of 
103.83 days a relatively large effect. Hiring a more familiar bank with a standard 
deviation greater advisory relationship strength ARSD reduces the time to resolve 
the transaction by 66.8383 0.0854 5.7080− × = −  days, which is a relatively small 
effect. The completion probability increases with a one standard deviation increase 
of IEDT by 2.1473 0.0532 0.1142× =  or 11.42 percentage points and of ARSD by 
0.3671 0.0847 0.0311× =  or 3.11 percentage points, which are compared to the 
mean and standard deviation of COMPLETED of 94.16% and 23.46% relatively 
large effects.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
FE panel 
reg
Heckman IV panel reg FE panel 
probit
biprobit with 
selection
IV probit
IEDT 89.8857*** 34.6687** -876.7493*** 0.0134 -0.0188 2.1473***
(6.014) (2.134) (-15.272) (0.707) (-1.203) (12.491)
ARSD 8.5259 -46.9199*** -66.8383*** 0.0567*** 0.0206 0.3671***
(1.117) (-5.541) (-3.786) (4.656) (1.228) (7.841)
PASTRESOLSPEED -0.0873*** 0.3179*** -0.0154
(-6.971) (10.540) (-0.967)
PASTCOMPLETED -0.0157*** 0.0145*** -0.1204***
(-7.023) (2.757) (-13.356)
ADVISORCHOICE 134.9538*** -0.2930***
(23.895) (-14.239)
ATobinsQ -0.5275 -3.8502*** 0.0525 0.0025*** 0.0006 -0.0020
(-1.056) (-5.914) (0.088) (2.812) (0.688) (-0.852)
AROA -8.2967 -114.5983*** -17.1710 0.0044 0.0067 0.0402
(-0.815) (-11.696) (-1.563) (0.379) (0.624) (1.203)
ALEVERAGE 0.3398 9.8175 -2.4500 0.0007 0.0008 0.0172
(0.047) (1.132) (-0.310) (0.074) (0.084) (0.637)
LNIS -22.9890* 5.3471*** -14.8684 0.0130** 0.0085*** 0.0659***
(-1.959) (3.426) (-1.037) (2.003) (4.425) (2.943)
SIXTH -6.9625*** -4.9596 -2.1278 0.0152*** -0.0012 0.0350***
(-3.022) (-1.437) (-0.861) (5.044) (-0.304) (4.575)
LOGME 1.4872 2.9274*** -1.1771 -0.0043*** 0.0028*** 0.0155***
(1.011) (3.528) (-0.746) (-2.715) (2.668) (3.567)
Constant 284.3550** 102.2751*** 93.7706
(2.520) (3.042) (0.677)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Transaction variables Yes No No Yes No No
Instrumented No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE
N 31,757 31,757 31,757 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,237 10,237 10,237 10,280 10,280 10,280
F-/Chi²-statistic 35.59 481.85 1,409.90 2,024.11 82.68 2,523.43
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of selection 412.86 163.26 576.26
p-value of selection 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.1804 0.7335
Chi²-statistic γ=0 322.82 389.59
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Table 13 shows the influence of the industry expertise and the advisory relationship strength on the days until the bid es resolved and the
completion probability. The dependent variables are RESOLSPEED and COMPLETED. The variables are summarized in table 2 and
described in the statistical appendix in table C. The coefficients are the marginal effects at the mean. The standard errors of regressions
(1), (2), (5) and (6) are corrected with the Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The
standard errors of IV panel regression (3) are corrected by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions clustered by acquirers (Mooney & Duval,
1993; Efron, 1979; Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender; 2003). T he standard errors of Chamberlain random effects panel probit
regression (4) with (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects are based on the observed informat ion matrix (OIM) after maxium likelihood estimation
(Efron & Hikley, 1978; Chamberlain, 1980). ADVISED and ADVISORCHOICE are instrumented on the variables in regressions (3) and
(4) in table 5 panels A and B. Year fixed effects, fixed effects and transact ion variables are included but not reported. Diagnostic statistics
of the models' Chi2-statistic of significance, the correlat ion of fixed effects ci with explanatory variables xit and the Chi
2-statistic of
significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown.
RESOLSPEED COMPLETED
Table 13: Regressions of the resolution speed and the deal completion probability
Robust t- and z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
VARIABLES
FE panel 
reg
Heckman IV panel reg FE panel 
probit
biprobit with 
selection
IV probit
MS 0.4235*** 0.0248 -10.5249*** 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0215***
(4.222) (0.238) (-16.395) (0.647) (-0.626) (16.649)
TADVISORTIER 11.9150*** 9.7063*** -8.5024*** 0.0132*** 0.0045 0.0615***
(10.055) (4.850) (-3.982) (7.833) (0.358) (10.655)
ARSD 14.4277* -108.7556*** -112.6868*** 0.0577*** -10.9347*** 0.3108***
(1.880) (-10.813) (-7.523) (4.776) (-3.971) (9.144)
PASTRESOLSPEED -0.0884*** 0.2953*** 0.0096
(-7.046) (9.915) (0.757)
PASTCOMPLETED -0.0158*** -0.0106
(-7.053) (-0.290)
ADVISORCHOICE 187.8459*** -0.3584***
(18.698) (-18.461)
ATobinsQ -0.5254 -3.6307*** 0.2694 0.0025*** 0.0043 0.0036
(-1.052) (-5.676) (0.417) (2.828) (1.022) (1.585)
AROA -8.9149 -111.4996*** -9.3498 0.0044 0.1036** 0.0166
(-0.875) (-11.396) (-0.793) (0.378) (2.097) (0.493)
ALEVERAGE 0.4322 11.8160 -6.1859 0.0006 -0.0121 -0.0044
(0.060) (1.386) (-0.662) (0.063) (-0.289) (-0.164)
LNIS -22.5423* 5.3042*** -23.1413 0.0132** 0.0435*** 0.0718***
(-1.917) (3.371) (-1.590) (2.036) (5.518) (3.284)
SIXTH -7.0782*** -3.5998 -0.6037 0.0152*** 0.0085
(-3.065) (-1.051) (-0.225) (5.032) (0.453)
LOGME 1.5286 2.5626*** -0.1799 -0.0044*** 0.0060 -0.0071*
(1.037) (2.874) (-0.104) (-2.741) (1.304) (-1.864)
Constant 263.1335** 83.7533** 435.3793**
(2.265) (2.459) (2.544)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Transaction variables Yes No No Yes No No
Instrumented No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE
N 31,757 31,757 31,757 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,237 10,237 10,237 10,280 10,280 10,280
F-/Chi²-statistic 35.08 518.00 1,247.23 2,018.42 104.22 2,155.23
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of selection 119.136 60.6056 812.8226
p-value of selection 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.1810 0.7514
Chi²-statistic γ=0 317.2998 150.5668
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Table 14 shows the influence of the SDC M&A Top-50 League Table market share MS and the tier of the target 's advisor
TADVISORT IER. The dependent variables are RESOLSPEED and COMPLETED. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described
in the statistical appendix in table C. The coefficients are the marginal effects at the mean. The standard errors of regressions (1), (2), (5) 
and (6) are corrected with the Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The standard errors
of instrumental variable panel regression (3) are corrected by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions clustered by acquirers (Mooney & Duval,
1993; Efron, 1979; Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender; 2003). The standard errors of Chamberlain random effects panel probit
regression (4) with (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects are based on the observed information matrix (OIM) after maxium likelihood
estimation (Efron & Hikley, 1978). ADVISED and ADVISORCHOICE are instrumented on the variables in regressions (3) and (4) in table 
5 panels A and B. Year fixed effects, fixed effects and transaction variables are included but not reported. Diagnostic statistics of the
models' Chi2-stat istic of significance, the correlation of fixed effects ci with explanatory variables xit and the Chi
2-statistic of significance
of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown.
RESOLSPEED COMPLETED
Table 14: Regressions of the resolution speed and the deal completion probability with alternative skill measures
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
FE panel 
reg
Heckman IV panel reg FE panel 
probit
biprobit with 
selection
IV probit
IEVT 34.2858*** 15.9973** -487.0018*** 0.0020 -0.0062 1.1927***
(4.573) (1.960) (-18.355) (0.192) (-0.686) (12.790)
ARSV 14.0532* -44.7413*** -76.5451*** 0.0556*** 0.0176 0.4059***
(1.841) (-5.367) (-5.620) (4.701) (1.079) (9.284)
PASTRESOLSPEED -0.0886*** 0.3171*** -0.0136
(-7.074) (10.508) (-0.909)
PASTCOMPLETED -0.0158*** 0.0150*** -0.1255***
(-7.101) (2.871) (-13.149)
ADVISORCHOICE 133.5570*** -0.2971***
(26.712) (-13.888)
ATobinsQ -0.5068 -3.8590*** -0.1305 0.0025*** 0.0006 -0.0009
(-1.014) (-5.934) (-0.217) (2.825) (0.694) (-0.372)
AROA -8.8506 -115.1748*** -10.7349 0.0044 0.0073 0.0211
(-0.870) (-11.738) (-0.953) (0.384) (0.667) (0.623)
ALEVERAGE 0.0625 10.0155 1.0538 0.0006 0.0006 0.0087
(0.009) (1.158) (0.122) (0.066) (0.061) (0.320)
LNIS -22.8334* 5.2142*** -16.6017 0.0129** 0.0087*** 0.0574**
(-1.946) (3.372) (-1.184) (2.006) (4.557) (2.564)
SIXTH -7.0707*** -5.1153 -1.9973 0.0151*** -0.0011 0.0320***
(-3.069) (-1.488) (-0.788) (5.039) (-0.264) (4.136)
LOGME 1.5385 2.8268*** -1.1546 -0.0043*** 0.0028*** 0.0139***
(1.045) (3.320) (-0.693) (-2.700) (2.674) (3.206)
Constant 280.8070** 105.1606*** 106.4522
(2.480) (3.097) (0.800)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Transaction variables Yes No No Yes No No
Instrumented No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE No ADVISED ADVISORCHOICE
N 31,757 31,757 31,757 31,954 31,954 31,954
Number of Acquirers 10,237 10,237 10,237 10,280 10,280 10,280
F-/Chi²-statistic 35.13 483.61 1,583.19 2,015.40 81.49 2,470.22
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of selection 411.61 163.15 563.95
p-value of selection 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.1829 0.7411
Chi²-statistic γ=0 318.30 409.69
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Table 15 shows the influence of the industry expertise and the advisory relationship strength based on the dollar value of transactions on
the days until the bid es resolved and the completion probability. T he dependent variables are RESOLSPEED and COMPLET ED. The
variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in table C. The coefficients are the marginal effects at the
mean. The standard errors of regressions (1), (2), (5) and (6) are corrected with the Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by
acquirers (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The standard errors of instrumental variable panel regression (3) are corrected by bootstrapping
with 200 repetitions clustered by acquirers (Mooney & Duval, 1993; Efron, 1979; Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender; 2003).
The standard errors of Chamberlain random effects panel probit regression (4) with (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects are based on the
observed information matrix (OIM) after maxium likelihood estimation (Efron & Hikley, 1978). ADVISED and ADVISORCHOICE are
instrumented on the variables in regressions (3) and (4) in table 5 panels A and B. Year fixed effects, fixed effects and transaction variables 
are included but not reported. Diagnostic statistics of the models' Chi2-statistic of significance, the correlation of fixed effects ci with
explanatory variables xit and the Chi
2-statistic of significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown.
RESOLSPEED COMPLETED
Table 15: Regressions of RESOLSPEED and COMPLETED with the dollar deal value definitions 
Robust t- and z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2.7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The univariate and multivariate analyses show that along the acquisition sequence 
hiring bank advisors with a higher industry expertise and more intensive advisory 
relationship is beneficial for the serial bidder. The serial bidder receives better 
advisory services to make good acquisition decisions, namely the completion of 
value creating acquisitions and withdrawing from value destroying ones, in less 
time. The focus on the cumulative abnormal returns to assess a bank’s influence on 
the value creation in M&As by completing value increasing acquisitions is extend 
by the other side, the ability of banks as advisors to protect their clients from losses 
like the winner’s curse. To sum it up this study extends the research of (Aktas, 
Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011), (Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007), (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 
2003), (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012), (Bao & Edmans, 2011), (Chang, 
Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013), and (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003) that along the 
acquisition sequence bank advisors support the serial bidder in making value 
increasing and smart acquisition decisions in shorter time with a higher deal 
completion probability. The advice for bidders is to look for banks with a large 
industry expertise and a good track record, to hunt performance.  
 
3. The bidder’s selection and retention of his bank advisor - Its positive 
effect on the extension of acquisition sequences and formation of a 
hierarchical investment banking market 
 
3.1 Introduction 
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The study combines the research that analyses investment banks as intermediaries 
in the market for corporate control with the recent research in acquisition series 
and theoretical research of investment banking markets in a unified empirical 
framework. The question whether investment banks as M&A advisors support 
bidding companies in the exploitation of their investment opportunities by finding 
targets for successor M&As is supported by the empirical observations. More 
experienced banks with stronger client relationships are more likely to be hired 
again, increasing their chances to be retained as advisors in successor transactions. 
The hiring of banks as M&A advisors, the retention of familiar advisors and the 
continuation of acquisition sequences leads to banks’ accumulation of expertise. 
The loop of M&A advisor choice, retention, acquisition continuation and banks’ 
accumulation of expertise and client relationships is repeated until a hierarchy with 
the most experienced banks that maintain the strongest client relationships at the 
top emerges.  
This study empirically examines the theories of (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994) 
and (Anand & Galetovic, 2006), considering advising banks as partners of serial 
acquirers along their acquisition sequences. Analyzing the role of serial bidders’ 
bank advisors complements the research of learning along acquisition sequences 
(Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011; Croci & Petmezas, 2009) and M&A sequences 
as means to exploit investment opportunities according to the neoclassical theory 
(Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, & Travlos, 2012; Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Andrade, 
Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). The analyses provide 
further empirical support for the literature that investigates the structure of bank-
bidder advisory relationships and the role of investment banks as financial 
intermediaries in the market for corporate control (Hunter & Walker, 1990; 
McLaughlin, 1990; 1992).  
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(Anand & Galetovic, 2006) argue that banks form relationships with bidders to 
generate M&A advisory business. The bulge-bracket banks form relationships with 
the largest and most frequent bidders, such as Cisco Systems that bid for and 
acquired 98 companies in the sample to grow externally. (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 
1994) and (Anand & Galetovic, 2006) model theoretically the hierarchical 
separation of the investment banking industry for underwriters and M&As advisors 
as a process of repeated rounds in which banks moving to the top accumulate more 
skills and experience and match with the bidders that benefit most from their 
experience. This study shows empirically that this process occurs with a 
concentration of the strongest client relationships among bulge-bracket banks that 
are active in almost every (Fama & French, 1997) industry. Non-bulge-bracket 
banks are usually specialized boutiques that are active in a few industries (Song, 
Zhou, & Wei, 2013).  
In the first step of the circular process the choice of a particular bank as advisor 
increases by 9.15% if the bank has advised one more deal in the last three years in 
the target’s industry. Having advised the bidder in one more transaction in the past 
three years increases the bank’s selection probability by 33.32%. A one standard 
deviation higher ranking in the SDC M&A Top-50 League Tables increases the 
bank’s visibility in the advisory market and chance to be chosen by 28.26%. The 
unconditional initial selection probability in the SDC M&A universe with 45 to 
392 banks per year is 0.36 percentage points. Being chosen initially increases the 
advising bank’s unconditional likelihood of 4.53% to be retained as advisor. A 
stronger client relationship, one more advised deal in the past three years, increases 
the bank’s retention probability relatively by 60.47%. Banks familiar with the 
bidder also pitch deals and are selected as advisors if the bidder accepts the deal 
proposal. The interrelatedness results in a simultaneous decision of advisor 
retention and acquisition sequence continuation. Being familiar with the bidder 
from previously advised deals in terms of a standard deviation greater advisory 
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relationship increases the likelihood to be retained as advisor in the current bid by 
11.89% and the successor bid probability of 66.59% relatively by 5.25%. The 
industry expertise in the target industry, being a standard deviation greater, 
increases the probability to be retained as old advisor by 27.29% and the 
continuation probability of the acquisition sequence by 12.04%. The advising 
bank’s advisory relationship strength and target industry expertise work indirectly 
on the bidder’s M&A series continuation as well through the retention probability, 
which itself increases the successor bid probability by 15.65%. Finally being 
retained as old advisor improves the bank’s target industry expertise by 34.47%, 
which going back to the first step enhances its chances to be initially chosen as 
M&A advisor from the set of all possible bank advisors. Besides the influence of 
the advising investment bank bidders with above industry average profitability and 
investment opportunities operating in large industries are more likely to continue 
making bids and acquisitions (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002; Servaes, 1991; Lang, 
Stulz, & Walkling, 1989; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007).  
The process starts all over, being a loop of simultaneous and interrelated decisions 
that are self-enforcing. Through this process empirically modeled along the 
theoretical arguments of (Anand & Galetovic, 2006) and (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 
1994) a few banks with strong client relationships and industry expertise emerge at 
the top, while the majority of non-bulge-bracket banks or boutiques focus on few 
industries and arms-length relationships. Goldman Sachs alone advised 4,472 deals 
in the SDC M&A sample and 654 deals in the final sample of 8,886 bid-bank 
matches, followed by Merrill Lynch with 514 advisory mandates. The Top-10 
M&A advisors account for 3,335 bid-bank matches, or 37.53%, of the 8,886 ones. 
The analysis uses a panel of 31,954 observations, one to six for advised deals, in 
sequences of 1 to 98 M&As from 1979 to 2006 by 10,280 bidders, which is 
constructed from the SDC M&A and Compustat databases.  
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A problem in the analyses is the selection bias and simultaneity caused by banks 
self-selecting themselves into advising more complex and larger transactions of the 
largest acquirers that make many acquisitions (Anand & Galetovic, 2006; 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Bao & Edmans, 2011; Golubov, Petmezas, & 
Travlos, 2012). The selection bias along the acquisition sequence is modeled with 
selection indicator dummies in the context of Chamberlain probit panel models 
including (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects of the likelihood to retain an old advisor 
and a successor transaction (Nijman & Verbeek, 1992; Verbeek & Nijman, 1992; 
Wooldridge, 2002e; 2002d). Finally the interrelated decisions are estimated within 
biprobit simultaneous equation systems (Heckman, 1978; Maddala, 1983a). Within 
the simultaneous equation systems the interrelated decisions of hiring a familiar 
bank advisor with greater expertise and the M&A sequence continuation are 
estimated (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013). For robustness checks biprobit models 
with selection and instrumental variables (IV) probit models are used (Vella, 1993; 
Greene, 2008a; 2008b; Vella, 1998). The econometric methods to estimate binary 
response models for panel date with fixed effects and the correction of a selection 
bias in panel data are explained well by (Wooldridge, 2002d; 2002e). (Vella, 1998) 
provides an excellent overview of pooled and panel selection models.  
In which way these results are obtained is elaborated in the following sections. 
Section 2 summarizes the literature and the hypothesis development. Section 3 
follows with the panel description. Section 4 contains the description of the 
variables, section 5 the univariate analysis, section 6 the multivariate analysis with 
robustness checks, section 7 the conclusion.  
 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
70 
 
The basic assumption of the choice of an investment bank as advisor is that skilled 
investment banks provide a better matching between the bidder and target 
according to the arguments of (Hunter & Walker, 1990) and (McLaughlin, 1990; 
1992). Investment banks as financial intermediaries reduce the information 
asymmetry between bidders and targets (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). Investment 
banks facilitate the matching process by reducing the search costs of the bidder by 
scanning the market for potentially valuable acquisition targets constantly. 
Investment banks help their clients to find targets or bidders with the highest 
expected synergies (Hunter & Walker, 1990; McLaughlin, 1990; 1992). (Servaes 
& Zenner, 1996) argue that besides the information asymmetry the higher the 
transaction costs, arising from the deal’s complexity, and contracting costs arising 
from agency problems the more likely is the employment of a financial advisor in 
the M&A on the side of the bidder.  
The contracting costs are caused by agency problems of managerial 
overconfidence or hubris, empire building, or payment with overvalued stock as 
acquisition currency (Roll, 1986; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990; Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; 2005b; 2008). 
The bank itself avoids to get involved in any agency conflict, because it might hurt 
its reputation (McLaughlin, 1990; 1992). 
Given the transaction costs (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011) and (Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996) argue that experienced bidders are less in need of the advice of a 
bank. This leads to the selection analysis that the probability of employing a bank 
as advisor is increasing in the transaction costs, contracting costs and information 
asymmetry and decreasing in the bidder’s acquisition experience. The bidder’s 
acquisition experience increases with the number of previous transactions and his 
prior acquisition performance. More profitable bidders with larger investment 
71 
 
opportunity sets are more likely to be advised, because banks want to retain these 
bidders as clients for future advisory mandates. 
The bank can probably advise more deals in an ongoing advisory relationship. The 
relationship with the bidder enables the investment bank to obtain private 
information about the bidder that is not available to external investment banks. In 
the relationship the bank and the bidder engage in a win-win situation. For the 
relationship bank it is easier to get the advisory mandate compared to unknown 
banks, because it is more familiar with the bidder. The bidder gets better informed 
advisory services at lower transaction costs (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; 
Anand & Galetovic, 2006; Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). Bidders are expected to be 
more likely to hire banks with which they have a strong advisory relationship 
(Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013; Forte, Iannotta, & Navone, 2010). The first 
equation captures these arguments that the probability to hire a bank as advisor is 
increasing in its advisory skills, its access to information in the industries of the 
bidder and target and its access to bidder’s private information. The access to 
information enables the bank to identify targets for successor deals to exploit the 
bidder’s investment opportunity set (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). Finally the 
investment bank’s skill and access to information are expected to increase in the 
number of M&As advised, which again improves its chances to be selected as 
advisor (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013; 
Anand & Galetovic, 2006). 
From the bidder’s perspective his set of investment opportunities changes due to 
economic shocks that facilitate the redeployment of assets to their most productive 
use according to the neoclassical theory (Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). Companies 
with larger investment opportunities, measured by Tobin’s Q, acquire companies 
with smaller investment opportunities (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002; Lang, Stulz, 
& Walkling, 1989). More profitable companies are more likely to acquire less 
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profitable companies as well (Harford, 2005). The bidder’s investment opportunity 
set is the set of possible targets. The time-varying changes in the companies’ 
investment opportunities lead to acquisition sequences as responses to these 
changes (Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). The larger the bidder’s investment 
opportunity set is the more likely is the continuation of the acquisition sequence. 
From the bidder’s perspective the choice of his advisor is expected to positively 
influence the probability of successor deals. These arguments lead to the 
hypothesis that the hiring or retention of a bank advisor has a positive influence on 
the probability to find a successor target if the bidder’s investment opportunity set 
is sufficiently large, which again increase the bank’s chances to be hired and 
retained as advisor through the accumulation of expertise and a stronger advisory 
relationship.  
 
3.3 Sample preparation and description 
 
To examine the hypothesis the sample of M&As is taken from the SDC mergers 
and acquisitions database. The sample of 30,908 bids includes M&As with US 
targets with a disclosed transaction value. The sample is also used in chapters 2 
and 4. The definition of an acquisition sequence is everything beyond one 
acquisition (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011; 
Ahern, 2008). The avoidance of restrictions on the time between successive 
transactions results in an average time gap of 500 days that is longer than in other 
studies (Ahern, 2008; Croci & Petmezas, 2009). Similar to (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 
2009) the time gap of 737 days between the first and second bid decreases to 304 
days between the sixth or later bid.  
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The number of banks in the SDC M&A universe, defined as sample A, per year 
ranges from 45 in 1979 to 392 in 1997. The 7,840 advised deals are advised by 
8,886 banks. The primary panel used to test the hypothesis has 23,068 unadvised 
transactions and 8,886 bank-deal matches with a total of 31,954 observations 
including 10,280 different bidders. The sample to test the initial particular M&A 
advisor selection in the 7,840 advised deals consists of 2,489,259 possible bank-
deal matches. The final estimation of advising banks’ accumulation of industry 
expertise and advisory relationships uses the panel of 8,886 bank-deal matches 
with 718 banks in sample B. The samples’ construction and statistics are 
summarized in table 1, which is similar to table 1 in chapters 2 and 4.  
The years after 2006 are not included in the analysis because of sample attrition 
caused by the insolvency of 470 smaller and two leading investment banks, 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, from 2007 until the end of 20124. According to 
the press these two banks were partly taken over by Barclays Capital, KPMG 
China, Nomura, PWC and Neuberger Bergman in the case of Lehman Brothers and 
JP Morgan in the case of Bear Stearns. If one tracks the surviving remains of the 
banks it is difficult to adjust for the bankruptcy caused break in banks’ industry 
expertise and advisory relationships, because newspapers mentioned that many 
bankers left the industry completely. The bank adjustments are summarized in 
table B in the statistical appendix. The adjustments are identical to the ones in 
chapters 2 and 4. 
 
                                                          
4 The list of bank failures can be downloaded as an Excel sheet from the Federal Depository Insurance 
Corporation’s (FDIC) website: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
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Steps in the Process M&As
1. The total SDC M&A sample 208,654
2. Excluding self tenders, recapitalisations and repurchases 188,326
3. Excluding "Creditors", "Investor", "Investors", "Investor Group", 
"Shareholders", "Undisclosed Acquiror", "Seeking Buyer", and "Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan"
166,778
4. Excluding deals with status of "Unknown Status", "Rumor", "Discontinued 
Rumor", "Intended", "Intent withdrawn", "Pending" and "Seeking Target"
143,138
5. Excluding acquisitions/bids with undisclosed transaction values 67,065
6. Excluding individual and financial acquirers 61,713
7. Excluding bids in which the target is the same company as the acquirer 61,676
Sample A before the merging processes, used to compute the industry experience 
and acquirer-advisor relationship strengh variables
61,676
Steps in the Process M&As
8. Complete Compustat annual files from 1976 to 2006 (Industrial North America) 609,162
9. Keeping the consolidated parent with common stock (cic = 1xx) 600,197
10. Keeping company-years with positiv total assets 558,263
Compustat sample before the merging processes, used to compute the industry 
variables in each Fama & French (1997) industry
558,263
11. Deals with Compustat data available for the acquirer, merged by the CUSIP 39,053
Steps in the Process M&As
12. Deals with available announcement returns after merging with CRSP 33,231
Steps in the Process M&As
13. Excluding acquisitions/bids without acquirer's leverage, ROA and Tobin's Q 30,908
Sample for the analysis of acquisitions/bids with anouncement returns 30,908
Thereof unadvised acquisitions/bids (1) 23,068
Thereof advised acquisitions/bids 7,840
Bank matches with the advised acquisitions/bids (2) 8,886
Final sample B for estimation of unadvised and bank matched advised M&As (1+2) 31,954
Steps in the Process Issues
14. Debt and equity issues from 1976 to 2006 852,896
15. Excluding issues with missing transaction values 755,267
16. Excluding issues without an underwriter 755,266
Final sample C to calculate the exclusion restriction SCOPE 755,266
deals excluded
Table 1: Data preparation and sample statistics
The sample is taken from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database. The sample includes US targets only. The deals included are
M&As (1, 2), spinoffs & splitoffs (4), tender offers (5), minority stake purchases (10), acquisit ions of remaining interest (11),
and privat izations (12). The initial sample of 208,654 deals from 01/01/1979 to 12/31/2008 is reduced by missing Compustat
data as well as incomplete variables. The sample includes only M&As of corporate acquirers as well as stake purchases. Most deals
without Compustat data involve private acquirers. T he final sample includes deals from 01/01/1979 to 12/31/2006. Panel F
includes the major statist ics of the acquisit ion sequences. Panel G reports the distribut ion of the bids and acquisitions over t ime,
the number of advised bids/acquisitions per year, the number of investment banks included in the SDC M&A sample and SDC
M&A League Tables and the actually chosen bid-bank matches. 
Panel A: Observation elemination before merging the data with Compustat
deals excluded
23,640
20,328
21,548
76,073
Panel B: Merging with the Compustat sample
5,352
37
2,323
8,965
Panel D: Observation elimination after merging with Compustat & CRSP
deals excluded
Panel C: Merging with the CRSP sample
deals excluded
41,934
Panel E: Preparing the SDC Global Debt & Equity Issues to calculate the exclusion restriction
issues excluded
97,629
1
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
30,908 --- --- --- --- ---
10,280 --- --- --- --- ---
--- 3.0 2.0 4.0 1 98
--- 499.7 224.0 760.1 0 9289
--- 736.6 369.5 1012.6 0 9289
--- 600.0 305.0 798.6 0 8141
--- 504.5 263.0 705.5 0 6070
--- 438.5 198.5 631.4 0 6177
--- 303.6 135.0 473.6 0 5517
Year
Bids /    
Acquisitions
Advised 
Deals
Banks in 
the SDC 
Universe
SDC M&A 
League 
Table 
Banks (#)
Possible 
advised 
bid-bank 
Matches
Winning 
Matches
Losing 
Matches
Missing 
Matches
1979 9 6 45 20 270 7 263 0
1980 45 22 83 49 1,826 23 1,803 0
1981 289 62 136 50 8,432 65 8,367 0
1982 402 68 172 50 11,696 73 11,623 0
1983 540 89 170 50 15,130 95 15,035 0
1984 615 110 164 51 18,040 115 17,925 0
1985 303 111 148 50 16,428 124 16,304 0
1986 479 176 210 50 36,960 193 36,767 0
1987 482 121 242 50 29,282 129 29,153 0
1988 546 167 261 50 43,587 180 43,407 0
1989 687 166 295 50 48,970 194 48,776 0
1990 646 118 256 50 30,208 132 30,076 0
1991 731 112 263 50 29,456 129 29,327 0
1992 965 158 271 51 42,818 167 42,651 0
1993 1,229 230 281 50 64,630 282 64,348 0
1994 1,600 351 345 50 121,095 398 120,697 0
1995 1,651 404 342 50 138,168 438 137,730 0
1996 1,989 477 351 50 167,427 515 166,912 0
1997 2,627 635 392 50 248,920 710 248,210 0
1998 2,669 613 351 50 215,163 681 214,482 0
1999 2,079 579 355 50 205,545 642 204,903 0
2000 1,919 597 318 50 189,846 695 189,151 0
2001 1,396 462 312 50 144,144 537 143,607 0
2002 1,330 365 292 50 106,580 407 106,173 0
2003 1,293 367 292 50 107,164 413 106,751 0
2004 1,387 421 336 50 141,456 494 140,962 0
2005 1,508 441 366 50 161,406 531 160,875 0
2006 1,492 412 351 50 144,612 517 144,095 0
Total 30,908 7,840 2,489,259 8,886 2,480,373 0
Table 1 (cont.): Data preparation and sample statistics
advised and unadvised 
bids/acquisitions
Days between the 1st and 2nd bid in SDC
Days between the 2nd and 3rd bid in SDC
Days between the 3rd and 4th bid in SDC
Days between the 4th and 5th bid in SDC
Days between the 5th and 6th and higher bid in SDC
Panel G: Time series of acquisitions/bids and possible bid-bank matches
Number of acquisitions/bids in the final sample
Number of acquirers/bidders in the final sample
Acquisitions per acquirer and sequence 
Days between acquisitions/bids
Panel F: Major acquisitions series characteristics in the final sample
bid-bank matchesbanks
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3.4 Description of variables 
 
The selection equation that the probability of the M&A being advised depends on 
the transaction’s complexity has to be estimated by probit and tobit panel 
regressions. The dependent variable ADVISED is a dummy that is 1 if the bid or 
acquisition is advised by at least one investment bank and 0 otherwise (Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996). The alternative dependent variable ADVISORCHOICE is 1 if no 
advisor is chosen, 2 if the bidder’s chosen lead bank with the highest market share 
MS is a non-bulge-bracket bank and 3 if the leading bank is a bulge-bracket bank. 
In the hypothesis tests the dependent variable SUCCESSORBID is 1 if the current 
M&A is succeeded by another M&A of the same bidder. OLDADVISOR is a 
dummy and indicates whether the current bank advisor who advised the bidder 
within the last 3 years is retained (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013). The variables are 
summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in table C, which is 
shared with chapters 2 and 4.  
The independent bank variables used to approximate investment banks’ access to 
information in the bidder’s and target’s industries and to bidder’s private 
information directly are adapted and modified from previous research (Chang, 
Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013; Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, & Saunders, 2004; 
Benveniste, Busaba, & Wilhelm, 2002; Forte, Iannotta, & Navone, 2010). The 
industry expertise i,k,tIE  is the sum of the investment bank’s i  investment banking 
skills and its access to information in (Fama & French, 1997) industry k  at time t . 
The industry expertise is measured either by the acquisition dollar volume (V) or 
the number of acquisitions (D) advised relative to the total volume or number of 
advised acquisitions in each of the 1,..., 49k =  (Fama & French, 1997) industries 
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in the three years 1t − , 2t − , 3t −  preceding year t  of the acquisition or bid. If 
the target and acquirer within the same industry are both advised the deal is 
counted once for the industry to avoid double counting. Avoidance of double 
counting guarantees that a bank which participated in every M&A as advisor on 
either the target’s or bidder’s side has an expertise of 1. Only acquisitions or bids 
that are advised on the bidders’, targets’ or both sides are counted for the number 
(D) or dollar volume (V) of advised deals. The industry expertise variables are 
IEDA, IEVA, IEDT and IEVT. The missing values in unadvised transactions are 
set to zero.  
The proxy for the access to bidder information is the advisory relationship strength 
ARS based on the arguments of (Anand & Galetovic, 2006) that building of 
relationships by investment banks with the bidding companies enables banks to get 
access to bidders’ private information. The measure is adapted from (Forte, 
Iannotta, & Navone, 2010) and (Allen, Jagtiani, Peristiani, & Saunders, 2004).  
The advisory relationship strength is based on the number (ARSD) or dollar 
volume (ARSV) of M&As bank i  advised with respect to the number or dollar 
volume of all advised M&As bidder j  conducted in the three years preceding the 
acquisition or bid considered in year t . The strength of the advisory relationship is 
a relative measure. The industry expertise and advisory relationship strength 
variables of the Top-25 banks in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables and sample 
A are summarized in table A in the statistical appendix, which is shared with 
chapters 2 and 4. 
Additionally the advisor’s market share MS over all industries and advised deals as 
reputation proxy is used. A higher reputation has been associated with better 
investment banking skills in previous studies (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003; Rau, 
2000).  
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
SUCCESSORBID 31,954 0.6659 1.0000 0.4717 0.0000 1.0000
OLDADVISOR 31,954 0.0453 0.0000 0.2081 0.0000 1.0000
ADVISED 31,954 0.2781 0.0000 0.4481 0.0000 1.0000
ADVISORCHOICE 31,954 1.4025 1.0000 0.6995 1.0000 3.0000
IEDA 31,954 0.0213 0.0000 0.0546 0.0000 0.6667
IEDT 31,954 0.0206 0.0000 0.0532 0.0000 0.6574
IEVA 31,954 0.0340 0.0000 0.0960 0.0000 0.9418
IEVT 31,954 0.0331 0.0000 0.0939 0.0000 0.8879
ARSD 31,954 0.0154 0.0000 0.0847 0.0000 1.0000
ARSV 31,954 0.0155 0.0000 0.0854 0.0000 1.0000
MS 31,954 2.7883 0.0000 7.5363 0.0000 94.6000
PASTBBCAR 31,954 0.0067 0.0000 0.0514 -0.1994 0.3135
PASTBIDDERCAR 31,954 0.0079 0.0000 0.0618 -0.1994 0.3135
DIVERS 31,954 0.4288 0.0000 0.4949 0.0000 1.0000
MAJORITY 31,954 0.9487 1.0000 0.2206 0.0000 1.0000
PUBLIC 31,954 0.2065 0.0000 0.4048 0.0000 1.0000
RDS 31,954 0.2467 0.0692 0.5036 0.0002 3.6040
TADVISORTIER 31,954 0.5352 0.0000 0.7529 0.0000 2.0000
MULTIPLE 31,954 1.0271 1.0000 0.2050 1.0000 8.0000
ANTITAKEOVER 31,954 0.0379 0.0000 0.1909 0.0000 1.0000
FAMILY 31,954 0.0031 0.0000 0.0553 0.0000 1.0000
LITIGATION 31,954 0.0181 0.0000 0.1334 0.0000 1.0000
REGULATORY 31,954 0.2898 0.0000 0.4537 0.0000 1.0000
CROSSBORDER 31,954 0.0612 0.0000 0.2397 0.0000 1.0000
DIVERSIFICATION 31,954 0.5002 0.0000 0.5794 0.0000 3.2189
TOEHOLD 31,954 1.8860 0.0000 10.2811 -0.0300 99.8000
HIGHTECH 31,954 0.2874 0.0000 0.4526 0.0000 1.0000
STOCK 31,954 0.1859 0.0000 0.3891 0.0000 1.0000
CASH 31,954 0.2423 0.0000 0.4285 0.0000 1.0000
MIXED 31,954 0.1951 0.0000 0.3963 0.0000 1.0000
OTHER 31,954 0.0868 0.0000 0.2816 0.0000 1.0000
FIRST 31,954 0.3302 0.0000 0.4703 0.0000 1.0000
SIXTH 31,954 0.2518 0.0000 0.4341 0.0000 1.0000
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of the transaction variables
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the bank/advisor variables
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables
This table reports the sample statist ics of the dependent, bank, bidder and transaction variables. The variables
are described in table C in the stat istical appendix. The continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and
lower 1 percentile to exclude outliers.
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
SCOPE 31,954 0.3036 0.0000 0.4598 0.0000 1.0000
DEALS3YEARS 31,954 1.7123 1.0000 2.9486 0.0000 41.0000
LOGME 31,954 20.3974 20.3154 2.1567 15.0841 25.7360
LNIS 31,954 6.6107 6.7719 0.9283 1.6094 7.9491
TobinsQ 31,954 2.1307 1.4492 2.1052 0.7074 16.1560
ITobinsQ 31,954 2.1184 1.8862 0.9232 0.8867 6.2588
ATobinsQ 31,954 0.0124 -0.2253 1.8525 -5.1792 14.9771
ROA 31,954 0.0557 0.0684 0.1473 -1.0911 0.3314
IROA 31,954 -0.0346 0.0075 0.1098 -0.7143 0.1666
AROA 31,954 0.0903 0.0718 0.1661 -1.1947 0.7949
LEVERAGE 31,954 0.2382 0.2060 0.2023 0.0000 0.9980
ILEVERAGE 31,954 0.2645 0.2708 0.0772 0.0752 0.4962
ALEVERAGE 31,954 -0.0263 -0.0532 0.1829 -0.4599 0.8223
AADVISOR 2,489,259 0.0036 0.0000 0.0596 0.0000 1.0000
IEDT 2,489,259 0.0116 0.0000 0.0347 0.0000 0.8333
IEDA 2,489,259 0.0117 0.0000 0.0351 0.0000 0.8333
ARSD 2,489,259 0.0005 0.0000 0.0150 0.0000 1.0000
IEVT 2,489,259 0.0156 0.0000 0.0582 0.0000 0.9418
IEVA 2,489,259 0.0157 0.0000 0.0589 0.0000 0.9704
ARSV 2,489,259 0.0005 0.0000 0.0151 0.0000 1.0000
PASTBBCAR 2,489,259 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 -0.1994 0.3135
RDS 2,489,259 0.4106 0.1815 0.6109 0.0002 3.6040
MS 2,489,259 0.7878 0.1000 3.3914 0.0000 94.6000
LOGME 2,489,259 20.9858 20.8738 2.0309 15.0841 25.7360
ARSD 8,886 0.0553 0.0000 0.1536 0.0000 1.0000
ARSV 8,886 0.0557 0.0000 0.1550 0.0000 1.0000
IEDT 8,886 0.0743 0.0521 0.0787 0.0000 0.6574
IEDA 8,886 0.0764 0.0536 0.0807 0.0000 0.6667
IEVT 8,886 0.1190 0.0513 0.1466 0.0000 0.8879
IEVA 8,886 0.1222 0.0539 0.1497 0.0000 0.9418
MS 8,886 10.0268 5.9000 11.4746 0.1000 94.6000
PASTBANKCAR 8,886 0.0074 0.0000 0.0840 -0.1994 0.3135
DEALS3YEARS 8,886 1.4931 1.0000 2.3953 0.0000 28.0000
ATobinsQ 8,886 0.0207 -0.1802 1.8604 -5.1723 14.5082
AROA 8,886 0.1057 0.0806 0.1556 -1.1152 0.7949
ALEVERAGE 8,886 -0.0274 -0.0537 0.1756 -0.4545 0.8071
LOGME 8,886 21.0566 20.9537 2.0205 15.0841 25.7360
Table 2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of the bidder variables
Panel E: Descriptive statistics of the subsample of possible bank-deal matches
Panel F: Descriptive statistics of the subsample of banks and their advised deals
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The market share of the investment bank is taken from the SDC Top-50 M&A 
League Tables according to (Rau, 2000), (Servaes & Zenner, 1996), (Francis, 
Hasan, & Sun, 2008) and (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). The market share MS of 
investment banks included in sample A but not appearing in the SDC Top-50 
M&A League Table is set to 0.1 and for unadvised deals to 0. According to 
(Derrien & Dessaint, 2012) however the league table rankings and market share 
MS are measures of investment banks’ skills or reputation that have to be used 
with caution due to their manipulation by banks. 
Finally the past acquisition and advisory performance of banks is modeled 
similarly to (Rau, 2000) and (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003). PASTBBCAR is the 
cumulative abnormal return ( )CAR 2,2− , computed with the Beta-1 model using 
the CRSP value-weighted index as market proxy, if the bank advised the bidder in 
a previous M&A. If the deal is unadvised PASTBBCAR is the return of the 
acquirer’s previous unadvised bid or acquisition. PASTBIDDERCAR is the 
bidder’s previous deal’s return independent of its advisory status.  
PASTBANKCAR is the ( )
1
CAR 2,2
i−
−  of the previous deal advised by the same 
bank, independent of the bidder. The CAR computation with the Beta-1 model 
avoids the problem of overlapping M&As in the pre-merger period (Fuller, Netter, 
& Stegemoller, 2002; Brown & Warner, 1985; 1980; Aktas, Bodt, & Cousin, 
2007).  
The calculation of the industry expertise, advisory relationship strength, market 
share and past performance variables requires adjustments for bank mergers and 
banks’ name changes. The assumption is that the successor bank inherits the 
expertise and advisory relationships of its predecessors. The ultimate parent bank 
has inherited all relationships and industry expertise of its former banks. Table B in 
the statistical appendix shared with chapters 2 and 4 includes the mergers and 
name changes of the 395 banks in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables from 
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1979 to 2006 together with 201 ultimate parents as of 12/31/2006. The 
methodology to track name changes and mergers is adapted from (Ljungqvist, 
Marston, & Wilhelm, 2006) complemented by a research in the Factiva and 
LexisNexis press database, websites and annual reports of banks. Implied by the 
adjustments is that predecessor bank’s major bankers, who embody the expertise 
and client relationships, stay with the successor bank (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). 
The name changes and mergers of banks not in the SDC Top-50 M&A League 
Table are not tracked, because sample A includes 1,854 and sample B 718 different 
banks. The 395 banks in the SDC M&A League Tables advise approximately 75% 
of all bids in SDC M&A sample A.  
The acquisition experience of the bidder is approximated by the number of bids or 
acquisitions he conducted in the previous three years, measured by the variable 
DEALS3YEARS (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). Larger companies are known to make 
larger and more acquisitions in general, which makes them attractive for 
investment banks as clients (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; Hunter & 
Walker, 1990). The bidder’s size is approximated by the logarithm of the bidder’s 
market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year before the announcement of the 
acquisition using the variable LOGME. 
To be able to conduct M&As the bidding company needs sufficient resources. The 
ability to bid for target companies increase in the ability to finance the acquisition. 
The profitability is measured with the variable ROA calculated according to 
(Heron & Lie, 2002). Higher leverage constrains bidder’s management in its 
attempts to acquire other companies. Leverage is modeled with the variable 
LEVERAGE according to (Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007). Besides a sufficient 
amount of resources a larger investment opportunity set, measured by Tobin’s Q, is 
expected to indicate more profitable acquisition opportunities (Lang, Stulz, & 
Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991). However, the measurement of Tobin’s Q is 
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difficult as marginal Q is usually not observable while average Tobin’s Q might be 
a flawed approximation (Hennessy, 2004). The simplified approximation by 
(Andrade & Stafford, 2004) of the bidder’s market value of equity divided his book 
value of his assets is used as it is easy to compute and to interpret. Similar to all 
other continuous variables TobinsQ is winsorized at the upper and lower 1% 
percentile.  
All mentioned variables measure the individual acquirer’s characteristics. 
According to the neoclassical theory of mergers and acquisitions those companies 
with the highest profitability and largest set of investment opportunities in an 
industry are going to acquire other companies (Andrade & Stafford, 2004; 
Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002; 2001; Harford, 2005; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996). 
The size of the set of investment opportunities and profitability are measured 
relative to the industry average. The average industry leverage is controlled with 
the variable ILEVERAGE, which is the annual mean of the (Fama & French, 
1997) industry. The average industry Tobin’s Q as ITobinsQ and average industry 
ROA as IROA are similarly defined as ILEVERGE, excluding the bidder’s values 
from the calculation. The size of the industry is measured with the variable LNIS, 
the natural logarithm of the number of companies in the bidder’s primary industry 
in the year before the deal (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001; 2002). The difference 
between the bidder’s values and industry’s averages are measured with the 
variables ATobinsQ, AROA and ALEVERAGE, with A for “abnormal”5. 
The variables of the deal characteristics that approximate the transaction’s 
contracting costs, potential agency conflicts and information asymmetry are taken 
from the previous literature and are shown in table 2 and described in table C in the 
statistical appendix. Different to previous studies the method of payment is 
                                                          
5 The Compustat sample of 558,263 company-years includes for Tobin’s Q and ROA so many positive 
outliers, and for LEVERAGE negative ones, that winsorizing by 5% at the upper and lower tail was 
necessary. Company-years with negative total assets are excluded. 
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modeled with the dummies STOCK, CASH, MIXED and OTHER (Martin, 1996), 
whereas these dummies together are all zero for the 28.57% of deals with missing 
payment method information. Variables for the mode of the acquisition whether it 
is a merger or tender offer are not used. The mode of the acquisition is usually 
determined with the advisor after he has been chosen (Bao & Edmans, 2011). 
The dummy SIXTH is used for long acquisition sequences to control for hidden 
factors not included explicitly. Controlling for the different lengths of acquisition 
sequence in the panel is necessary as the characteristics of the transactions, bidding 
companies and chosen advising investment banks change over the course of 
successive transactions (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 
2009; 2011; Ahern, 2008). The change in the characteristics of the advising banks, 
bidders and transactions is subject of the univariate analyses. The independent 
variables are mostly shared with chapters 2 and 4.  
 
3.5 Univariate analysis of advisor choices and acquisition sequences 
 
The univariate analyses of the primary panel of 31,954 observations examine the 
differences in the advisor, bidder, and transaction characteristics along the 
acquisition sequence as well as between the advisor types. The distribution of the 
variables is of interest to check whether the advisory relationships and transaction 
characteristics change along the acquisition sequence and differ between the 
M&As that are unadvised or advised by non-bulge-bracket banks and bulge-
bracket banks. 
The definition of a non-bulge-bracket bank and a bulge-bracket bank is adapted 
from (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003) and (Rau, 2000). A bank is defined as a bulge-
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bracket bank if it has an annual rank of 10 or higher based on its weighted ranks of 
the last three years in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables. A non-bulge-bracket 
bank has a weighted rank of 11 or less. Banks that do not appear in the SDC Top-
50 M&A League Tables but in the SDC M&A sample A are labeled as non-bulge-
bracket banks. To avoid a look-ahead bias and to adjust for changes in the 
perception of the ranking of investment bank i  in year t  the rank is the sum of the 
equally weighted ranks of the current year 0t =  and the preceding two years 1t −  
and 2t − . The formula is ( )t, i t, i t-1, i t-2, iNewRank = rank +rank +rank 3 . The 
analysis in table 3 reveals that bulge-bracket banks have a significantly greater 
industry expertise and advisory relationship strength than non-bulge-bracket banks 
and are chosen or retained more often as old advisors in advised bids or acquisition 
in later stages of the acquisition sequence. The significant difference between 
transactions advised by different advisor types requires controlling for selection. 
The multivariate analysis of selection between advisor types in table 5 shows 
similar observations. 
The distribution of the advisor characteristics along the acquisition sequence shows 
in table 4 a significant increase of the industry expertise in the bidders’ and targets’ 
industries of banks chosen as advisor. Hence more experienced banks are chosen in 
later acquisitions. Later acquisitions are more often advised by more familiar bank 
advisors, even though serial bidders’ experience in terms of deals in the last three 
years is increasing. The repeated interaction of advising banks with serial bidders 
results in a greater familiarity and industry expertise after several acquisitions, 
which is preliminary evidence for the hypothesis and theoretical models of (Anand 
& Galetovic, 2006) and (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). Tables 3 and 4 are 
comparable to the univariate analysis in chapters 2 and 4. However, the past 
performance of advised deals in terms of returns is decreasing after the fifths bid, 
which coincides with the learning hypothesis of (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011) 
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and is observed in previous studies as well (Ahern, 2008; Fuller, Netter, & 
Stegemoller, 2002; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). 
The bidder becomes larger measured by his market capitalization LOGME, 
because he integrates acquired companies, which is observed by (Ahern, 2008) as 
well. The growth in size is caused by the exploitation of investment opportunities 
in the investment opportunity set (Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). The at first larger 
bidders’ Tobin’s Q decreases along the acquisition sequences, which hints at the 
observation of (Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007) that serial bidders with the largest 
investment opportunities make more acquisitions to exploit these opportunities. 
The abnormal Tobin’s Q is at first positive and becomes negative in the fourth bid 
or acquisition. Hence another question is whether the optimal exploitation of 
investment opportunities occurs until the fourth M&A. The industry Tobin’s Q is 
larger along the acquisition sequence, because more acquisitions are possible in 
industries with better investment opportunities (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002). 
Together with a greater likelihood of a successor deal in later transactions ROA 
and AROA are larger in later transactions, too. Bidders’ in larger industries make 
more acquisitions, indicated by a larger industry size in later bids. These 
observations provide preliminary evidence for the neoclassical theory that more 
profitable companies in larger industries with better investment opportunities make 
more acquisitions (Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). 
Regarding the deal characteristics later acquisitions or bids are more complex. It 
follows that the increasing proportion of bidder-advisor matches with familiar 
banks with a greater expertise in later M&As coincides with the increasing 
transaction costs and information asymmetries of those deals (Servaes & Zenner, 
1996; Ahern, 2008). However, the fraction of cross-border transactions is 
diminishing and the bidder has a greater toehold in the targets of later stages, 
which reduces the information asymmetry. 
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Acquirer advisor tier unadvised non-bulge-bracket bulge-bracket All Bids t-test t-test
N 23,068 4,911 3,975 31,954 p-value p-value
Variable 1 2 3 1 - 3 = 0 2 - 3 = 0
SUCCESSORBID Mean 0.6722 0.6186 0.6875 0.6659 0.0281 0.0000
OLDADVISOR Mean 0.0000 0.1317 0.2018 0.0453 0.0000 0.0000
IEDA Mean 0.0000 0.0409 0.1203 0.0213 0.0000 0.0000
IEDT Mean 0.0000 0.0408 0.1156 0.0206 0.0000 0.0000
IEVA Mean 0.0000 0.0384 0.2257 0.0340 0.0000 0.0000
IEVT Mean 0.0000 0.0379 0.2191 0.0331 0.0000 0.0000
ARSD Mean 0.0000 0.0435 0.0699 0.0154 0.0000 0.0000
ARSV Mean 0.0000 0.0435 0.0709 0.0155 0.0000 0.0000
MS Mean 0.0000 2.0798 19.8451 2.7883 0.0000 0.0000
PASTBBCAR Mean 0.0084 0.0027 0.0021 0.0067 0.0000 0.2262
PASTBIDDERCAR Mean 0.0083 0.0079 0.0054 0.0079 0.0027 0.0371
SCOPE Mean 0.2879 0.2997 0.3036 0.3036 0.0000 0.0000
DEALS3YEARS Mean 1.7968 1.3038 1.7123 1.7123 0.0920 0.0000
LOGME Mean 20.1435 20.3757 20.3974 20.3974 0.0000 0.0000
LNIS Mean 6.6044 6.7126 6.6107 6.6107 0.0000 0.0000
TobinsQ Mean 2.1137 2.1754 2.1307 2.1307 0.0460 0.4912
ITobinsQ Mean 2.1045 2.1475 2.1184 2.1184 0.0001 0.2388
ATobinsQ Mean 0.0091 0.0278 0.0124 0.0124 0.4668 0.3430
ROA Mean 0.0525 0.0509 0.0557 0.0557 0.0000 0.0000
IROA Mean -0.0319 -0.0430 -0.0346 -0.0346 0.0000 0.0970
AROA Mean 0.0844 0.0940 0.0903 0.0903 0.0000 0.0000
LEVERAGE Mean 0.2420 0.2091 0.2382 0.2382 0.0014 0.0000
ILEVERAGE Mean 0.2679 0.2489 0.2645 0.2645 0.0036 0.0000
ALEVERAGE Mean -0.0259 -0.0399 -0.0263 -0.0263 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3: Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer and transaction variables by the advisor type
Panel A: Dependent and bank/advisor variables
Table 3 shows the distribution of variables between the types of advisory choices. The last two columns show the t-tests with
p-values and differences between the unadvised (1), non-bulge-bracket bank advised (2) and bulge-bracket bank (3) advised
deals.
Panel B: Bidder variables
 
 
87 
 
Acquirer advisor tier unadvised non-bulge-bracket bulge-bracket All Bids t-test t-test
N 23,068 4,911 3,975 31,954 p-value p-value
Variable 1 2 3 1 - 3 = 0 2 - 3 = 0
DIVERS Mean 0.4498 0.3604 0.3919 0.4288 0.0000 0.0011
MAJORITY Mean 0.9391 0.9794 0.9665 0.9487 0.0000 0.0001
PUBLIC Mean 0.1348 0.3653 0.4267 0.2065 0.0000 0.0000
RDS Mean 0.1713 0.4632 0.4166 0.2467 0.0000 0.0003
TADVISORTIER Mean 0.3100 0.9597 1.3180 0.5352 0.0000 0.0000
MULTIPLE Mean 1.0126 1.0495 1.0835 1.0271 0.0000 0.0000
ANTITAKEOVER Mean 0.0168 0.0804 0.1074 0.0379 0.0000 0.0000
FAMILY Mean 0.0021 0.0043 0.0070 0.0031 0.0000 0.0399
LITIGATION Mean 0.0075 0.0350 0.0589 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000
REGULATORY Mean 0.2032 0.4970 0.5361 0.2898 0.0000 0.0001
CROSSBORDER Mean 0.0537 0.0872 0.0727 0.0612 0.0000 0.0065
DIVERSIFICATION Mean 0.4293 0.6380 0.7414 0.5002 0.0000 0.0000
TOEHOLD Mean 1.6892 1.7831 3.1553 1.8860 0.0000 0.0000
HIGHTECH Mean 0.2788 0.3221 0.2946 0.2874 0.0203 0.0026
STOCK Mean 0.1572 0.2916 0.2221 0.1859 0.0000 0.0000
CASH Mean 0.2366 0.2429 0.2745 0.2423 0.0000 0.0004
MIXED Mean 0.1625 0.2790 0.2803 0.1951 0.0000 0.4466
OTHER Mean 0.0965 0.0536 0.0719 0.0868 0.0000 0.0002
FIRST Mean 0.3379 0.3470 0.2652 0.3302 0.0000 0.0000
SIXTH Mean 0.2503 0.2004 0.3245 0.2518 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3 (cont.): Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer and transaction variables
Panel C: Transaction variables
Table 3 shows the distribution of variables over the types of advisory choices. The last two columns show the t-tests with p-values and
differences between the unadvised (1), non-bulge-bracket bank advised (2) and bulge-bracket bank (3) advised deals.
 
88 
 
FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH SIXTH All Bids t-test t-test
Variable N 10,552 5,511 3,515 2,485 1,844 8,047 31,954 1/2 - 5 = 0 1/2 - 6 = 0
SUCCESSORBID Mean 0.5195 0.6362 0.6962 0.7433 0.7505 0.8215 0.6659 0.0000 0.0000
OLDADVISOR Mean 0.0000 0.0377 0.0586 0.0652 0.0781 0.0906 0.0453 0.0000 0.0000
ADVISED Mean 0.2614 0.2854 0.2862 0.2966 0.2918 0.2826 0.2781 0.0032 0.0006
ADVISORCHOICE Mean 1.3613 1.3934 1.4097 1.4262 1.4436 1.4429 1.4025 0.0000 0.0000
IEDA Mean 0.0182 0.0204 0.0221 0.0234 0.0247 0.0240 0.0213 0.0000 0.0000
IEDT Mean 0.0181 0.0195 0.0220 0.0220 0.0229 0.0232 0.0206 0.0001 0.0000
IEVA Mean 0.0262 0.0303 0.0344 0.0352 0.0406 0.0446 0.0340 0.0000 0.0000
IEVT Mean 0.0262 0.0300 0.0346 0.0327 0.0390 0.0423 0.0331 0.0000 0.0000
ARSD Mean 0.0000 0.0092 0.0161 0.0212 0.0246 0.0356 0.0154 0.0000 0.0000
ARSV Mean 0.0000 0.0092 0.0161 0.0213 0.0248 0.0360 0.0155 0.0000 0.0000
MS Mean 2.1717 2.5352 2.7440 2.8377 3.2966 3.6579 2.7883 0.0000 0.0000
PASTBBCAR Mean 0.0000 0.0127 0.0124 0.0121 0.0112 0.0063 0.0067 0.2039 0.0000
PASTBIDDERCAR Mean 0.0000 0.0192 0.0139 0.0137 0.0119 0.0051 0.0079 0.0006 0.0000
SCOPE Mean 0.1728 0.2597 0.3141 0.3505 0.3774 0.4694 0.3036 0.0000 0.0000
DEALS3YEARS Mean 0.0000 0.6966 1.2356 1.7404 2.1855 4.7445 1.7123 0.0000 0.0000
LOGME Mean 19.7098 19.9317 20.2171 20.5131 20.6855 21.5949 20.3974 0.0000 0.0000
LNIS Mean 6.5305 6.5548 6.5756 6.5758 6.6113 6.7801 6.6107 0.0003 0.0000
TobinsQ Mean 2.2066 2.2037 2.1086 2.0753 2.0381 2.0293 2.1307 0.0013 0.0000
ITobinsQ Mean 2.0652 2.1235 2.1140 2.1333 2.1284 2.1796 2.1184 0.0032 0.0000
ATobinsQ Mean 0.1414 0.0802 -0.0054 -0.0580 -0.0903 -0.1503 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000
ROA Mean 0.0339 0.0513 0.0614 0.0723 0.0736 0.0755 0.0557 0.0000 0.0000
IROA Mean -0.0284 -0.0324 -0.0348 -0.0349 -0.0341 -0.0443 -0.0346 0.0177 0.0000
AROA Mean 0.0623 0.0838 0.0961 0.1072 0.1078 0.1198 0.0903 0.0000 0.0000
LEVERAGE Mean 0.2194 0.2207 0.2303 0.2412 0.2509 0.2747 0.2382 0.0000 0.0000
ILEVERAGE Mean 0.2627 0.2626 0.2640 0.2655 0.2660 0.2679 0.2645 0.0456 0.0000
ALEVERAGE Mean -0.0433 -0.0419 -0.0338 -0.0243 -0.0151 0.0068 -0.0263 0.0000 0.0000
Panel C: Distribution of the bidder variables
Panel B: Distribution of the bank variables
Table 4: Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer, and transaction variables between the bids
Table 4 shows the distribution of variables along the bids/acquisitions of acquisit ion sequences. The last column shows the t-tests with
p-values between the first (1) or second (2) and fifths (5) or sixths and higher bids (6). The variables are summarized in table 2 and
described in the statist ical appendix in table C.
Panel A: Distribution of the dependent variables
bids in the sequence
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FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH FIFTH SIXTH All Bids t-test t-test
Variable N 10,552 5,511 3,515 2,485 1,844 8,047 31,954 1 - 5 = 0 1 - 6 = 0
DIVERS Mean 0.4182 0.4242 0.4202 0.4266 0.4387 0.4481 0.4288 0.0500 0.0000
MAJORITY Mean 0.9542 0.9497 0.9462 0.9433 0.9501 0.9432 0.9487 0.2190 0.0003
PUBLIC Mean 0.1724 0.1878 0.2040 0.2040 0.2104 0.2652 0.2065 0.0000 0.0000
RDS Mean 0.3076 0.2758 0.2512 0.2128 0.2111 0.1635 0.2467 0.0000 0.0000
TADVISORTIER Mean 0.4418 0.4936 0.5272 0.5590 0.5857 0.6709 0.5352 0.0000 0.0000
MULTIPLE Mean 1.0223 1.0245 1.0296 1.0217 1.0298 1.0352 1.0271 0.0624 0.0000
ANTITAKEOVER Mean 0.0235 0.0357 0.0367 0.0382 0.0401 0.0580 0.0379 0.0000 0.0000
FAMILY Mean 0.0030 0.0034 0.0037 0.0028 0.0049 0.0022 0.0031 0.1011 0.1496
LITIGATION Mean 0.0158 0.0187 0.0174 0.0177 0.0141 0.0221 0.0181 0.2903 0.0008
REGULATORY Mean 0.2380 0.2593 0.2799 0.2954 0.3118 0.3760 0.2898 0.0000 0.0000
CROSSBORDER Mean 0.0831 0.0686 0.0617 0.0604 0.0521 0.0295 0.0612 0.0000 0.0000
DIVERSIFICATION Mean 0.4601 0.4886 0.5029 0.5386 0.5274 0.5415 0.5002 0.0000 0.0000
TOEHOLD Mean 1.5406 2.0898 2.0169 2.1151 2.1728 2.0058 1.8860 0.0047 0.0007
HIGHTECH Mean 0.2819 0.2999 0.2979 0.2869 0.2777 0.2838 0.2874 0.3531 0.3881
STOCK Mean 0.1757 0.1909 0.1866 0.1710 0.1638 0.2053 0.1859 0.1063 0.0000
CASH Mean 0.2079 0.2419 0.2444 0.2523 0.2619 0.2790 0.2423 0.0000 0.0000
MIXED Mean 0.1966 0.2012 0.2171 0.2020 0.2088 0.1739 0.1951 0.1139 0.0000
OTHER Mean 0.1344 0.0962 0.0765 0.0724 0.0575 0.0337 0.0868 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4 (cont.): Univariate tests of the dependent, advisor, acquirer, and transaction variables between the bids
Panel D: Distribution of the transaction variables
bids in the sequence
 
That more complex transactions are more likely to be advised by bulge-bracket 
banks is not so obvious from the univariate analyses. This is similar to (Song, 
Zhou, & Wei, 2013) observation that non-bulge-bracket banks are employed in 
complex transactions as well. 
Finally the univariate analyses provide first empirical support for the first part of 
the hypothesis that investment banks with a greater industry expertise and advisory 
relationship strength are more often chosen and retained as advisors, which is 
comparable to the observations made by (Song, Zhou, & Wei, 2013) and (Forte, 
Iannotta, & Navone, 2010). Similarly to (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002) the 
transaction, bidder and advisor characteristics change in successor transactions. 
Whether these preliminary empirical observations for the selection equation and 
hypothesis are supported by the regression analyses and whether the choice of 
90 
 
investment banks as advisors affects the likelihood of successor bids, which also 
affect banks’ accumulation of expertise and client relationships, is subject of the 
multivariate analyses. 
  
3.7 Multivariate analyses 
 
3.7.1 Analysis of advisor selection  
 
After the univariate analysis of outliers the multivariate outlier analysis is based on 
a Mahalanobis Distance D² analysis (Bar-Hen & Daudin, 1995; Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, & Black, 1998; Mahalanobis, 1936). The Mahalanobis Distance D² 
measure is used, because a transaction might not be identified as an outlier with 
respect to each individual variable. The extreme combination of several variables 
might move the observation beyond the sphere of the multivariate normal 
distribution focused around the centroid. The centroid is the representative 
observation, the average combination of variables. The Mahalanobis Distance D² 
measure rescales all variables onto a common scale. The distance of the variables’ 
values to the centroid becomes measurable. At the 1% and 0.1% confidence levels 
no deal is excluded from sample B. The potential heteroscedasticity arising from 1 
to 6 bid-bank matches for advised M&A is addressed with the Huber & White 
sandwich estimator and the observed information matrix (OIM) in the probit panel 
models (Huber, 1967; Efron & Hinkley, 1978; White, 1980).  
The probit and tobit panel regressions of the selection equations are shown in table 
5. The coefficients of bidder’s M&A experience as well as his profitability 
compared to the industry’s mean have the expected signs.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit RE panel probit FE panel tobit RE panel tobit
PASTBIDDERCAR -0.0294 -0.0619 -0.1176 -0.3409
(-0.674) (-1.370) (-0.368) (-1.060)
TADVISORTIER 0.1478*** 0.1876*** 1.1747*** 1.4790***
(29.487) (39.092) (31.516) (44.723)
DEALS3YEARS 0.0248*** 0.0496*** 0.2182*** 0.4127***
(2.763) (6.561) (3.250) (8.202)
SCOPE -0.0070*** -0.0103*** -0.0485*** -0.0775***
(-4.382) (-5.584) (-3.990) (-6.929)
ATobinsQ 0.0012 0.0042** -0.0135 0.0281**
(0.451) (2.285) (-0.702) (2.212)
AROA 0.0987** 0.1339*** 0.7091** 1.0670***
(2.403) (6.238) (2.255) (6.908)
ALEVERAGE 0.0295 -0.0210 0.1806 0.0093
(0.891) (-1.058) (0.730) (0.069)
SIXTH -0.0216** -0.0252** -0.1196 -0.0732
(-2.175) (-2.489) (-1.614) (-1.128)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes No Yes No
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
No. of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 6,345.46 5,817.17 5,104.96 4,220.16
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.3316 0.3237 0.2355 0.2404
Chi²-statistic γ=0 333.18 343.06
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5 shows the regressions of the advisory choices in M&As. The dependent variables are ADVISED
and ADVISORCHOICE. ADVISED is a dummy (0/1) if the deal is advised by a bank. ADVISORCHOICE is
1 for unadvised deals, 2 if the lead advisor with the largest SDC Top-50 League Table market share MS is
a non-bulge-bracket bank and 3 if the lead advisor is a bulge-bracket bank. The variables are summarized
in table 2 and described in the stat istical appendix in table C. T he coefficients are the marginal probability
effects at the mean. T he fixed effects in Chamberlain random effects probit panel model (1) and tobit
panel (3) based on (Mundlak, 1978) are reported if they are meaningful (Chamberlain, 1980; Wooldridge,
2002b). The standard errors of fixed and random effects panel regressions (1) to (4) are based on the
observed information matrix (OIM), the inverse Hessian, after maximum likelihood estimation (Efron &
Hinkley, 1978). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. The diagnostic statist ics of the models'
fit , the correlation of fixed or random effects ci with explanatory variables xit and the test of significance
of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown. 
Table 5: Regressions of the advisory choice in M&As
ADVISED
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ADVISORCHOICE
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit RE panel probit FE panel tobit RE panel tobit
DIVERS -0.0135* -0.0203*** -0.0888 -0.1256***
(-1.699) (-3.062) (-1.485) (-2.791)
MAJORITY 0.0803*** 0.0691*** 0.5478*** 0.4468***
(4.864) (4.016) (4.343) (4.048)
HOSTILE 0.0945*** 0.0774** 0.5656*** 0.4118**
(2.912) (2.241) (2.679) (2.210)
ANTITAKEOVER 0.0693*** 0.0837*** 0.4623*** 0.5257***
(4.269) (4.883) (4.128) (5.314)
FAMILY 0.0024 -0.0064 0.2274 0.1099
(0.048) (-0.119) (0.624) (0.340)
LITIGATION 0.0861*** 0.0850*** 0.4776*** 0.5235***
(3.466) (3.376) (2.863) (3.568)
REGULATORY 0.1131*** 0.1322*** 0.7955*** 0.9040***
(13.870) (18.471) (13.184) (18.117)
CROSSBORDER -0.0995 0.0624*** -0.9292 0.2918***
(-0.952) (4.566) (-1.211) (2.971)
TOEHOLD 0.0010*** 0.0015*** 0.0097*** 0.0140***
(3.228) (4.958) (4.336) (7.502)
HIGHTECH 0.0078 0.0222*** -0.0419 0.1484***
(0.452) (2.779) (-0.321) (2.599)
DIVERSIFICATION 0.0395*** 0.0408*** 0.2437*** 0.2690***
(6.510) (7.393) (5.449) (7.176)
MULTIPLE -0.0390** -0.0126 -0.2378** -0.0696
(-2.502) (-0.880) (-2.253) (-0.765)
RDS 0.2136*** 0.1422*** 1.1877*** 0.7793***
(23.454) (20.123) (20.035) (19.168)
LNIS 0.0243 0.0070* 0.1544 0.0186
(0.775) (1.719) (0.653) (0.635)
PUBLIC 0.0822*** 0.0933*** 0.4974*** 0.5624***
(9.217) (11.575) (7.663) (10.254)
STOCK 0.1430*** 0.1398*** 1.0914*** 0.9765***
(12.619) (13.464) (12.662) (13.824)
CASH 0.0670*** 0.0662*** 0.5503*** 0.5162***
(7.011) (7.446) (7.509) (8.356)
MIXED 0.1768*** 0.1574*** 1.3846*** 1.1467***
(16.738) (17.170) (17.306) (17.527)
OTHER 0.0922*** 0.0839*** 0.7845*** 0.6854***
(5.231) (4.924) (5.835) (5.675)
mean_TADVISORTIER 0.0982*** 0.7390***
(11.169) (11.547)
mean_DEALS3YEARS 0.0613*** 0.4464***
(4.436) (4.404)
mean_SCOPE -0.0178*** -0.1746***
(-4.212) (-5.693)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes No Yes No
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
No. of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 6,345.46 5,817.17 5,104.96 4,220.16
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.3316 0.3237 0.2355 0.2404
Chi²-statistic γ=0 333.18 343.06
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5 (cont.): Regressions of the advisory choice in M&As
ADVISED
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ADVISORCHOICE
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These empirical observations are similar to (Servaes & Zenner, 1996) and (Kale, 
Kini, & Ryan, 2003). The more experienced and successful the serial bidder is the 
less likely is the transaction advised, particularly by more reputable and 
experienced bulge-bracket banks. More profitable bidders facing advised targets in 
later deals however are likely to be advised, because investment banks are 
interested in these clients for successive advisory mandates. The likelihood to be 
advised by a bulge-bracket bank increases with the deal’s complexity compared to 
a non-bulge-bracket bank, shown in regressions (3) and (4) of table 5.  
The observation in table 5 of the transaction characteristics’ effects on the selection 
of the advisor type in regressions (3) and (4) coincides with the univariate 
observations in table 3 of significant transaction differences between the advisor 
types. The multivariate analysis of the hypothesis controls for selection primarily 
with instrumental variables (IV) estimation of the lagged Tobit-type selection 
indicator L1.ADVISORHOICE, which is explained in detail in econometric 
appendix E.2. The binary selection dummy ADVISED is used to control for 
selection in biprobit models with selection conceptually similar to (Heckman, 
1976; 1979) selection regressions used by (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012) 
and (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) to ensure comparability of the analysis to previous 
studies (Greene, 2008a; 2008b). 
 
3.7.2 Analyses of hiring and retaining a skilled and familiar bank advisor 
 
The first analysis in table 6 shows that banks with a greater industry expertise and 
greater advisory relationship strength, a better familiarity with the serial bidder, 
and a better past performance are more likely to be chosen as advisors. 
Conditioning on advised deals the pooled probit analysis of all possible bank-deal 
94 
 
matches reveals that the likelihood of a particular bank to be the acquirer’s advisor 
increases by 0.0178 0.0185 0.0003× =  or 0.03%6 given a one deal improvement in 
its industry expertise IEDT. Relative to a probability of 0.36% to be selected the 
one deal increase in IEDT results in a 0.03 0.36 0.0915=  or 9.15% higher 
probability to be chosen, which is a sizeable economic effect. For ARSD the effect 
is 0.0287 0.0418 0.0012× =  or 0.12 0.36 0.3332=  or 33.32%. A standard 
deviation higher past performance has a positive effect on the bank to be chosen of 
0.0326 0.0023 0.000075× =  or 0.0075 0.36 0.0208=  or 2.08%. Still reputation 
and visibility matter as a one standard deviation larger market share MS is 
associated with a 0.0003 3.3914 0.0010× =  or relative 0.10 0.36 0.2826=  or 
28.26% higher selection probability. The banks’ reported market shares, industry 
expertise and advisory relationships are related to each other in the accumulation of 
expertise and advisory relationships shown later in table 10. 
The relevance of the industry expertise, past performance and advisory relationship 
strength for the hiring and retention of a familiar advisor along the acquisition 
sequence is shown in table 7. The past performance of a previous deal advised by 
the same bank has no effect on the retention of a familiar bank, compared to the 
positive effect on the selection among all possible bank advisors. The industry 
expertise and past advisory choice of a bank with greater advisory relationship 
strength are the major determinants of hiring or retaining a familiar bank in the 
present deal. Controlling for selection in regressions (2) to (4) in table 7 the 
positive effect of the bank’s industry expertise to be retained is observed. The 
effect of the expertise in the target’s industry is larger if one controls for the past 
                                                          
6 The one deal increase of IEDT and IEVT is calculated as 
( )IEDT+1=IEDT+ 1/advised_industry_deal_number_3years  and for a deal increase of average value 
( )IEVT+1=IEVT+ average_deal_value/advised_industry_deal_volume_3years . The computations of 
ARSD+1  and ARSV+1  are similar. The means are 0.0185 for IEDT+1, 0.0527 for IEVT+1, 
0.0418 for ARSD+1 and 0.0424 for ARSV+1. 
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advisory choice in instrumental variables (IV) probit regression (4) that also solves 
the initial conditions problem of the stochastic process of advisor retention 
(Heckman, 1981). The models are explained in econometric appendix E.2. The 
bank has access to the serial bidder and improves its advisory relationship if it 
advised him in a past transaction, which increases its chances to be retained as 
familiar bank advisor in the current transaction. The advisory choice of the serial 
bidder’s previous transaction is considered, because according to the univariate 
analysis bulge-bracket banks have stronger client relationships than non-bulge-
bracket banks and are more often retained as familiar bank advisors. 
The analysis in panel B is similar to the analysis in panel A, except for the addition 
of the advisory relationship strength of the bank advisor chosen in the previous bid. 
The lagged advisory relationship strength is used to model the influence client 
relationships have on retaining familiar banks. The problem of lagged selection 
indicators is the truncation of the first bids in the sample, or one third of all 
observations (10,552). By construction the selection indicators are positively 
correlated with the bank variables, which are positive only in advised deals. The 
lagged selection indicators are still positively correlated, albeit smaller, with the 
current bid’s bank variables due to the positive correlation of retaining familiar 
bank advisors along the acquisition sequence (Nijman & Verbeek, 1992; Verbeek 
& Nijman, 1992). The correlation problem is solved with instrumental variables 
(IV) probit models for the lagged selection indicator ADVISORCHOICE. The IV 
approach to the inclusion of a lagged selection indicator also solves the initial 
conditions problem (Heckman, 1981), which is explained in econometric appendix 
E.2 in more detail. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES pooled probit pooled probit pooled probit pooled probit pooled probit pooled probit 
IEDT 0.0097*** 0.0179*** 0.0178***
(6.067) (6.956) (42.467)
IEDA 0.0104***
(6.946)
ARSD 0.0277*** 0.0284*** 0.0287***
(9.072) (8.994) (34.393)
IEVT 0.0025*** 0.0050*** 0.0049***
(3.166) (4.187) (15.165)
IEVA 0.0032***
(3.822)
ARSV 0.0313*** 0.0316*** 0.0319***
(9.166) (9.132) (37.041)
PASTBBCAR 0.0323*** 0.0329*** 0.0326*** 0.0360*** 0.0364*** 0.0361***
(2.969) (2.994) (6.665) (3.087) (3.098) (6.926)
RDS 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0001*** 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002***
(1.865) (1.792) (5.910) (1.754) (1.741) (6.049)
MS 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(7.090) (7.459) (89.540) (7.517) (7.850) (81.739)
LOGME -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001***
(-1.094) (-1.119) (-9.094) (-1.103) (-1.102) (-8.870)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transaction variables No No Yes No No Yes
Acquirer variables No No Yes No No Yes
N 2,489,259 2,489,259 2,489,259 2,489,259 2,489,259 2,489,259
N of banks/deals 1,854 1,854 7,840 1,854 1,854 7,840
Chi²-statistic 2,474.71 2,419.53 33,181.27 2,385.65 2,201.11 30,031.62
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: Regressions of the selection of a particular bank in advised deals
AADVISOR
Table 6 shows the probit analysis of selecting an advisor from all 1,854 banks in SDC M&A sample A, given that the bid is advised.
The dependent variable is AADVISOR, a dummy that indicates whether the particular bank is an advisor of the advised bid. The
independent variables are the bank characterist ics and in regressions (3) and (6) the acquirer and transact ion characteristics as well.
The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in the statist ical appendix in table C. The coefficients are the marginal
probability effects at the mean on P(AADVISOR=1). The standard errors are corrected with the Huber & White sandwich estimator
clustered by banks or deals (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). All probit regressions include year fixed effects and (Fama & French, 1997)
industry fixed effects that are not  reported.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit FE panel probit IV probit biprobit with selection
IEDT 0.1460*** 0.2855*** 0.4594*** 0.3003***
(10.128) (12.588) (16.750) (6.506)
PASTBBCAR 0.0075 0.0052 0.0148 0.1667
(1.096) (0.401) (0.546) (0.947)
L1.ADVISORCHOICE 0.0111*** 0.0286***
(9.227) (7.274)
DEALS3YEARS 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 0.0018*** 0.0177***
(3.935) (2.732) (2.997) (6.067)
RDS 0.0048*** 0.0084*** 0.0120*** -0.0205*
(4.885) (4.845) (3.958) (-1.819)
LNIS 0.0069* -0.0013 -0.0035 0.0162***
(1.689) (-0.168) (-0.229) (3.729)
ATobinsQ -0.0004 0.0004 0.0011 0.0039**
(-1.168) (0.690) (1.131) (2.195)
AROA -0.0039 -0.0079 -0.0235 -0.0221
(-0.639) (-0.663) (-1.146) (-0.854)
ALEVERAGE 0.0096** 0.0047 0.0010 -0.0100
(2.263) (0.578) (0.071) (-0.390)
SIXTH 0.0005 0.0039* 0.0058 0.0748***
(0.419) (1.800) (1.499) (4.834)
LOGME 0.0038*** 0.0036*** 0.0045* 0.0112***
(4.897) (2.606) (1.667) (4.593)
mean_IEDT 0.0208* -0.2397*** 0.1880***
(1.795) (-6.584) (3.028)
mean_PASTBBCAR -0.0122 -0.0069 -0.1284
(-0.577) (-0.173) (-1.308)
mean_L1.ADVISORCHOICE 0.0462***
(12.298)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Instrumented No No L1.ADVISORCHOICE ADVISED
N 31,954 21,402 21,402 31,954
No. of Acquirers 10,280 5,344 5,344 10,280
Chi² statistic 3,405.00 3,284.95 1,498.06 417.23
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.3424 0.1826 0.0697
Chi²-statistic γ=0 95.15 369.07 815.41
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 4.72 1.31
p-value of exogeneity 0.0298 0.2522
Table 7: Regressions of the hiring/retention of an old advisor
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7 panel A shows the primary regression of hiring or retaining an old advisor. T he dependent variable is OLDADVISOR and 1
if the chosen bank advised the bidder within the last three years and 0 for unfamiliar banks and unadvised deals. The variables are
summarized in table 2 and described in the statistical appendix in table C. ADVISORCHOICE serves as lagged Tobit-type selection
indicator in panel probit and instrumental variable (IV) probit regressions (2) and (3) (Nijman & Verbeek, 1992; Wooldridge,
2002a; Heckman, 1978; Hausmann, 1978; Vella, 1998). The instruments for ADVISED and ADVISORCHOICE in IV panel
regression (3) and biprobit regression with select ion (4) (Greene, 2008a, 2008b) are identical to regressions (2) and (4) in table 5.
The coefficients are the marginal effects at the mean on P(OLDADVISOR=1). The standard errors of regressions (1) and (2) are
based on the observed information matrix (OIM), the inverse Hessian, after maximum likelihood est imation (Efron & Hinkley,
1978). In IV probit regression (3) and biprobit regression (4) the Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by acquirers is used
to correct the standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. The fixed effects in
regressions (1) to (3) based on (Mundlak, 1978) are reported if they are meaningful. The diagnostic stat ist ics of the models' fit , the 
correlat ion of fixed effects ci with explanatory variables xit and the test of significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown. 
OLDADVISOR
Panel A: Primary analysis of 
hiring an old advisor
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit FE panel probit IV probit biprobit with selection
IEDT 0.3863*** 0.3535*** 0.4360*** 0.4250***
(15.583) (15.331) (17.700) (6.697)
L1.ARSD -0.0035 -0.0297*** -0.0344*** 0.4423***
(-0.466) (-4.380) (-2.818) (9.545)
PASTBBCAR 0.0047 0.0042 0.0044 0.1356
(0.256) (0.258) (0.175) (0.673)
L1.ADVISORCHOICE 0.0161*** 0.0217***
(11.058) (5.913)
DEALS3YEARS 0.0010** 0.0012*** 0.0017*** 0.0119***
(2.134) (2.949) (2.594) (4.761)
RDS 0.0111*** 0.0100*** 0.0116*** -0.0187
(4.528) (4.773) (4.179) (-1.336)
LNIS 0.0019 -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0242***
(0.176) (-0.017) (-0.095) (4.515)
ATobinsQ 0.0007 0.0007 0.0012 0.0091***
(0.808) (1.025) (1.353) (3.574)
AROA -0.0212 -0.0104 -0.0178 -0.0660*
(-1.251) (-0.713) (-0.977) (-1.857)
ALEVERAGE 0.0175 0.0071 0.0085 -0.0185
(1.496) (0.703) (0.634) (-0.563)
SIXTH 0.0052* 0.0068** 0.0086** 0.0346**
(1.665) (2.482) (2.221) (2.318)
LOGME 0.0054*** 0.0038** 0.0039 0.0113***
(2.750) (2.257) (1.559) (3.290)
mean_IEDT 0.0172 -0.3690*** -0.1564**
(0.431) (-8.535) (-2.241)
mean_L1.ARSD 0.4802*** 0.3234*** 0.4798***
(16.388) (13.896) (10.671)
mean_PASTBBCAR -0.0538 -0.0435 -0.0719
(-1.022) (-0.979) (-1.147)
mean_L1.ADVISORCHOICE 0.0368***
(11.359)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Instrumented No No L1.ADVISORCHOICE ADVISED
N 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402
No. of Acquirers 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344
Chi² statistic 3,925.57 4,286.09 1,666.59 467.51
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.1217 0.0632 0.0797
Chi²-statistic γ=0 596.64 715.31 869.80
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 5.34 5.66
p-value of exogeneity 0.0209 0.0173
Table 7 (cont.): Regressions of the hiring/retention of an old advisor
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7 panel B shows the influence of ARSD of the previous bid's advisor on retaining an old advisor in the current bid. The
dependent variable is OLDADVISOR and 1 if the bank advised the bidder within the last three years and 0 for unfamiliar banks and
unadvised deals. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in table C. The analysis is otherwise similar to the one in
panel A. Year fixed effects are included but not reported. The fixed effects in regressions (1) to (3) based on (Mundlak, 1978) are
reported if they are meaningful. The diagnostic statistics of the models' fit , the correlat ion of fixed effects ci with explanatory
variables xit and the test of significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown. 
OLDADVISOR
Panel B: previous advisor's 
ARSD
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
OLDADVISOR ADVISED
joint 
probability
OLDADVISOR ADVISED
joint 
probability
IEDT 2.5228*** 0.8482*** 2.3491*** 0.5605***
(10.073) (12.354) (10.301) (12.722)
L1.ARSD 1.3341*** 0.4486***
(13.101) (12.005)
PASTBBCAR 0.4467 0.1502 0.6573 0.1568
(1.190) (1.183) (1.447) (1.436)
PASTBIDDERCAR -0.2190 0.0418 -0.1881 0.0240
(-1.284) (1.275) (-1.119) (1.113)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0069 -0.0461*** 0.0065*** 0.0123 -0.0478*** 0.0090***
(-1.038) (-7.504) (3.269) (1.340) (-7.889) (4.491)
RDS 0.3397*** 0.5938*** 0.0010 0.2989*** 0.4274*** 0.0169**
(11.678) (16.261) (0.091) (11.078) (20.001) (2.572)
LNIS 0.1149*** -0.0041 0.0394*** 0.1059*** 0.0118 0.0238***
(5.533) (-0.251) (6.506) (4.993) (0.901) (5.194)
ATobinsQ 0.0186** 0.0124 0.0039* 0.0111 0.0176*** 0.0004
(2.073) (1.552) (1.675) (1.289) (2.898) (0.242)
AROA 0.1118 0.6512*** -0.0865** 0.1281 0.4406*** -0.0256
(0.870) (6.617) (-2.313) (1.064) (6.351) (-0.989)
ALEVERAGE -0.1760 0.0280 -0.0645** -0.1681 -0.0157 -0.0381
(-1.557) (0.350) (-1.990) (-1.500) (-0.250) (-1.609)
SIXTH 0.1448*** -0.0312 0.0546*** 0.3827*** -0.0393 0.0963***
(3.443) (-0.890) (4.245) (7.471) (-1.099) (8.117)
LOGME 0.0934*** 0.0314*** 0.1047*** 0.0250***
(9.159) (9.734) (10.188) (11.433)
Constant -4.7378*** -1.7998*** -5.0400*** -1.0597**
(-17.680) (-11.556) (-19.186) (-2.265)
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Fixed effects No No No No No No
Transaction characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 21,402 21,402 21,402 31,954 31,954 31,954
No. of Acquirers 5,344 5,344 5,344 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi² statistic 3,418.78 3,418.78 5,360.04 5,360.04
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 542.86 542.86 513.81 513.81
p-value of exogeneity 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 7 (cont.): Regressions of the hiring/retention of an old advisor
System 1 System 2
OLDADVISOR & ADVISED
Table 7 Panel C shows the SUR biprobit simultaneous equation systems (Heckman, 1978) of hiring or retaining an old advisor
and whether the bid is advised. The dependent variables are OLDADVISOR and ADVISED. OLDADVISOR is a dummy (0/1) if
the chosen bank advised the bidder within the last three years and 0 for unfamiliar banks and unadvised deals. ADVISED is a
dummy if the bid is advised by a bank. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in table C in the stat ist ical
appendix. The regressions for OLDADVISOR and ADVISED are identical to regressions (1) in table 7 panels A and B and (2) in
table 5. The coefficients in (3) and (6) are the marginal effects at the mean of the simultaneously estimated variables in
regressions (1), (2) and (4), (5) on the joint probability P(OLDADVISOR=1 & ADVISED=1). In the biprobit simultaneous
equation systems the Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by acquirers is used to correct the standard errors (Huber,
1967; White, 1980). Year fixed effects and transaction variables are included but not reported. 
Panel C: Biprobit 
simultaneous equation 
system
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A one standard deviation greater advisory relationship strength of the chosen bank 
advisor in the previous bid increases the bank’s chances to be retained as advisor in 
the current bid by at least 0.0847 0.3234 0.0274× =  or relatively by 
0.0274 0.0453 0.6047=  or 60.47%. The economic effect of the strength of the 
advisory relationship on hiring and retaining a familiar bank as advisor is large. 
The 4.53% of hired and retained old bank advisors compared to 27.81% of deals 
that are advised receive 0.0452 0.2781 0.1622=  or 16.22% of all advisory 
mandates. Banks are aware of the importance of close advisory relationships to 
receive advisory mandates. Therefore, banks pitch deals to known bidders to 
receive the advisory mandate of the proposed deal. The decisions whether the bid 
is advised and whether to hire and retain a familiar bank as advisor are not 
exclusive but occur simultaneously. The interrelatedness of the advisor selection 
and retention decisions are modeled with biprobit simultaneous equation systems 
of (Heckman, 1978) shown in panel C of table 7. The empirically observed 
positive effects of banks’ industry expertise and advisory relationship strength are 
similar to the effects observed in panels A and B. The independence of the 
advisory decision and whether to retain a familiar bank advisor are clearly reject, 
which is evident by the p-value of the exogeneity test of the two equations.  
 
3.7.3 Analysis of acquisition sequence continuation  
 
The regressions in table 8 show that the advising bank’s industry expertise and 
advisory relationship strength have a significantly positive effect on the probability 
of the current M&A being succeeded by another one. The more profitable the 
bidder is with above average investment opportunities and a good past acquisition 
performance the more likely is he extending his acquisition series. The advising 
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investment bank supports the bidder in the exploitation of his investment 
opportunities. The effects are driven by the fixed effects that are negatively 
correlated with the changes in the advising banks’ industry expertise, advisory 
relationship strength and the probability to retain an old advisor. The correlation 
and significance of the fixed effects emerges from the relatively few acquirers that 
make many acquisitions in short succession, like Cisco Systems with 98 
acquisitions.  
On the other hand the interrelatedness of hiring or retaining a familiar advisor and 
the probability of a successor deal is significant, shown in table 9 in biprobit 
simultaneous equation system 1. Banks pitch deals to known clients to earn the 
advisory fees from further advisory mandates (McLaughlin, 1990; 1992). With the 
acceptance of the proposed successor transaction the bidder also accepts the 
pitching bank as advisor. The empirical observations of the positive influence of 
the target industry expertise and advisory relationship strength on the retention of 
an old advisor and on the probability of a successor deal are similar to the 
empirical observations shown before.  
The economic effect of hiring a familiar advisor measured by ARSD in the 
previous deal is greater on the retention of an old advisor than on the probability of 
a successor transaction. The economic effect of the previous deal’s advising bank’s 
standard deviation greater advisory relationship strength is 
0.2921 0.0847 0.0247× =  or relatively 0.0247 0.4717 0.0525=  or 5.25% on the 
successor bid probability and 0.0247 0.2081 0.1189=  or 11.89% on the retention 
of an old advisor. Similarly a one standard deviation increase in IEDT is associated 
with a 1.0676 0.0532 0.0568× =  or 0.0568 0.4717 0.1204=  or 12.04% higher 
successor bid probability and 0.0568 0.2081 0.2729=  or 27.29% higher 
probability of retaining an old advisor. A standard deviation greater probability of 
retaining an old advisor itself increases the successor bid probability by 
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0.3548 0.2081 0.0738× =  and thus 0.0738 0.4717 0.1565=  or 15.65%. Compared 
to an unconditional successor bid probability of 66.59% and a standard deviation 
of 47.17% the relative economic effect in the range of 23.51% to 33.18% is fairly 
large. The mechanism of establishing stronger client relationships and 
accumulating industry expertise positively affecting the likelihood of extending 
serial bidders’ acquisition sequences is an indirect one through the greater 
likelihood of hiring or retaining old advisors. 
Controlling for simultaneity a one standard deviation increase in Tobin’s Q above 
the industry average increases the successor bid probability by 
0.0278 1.8525 0.0515× = , 5.15 percentage points, or relatively by 
0.0515 0.4717 0.1092=  or 10.92%. The profitability above average has an 
economic effect of 0.0606 0.1661 0.0101× = , 1.01 percentage points, or relatively 
of 0.0101 0.4717 0.0213=  or 2.13%. A one standard deviation larger industry size 
LNIS makes a successor bid also more likely, namely by 0.0359 0.9283 0.0333× =
, 3.33 percentage points, or relatively by 0.0333 0.4717 0.0707=  or 7.07%. 
Interesting is the observations that above average leverage of the bidder makes 
retaining an old advisor and a successor bid more likely, probably because highly 
leveraged bidders offer banks business opportunities of providing financing 
different from debt for the acquisition besides obtaining the M&A advisory 
mandate itself.   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES RE panel probit RE panel probit FE panel probit FE panel probit
IEDT 0.1800** 0.1691** -0.0353 -0.0339 0.1222* 0.1247*
(2.217) (2.087) (-0.541) (-0.521) (1.773) (1.820)
ARSD 0.0063 -0.2962*** 0.2146***
(0.118) (-6.913) (5.392)
OLDADVISOR 0.0155 -0.1167*** 0.1144***
(0.747) (-7.378) (7.151)
PASTBIDDERCAR 0.0559 0.0559 -0.1187*** -0.1145*** 0.1578* 0.1564*
(0.899) (0.898) (-2.752) (-2.648) (1.885) (1.843)
RDS -0.0779*** -0.0780*** -0.0420*** -0.0417*** -0.0894*** -0.0889***
(-9.456) (-9.470) (-5.725) (-5.684) (-9.730) (-9.597)
LNIS 0.0458*** 0.0457*** -0.4497*** -0.4514*** 0.0099 0.0093
(7.180) (7.168) (-12.165) (-12.204) (1.561) (1.460)
ATobinsQ 0.0294*** 0.0294*** 0.0524*** 0.0528*** 0.0153*** 0.0149***
(10.489) (10.478) (18.028) (18.170) (4.484) (4.368)
AROA 0.3550*** 0.3547*** -0.3505*** -0.3539*** 0.2997*** 0.3006***
(11.525) (11.525) (-8.833) (-8.926) (7.440) (7.459)
ALEVERAGE -0.0636** -0.0634** -0.2755*** -0.2772*** 0.0879** 0.0891**
(-2.295) (-2.289) (-8.439) (-8.489) (2.509) (2.527)
SIXTH -0.0488*** -0.0486*** -0.5007*** -0.5030*** 0.1939*** 0.1919***
(-3.437) (-3.426) (-42.898) (-43.154) (12.243) (12.217)
mean_IEDT 0.1691* 0.0535
(1.827) (0.572)
mean_ARSD 1.0449***
(11.284)
mean_OLDADVISOR 0.5029***
(14.896)
mean_PASTBBCAR 1.3331*** 1.3253***
(13.186) (13.087)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No
Instrumented No No No No ADVISED ADVISED
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954 31954
No. of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280 10280
Chi² statistic 1,814.82 1,819.43 6,324.40 6,399.58 975.26 998.9345
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.5168 0.5157
Chi²-statistic γ=0 4,122.91 4,195.56
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 11.02 11.11
p-value of exogeneity 0.0009 0.0009
Table 8: Regressions of the probability of a successor bid
SUCCESSORBID
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8 shows the primary analysis of the liklihood of a successor bid. The dependent variable is SUCCESSORBID.
SUCCESSORBID is a dummy (0/1) if the current bid is succeeded by another bid of the same bidder. T he variables are summarized
in table 2 and described in table C. ADVISED is a dummy (0/1) if the deal is advised by a bank. ADVISED serves as select ion
dummy in biprobit regressions with select ion (5) and (6) (Greene, 2008a, 2008b). The instruments for ADVISED are identical to
regression (2) in table 5. The standard errors of probit panel regressions (1) to (4) are based on the observed information matrix,
the inverse Hessian, after maximum likelihood estimation (Efron & Hinkley, 1978). In biprobit regressions with selection (5) and
(6) the Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by acquirers is used to correct the standard errors (Huber, 1967; White,
1980). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. The fixed effects in regressions (3) and (4) based on (Mundlak, 1978) are
reported if they are meaningful. The diagnostic stat istics of the models' fit, the correlat ion of fixed effects ci with explanatory
variables xit and the test of significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown. 
biprobit with selection
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
SUCCESSORBID OLDADVISOR
joint 
probability
SUCCESSORBID OLDADVISOR
joint 
probability
IEDT 6.5717*** 1.0676*** 0.2199 6.9761*** -0.0250
(16.191) (3.764) (1.146) (26.890) (-0.362)
OLDADVISOR 0.8532*** 0.3548***
(3.317) (4.042)
L1.ARSD 1.7980*** 0.2921*** 1.9001*** -0.0246**
(10.835) (3.818) (13.748) (-2.314)
PASTBIDDERCAR 0.2108 0.0877 0.1608 0.0477
(1.482) (1.489) (1.124) (1.123)
PASTBBCAR 0.0848 0.0138 -0.0124 0.0002
(0.246) (0.243) (-0.035) (0.035)
DEALS3YEARS 0.0083 0.0013 -0.0027 0.0000
(0.987) (0.813) (-0.393) (0.385)
RDS -0.2779*** 0.2248*** -0.0791*** -0.2468*** 0.2122*** -0.0760***
(-10.623) (7.124) (-4.307) (-9.813) (6.830) (-9.973)
LNIS 0.0268** 0.1526*** 0.0359*** 0.0363*** 0.1481*** 0.0089**
(2.246) (6.841) (4.640) (3.189) (6.708) (2.465)
ATobinsQ 0.0666*** 0.0005 0.0278*** 0.0735*** 0.0132 0.0216***
(7.481) (0.053) (5.490) (9.017) (1.527) (8.493)
AROA 0.0830 0.1604 0.0606* 0.1269* 0.0207 0.0374*
(1.132) (1.139) (1.808) (1.781) (0.160) (1.761)
ALEVERAGE 0.2086*** -0.1752 0.0583* 0.2081*** -0.2039* 0.0644***
(3.232) (-1.516) (1.834) (3.255) (-1.766) (3.378)
SIXTH 0.3693*** 0.0600 0.1634*** 0.4125*** 0.0962** 0.1212***
(11.536) (1.320) (8.091) (16.742) (2.218) (13.813)
Constant 0.3323*** -3.1185*** 0.3065*** -3.0633***
(4.391) (-5.747) (4.057) (-5.329)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No No No No No
N 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402
No. of Acquirers 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344
Chi² statistic 2,892.25 2,892.25 2,373.24 2,373.24
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 5.88 5.88 4.71 4.71
p-value of exogeneity 0.0153 0.0153 0.0300 0.0300
Table 9: Biprobit Simultaneous Equation Systems of SUCCESSORBID and OLDADVISOR
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 9 shows the recursive and SUR biprobit simultaneous equation systems (Heckman, 1978) of the current bid being succeeded by
another bid and hiring or retaining an old advisor. The dependent  variables are SUCCESSORBID and OLDADVISOR. SUCCESSORBID is 
a dummy (0/1) if the current bid of the serial bidder is succeeded by another bid. OLDADVISOR is a dummy (0/1) if the chosen bank
advised the bidder within the last three years and 0 for unfamiliar banks and unadvised deals. The variables are summarized in table 2 and
described in table C. The regression equations of SUCCESSORBID and OLDADVISOR are identical to the regressions in table 7 panel A
and table 8. The coefficients in (3) and (6) are the marginal effects at the mean on the joint probability P(SUCCESSORBID=1 &
OLDADVISOR=1). In the biprobit simultaneous equation systems the Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers is used
to correct  the standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. 
System 1 System 2
SUCCESSORBID & OLDADVISOR
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3.7.4 Analysis of banks’ accumulation of expertise and advisory relationships 
 
Finally banks’ accumulation of expertise in acquirers’ and targets’ industries as 
well as the strengthening of their advisory relationships is modeled along the 
sequences of advised deals for each bank in sample B, shown in table 10. The 
regressions on the panel of 8,886 bid-bank matches with 718 banks show that 
industry expertise and advisory relationships are positively correlated as expected. 
Banks with stronger advisory relationships (ARSD) get advisory mandates easier, 
which improves their industry expertise in the targets’ and acquirers’ industries. 
Being retained as familiar advisor makes the accumulation of industry expertise 
easier, shown in regressions (1) and (2). Being retained increases the industry 
expertise IEDT by 0.0071, which compared to the average of 0.0206 is a sizeable 
effect of 34.47%. The effect of an increase of 0.0119 of IEVT compared to its 
average of 0.0331, or 35.95%, is similar. The greater industry expertise on the 
other hand increases the likelihood to be hired and retained as advisor, shown in 
tables 6 and 7. The process over several rounds of hiring and retaining bank 
advisors who accumulate expertise and advisory relationships is self-enforcing.  
The self-enforcing mechanism of expertise and relationship accumulation is 
evident in dynamic regressions (3) to (6). The lagged industry expertise and 
advisory relationship strength limit the dynamic analysis to those banks that advise 
more than one deal in sample B. The 274 banks who advise more than one deal 
account for 38% of all 718 banks in sample B and for 15% of all banks in SDC 
M&A sample A. The market of M&A advisors is dominated by few banks that 
advise many deals. Goldman Sachs alone advised 654 deals, followed by Merrill 
Lynch with 514 deals. The Top-10 banks advised 3,335 deals, or 37.53%. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IEDT IEVT ARSD ARSV IEDT IEVT
VARIABLES FE panel reg FE panel reg
Arellano-
Bond
Arellano-
Bond
Arellano-
Bond
Arellano-
Bond
OLDADVISOR 0.0071*** 0.0119***
(2.814) (3.145)
IEDT 0.1684*
(1.650)
L1.ARSD 0.0380
(1.249)
IEVT 0.1167***
(3.054)
L1.ARSV 0.0379
(1.275)
ARSD 0.0304**
(2.025)
L1.IEDT 0.0756**
(2.498)
ARSV 0.0436***
(3.825)
L1.IEVT 0.0855***
(3.096)
MS 0.0006** 0.0032*** 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0004
(2.245) (5.114) (0.106) (0.265) (0.821) (0.465)
PASTBANKCAR 0.0137* -0.0049 -0.0003 0.0011 0.0021 -0.0045
(1.730) (-0.380) (-0.013) (0.054) (0.193) (-0.331)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0009** -0.0011* 0.0201*** 0.0203*** -0.0009** -0.0013**
(-2.516) (-1.776) (6.882) (6.815) (-2.132) (-2.389)
ATobinsQ -0.0011** -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0003 0.0002
(-2.092) (-1.448) (-1.574) (-1.554) (-0.543) (0.263)
AROA -0.0099 -0.0036 -0.0196 -0.0183 0.0127* 0.0084
(-1.108) (-0.405) (-0.977) (-0.896) (1.699) (0.873)
ALEVERAGE 0.0190*** 0.0285*** 0.0064 0.0067 0.0210*** 0.0402***
(4.095) (3.511) (0.320) (0.334) (2.928) (3.347)
LOGME -0.0004 0.0006 0.0091*** 0.0086*** -0.0005 0.0007
(-0.873) (0.850) (2.950) (2.791) (-0.768) (0.599)
Constant -0.0701 -0.3123** -0.0876 -0.0862 -0.0608 -0.1579*
(-1.538) (-2.536) (-1.142) (-1.225) (-0.881) (-1.930)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
N 8,886 8,886 5,203 5,203 5,203 5,203
Number of banks 718 718 274 274 274 274
F-/Chi²-statistic 8.28 53.79 286.64 273.05 288.81 574.63
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.03 0.07
Table 10: Regressions of banks' accumulation of industry expertise and advisory relationships
Robust t- and z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10 shows the dynamic panel regressions of banks' accumulat ion of industry expert ise and advisory relat ionships. The
dependent and primary independent variables are the banks' industry expertise variables IEDT, IEDA, IEVT, IEVA and
their advisory relat ionship strength variables ARSD and ARSV as well as OLDADVISOR. The variables are summarized in
table 2 and described in table C. The Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by banks is used to correct the standard
errors in fixed effects panel regressions (1) and (2) (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The standard errors of (Arellano & Bond,
1991) GMM one-step dynamic panel regressions (3) to (6) are based on their robust variance estimator as well. Year fixed
effects are included but not reported. 
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3.8 Sensitivity analysis 
 
The empirical analysis of hiring and retaining a familiar advisor, the probability of 
a successor transaction and the simultaneity of retaining an old advisor and the 
influence of advisor retention on the successor bid probability are replicated with 
dollar volume based definitions of the industry expertise and advisory relationship 
strength in table 11. The economic effects of the dollar value based definitions on 
the retention of a familiar bank as advisor shown in table 11 panel A are similar to 
the ones of the deal number based definitions used in table 7 panels A and B. The 
likelihood of a successor bid is similarly positively influenced by the dollar value 
based measures as it is by the deal number based measures in table 8. Finally the 
interrelatedness, or simultaneity, of the occurrence of a successor bid and retaining 
a familiar bank advisor is unaffected whether the industry expertise and advisory 
relationship strength are measured by the number or dollar value of deals, shown in 
table 11 panel C. The economic effects are similar to the ones observed for the deal 
number based definitions of the industry expertise and advisory relationship 
strength. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit FE panel probit IV probit biprobit with selection
IEDT 0.1966*** 0.1829*** 0.2205*** 0.1734***
(15.517) (15.760) (18.160) (5.403)
L1.ARSV -0.0030 -0.0318*** -0.0367*** 0.4402***
(-0.363) (-4.314) (-2.805) (10.173)
L1.ADVISORCHOICE 0.0177*** 0.0237***
(11.473) (6.076)
PASTBBCAR 0.0066 0.0058 0.0055 0.1530
(0.329) (0.324) (0.206) (0.745)
DEALS3YEARS 0.0012** 0.0014*** 0.0019*** 0.0122***
(2.243) (3.176) (2.639) (4.774)
RDS 0.0145*** 0.0134*** 0.0150*** -0.0193
(5.452) (5.856) (5.231) (-1.359)
LNIS 0.0052 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0209***
(0.444) (-0.034) (0.048) (3.891)
ATobinsQ 0.0012 0.0012 0.0018* 0.0096***
(1.303) (1.447) (1.821) (3.692)
AROA -0.0364** -0.0247 -0.0348* -0.0816**
(-1.985) (-1.553) (-1.710) (-2.225)
ALEVERAGE 0.0139 0.0033 0.0040 -0.0173
(1.093) (0.302) (0.278) (-0.515)
SIXTH 0.0052 0.0064** 0.0082* 0.0344**
(1.519) (2.156) (1.922) (2.277)
LOGME 0.0056*** 0.0039** 0.0040 0.0106***
(2.626) (2.090) (1.489) (3.044)
mean_IEVT 0.0131 -0.2668*** -0.0965***
(0.523) (-9.928) (-2.628)
mean_L1_ARSV 0.5485*** 0.3587*** 0.5296***
(18.098) (15.102) (9.935)
mean_L1.ADVISORCHOICE 0.0451***
(12.851)
mean_PASTBBCAR -0.0594 -0.0483 -0.0675
(-1.046) (-1.003) (-1.103)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Instrumented No No L1.ADVISORCHOICE ADVISED
N 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402
No. of Acquirers 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344
Chi² statistic 4,240.89 4,864.00 1,700.55 442.03
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.1144 0.0489 0.0879
Chi²-statistic γ=0 623.30 783.74 1,244.06
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 6.17 7.22
p-value of exogeneity 0.0130 0.0072
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 11 panel A shows the sensitivity analysis of hiring or retaining an old advisor. The dependent variable is OLDADVISOR that
is 1 if the chosen bank advised the bidder within the last three years and 0 for unfamiliar banks and unadvised deals. The variables
are summarized in table 2 and described in table C. The analysis is otherwise similar to the one shown in table 7 panel B, except for
the use of IEVT and ARSV. Year fixed effects are included but not reported. The fixed effects in regressions (1) to (3) based on
(Mundlak, 1978) are reported if they are meaningful. The diagnostic statistics of the models' fit , the correlation of fixed effects ci 
with explanatory variables xit and the test of significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown. 
OLDADVISOR
Panel A: OLDADVISOR
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FE panel probit FE panel probit
IEVT -0.0945*** -0.0932*** 0.0807** 0.0816**
(-2.672) (-2.631) (2.182) (2.217)
ARSV -0.2811*** 0.2183***
(-6.673) (5.467)
OLDADVISOR -0.1111*** 0.1172***
(-7.068) (7.234)
PASTBIDDERCAR -0.1169*** -0.1134*** 0.1617* 0.1592*
(-2.713) (-2.626) (1.888) (1.832)
RDS -0.0394*** -0.0392*** -0.0872*** -0.0867***
(-5.401) (-5.368) (-9.262) (-9.130)
LNIS -0.4497*** -0.4517*** 0.0097 0.0091
(-12.166) (-12.213) (1.501) (1.402)
ATobinsQ 0.0523*** 0.0527*** 0.0156*** 0.0152***
(18.009) (18.160) (4.480) (4.356)
AROA -0.3468*** -0.3500*** 0.3055*** 0.3061***
(-8.747) (-8.833) (7.492) (7.513)
ALEVERAGE -0.2743*** -0.2760*** 0.0877** 0.0893**
(-8.408) (-8.457) (2.454) (2.486)
SIXTH -0.5002*** -0.5026*** 0.1961*** 0.1941***
(-42.885) (-43.136) (12.207) (12.179)
mean_IEVT 0.2238*** 0.1594***
(4.216) (2.966)
mean_ARSV 0.9945***
(10.879)
mean_OLDADVISOR 0.4858***
(14.507)
mean_PASTBBCAR 1.3373*** 1.3306***
(13.243) (13.155)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Yes Yes No No
Instrumented No No ADVISED ADVISED
N 31,954 31,954 31,954 31954
No. of Acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10280
Chi² statistic 6,320.89 6,320.89 971.99 994.6615
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
corr(ci, xit) 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic γ=0 4,125.98 4,125.98
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 5.76 5.82
p-value of exogeneity 0.0164 0.0158
Table 11 (cont.): Sensitivity analysis 
SUCCESSORBID
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
T able 11 Panel B shows the sensit ivity analysis of the probability of a successor bid. T he dependent variable is
SUCCESSORBID. SUCCESSORBID is a dummy (0/1) and 1 if the current bid is succeded by another bid of the same
bidder. ADVISED serves as selection dummy in biprobit regressions with selection (3) and (4) (Greene, 2008a, 2008b).
T he instruments for ADVISED are identical to regression (2) in table 5. T he variables are summarized in table 2 and
described in table C. The coefficients are the marginal effects at the mean on P(SUCCESSORBID=1). T he standard
errors of probit panel regressions (1) and (2) are based on the observed information matrix, the inverse Hessian, after
maximum likelihood estimation (Efron & Hinkley, 1978). In biprobit regressions (3) and (4) the Huber & White
sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers is used to correct the standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). Year fixed
effects are included but not reported. The fixed effects in regressions (3) and (4) based on (Mundlak, 1978) are reported
if they are meaningful. T he diagnostic statist ics of the models' fit , the correlation of fixed effects ci with explanatory
variables xit and the test of significance of fixed effects' regressor γ=0 are shown.
Panel B: SUCCESSORBID
biprobit with selection
110 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
SUCCESSORBID OLDADVISOR
joint 
probability
SUCCESSORBID OLDADVISOR
joint 
probability
IEVT 2.9186*** 0.5691*** -0.0328 3.2804*** -0.0533
(13.250) (23.858) (-0.322) (26.056) (-1.591)
OLDADVISOR 1.0927*** 0.4137***
(5.431) (23.241)
L1.ARSV 1.7401*** 0.3393*** 1.9273*** -0.0256**
(10.834) (14.655) (15.048) (-2.485)
PASTBIDDERCAR 0.2388* 0.0904* 0.1562 0.0463
(1.704) (1.688) (1.086) (1.085)
PASTBBCAR 0.1393 0.0272 0.0079 -0.0001
(0.436) (0.434) (0.023) (-0.023)
DEALS3YEARS 0.0117 0.0023 -0.0027 0.0000
(1.536) (1.445) (-0.408) (0.401)
RDS -0.2864*** 0.2431*** -0.0610*** -0.2410*** 0.2267*** -0.0745***
(-11.495) (8.181) (-2.886) (-9.661) (7.652) (-9.940)
LNIS 0.0243** 0.1195*** 0.0325*** 0.0356*** 0.1122*** 0.0091***
(2.085) (5.695) (6.172) (3.127) (5.401) (2.582)
ATobinsQ 0.0630*** -0.0018 0.0235*** 0.0737*** 0.0148* 0.0217***
(7.147) (-0.189) (3.569) (9.063) (1.713) (8.550)
AROA 0.0663 0.1093 0.0464 0.1323* -0.0927 0.0404*
(0.912) (0.804) (1.506) (1.857) (-0.731) (1.909)
ALEVERAGE 0.2070*** -0.1837* 0.0426 0.2088*** -0.2181** 0.0648***
(3.200) (-1.677) (1.390) (3.271) (-1.995) (3.411)
SIXTH 0.3497*** 0.0405 0.1403*** 0.4139*** 0.0832** 0.1216***
(11.080) (0.957) (4.504) (16.766) (1.983) (14.118)
Constant 0.3351*** -2.5647*** 0.3149*** -2.4397***
(4.474) (-4.998) (4.172) (-4.307)
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Fixed effects No No No No No No
N 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402 21,402
No. of Acquirers 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344 5,344
Chi² statistic 3,531.33 3,531.33 2,647.35 2,647.35
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi² of exogeneity 13.10 13.10 5.40 5.40
p-value of exogeneity 0.0003 0.0003 0.0201 0.0201
Table 11 (cont.): Sensitivity analysis
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11 panel C shows the sensitivity analysis of biprobit simultaneous equation systems (Heckman, 1978) of the current bid being succeded by
another bid and hiring or retaining an old advisor. The dependent variables are SUCCESSORBID and OLDADVISOR. SUCCESSORBID is a dummy
and 1 if the current bid of the serial bidder is succeded by another bid. OLDADVISOR is a dummy (0/1) and 1 if the chosen bank advised the bidder
within the last three years and 0 for unfamiliar banks and unadvised deals. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in table C in the
statistical appendix. The regression equations for SUCCESSORBID and OLDADVISOR are identical to the regression equations in table 11 panels A
and B. The coefficients in (3) and (6) are the marginal effects at the mean of the joint probability P(SUCCESSORBID=1 & OLDADVISOR=1). In the
biprobit simultaneous equation systems the Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by acquirers is used to correct the standard errors (Huber,
1967; White, 1980). Year fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Panel C: Biprobit 
simultaneous equation 
system System 1 System 2
SUCCESSORBID & OLDADVISOR
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3.9 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The analysis shows that the choice of the advising investment bank particularly by 
its familiarity with the bidder has a positive effect on the probability of a successor 
transaction and the formation of acquisition sequences. Similar to the neoclassical 
theory of mergers and acquisitions those companies are more likely to make 
successive acquisitions that are more profitable and have better investment 
opportunities (Harford, 2005; Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Klasa & Stegemoller, 
2007). The process of bank advisor hiring and retention, banks’ accumulation of 
expertise and client relationships and the increasing likelihood of successor 
transactions is self-enforcing over several rounds of repeated interaction. 
Since investment banks are paid for advising M&As, which includes the finding of 
targets for bidders, their incentives are strong to get access to the information 
necessary to match bidders and targets. These monetary incentives are the 
economic rationale behind the building of advisory relationships with serial bidders 
who make the largest and most frequent transactions (Anand & Galetovic, 2006; 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). The loop of the decision whether to employ a 
bank as advisor and which bank to choose in particular is repeated over successive 
transactions with an increasing likelihood of the employment of a familiar bank in 
each M&A. Furthermore, the bidder-bank matches later in acquisition sequences 
are more often between frequent bidders and more experienced bulge-bracket 
banks. The empirical observations are in line with the theoretical argument that 
bulge-bracket banks more often form advisory relationships with serial bidders 
(Anand & Galetovic, 2006). This empirical support is driven by the observation 
that banks with a greater industry expertise and advisory relationship strength are 
more likely to be chosen as advisors in advised deals. Over the course of advising 
transactions banks accumulate industry expertise and form stronger advisory 
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relationships. Finally these related and repeated decisions increase the probability 
of successor transactions and thus the formation of acquisition sequences and the 
hierarchical separation of the investment banking market with the more 
experienced bulge-bracket banks at the top advising repeat bidders with the largest 
investment opportunity sets. Whether the repeated interaction between frequent 
bidding companies and familiar investment banks advising these companies to 
exploit their investment opportunities is beneficial for serial bidders requires 
further research, shown in the previous chapter. The past performance is positively 
related to the probability of hiring bank advisors and extending the acquisition 
series.  
 
4. A Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data with fixed effects - An 
application to bidders’ advisor choice and returns in acquisition sequences 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This study introduces a Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data with fixed 
effects to control two-step sequential selection applied in a panel of acquisition 
sequences. The first two steps analyze sequential double selection with a bivariate 
probit model with selection (Greene, 2008b). The concept of sequential double 
selection was introduced by (Tunali, Behrman, & Wolfe, 1980) and the bivariate 
probit model with selection formalized and applied by (van de Ven & van Praag, 
1981). The bivariate probit model is used to estimate the regressions’ coefficients 
of the first and second selection equation. The estimated coefficients of the 
selection equations are needed to compute the inverse mills ratios that are added as 
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selection correction factors in the third step structural regression estimated with 
pooled OLS. The Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data extends the 
methodology to correct for selection of (Wooldridge, 1995) by replacing the first 
step univariate probit model with a bivariate probit model with selection to derive 
two inverse mills ratios instead of one. The derivation of the estimator reveals that 
the Heckit Two-step estimator of (Wooldridge, 1995) is just a special case of the 
more general Three-step estimator if only one selection regression is significant 
with no correlation between the selection regressions. The resulting Three-step 
Heckit estimator is suitable for pooled and panel data and can be adapted to control 
for fixed effects, for instance with the (Mundlak, 1978) correction as one method 
in line with the linear fixed effects assumption of (Chamberlain, 1980). The 
asymptotic variance of the estimated regression coefficients of the third step 
structural equation can be adjusted for heteroscedasticity arising from sample 
estimation of the inverse mills ratios and serial correlation with the formulas of 
(Wooldridge, 1995; 2002c) or by bootstrapping (Adkins & Hill, 2004; Efron, 1979; 
Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003). In this study bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions 
incorporating the panel structure is used, because it is easy to implement.  
The first and second step selection equations are estimated with exclusion 
restrictions taken from the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature analyzing 
the influence of bank advisors (Li & Prabhala, 2007; Golubov, Petmezas, & 
Travlos, 2012). The estimation of the influence of chosen bank advisors’ expertise 
in the target’s industry and the strength of their client relationship with the acquirer 
in M&As reveals the positive effect of banks’ expertise on bidders’ returns while 
correction for sequential two-step selection. The three studies that also observe a 
positive influence of advising investment banks on the acquirers’ returns are (Kale, 
Kini, & Ryan, 2003), (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013) and (Golubov, Petmezas, & 
Travlos, 2012).  
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In this study the advisory skills of investment banks are not assumed to be 
represented by a measure of reputation, the SDC Top-50 M&A League Table 
market share MS (Ma, 2005; Rau, 2000; Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003; Hunter & 
Jagtiani, 2003). The SDC M&A League Table market share MS is biased against 
smaller banks. Banks also ratchet up their SDC League Table rankings (Derrien & 
Dessaint, 2012). Modeling the expertise directly makes it possible to compare all 
1,854 banks in the sample on an industry level. The banks’ industry expertise 
modeled as the fraction of M&As advised in the target’s (Fama & French, 1997) 
industry in the previous three years approximates their relative advisory experience 
compared to other banks and access to industry information. This direct measure of 
advisory skills is adapted and advanced from (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013) and 
(Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013) and used in the previous chapters as well. 
The average industry expertise of bulge-bracket banks is three times larger than the 
average industry expertise of more specialized non-bulge-bracket banks, whereas 
their league table market share is ten times larger (Song, Zhou, & Wei, 2013). The 
acquirer-advisor relationship strength over the past three years with the bidders is 
adapted and calculated in every year (Benveniste, Busaba, & Wilhelm, 2002; 
Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013; Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013; Forte, Iannotta, 
& Navone, 2010). 
The positive influence the advising bank’s industry expertise and advisory 
relationship strength have on the returns differs from the at best mixed 
observations previous studies made. Hiring a bank that has advised one more deal 
in the target industry in the last 3 years is associated with an equity gain of 965,800 
to 1,668,200 dollar. Hiring a bank advisor that has advised one more deal of the 
bidder in the last 3 years has a positive equity effect of 790,200 to 1,053,600 
dollar. Compared to an average equity increase of 7,463,000 dollar around the 
acquisition announcement it is economic beneficial to hire more experienced and 
familiar bank advisors. (Bao & Edmans, 2011) observe an inverse relationship 
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between the bidder’s returns and the M&A league table ranking of investment 
banks. Earlier studies such as (Rau, 2000), (Servaes & Zenner, 1996) and (Hunter 
& Jagtiani, 2003) find mixed results regarding the benefits in terms of a better 
performance that M&A advisors provide. 
For the Three-step Heckit analysis of the bidders’ returns a panel of 30,908 bids or 
acquisitions with 31,954 observations is used, one to six for 7,840 advised deals 
with 8,886 bid-bank matches and 23,068 unadvised deals. The panel includes 
acquisition series of 1 to 98 M&As from 1979 to 2006 by 10,280 bidders. The 
panel is constructed from the SDC M&A, Compustat and CRSP databases. The 
bivariate probit model with selection is estimated on a sample of 9,749,781 
potential bid-bank matches composed of the 30,908 deals matched annually with 
all possible bank advisors in the SDC M&A sample. The SDC M&A sample 
includes 1,854 different M&A advisors, or 45 to 392 per year. 
In which way the empirical observations are obtained with the developed Three-
step Heckit estimator is subject of the next sections. Section 2 discusses the theory 
development of the three-step Heckit estimator for panel data. Section 3 includes 
the empirical application of the Three-step Heckit estimator on the decision 
whether to hire an investment bank as M&A advisor at all, which bank to choose 
as advisor in particular, and the effect of the hiring decision on acquisition 
performance. Section 4 includes the discussion and conclusion. The econometric 
appendices E.3 to E.6 include the derivations and proofs, the statistical appendix 
additional tables of the annually estimated bivariate selection regressions.  
 
4.2 The Three-step Heckit estimator 
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Modeling banks’ advisory skills by their industry expertise and advisory 
relationship strength the influence of these skill approximations on the cumulative 
announcement returns (CAR) 3itjy  can be observed only for those banks that are 
hired as M&A advisors 2itjy  by the acquirer in his bid or acquisition 
1
ity  such that 
the problem is to estimate ( )3 2 1| 1 y 1itj itj ity yΕ = ∩ = . This estimation problem 
inspired the development of the Three-step Heckit estimator.   
The general Three-step Heckit estimator for a panel N T×  of 1,...,i N=  
individuals each having a times series 1,...,t T=  of observations of continuous 
random variables { }( )3 3 :it
N T
y Y R
×
∈ Ω→  begins with the sequential selection 
problem that observations 3
ity  can be observed only for the binary random variable 
{ }( )2 2 : 0,1it
N T
y Y
×
∈ , which itself can be observed only if the binary random 
variable { }( )1 1 : 0,1it
N T
y Y
×
∈  is observed. In this sequential selection process first 
the three outcome possibilities ( )2 11| y 1it itP y = = , ( )2 10 | y 1it itP y = =  and 
( ) ( )1 2 1y 0 y 0 y 0it it itP P= = = ∩ =  have to be estimated. The three outcome 
probabilities of the selection process are modeled by the familiar bivariate probit 
model with selection (van de Ven & van Praag, 1981; Maddala, 1983b; Greene, 
2008b). The two selection equations are 1
it it ity z uγ′= +  [1] and 
2
it it ity x β ε′= +  [2]. 
According to (Greene, 2008a; 2008b) the conditional probability 
( ) ( )( )
2 UE2 1 , ,1 | y 1 it itit it
it
x z
P y
z
β γ ρ
γ
′ ′Φ
= = =
′Φ
 with correlation 
( ) ( )U U, cov U,u u
u
cor ε ε
ε
σ
ρ σ
σ σΕ
= Ε = = = Ε , ( )it N TU u ×= and ( )it N Tε ×Ε = , is used 
to build up the likelihood function with the unconditional probabilities of the three 
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possible outcomes. The first assumption of the bivariate probit model with 
selection is: 
Assumption 1: 
1a) ( ), 0,it itu Nε ≈ Σ  with 
1
1
u
u
ε
ε
σ
σ
 
Σ =  
 
 as [ | , ] [ | , ] 1
it it it it it it
Var x z Var u x zε = =  
and   
1b) [ ] [ ]| , | , 0it it it it it itE x z E u x zε = =  
The three possible outcomes and their unconditional probabilities are: 
( ) ( )1 10 : P 0 | , 1it it it it ity y x z z γ′= = = −Φ  
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 2 U0, 1: P 0, 1| , , ,it it it it it it it ity y y y x z x zβ γ ρ Ε′ ′= = = = = Φ − − 7 
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 2 UE1, 1: P 1, 1 | , , ,it it it it it it it ity y y y x z x zβ γ ρ′ ′= = = = = Φ  
The likelihood function from (Greene, 2008b) and (van de Ven & van Praag, 1981) 
of the bivariate probit model with selection adapted to a panel is  
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 U 2 UE
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 , , , ,
n t n t N T
it it it E it it
i t i n t t i n t t
L z x z x zγ β γ ρ β γ ρ
= = = + = + = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= −Φ × Φ − − × Φ∏∏ ∏ ∏ ∏ ∏   
                                                          
7 ( )itx β′Φ  and ( )itz γ′Φ  are the univariate normal cumulative distribution functions and 
( )2 , ,it it UEz xγ β ρ′ ′Φ  denotes the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function 
( ) ( )1 2 2 1 2 1 2Prob , , ,it it
z x
it it UEY z Y x d d
γ β
γ β φ δ δ ρ δ δ
′ ′
−∞ −∞
′ ′< < = ∫ ∫  with the bivariate normal probability density 
function ( )2 , ,it it UEz xφ γ β ρ′ ′  (Greene, 2008c; 2008a). ( )itxφ β′  and ( )itzφ γ′  are the univariate normal 
probability density function (See econometric appendix E.3). 
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where the first 1 1n t×  observations 
1
ity  are unobserved with ( )
1 1
1 0it n ty ×= , the 
following ( ) ( )2 1 2 1n n t t− × −  observations 1ity  are observed but not 2ity  such 
that ( )
( ) ( )2 1 2 1
2 10 1it it n n t ty y − × −= ∩ = , and the last ( ) ( )2 2N n T t− × −  observations 
1
ity  
and 2
ity  are observed such that ( )( ) ( )2 2
2 11 1it it N n T ty y − × −= ∩ = .  
From the bivariate probit model with selection estimated on sample A  of size 
N T×  the consistently estimated regression coefficient vectors γˆ  and βˆ  are used 
to calculate the bivariate inverse mills ratios 
( )
( )
U
2
U1
2 U
1
, ,
it it
it
it
it it
x z
z
z x
β ρ γ
φ γ
ρ
λ
γ β ρ
Ε
Ε
Ε
 ′ ′− ′ Φ
 − =
′ ′Φ
 and 
( )
( )
U
2
U2
2 U
1
, ,
it it
it
it
it it
z x
x
z x
γ ρ β
φ β
ρ
λ
γ β ρ
Ε
Ε
Ε
 ′ ′− ′ Φ
 − =
′ ′Φ
 according to (Maddala, 1983b; Poirier, 1980) and 
the univariate inverse mills ratios 
( )
( )
3 it
it
it
z
z
φ γ
λ
γ
′
=
′Φ
 and 
( )
( )
4 it
it
it
x
x
φ β
λ
β
′
=
′Φ
 according to 
(Heckman, 1979; 1976). The univariate inverse mills ratios are needed if 
correlation U 0ρ Ε = . The selection equations can be estimated separately with 
univariate probit models if they are uncorrelated (Maddala, 1983b). Furthermore, 
the bivariate inverse mills ratios converge in the limit for U 0ρ Ε →  to the 
univariate inverse mills ratios, which is shown in econometric appendix E.3. If the 
bivariate normal cumulative distribution function ( )2 , z , 0it it Ux β γ ρ Ε′ ′Φ =  the 
random variables 1Y  and 2Y  are independent as the probability of their 
simultaneous observation  ( )1 21 1P Y Y= ∩ =  is zero. In this case the denominator 
of the bivariate inverse mills ratios is zero, such that the bivariate inverse mills 
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ratios do not exist. Hence if ( )2 , z , 0it it Ux β γ ρ Ε′ ′Φ =  the univariate inverse mills 
ratios 3
itλ  and 
4
itλ  are inserted into structural equation 
3
it it ity α δ ν′= +  [ ]3 . The 
limit of the bivariate inverse mills ratios is useful, as will be shown, for 
observations with ( )2 , z , 0it it Ux β γ ρ Ε′ ′Φ =  that would otherwise drop out of the 
sample if their missing bivariate inverse mills ratios are not replaced by their 
univariate counterparts.  
The concept of the Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data is derived for a 
balanced panel of dimension N T× , where T  is fixed and N →∞  to derive the 
asymptotic properties, with sufficient observations in each time period t  to 
estimate 
t
L . The Three-step Heckit estimator works for unbalanced panels as well. 
In the procedure of (Wooldridge, 1995) the likelihood function 
t
L  is estimated for 
each time period t  to obtain the time period specific coefficient vectors 
tˆ
γ  and ˆ
t
β  
as well as correlation coefficients ,ˆUE tρ  to calculate the inverse mills ratios. If the 
sample is unbalanced the coefficient vectors, correlation coefficients and inverse 
mills ratios differ in their estimation by the number of individuals i  per time 
period t . This might be a problem if few observations for some time periods are 
available with the inverse mills ratio being weakly estimated. The problem of 
insufficient observations for some time periods in unbalanced panels is mitigated 
by calculating the inverse mills ratios for each observation it  with time invariant 
coefficients γˆ , βˆ  and ˆUρ Ε  obtained from a time series pooled estimator of the 
likelihood function L .  
Likelihood function L  of the bivariate probit model with selection can be 
estimated for each time period and pooled as well if unobserved fixed effects 1
iζ  
or 2
iζ  in selection equations [1] or [2] exist (Wooldridge, 2002e). To correct for 
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selection biases in panels with fixed effects the assumptions of (Wooldridge, 1995) 
are extended to the case of two selection equations with binary selection indicators 
1Y  and 2Y : 
Assumption 2:  
2a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2
( 1)| ,..., , , | , | ,it i t iT it it it it it it it it it itE v u E v u L v u g u gα α ε ε ε κ κ ε+ = = = +  for 
2 1,...,t t T= +  
2b) ( ) ( )
2 2( 1) ( 1)
| ,..., , , |1, ,..., , ,
i i t iT it it i i t iT it it
E u L uξ α α ε ξ α α ε+ +=  
2c) 1 1
it it it iy z uγ ζ′= + +  
2d) 2 2
it it it iy x β ε ζ′= + +  
2e) 1 0 1 1 ...i i iT T iz z cζ η η η= + + + +  
2f) 2 0 1 1 ...i i iT T ix x oζ τ τ τ= + + + +  
2g) ( )2, 0,i ic o σ≈ Ν  
Assumption 2a implies with the linear operator ( )* | *L  that itv  of [3] is a linear 
combination of the error terms 
it
u  and 
it
ε  of selection equations [1] and [2]. The 
derivation of the correction terms is shown in econometric appendix E.4. 
Assumption 2b implies with the linear operator that the unobserved fixed effect 
i
ξ  
of structural equation [3] is a linear combination of all explanatory variables  
( )
( ) ( )2 2 2
( 1)1, ,...,i t iT
N n T t
α α+ − × −  and the error terms itu  and itε . Assumption 2b with 2e 
and 2f was imposed first by (Chamberlain, 1980) for unobserved effects in probit 
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models and used by (Verbeek & Nijman, 1992). The linear predictor 2b allows 
correcting for selection, because it can be written for each t  as 
  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 201 1 1 2 2
1 2
|1, ,..., , ,
                                                                                  ...
i it it ti t i T i t t t i t t t
t it t iti T t T
L u
u
ξ α α ε ψ α ψ α ψ
α ψ π ε π
+ + + + += + + +
+ + +
 
where 0tψ  is a scalar and trψ , 2 1,...,r t T= +  are 3 1K ×  vectors. From 
assumptions 2c and 2d as well as ( )( ) ( )( )2 21 1| ,..., | ,..., 0it iT it iTi t i tE E uε α α α α+ += =  
and  ( )( ) ( )( )2 21 1| ,..., | ,..., 1it it iT it it iTi t i tE E u uε ε α α α α+ += =  it follows that vectors 
tr
ψ  are constant over t , independent of the selection equations’ error terms 
it
ε  
and 
it
u
8. Applying the law of iterated expectations the expectation of the fixed 
effect of structural equation [3] becomes:  
( )
( )
2 2 2 2 2
2
( 1) 0 ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 2)
1
( 1)
| ,..., , , ...
                                                                      | ,...,
                            
i i t iT it it t i t t t i t t t iT tT
t it i t iT
E u
E
ξ α α ε ψ α ψ α ψ α ψ
π ε α α
+ + + + +
+
= + + + +
+
( )
2
2 2 2 2
2
( 1)
0 ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 2)
                                                              | ,...,
                                           = ...
                     
t it i t iT
t i t t t i t t t iT tT
E uπ α α
ψ α ψ α ψ α ψ
+
+ + + +
+
+ + + +
2 2 2 20 ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 2)
                      = ...
i t t i t t iT T
ψ α ψ α ψ α ψ+ + + ++ + + +
 
Structural equation 3
it it ity α δ ν′= +  [3] becomes ( )( )23 1 ,...,it iT it iti ty α α ψ α δ ϖν+ ′= + +  
[3’], such that δ  can be identified. The same holds for selection equations [1] and 
[2]. Without the error term 
it
ϖν  capturing selection equation [3’] would be 
                                                          
8 If the error terms of the selection equations are heteroscedastic and correlated with the fixed effects, 
that are supposed to control for firm specific heterogeneity otherwise captured by those error terms, 
than the coefficients would be biased and the inverse mills ratios as well. Therefore, the fixed effects are 
assumed to be constant over time due to the absence of correlation with the remaining residuals, which 
otherwise would cause changing fixed effects to accommodate the serial correlation. Hence pooled 
Heckit estimators of panels without fixed effects are biased if the assumption of strict exogeneity, the 
absence of unobserved fixed effects, is not tested but violated. 
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comparable to (Chamberlain, 1982). Still the error term ( ) 0itE ϖν ≠  caused by 
selection has to be corrected, which refers to assumption 2a. The assumptions of 
the structure of the fixed effects and error terms allow for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity of 
it
v  and serial correlation of 
i
ξ . No distributional assumptions 
about 
it
v  and 
i
ξ  are made. In selection equations of the form 2c and 2d the 
existence of unobserved fixed effects 1
iζ  or 
2
iζ  is likely to cause serial correlation 
of the error terms 
it
ε  and 
it
u  as well if not corrected, violating the basic 
assumption of pooled probit of ( ) 0it irE ε ε =  and ( ) 0it irE u u =  for r t≠  and 
, 1,...,r t T=  according to (Wooldridge, 1995). If unobserved fixed effects 1
iζ , 
2
iζ  
or 
i
ξ  are assumed an applicable correction in probit models and in pooled OLS is 
the (Mundlak, 1978) version of (Chamberlain, 1980) fixed effects assumption 2b, 
2e, 2f and 2g as suggested by (Wooldridge, 1995; 2002e), (Nijman & Verbeek, 
1992) and (Zabel, 1992). In the (Mundlak, 1978) version 1
i i iz cζ η′= + , 
2
i i ixζ τ ο′= +  and i i ieξ αψ′= +  are approximated with the time invariant means iz , 
i
x  and 
i
α  of the explanatory variables 
it
z , 
it
x  and 
it
α  for each individual i . The 
(Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects are a close approximation of the classic fixed effects 
correction applied in feasible GLS estimation in which the time constant means are 
subtracted from the dependent and independent variables, the “within” estimator. 
Subtraction of fixed effects is unfeasible if the dependent variable is binary like 1Y
and 2Y  (Wooldridge, 2002d). Mean differencing to get the “within” estimator of 
structural equation [3] is unfeasible as well, because the period specific difference 
from the time constant mean of selection ( ) ( )1 1 2 2UV EVit i it iρ λ λ ρ λ λ− − − −  is 
difficult to interpret and to estimate, because error terms 
it
ϖν  in [3’] are 
differently correlated with 
it
u  and 
it
ε  in every period (See Assumption 2a) 
(Wooldridge, 1995; 2002e). With fixed effects and potentially serially correlated 
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error terms 
it
ε , 
it
u  and 
it
v  the standard errors of the bivariate probit model and 
pooled OLS with selection have to be corrected using the robust variance 
estimators shown in econometric appendices E.5 and E.6 or by numerical methods 
such as bootstrapping or jackknifing (Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & 
Bender, 2003). If one assumes random effects assumptions 2b, 2e and 2f simplify 
to a constant with 1
i icζ η= +  and 
2
i ioζ τ= + , which gives selection equations 2c 
and 2d of the form ( )1it it it iy z u cη γ′= + + +  and ( )2it it it iy xτ β ε ο′= + + +  
(Wooldridge, 1995; Verbeek & Nijman, 1992; Nijman & Verbeek, 1992; Vella, 
1998). Structural equation [3’] includes a constant under the assumption of random 
effects as well, such that 
i i
eξ ψ= +  and ( )3it it it iy eψ α δ ϖ ν′= + + + . 
In the third step the inverse mills ratios are added as correction factors to equation 
( )( )23 1 ,...,it iT it iti ty α α ψ α δ ϖν+ ′= + +  [3’]. If U 0ρ Ε =  the selection equations are 
independent and the error term 
it
ϖν  of structural equation 
( )( )23 1 ,...,it iT it iti ty α α ψ α δ ϖν+ ′= + +  [3’] is replaced by its expected value 
( ) 3 4UV V| ,it it it it it it itE v x u zε β γ ρ λ ρ λΕ′ ′> − > − = +  to get 
( )( )23 *1 3 4UV V,...,it iT it iti t it ity vα α ψ α δ ρ λ ρ λ+ Ε′= + + + +  [4] (Maddala, 1983b). If 
U 0ρ Ε ≠  the expected value of the error term itϖν  is 
( ) 1 2UV V| ,it it it it it it itE v x u zε β γ ρ λ ρ λΕ′ ′> − > − = +  and one gets 
( )( )23 *1 1 2UV V,...,it iT it iti t it ity vα α ψ α δ ρ λ ρ λ+ Ε′= + + + +  [5] with var( )V Vσ = , 
( )( ) ( )2 2it N n T tV v − × −= , ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 22 2
* *
it it i N n T tN n T t
V v v e
− × −− × −
= = + , ( )UV ,cor U Vρ = , 
( )V ,cor VρΕ = Ε  (Heckman, 1976; 1979; Maddala, 1983b). The derivation of the 
correction terms is shown in econometric appendix E.4. The implicit assumption is 
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that covariances UVρ  and VρΕ  are constant over time t . If the influence of 
selection in each time period 2 1,...,t t T= +  is assumed to be different the period 
specific regression coefficients  
( ) ( )
2 2 22 2
1 2 1 2
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) UV,T V,TUV,( 1) V,( 1) ...t i t i t T iT iTEt E td dλ λ λ λρ ρ ρ ρ+ + ++ +× + + + × +  with td  
being time dummies are inserted into [4] and [5] as suggested by (Wooldridge, 
1995; 2002e).  
The finally estimated regression equations with the simply to apply (Mundlak, 
1978) fixed effects are 3 *1 2UV V
ˆ ˆ
it it i itit ity vα δ αψ ρ λ ρ λΕ′ ′= + + ++  [4] and 
3 *3 4
UV V
ˆ ˆ
it it i itit ity vα δ αψ ρ λ ρ λΕ′ ′= + + ++  [5] where ( )( )2 1i N n xα −Α =  is the vector of 
time constant means of individuals 2 1,...,i n N= +  of explanatory variables 
( )( ) ( )2 2it N n T tα − × −Α =  and 
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′Φ
 are the sample 
estimates of the inverse mills ratios. Equations [4] and [5] are estimated 
consistently by pooled OLS on subsample B  with selection ( )2 11 1it ity y= ∩ =  of 
size ( ) ( )2 2N n T t− × −  (Wooldridge, 1995; 2002e). After correcting for 
unobserved fixed effects and sequential selection no distributional assumptions 
about *
itv  are made, but still ( ) ( )* *3 4 1 2| , , , | , , , 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆit it i it it iit it it itE v E vα α α αλ λ λ λ= = . 
The variance-covariance matrices of [4] and [5] have to be adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity, because the sample inverse mills ratios are estimated and the 
125 
 
true population inverse mills ratios are unknown (Wooldridge, 1995; Heckman, 
1979). The correlation of iξ  with iα  as i i ieξ αψ′= +  requires adjustment of the 
standard errors as well. The variance-covariance matrix of the bivariate probit 
model without fixed effects for instance can be estimated with the observed 
information matrix (OIM), the inverse Hessian matrix, or with the adjusted 
sandwich estimator clustered by individuals 1,...,i N=  if fixed effects matter 
(Huber, 1967; Efron & Hinkley, 1978; Wooldridge, 1995; 2002e; White, 1980). 
Bootstrapping clustered by individuals 1,...,i N=  who are grouped by their time 
series of observations 1,...,t T=  to control for the panel structure and serial 
correlation of the error terms is another option (Efron, 1979). The variance-
covariance matrices of equations [4] and [5] can for example be estimated by 
bootstrapping or jackknifing clustered by individuals 2 1,...,i n N= +  grouped by 
their time series of observations 2 1,...,t t T= +  to control for the panel structure 
and potential serial correlation of *
itv  as well (Adkins & Hill, 2004; Efron, 1979; 
Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003). The procedure to control and correct for two-step 
sequential selection with the Three-step Heckit estimator is therefore: 
1.) Estimate selection equations 1
it it ity z uγ′= +  [1] and 
2
it it ity x β ε′= +  [2], 
with [2] potentially depending on [1], where { }( )1 1 : 0,1it
N T
y Y
×
∈  and 
{ }( )2 2 : 0,1it
N T
y Y
×
∈  are binary random variables, in a bivariate probit 
model with selection with the likelihood function 
( )( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
2 UE
1 1 1 1
2 UE
1 1
1 , ,
                                                                      , ,
n t n t
it it it
i t i n t t
N T
it it
i n t t
L z x z
x z
γ β γ ρ
β γ ρ
= = = + = +
= + = +
′ ′ ′= −Φ × Φ − −
′ ′× Φ
∏∏ ∏ ∏
∏ ∏
. Estimate the likelihood function L  for each time period t  if the panel 
N T×  is sufficiently balanced with enough observations i  in each time 
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period t  to estimate tˆγ , ˆtβ  and ,ˆU tρ Ε . If the panel is unbalanced and in 
some time periods the number of observations, particularly those affected 
by selection, is relatively small estimate L  on the pooled sample to obtain 
time invariant estimates γˆ , βˆ  and ˆUρ Ε . Control for potential 
heteroscedasticity with the adjusted sandwich estimator, by bootstrapping 
or jackknifing (See econometric appendix E.5). Sequential selection 
matters if ( ),U cor Uρ Ε = Ε  is significantly different from 0. If ˆ 0UEρ =  or 
,
ˆ 0UE tρ =  estimate the selection equations separately with univariate 
probit models to calculate inverse mills ratios 3ˆitλ  and 
4ˆ
itλ  according to 
(Heckman, 1976; 1979). If necessary one ought to control for fixed effects 
with 1
i i iz cζ η′= +  and 
2
i i ixζ τ ο′= +  (Mundlak, 1978). 
2.) Calculate the sample estimates of inverse mills ratios 
( )
( )
U
2
U1
2 U
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ1
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ, ,
it it
it
it
it it
x z
z
z x
β ρ γ
φ γ
ρ
λ
γ β ρ
Ε
Ε
Ε
 ′ ′− ′ Φ
 − =
′ ′Φ
, 
( )
( )
U
2
U2
2 U
ˆˆ ˆˆ
ˆ1
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ, ,
it it
it
it
it it
z x
x
z x
γ ρ β
φ β
ρ
λ
γ β ρ
Ε
Ε
Ε
 ′ ′− ′ Φ
 − =
′ ′Φ
, 
( )
( )
3
ˆˆ
ˆ
it
it
it
z
z
φ γ
λ
γ
′
=
′Φ
 and 
( )
( )
4
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
it
it
it
x
x
φ β
λ
β
′
=
′Φ
 with { },ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, ,t t t U tθ γ β ρ Ε=  or 
{ }ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , UEθ γ β ρ= . 
3.) Insert inverse mills ratios 1ˆitλ , 
2ˆ
itλ  or 
3ˆ
itλ , 
4ˆ
itλ  into structural equation 
3
it it ity α δ ν′= + [3] with { }( )( ) ( )2 2
3 3 :it
N n T t
y Y R
− × −
∈ Ω→  being a continuous 
random variable to estimate for instance with (Mundlak, 1978) fixed 
effects 3 *1 2UV V
ˆ ˆ
it it i itit ity vα δ αψ ρ λ ρ λΕ′ ′= + + ++  [4] or 
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3 *3 4
UV V
ˆ ˆ
it it i itit ity vα δ αψ ρ λ ρ λΕ′ ′= + + ++  [5] by pooled OLS on subsample 
( ) ( )2 2N n T t
B − × −  affected by selection ( )2 11 y 1it ity = ∩ = . Control for potential 
heteroscedasticity caused by the sample estimates of the inverse mills 
ratios and potential serial correlation of *
itv  for instance with the 
asymptotic variance estimator or by bootstrapping or jackknifing clustered 
by individuals 2 1,...,i n N= +  who are grouped by their time series of 
observations 2 1,...,t t T= +  to incorporate the panel structure (See 
econometric appendix E.6). Selection matters if covariances UVρ  or EVρ  
or both are significantly different from 0. If ( )2 ˆ ˆ ˆ, z , 0it it Ux β γ ρ Ε′ ′Φ =  
replace the missing inverse mills ratios 1ˆ
it
λ , 2ˆ
it
λ  by 3ˆ
it
λ , 4ˆ
it
λ , because in the 
limit for 0
UE
ρ →  1ˆ
it
λ , 2ˆ
it
λ  converge to 3ˆ
it
λ , 4ˆ
it
λ  (See econometric 
appendix E.3). 
The Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data with fixed effects includes the Two-
step Heckit estimator of (Wooldridge, 1995), because if 0
UE
ρ =  and either UVρ  
or VρΕ  is significant the model simplifies to structural equation [5] with one 
univariate inverse mills ratio. The bivariate probit model with selection differs 
from the partially observable bivariate probit models of (Poirier, 1980) and 
(Abowd & Farber, 1982) in the observability of both dependent variables  1Y  and 
2Y . In their models only the product of the dependent variables 
{ } { }( )1 20,1 0,1it ity y∈ ∩ ∈  is observed with four possible outcomes. Besides the 
joint outcome { }( )1 2 1it ity y∩ ∈  the product { }( )1 2 0it ity y∩ ∈  implies three 
indistinguishable outcome combinations, ( )1 20 0it ity y= ∩ = , ( )1 21 0it ity y= ∩ =  and 
( )1 20 1it ity y= ∩ = . The joint outcome ( )1 20 1it ity y= ∩ =  is unobservable in the case 
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of sequential selection and indistinguishable from ( )1 20 0it ity y= ∩ = , such that its 
probability is zero and therefore not modeled in the bivariate probit model with 
selection compared to the partially observable bivariate probit model. (Abowd & 
Farber, 1982) assume in their partially observable bivariate probit model with 
selection that { }( )1 2 1it ity y∩ ∈  or { }( )1 2 0it ity y∩ ∈  can be observed only, similar to 
(Poirier, 1980). The partially observable bivariate probit models can be used as 
well to model the first two steps of the Three-step Heckit estimator if the selection 
process fulfills assumptions 1 and 2. The appropriate likelihood functions differ 
from the likelihood function of the bivariate probit model with selection9. The 
bivariate probit model with partial observability of (Poirier, 1980) has the 
likelihood function  
( )( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
2 UE 2 UE
1 1 1 1
1 , , , ,
n t N T
it it it it
i t i n t t
L x z x zβ γ ρ β γ ρ
= = = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′= −Φ × Φ∏∏ ∏ ∏ . 
The bivariate probit model with sequential partial observability of (Abowd & 
Farber, 1982) has the likelihood function 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 11 1 1 1
1
n t N T
it it it it
i t i n t t
L x z x zβ γ β γ
= = = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′= −Φ ×Φ × Φ ×Φ∏∏ ∏ ∏ . 
The remaining steps of calculating the inverse mills ratios and estimating the 
pooled OLS model, for instance with (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects, on the 
selected subsample remain the same. (Meng & Schmidt, 1985) provide a good 
discussion of the different costs and benefits in terms of observable alternative 
outcomes of the three bivariate probit models. (Maddala, 1983b) explains the 
                                                          
9 The estimation of partially observable bivariate probit models is straightforward with statistics 
software like STATA that have the appropriate commands built-in, for instance the “biprobit, partial” 
command. The inverse mills ratios are calculated with the estimated coefficient vectors. 
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differences of these probit models to estimate joint or sequential selection with two 
selection equations.  
 
4.3 Applying the Three-step Heckit estimator on a panel 
 
4.3.1 Preparing the sample and variables 
 
In this study of 1,...,10,280i =  acquirers with highly unbalanced sequences of 
1,...,98t =  bids with 30,980N T× =  of which some are advised by one to six 
banks the individually estimated inverse mills ratios are necessary to control for 
selection in this kind of double panel structure. The same panel is used in the 
previous chapters. Hiring of a particular investment bank j  as M&A advisor 
( )2 1itjy =  can be observed only in advised transaction ( )1 1ity =  (Servaes & Zenner, 
1996). The decision process of the bidder is sequential as at first the decision is 
made whether an advising bank at all is needed or whether to do the deal without 
external advice { }( )1 0,1ity ∈ . If the bidder decides to hire an investment bank he 
has to choose one or more among all banks that are competing for the advisory 
mandate { }( )2 10,1 y 1itj ity ∈ ∩ = . Banks also pitch deals to bidders with the 
simultaneous observation that the deal is advised and the bank hired as advisor 
( )2 11 y 1itj ity = ∩ = . The matching of a particular bank advisor to an unadvised deal 
( )2 11 y 0itj ity = ∩ =  is not possible, because a particular hiring decision implies that 
the deal is advised. In this decision process the three outcome possibilities 
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( )2 11| 1itj itP y y= = , ( )2 10 | 1itj itP y y= =  and ( ) ( )1 2 10 0 | 0it itj itP y P y y= = = =  have to 
be estimated with a likelihood function that includes banks 1,...,j J=  as advisors: 
( )( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 U
1 1 1
1 , ,
                                                                          , ,
n t j n t j
it itj it U
i t j i n t t j j
N T J
itj it
i n t t j j
L z x z
x z
γ β γ ρ
β γ ρ
Ε
= = = = + = + = +
Ε
= + = + = +
′ ′ ′= −Φ Φ − −
′ ′× Φ
∏∏∏ ∏ ∏ ∏
∏ ∏ ∏
 
The first ( )1 1 1n t j× ×  observations are unadvised deals without advising banks 
( ) ( )1 2 1y 0 0 y 0it itj ity= = = ∩ = , the following ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 2 1 2 1n n t t j j− × − × −  
observations are banks that were not selected as advisors in advised deals 
( )2 10 y 1itj ity = ∩ = , and the last ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 2N n T t J j− × − × −  observations are the 
banks matched as advisors to advised deals ( )2 11 y 1itj ity = ∩ = . Outcome 
( )2 11 1itj ity y= ∩ =  has 8,886 observations, outcome ( )2 10 1itj ity y= ∩ =  has 
2,480,373 observations and outcome ( )2 10 0itj ity y= ∩ =  has 7,260,522 
observations, in total 9,749,781 shown in table 1. The trick is to define 
( ) ( )1 2 10 0 y 0it itj ity y= = = ∩ =  that makes it possible to create sample ( )N T JA × ×  of 
9,749,781 possible bid-bank matches { } { }( )1 20,1 0,1it itjy y∈ ∪ ∈ composed of all 
bidders and their deals ( )30,980N T× = , advised and unadvised { }( )1 0,1ity ∈ , 
matched with all possible bank advisers J  { }( )2 0,1itjy ∈ . The annual number of 
possible bank advisors J  runs from 45J =  in 1979 to 392J =  in 1997. With this 
sample the bivariate probit model with selection can be estimated easily10. 
                                                          
10 The bivariate probit model with selection is estimated with the command “heckprob” using STATA. 
The inverse mills ratios are calculated and inserted into regression equations [4] and [5]. The sandwich 
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Equations [4] and [5] are estimated by pooled OLS on the selected subsample 
( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 2
8,886
N n T t J j
B
− × − × −
=  of bid-bank matches ( )2 11 1itj ity y= ∩ =  for 7,840 
advised deals. The sample of M&As, its preparation and descriptive statistics with 
all possible bid-bank matches are shown in table 1.  
The sample is defined as a kind of double panel distinguishing between acquirers 
and their acquisition series of bids instead of a pooled sample of bids, which 
(Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012) and (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) use. Over 
time bidders with better investment opportunities make more acquisitions in faster 
succession, which is observed by (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002), (Klasa & 
Stegemoller, 2007) and (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011) as well and shown in 
table 1 panel F. Furthermore, the panel structure allows controlling for fixed effects 
in the Three-step Heckit estimator.  
Table 2 includes the descriptive statistics of the variables and banks’ industry 
expertise and advisory relationship proxies to estimate selection equation [1] 
whether the deal is advised (ADVISED=0/1) similar to (Servaes & Zenner, 1996), 
the selection of the particular M&A advisor [2] (AADVISOR=0/1) and the 
bidder’s bid-bank cumulative announcement returns (CAR) equations [4] and [5]. 
The variables are similar to the ones used in chapter 2. The cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR(-2, 2) calculated with the Beta-1 model are used to avoid the problem 
of overlapping M&As in the pre-merger estimation period (Fuller, Netter, & 
Stegemoller, 2002; Aktas, Bodt, & Cousin, 2007).  
                                                                                                                                      
estimator is built into the command and applied with clustering by acquirers i . The OLS estimates are 
bootstrapped with 1,000 replications clustered by acquirers i grouped by their sequences of bid-bank-
matches tj . 
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Steps in the Process M&As
1. The total SDC M&A sample 208,654
2. Excluding self tenders, recapitalisations and repurchases 188,326
3. Excluding "Creditors", "Investor", "Investors", "Investor Group", 
"Shareholders", "Undisclosed Acquiror", "Seeking Buyer", and "Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan"
166,778
4. Excluding deals with status of "Unknown Status", "Rumor", "Discontinued 
Rumor", "Intended", "Intent withdrawn", "Pending" and "Seeking Target"
143,138
5. Excluding acquisitions/bids with undisclosed transaction values 67,065
6. Excluding individual and financial acquirers 61,713
7. Excluding bids in which the target is the same company as the acquirer 61,676
Sample A before the merging processes, used to compute the industry experience 
and acquirer-advisor relationship strengh variables
61,676
Steps in the Process M&As
8. Complete Compustat annual files from 1976 to 2006 (Industrial North America) 609,162
9. Keeping the consolidated parent with common stock (cic = 1xx) 600,197
10. Keeping company-years with positiv total assets 558,263
Compustat sample before the merging processes, used to compute the industry 
variables in each (Fama & French, 1997) industry
558,263
11. Deals with Compustat data available for the acquirer, merged by the CUSIP 39,053
Steps in the Process M&As
12. Deals with available announcement returns after merging with CRSP 33,231
Steps in the Process M&As
13. Excluding acquisitions/bids without acquirer's leverage, ROA and Tobin's Q 30,908
Sample for the analysis of acquisitions/bids with anouncement returns 30,908
Thereof unadvised acquisitions/bids (1) 23,068
Thereof advised acquisitions/bids 7,840
Bank matches with the advised acquisitions/bids (2) 8,886
Final sample B for estimation of unadvised and bank matched advised M&As (1+2) 31,954
Steps in the Process Issues
14. Debt and equity issues from 1976 to 2006 852,896
15. Excluding issues with missing transaction values 755,267
16. Excluding issues without an underwriter 755,266
Final sample C to calculate the exclusion restriction SCOPE 755,266
deals excluded
Table 1: Data preparation and sample statistics
The sample is taken from the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database. The sample includes US targets only. The deals included are
M&As (1, 2), spinoffs & splitoffs (4), tender offers (5), minority stake purchases (10), acquisit ions of remaining interest (11),
and privatizat ions (12). The initial sample of 208,654 deals from 01/01/1979 to 12/31/2008 is reduced by missing Compustat
data as well as incomplete variables. The sample includes only M&As of corporate acquirers as well as stake purchases. Most deals
without Compustat data involve private acquirers. The final sample includes deals from 01/01/1979 to 12/31/2006. Panel F
includes the major stat istics of the acquisition sequences. Panel G reports the dist ribution of the bids and acquisitions over time,
the number of advised bids/acquisitions per year, the number of investment banks included in the SDC M&A sample and SDC
M&A League Tables and the actually chosen bid-bank matches. 
Panel A: Observation elemination before merging the data with Compustat
deals excluded
23,640
20,328
21,548
76,073
Panel B: Merging with the Compustat sample
5,352
37
2,323
8,965
Panel D: Observation elimination after merging with Compustat & CRSP
deals excluded
Panel C: Merging with the CRSP sample
deals excluded
41,934
Panel E: Preparing the SDC Global Debt & Equity Issues to calculate the exclusion restriction
issues excluded
97,629
1
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
30,908 --- --- --- --- ---
10,280 --- --- --- --- ---
--- 3.0 2.0 4.0 1 98
--- 499.7 224.0 760.1 0 9289
--- 736.6 369.5 1012.6 0 9289
--- 600.0 305.0 798.6 0 8141
--- 504.5 263.0 705.5 0 6070
--- 438.5 198.5 631.4 0 6177
--- 303.6 135.0 473.6 0 5517
Year
Bids /    
Acquisitions
Advised 
Deals
Banks in 
the SDC 
Universe
SDC M&A 
League 
Table 
Banks (#)
Possible 
advised bid-
bank 
Matches
Observed 
advised 
bid-bank 
Matches
Unobserved 
advised bid-
bank 
Matches
Unadvised bid-
bank Matches
(2) x (3) (1-2) x (3)
(1) (2) (3) a b c
1979 9 6 45 20 270 7 263 135
1980 45 22 83 49 1,826 23 1,803 1,909
1981 289 62 136 50 8,432 65 8,367 30,872
1982 402 68 172 50 11,696 73 11,623 57,448
1983 540 89 170 50 15,130 95 15,035 76,670
1984 615 110 164 51 18,040 115 17,925 82,820
1985 303 111 148 50 16,428 124 16,304 28,416
1986 479 176 210 50 36,960 193 36,767 63,630
1987 482 121 242 50 29,282 129 29,153 87,362
1988 546 167 261 50 43,587 180 43,407 98,919
1989 687 166 295 50 48,970 194 48,776 153,695
1990 646 118 256 50 30,208 132 30,076 135,168
1991 731 112 263 50 29,456 129 29,327 162,797
1992 965 158 271 51 42,818 167 42,651 218,697
1993 1,229 230 281 50 64,630 282 64,348 280,719
1994 1,600 351 345 50 121,095 398 120,697 430,905
1995 1,651 404 342 50 138,168 438 137,730 426,474
1996 1,989 477 351 50 167,427 515 166,912 530,712
1997 2,627 635 392 50 248,920 710 248,210 780,864
1998 2,669 613 351 50 215,163 681 214,482 721,656
1999 2,079 579 355 50 205,545 642 204,903 532,500
2000 1,919 597 318 50 189,846 695 189,151 420,396
2001 1,396 462 312 50 144,144 537 143,607 291,408
2002 1,330 365 292 50 106,580 407 106,173 281,780
2003 1,293 367 292 50 107,164 413 106,751 270,392
2004 1,387 421 336 50 141,456 494 140,962 324,576
2005 1,508 441 366 50 161,406 531 160,875 390,522
2006 1,492 412 351 50 144,612 517 144,095 379,080
Total 30,908 7,840 2,489,259 8,886 2,480,373 7,260,522
Table 1 (cont.): Data preparation and sample statistics
advised and unadvised 
bids/acquisitions
Days between the 1st and 2nd bid in SDC
Days between the 2nd and 3rd bid in SDC
Days between the 3rd and 4th bid in SDC
Days between the 4th and 5th bid in SDC
Days between the 5th and 6th and higher bid in SDC
Panel G: Time series of acquisitions/bids and possible bid-bank matches
Number of acquisitions/bids in the final sample
Number of acquirers/bidders in the final sample
Acquisitions per acquirer and sequence 
Days between acquisitions/bids
Panel F: Major acquisitions series characteristics in the final sample
banks possible bid-bank matches
100,860
44,844
100,590
116,644
All 
possible 
bid-bank 
matches
405
3,735
39,304
69,144
(1) x (3)
91,800
a+b+c
551,928
523,692
9,749,781
936,819
738,045
610,242
435,552
388,360
377,556
466,032
345,349
552,000
564,642
698,139
1,029,784
142,506
202,665
165,376
192,253
261,515
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In the sensitivity analyses CARs over event windows (-1, 1) and (-3, 3) based on 
the CAPM, estimated for each deal from -270 to -21 trading days to exclude the 
pre-announcement stock price run-up period, are used as well (Mitchell, Pulvino, 
& Stafford, 2004; Brown & Warner, 1985; 1980). 
The industry expertise and access to the bidder are approximated with the target 
industry expertise IEDT and IEVT and the advisory relationship strength ARSD 
and ARSV. The industry expertise j,k,sIE  is the proxy of investment bank’s j  
advisory skills and its access to information in industry k  at time s , adapted from 
previous research (Benveniste, Busaba, & Wilhelm, 2002; Chang, Shekhar, Tam, 
& Zhu, 2013; Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013; Forte, Iannotta, & Navone, 2010). The 
approximation of the industry expertise is based on the M&As advised in the past 
three years. With more transactions advised the bank learns how to advise M&As 
better by accumulating advisory skills (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). The 
industry expertise is measured either by the number (D) or dollar value (V) of 
acquisitions advised with respect to the total number or dollar value of advised 
acquisitions in each of the 1,..., 49k =  (Fama & French, 1997) industries in the 
three years 1s − , 2s − , 3s −  preceding the year s  of the acquisition or bid. The 
measure of the industry expertise of bank j  in industry k  in year s  measured by 
the relative number of deals (D) advised is defined as 
j,k,s-1 j,k,s-2 j,k,s-3
k,s-1 k,s-2 k,s-3
j,k,s
advised_deals advised_deals advised_deals
+ +
advised_industry_deals advised_industry_deals advised_industry_deals
IED =
3
 
  
 
 
For instance in the year 1998 Goldman Sachs had an industry expertise by 
acquisitions or bids advised in the ship building industry of 0.1111. This is 
computed by the number of M&As Goldman Sachs advised in the preceding year 
1997 divided by the sum of advised M&As in the ship building industry in 1997. 
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Goldman Sachs did not advice any deal in the ship building industry in years 1996 
and 1995. The industry expertise of Goldman Sachs in “Ships” 1998 is 
( )GS,Ships,1998IED = 0.3+0+0 /3=0. 1 . The normalization with 3 ensures that the 
industry expertise is a ratio between 0 and 1. The maximum industry expertise of 1 
corresponds to 100% if Goldman Sachs had participated in the preceding three 
years as advisor on the acquirers’ or targets’ sides in all advised deals in the ship 
building industry. The variable of the industry expertise based on the number (D) 
or dollar volume (V) of deals in the target’s (T) industry are IEDT and IEVT.  
The proxy for the advisory relationship strength ARS is based on the arguments of 
(Anand & Galetovic, 2006) that building relationships with bidding companies 
enables investment banks to get access to the private information of acquirers. The 
advisory relationship strength is based on the relative number of deals (D) or dollar 
volume (V) the bank advised with respect to the number of all advised M&As the 
acquirer conducted in the three years preceding the bid considered. The variables 
of the advisory relationship strength are ARSD and ARSV. The statistics of the 
Top-25 banks in sample A are summarized in table A in the statistical appendix, 
which is shared with the previous chapters. 
Finally the past performance PASTBBCAR of previous bidder-bank matches is 
modeled comparably to (Rau, 2000) and (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003). PASTBBCAR 
is the value weighted bidder-bank matched CAR (-2, 2) of the acquirer’s previous 
M&A if he was advised by the same bank, or of the previous unadvised deal if no 
advisor is chosen in the current bid.  
The market share MS of the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables, which is set to 0.1 
if the bank is not in the annual league tables, is used as an exclusion restriction (Li 
& Prabhala, 2007). The market share MS as a measure of reputation is expected to 
be a proxy for the visibility of a bank in the advisory market (Rau, 2000; Carter & 
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Manaster, 1990; Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2008; Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). The 
market share and ranking in the league tables is so important for the banks that 
they have incentives to ratchet it up (Derrien & Dessaint, 2012). The variable 
SCOPE serves as exclusion restriction in selection equation [1] similar to 
(Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). SCOPE is a dummy whether the bidder 
hired an underwriter in an equity or debt offering in the previous three years. The 
market share MS serves as exclusion restriction in selection equation [2] of the 
particular bank advisor choice. 
The calculation of the industry expertise, advisory relationship strength, market 
share and past performance requires the tracking and controlling of bank mergers 
and banks’ name changes. The assumption is that merging banks inherit the 
expertise and advisory relationships of their predecessors. The ultimate parent bank 
has inherited the relationships and expertise of its predecessors. Table B in the 
statistical appendix includes the bank mergers and name changes of all 395 banks 
in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables from 1979 to 2006 together with their 
201 ultimate parents as of 12/31/2006. The name changes and mergers of banks not 
in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables are not tracked, because sample A 
includes 1,854 different banks from 1979 to 2006. The 395 banks in the league 
tables advise almost 75% of all M&As. In years 2007 and 2008 during the 
financial crisis many banks went bankrupt, among them two leading investment 
banks, Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns. Tracking their remains is difficult as 
many key bankers left the industry entirely according to the press. Therefore, the 
sample is truncated after 2006 because of sample attrition of bankrupt banks 
(Wooldridge, 2002e). 
The transaction and bidder characteristics are taken from the literature. The 
acquisition experience of the acquirer is approximated by the number of bids or 
acquisitions he conducted in the previous three years, measured by the variable 
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DEALS3YEARS (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). The return on assets compared to 
bidders’ industry average, abnormal AROA, is used an approximation of acquirers’ 
profitability to make acquisitions (Heron & Lie, 2002). Opposing the effect of a 
high profitability is a high abnormal leverage ALEVERAGE above the industry 
mean that constraints bidder’s management in debt financing the acquisition. 
(Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007). The assessment of bidders’ investment 
opportunities by the market is modeled with Tobin’s Q relative to the industry 
average, ATobinsQ, adapted from (Andrade & Stafford, 2004). The logarithm of 
the industry size LNIS measures the number of potential targets in the bidder’s 
(Fama & French, 1997) industry (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001; 2002). The 
logarithm of the market value of equity LOGME at the end of the fiscal year before 
the M&A announcement year controls for the bidder’s size (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). 
The transaction variables approximate the transaction’s contracting costs and 
information asymmetry that affect the bidder’s gain. The first one is the dummy 
DIVERS for a diversifying acquisition (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). The target’s 
industry diversification as the number of its primary industries is measured with 
the continuous variable DIVERSIFICATION (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). The 
purchase of a controlling majority of the target is modeled with the dummy 
MAJORITY (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). If the target or acquirer or both are in high-
tech industries with a large share of intangible assets the information asymmetry is 
high, measured with the dummy HIGHTECH (Loughran & Ritter, 2004). The 
bidder’s access to insider target information is measured by his pre-merger 
ownership stake TOEHOLD (Song, Zhou, & Wei, 2013). Relatively larger targets, 
associated with a higher relative deal size RDS, have more bargaining power that 
increases the transaction costs (Servaes & Zenner, 1996; Ahern, 2008; Fuller, 
Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). The 
existence and potential entry of competition from other bidders makes the 
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acquirer’s bidding strategy more complex, modeled with the variable MULTIPLE 
(Boone & Mulherin, 2008).  
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
ADVISED 9,749,781 0.2553 0.0000 0.4360 0.0000 1.0000
TADVISORTIER 9,749,781 0.5008 0.0000 0.7285 0.0000 2.0000
SCOPE 9,749,781 0.3099 0.0000 0.4624 0.0000 1.0000
DEALS3YEARS 9,749,781 1.7814 1.0000 3.0328 0.0000 41.0000
DIVERS 9,749,781 0.4285 0.0000 0.4949 0.0000 1.0000
MAJORITY 9,749,781 0.9502 1.0000 0.2175 0.0000 1.0000
HOSTILE 9,749,781 0.0078 0.0000 0.0879 0.0000 1.0000
ANTITAKEOVER 9,749,781 0.0357 0.0000 0.1855 0.0000 1.0000
FAMILY 9,749,781 0.0024 0.0000 0.0491 0.0000 1.0000
LITIGATION 9,749,781 0.0131 0.0000 0.1139 0.0000 1.0000
REGULATORY 9,749,781 0.2876 0.0000 0.4526 0.0000 1.0000
CROSSBORDER 9,749,781 0.0591 0.0000 0.2358 0.0000 1.0000
TOEHOLD 9,749,781 1.7710 0.0000 10.0098 -0.0300 99.8000
HIGHTECH 9,749,781 0.2922 0.0000 0.4548 0.0000 1.0000
DIVERSIFICATION 9,749,781 0.4855 0.0000 0.5680 0.0000 3.2189
MULTIPLE 9,749,781 1.0226 1.0000 0.1868 1.0000 8.0000
RDS 9,749,781 0.2271 0.0639 0.4748 0.0002 3.6040
LNIS 9,749,781 6.6491 6.7845 0.9239 1.6094 7.9491
PUBLIC 9,749,781 0.1928 0.0000 0.3945 0.0000 1.0000
STOCK 9,749,781 0.1909 0.0000 0.3930 0.0000 1.0000
CASH 9,749,781 0.2467 0.0000 0.4311 0.0000 1.0000
MIXED 9,749,781 0.1965 0.0000 0.3974 0.0000 1.0000
OTHER 9,749,781 0.0602 0.0000 0.2378 0.0000 1.0000
ATobinsQ 9,749,781 0.0229 -0.2317 1.8885 -5.1792 14.9771
AROA 9,749,781 0.0912 0.0723 0.1678 -1.1947 0.7949
ALEVERAGE 9,749,781 -0.0246 -0.0514 0.1841 -0.4599 0.8223
SIXTH 9,749,781 0.2612 0.0000 0.4393 0.0000 1.0000
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables in the first selection equation
This table reports the sample statistics of the dependent, bank, bidder and transaction variables. Panel A includes the descriptive statistics
of the first selection equation whether the deal is advised (ADVISED=0/1). Panel B includes the descriptive statistics of the second
selection equation of the particular acquirer advisor choice (AADVISOR=0/1). Panel C includes inverse mills ratios 1, 2, 3, and 4 and
correlation ρUE of the annual and pooled bivariate probit model, estimated with IEDT and ARSD as well as IEVT and ARSV (4 versions).
Panel D includes the descriptive statistics of the structural equation of the particular acquirer advisor choice's influence on the cumulative
announcement returns. Panel E includes the acquirer specific means of variables (Mundlak, 1978). The variables are described in table C
in the statistical appendix. The continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1 percentile to exclude outliers.
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
AADVISOR 9,749,781 0.0009 0.0000 0.0302 0.0000 1.0000
IEDT 9,749,781 0.0119 0.0000 0.0357 0.0000 0.8333
ARSD 9,749,781 0.0002 0.0000 0.0092 0.0000 1.0000
IEVT 9,749,781 0.0157 0.0000 0.0581 0.0000 0.9704
ARSV 9,749,781 0.0002 0.0000 0.0093 0.0000 1.0000
MS 9,749,781 0.7729 0.1000 3.3135 0.1000 94.6000
PASTBBCAR 9,749,781 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 -0.1994 0.3135
LOGME 9,749,781 20.3683 20.2763 2.1567 15.0841 25.7360
RDS 9,749,781 0.2271 0.0639 0.4748 0.0002 3.6040
meanIEDT 9,749,781 0.0119 0.0111 0.0044 0.0000 0.0762
meanARSD 9,749,781 0.0002 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0142
meanIEVT 9,749,781 0.0119 0.0111 0.0044 0.0000 0.0762
meanARSV 9,749,781 0.0002 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0142
meanMS 9,749,781 0.7729 0.7647 0.1021 0.5899 4.6533
meanPASTBBCAR 9,749,781 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0012
meanLOGME 9,749,781 20.3683 20.2735 2.0765 15.0841 25.7360
meanRDS 9,749,781 0.2271 0.1190 0.3584 0.0002 3.6040
For IEDT and ARSD, annually:
ρ_1 8,886 -0.0112 -0.0074 0.0287 -0.0632 0.0860
invmills_1 8,886 0.8969 0.7964 0.5347 0.0000 2.9078
invmills_2 8,886 2.5616 2.8265 0.7540 0.0000 5.8190
invmills_3 8,886 0.8771 0.7829 0.5282 0.0000 2.8891
invmills_4 8,886 2.5511 2.8171 0.7522 0.0000 5.8115
For IEVT and ARSV, annually:
ρ_2 8,886 0.0011 -0.0022 0.0252 -0.0628 0.0931
invmills_1_v 8,886 0.8776 0.7784 0.5283 0.0000 2.8854
invmills_2_v 8,886 2.5906 2.9125 0.7602 0.0000 5.7769
invmills_3_v 8,886 0.8771 0.7829 0.5282 0.0000 2.8891
invmills_4_v 8,886 2.5900 2.9129 0.7598 0.0000 5.7664
For IEDT and ARSD, pooled:
ρ_3 8,886 -0.0392 -0.0392 0.0000 -0.0392 -0.0392
invmills_1_p 8,886 0.9524 0.8434 0.5528 0.0068 2.9390
invmills_2_p 8,886 2.4403 2.6493 0.7955 0.0001 4.1645
invmills_3_p 8,886 0.8880 0.7815 0.5310 0.0049 2.9104
invmills_4_p 8,886 2.4053 2.6143 0.7878 0.0001 4.0946
For IEVT and ARSV, pooled:
ρ_4 8,886 -0.0375 -0.0375 0.0000 -0.0375 -0.0375
invmills_1_p_v 8,886 0.9502 0.8402 0.5521 0.0066 2.9337
invmills_2_p_v 8,886 2.4695 2.7190 0.7981 0.0000 4.2620
invmills_3_p_v 8,886 0.8880 0.7815 0.5310 0.0049 2.9104
invmills_4_p_v 8,886 2.4361 2.6835 0.7907 0.0000 4.2081
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of the inverse mills ratios and correlation coefficients
Table 2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of variables of the second selection equation
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw 8,886 0.0085 0.0013 0.0881 -0.1994 0.3135
IEDT 8,886 0.0743 0.0521 0.0787 0.0000 0.6574
ARSD 8,886 0.0553 0.0000 0.1536 0.0000 1.0000
IEVT 8,886 0.1190 0.0513 0.1466 0.0000 0.8879
ARSV 8,886 0.0557 0.0000 0.1550 0.0000 1.0000
SIXTH 8,886 0.2559 0.0000 0.4364 0.0000 1.0000
PASTBBCAR 8,886 0.0024 0.0000 0.0384 -0.1994 0.3135
LOGME 8,886 21.0566 20.9537 2.0205 15.0841 25.7360
LNIS 8,886 6.6272 6.7845 0.9498 1.6094 7.9491
ALEVERAGE 8,886 -0.0274 -0.0537 0.1756 -0.4545 0.8071
ATobinsQ 8,886 0.0207 -0.1802 1.8604 -5.1723 14.5082
AROA 8,886 0.1057 0.0806 0.1556 -1.1152 0.7949
TADVISORTIER 8,886 1.1200 1.0000 0.7946 0.0000 2.0000
DEALS3YEARS 8,886 1.4931 1.0000 2.3953 0.0000 28.0000
DIVERS 8,886 0.3745 0.0000 0.4840 0.0000 1.0000
MAJORITY 8,886 0.9737 1.0000 0.1601 0.0000 1.0000
HOSTILE 8,886 0.0277 0.0000 0.1641 0.0000 1.0000
ANTITAKEOVER 8,886 0.0925 0.0000 0.2898 0.0000 1.0000
FAMILY 8,886 0.0055 0.0000 0.0741 0.0000 1.0000
LITIGARTION 8,886 0.0457 0.0000 0.2088 0.0000 1.0000
REGULATORY 8,886 0.5145 1.0000 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000
CROSSBORDER 8,886 0.0807 0.0000 0.2724 0.0000 1.0000
TOEHOLD 8,886 2.3969 0.0000 11.6292 0.0000 99.7000
HIGHTECH 8,886 0.3098 0.0000 0.4624 0.0000 1.0000
DIVERSIFICATION 8,886 0.6843 0.6931 0.6351 0.0000 3.2189
MULTIPLE 8,886 1.0647 1.0000 0.3030 1.0000 4.0000
RDS 8,886 0.4424 0.1979 0.6430 0.0002 3.6040
PUBLIC 8,886 0.3928 0.0000 0.4884 0.0000 1.0000
STOCK 8,886 0.2605 0.0000 0.4389 0.0000 1.0000
CASH 8,886 0.2570 0.0000 0.4370 0.0000 1.0000
MIXED 8,886 0.2795 0.0000 0.4488 0.0000 1.0000
OTHER 8,886 0.0618 0.0000 0.2408 0.0000 1.0000
Table 2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of the selected subsample of bid-bank matches
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Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
meanIEDT 8,886 0.0461 0.0344 0.0467 0.0000 0.6574
meanARSD 8,886 0.0346 0.0000 0.0712 0.0000 0.6667
meanIEVT 8,886 0.0734 0.0487 0.0819 0.0000 0.8033
meanARSV 8,886 0.0348 0.0000 0.0714 0.0000 0.6667
meanSIXTH 8,886 0.2455 0.0000 0.3023 0.0000 0.9490
meanPASTBBCAR 8,886 0.0050 0.0000 0.0246 -0.0997 0.1914
meanLOGME 8,886 21.0212 20.8983 1.9466 15.0841 25.7360
meanLNIS 8,886 6.6251 6.7719 0.9421 1.8405 7.9491
meanATobinsQ 8,886 0.0263 -0.1521 1.5356 -5.0724 14.5082
meanALEVERAGE 8,886 -0.0295 -0.0517 0.1560 -0.4091 0.7906
meanAROA 8,886 0.1032 0.0825 0.1423 -1.1152 0.7766
meanTADVISORTIER 8,886 0.8614 0.8750 0.5462 0.0000 2.0000
meanDEALS3YEARS 8,886 1.4891 1.0000 1.8065 0.0000 18.7755
meanDIVERS 8,886 0.3975 0.3333 0.3656 0.0000 1.0000
meanMAJORITY 8,886 0.9533 1.0000 0.1173 0.0000 1.0000
meanHOSTILE 8,886 0.0172 0.0000 0.0767 0.0000 1.0000
meanANTITAKEOVER 8,886 0.0649 0.0000 0.1582 0.0000 1.0000
meanFAMILY 8,886 0.0042 0.0000 0.0358 0.0000 1.0000
meanLITIGATION 8,886 0.0327 0.0000 0.1229 0.0000 1.0000
meanREGULATORY 8,886 0.4193 0.4000 0.3397 0.0000 1.0000
meanCROSSBORDER 8,886 0.0806 0.0000 0.2708 0.0000 1.0000
meanTOEHOLD 8,886 2.3379 0.0000 7.2534 0.0000 99.7000
meanHIGHTECH 8,886 0.3114 0.0000 0.4388 0.0000 1.0000
meanDIVERSIFICATION 8,886 0.6084 0.5973 0.4052 0.0000 2.5649
meanMULTIPLE 8,886 1.0499 1.0000 0.1761 1.0000 4.0000
meanRDS 8,886 0.3191 0.1759 0.4417 0.0002 3.6040
meanPUBLIC 8,886 0.3073 0.2500 0.3047 0.0000 1.0000
meanSTOCK 8,886 0.2223 0.0741 0.2942 0.0000 1.0000
meanCASH 8,886 0.2667 0.2000 0.2824 0.0000 1.0000
meanMIXED 8,886 0.2216 0.1364 0.2685 0.0000 1.0000
meanOTHER 8,886 0.0721 0.0000 0.1699 0.0000 1.0000
Table 2 (cont.): Descriptive statistics of variables
Panel E: Descriptive statistics of acquirer specific means of the selected subsample's variables
 
The last variables modelling the complexity of the transaction are dummy variables 
adapted and extended from (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). ANTITAKEOVER 
controls for anti-takeover measures (Comment & Schwert, 1995). The dummy 
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CROSS-BORDER controls for cross-border deals (Moeller & Schlingemann, 
2005; Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2008). The dummy REGULATORY models the 
requirement of regulatory approval, FAMILY models family ownership, and 
LITIGATION a pending litigation against the target. (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003) 
show that the acquirer’s advisor choice depends on the target advisor’s tier, which 
is modelled with the discrete variable TADVISORTIER. 
A hostile acquisition is more complex and increases the costs to remove the 
resistance of target’s management, controlled with the dummy HOSTILE 
(Schwert, 2000). The payment by stock increases the complexity and thus the 
transaction costs, because the shares of the acquirer and target have to be valued to 
determine how many shares he has to bid for one share of the target company. The 
payment methods are modeled with the dummies STOCK, CASH, MIXED and 
OTRHER (Servaes & Zenner, 1996; Song, Zhou, & Wei, 2013; Chang S. , 1998; 
Martin, 1996). The dummy SIXTH is set to one if the transaction is the sixth and 
later one of the bidding company (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002). All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1% percentile. 
 
4.3.2 Estimating the selection equations with a bivariate probit model  
 
Tables D and E, put in the statistical appendix due to their length, show the annual 
regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection as suggested by 
(Wooldridge, 1995; 2002e) and proposed as annual method to obtain regressions 
coefficients for the first and second selection equation and the correlation 
coefficient 
UE
ρ . The strict estimation of 98T =  separate selection equations for 
each bid t , from the 1t =  to 98t = , is unfeasible as the number of observations 
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decreases from 10, 280n =  for 1t =  to 1n =  for 98t = . Therefore, the bid-bank 
matches tj  are clustered each year s  to estimate annual selection regressions with 
a sufficient number of observations n t j× × . The problems arising in the annual 
estimation are non-convergence of regressions in years with few observed bid-bank 
matches, because the mean of the dependent variable AADVISOR is close to zero 
with little variation. Besides non-convergence also multicollinearity among the 
transaction characteristics of the first selection equation and the bank variables, 
particularly IEDT or IEVT and the market share MS, is problematic if the mean of 
AADVISOR is close to zero. In years 1979 to 1981, 1986, 1994 and 2004 to 2006 
only is the correlation coefficient 
UE
ρ   significant. The correlation coefficient 
UE
ρ  
is almost zero, causing the bivariate inverse mills ratios invmills_1 and invmills_2 
to converge to the univariate inverse mills ratios invmills_3 and invmills_4 with 
the proof shown in econometric appendix E.3.  
The pooled model of the bivariate probit with selection is shown in table 3. The fit 
is better, because multicollinearity and non-convergence do not pose problems. 
The two sequential selection equations are correlated. Industry expertise IEDT and 
IEVT, advisory relationship strength ARSD or ARSV, as well as the past returns of 
the bank advisor in the bidder’s previous deal PASTBBCAR and the bank’s market 
share MS are significantly positively correlated to the probability of its selection as 
advisor. This is comparable to the observation of (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013) 
concerning the retention of old advisors and the theoretical arguments of (Anand & 
Galetovic, 2006) and (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994) of advisor selection, and the 
observation of (Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013) of banks being selected by 
their industry expertise and advisory relationships. The positive effect of the past 
announcement returns on hiring a bank as advisors is contrary to the observation 
made by (Bao & Edmans, 2011) and (Rau, 2000) that past performance would be 
irrelevant for the advisor choice.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEDT 2.8406***
(31.605)
ARSD 4.9910***
(18.452)
IEVT 0.7539***
(13.683)
ARSV 5.1876***
(20.140)
MS 0.0429*** 0.0463***
(68.735) (65.662)
PASTBBCAR 5.2506** 5.5148**
(2.055) (2.136)
LOGME -0.0259*** -0.0313***
(-5.122) (-6.400)
RDS 0.0142** 0.4135*** 0.0127* 0.4135***
(2.116) (19.092) (1.957) (19.092)
meanIEDT -1.5841
(-1.571)
meanARSD -119.1972***
(-10.049)
meanIEVT 0.5141
(0.557)
meanARSV -114.2725***
(-10.708)
meanMS -0.3006*** -0.3105***
(-8.067) (-8.341)
meanPASTBBCAR -82.3384* -89.0685*
(-1.821) (-1.893)
meanLOGME 0.0094 0.0148**
(1.425) (2.277)
meanRDS -0.0237** -0.0218**
(-2.540) (-2.419)
Constant -2.1348*** -2.1348***
(-18.286) (-18.286)
Transaction characteristics No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes No
N 9,749,781 9,749,781 9,749,781 9,749,781
N of acquirers 10,280 10,280 10,280 10,280
Chi²-statistic 345,993.28 345,993.28 370,219.16 370,219.16
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 45.67 45.67 42.81 42.81
p-value of exogeneity 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pooled Model 1 Pooled Model 2
Table 3: Pooled regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 shows the pooled estimation of the bivariate probit model with selection. Pooled model 1 uses IEDT
and ARSD as bank variables. Pooled model 2 uses IEVT and ARSV as bank variables. The descriptive statistics 
are shown in table 2 and the variables are described in table C in the stat istical appendix. The transact ion
variables, year fixed effects and (Fama & French, 1997) industry fixed effects of the primary acquirer
industry are included but not reported. The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity with
the Huber & White sandwich est imator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). 
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The transaction variables that are not shown in table 3 are significant. The 
extended table is available upon request. The more complex the deal is the more 
likely is the transaction advised (Servaes & Zenner, 1996). Bidders with better 
investment opportunities, measured by ATobinsQ, are more likely to be advised, 
because banks sense opportunities for follow-on business (Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri, 1994; Hunter & Walker, 1990; Klasa & Stegemoller, 2007). The 
advisory opportunities arise for investment banks, because companies with larger 
sets of investment opportunities make more acquisitions (Servaes, 1991; Klasa & 
Stegemoller, 2007). Larger deals are more likely to be advised, because the 
advisory fees increase with deal size (McLaughlin, 1990; 1992; Hunter & Walker, 
1990; Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003).  
A more prestigious bank advisor on the target’s side increases the likelihood that 
the acquirer hires a bank advisor (Servaes & Zenner, 1996; Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 
2003). On the other hand more experienced bidders who have announced more 
bids or acquisitions in the previous three years are more experienced and thus less 
likely to hire an investment bank (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 2009; 2011; Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996).  
In the estimation of the bivariate probit model with selection the correlation 
UE
ρ  
of the selection equations is significant. In the pooled model the bivariate inverse 
mills ratios differ from the univariate inverse mills ratios more than in the annual 
regressions. The fixed effects are significantly different from zero (Mundlak, 
1978). Without the fixed effects the coefficients of the explanatory variables do not 
change. The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity of 
residuals 
it
u  and 
it
ε  with the Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by 
acquirers i  derived in econometric appendix E.6  (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). 
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4.3.3 Estimating the structural equation on the selected subsample 
 
Finally estimating the effect of the particular advisor selection by the bidder on his 
acquisition returns reveals the positive influence that the chosen bank’s target 
industry expertise and advisory relationship strength have on returns, shown in 
table 4. The announcement return of the bidder’s deal previously advised by the 
same bank chosen as advisor in the current bid PASTBBCAR is insignificant. The 
inclusion of the bivariate and univariate inverse mills ratios shows the significance 
of the second selection equation, the choice of the particular bank advisor. The 
annual inverse mills ratios have a greater influence on the returns than the pooled 
inverse mills ratios. However, the inclusion of annual inverse mills ratios is 
difficult if the number of observations affected by selection is relatively small in 
some years, less than 100 per year in the first five years from 1979 to 1984. 
Therefore, time constant regression coefficients of the inverse mills ratios are used 
in the regressions in tables 4 to 7.  
The remaining explanatory variables have the expected signs. Bidders with above 
industry average investment opportunities ATobinsQ experience higher 
announcement returns (Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989; Klasa & Stegemoller, 
2007). Making more acquisitions the announcement returns decrease, even though 
the acquisition experience of the bidder DEALS3YEARS increases, which 
corresponds to the learning hypothesis of serial bidders (Aktas, Bodt, & Roll, 
2009; 2011; Croci & Petmezas, 2009). On the other hand highly profitable bidders 
experience lower announcement returns, which could be related to managerial 
hubris and overpayment for targets (Roll, 1986; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; 
2005b; 2008; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). The logarithm of the market value 
of equity LOGME is also negatively correlated with returns, indicating that large 
companies often make value destroying acquisitions (Moeller, Schlingemann, & 
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Stulz, 2004; 2005; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006). Finally 
excessive leverage ALEVERAGE and a more reputable target advisor are not 
associated with smaller announcement returns compared to previous studies 
(Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007; Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003). The transaction 
variables shown in table 2 panel D are included but not reported, having the 
expected signs. 
The (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects proposed by (Wooldridge, 1995; 2002e) are 
included but not reported and overall significant. The F-statistic of the fixed effects 
coefficients’ joint significance and its p-value are reported besides the Skewness 
and Kurtosis test of the distribution of the error terms *
itv  and a two-sided t-test 
whether they are truly indistinguishable from zero (D'Agostino, Belanger, & 
D'Agostino Jr., 1990; Wooldridge, 1995). The diagnostic statistics indicate the 
reasonability of the absence of any distributional assumption of the error terms *
itv  
that are not normally distributed. The model’s fit is good, because the error terms 
are indistinguishable from zero, the adjusted 2R  is fairly high for a returns 
regression and the Root MSE small. The overall fit of the regression of structural 
equations [4] and [5] is significant. The variance-covariance matrices of equations 
[4] and [5] in tables 4 to 7 are based on 1,000 bootstrapped samples clustered by 
acquirers i  grouped by their sequences of bid-bank matches tj . For some bids t  
one to six banks are matched as advisors, such that observation it  occurs up to six 
times in subsample B  (Adkins & Hill, 2004; Efron, 1979; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 
2003).   
148 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
IEDT 0.0189 0.0573*** 0.0573*** 0.0355** 0.0362**
(1.554) (3.022) (3.053) (2.209) (2.371)
ARSD -0.0089 0.0223* 0.0224* 0.0037 0.0042
(-1.357) (1.806) (1.757) (0.393) (0.440)
PASTBBCAR -0.0155 0.0067 0.0069 -0.0013 -0.0008
(-0.479) (0.203) (0.212) (-0.039) (-0.025)
TADVISORTIER -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0023
(-0.574) (-0.201) (0.055) (-0.420) (-0.578)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0016** -0.0017** -0.0018*** -0.0016** -0.0015**
(-2.409) (-2.451) (-2.596) (-2.198) (-2.098)
ATobinsQ 0.0025* 0.0024* 0.0024 0.0025* 0.0024*
(1.801) (1.747) (1.625) (1.759) (1.779)
AROA -0.0475** -0.0480** -0.0483** -0.0475** -0.0479**
(-2.188) (-2.277) (-2.296) (-2.360) (-2.274)
ALEVERAGE 0.0055 0.0058 0.0058 0.0055 0.0055
(0.365) (0.380) (0.395) (0.380) (0.382)
LOGME -0.0078*** -0.0075*** -0.0074*** -0.0077*** -0.0077***
(-3.157) (-3.090) (-2.891) (-3.178) (-3.206)
SIXTH 0.0011 0.0016 0.0017 0.0013 0.0013
(0.297) (0.417) (0.444) (0.346) (0.355)
invmills_1 0.0012
(0.292)
invmills_2 0.0091***
(2.936)
invmills_3 0.0029
(0.673)
invmills_4 0.0092***
(2.902)
invmills_1_p -0.0018
(-0.219)
invmills_2_p 0.0037
(1.631)
invmills_3_p -0.0032
(-0.397)
invmills_4_p 0.0038*
(1.757)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886
Number of acquirers 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164
Chi²-statistic 1,016.12 917.65 827.94 1,074.36 991.49
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RMSE 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814
R² adjusted 0.1539 0.1550 0.1552 0.1540 0.1540
N of bootstrap repetitions 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
F-Statistic of fixed effects 361.01 315.89 314.57 337.74 337.74
F-Statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skewness-Kurtosis test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T-test vit
*=0 p-value 0.8135 0.8798 0.8890 0.8348 0.8348
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw
Table 4: Regressions of the announcement returns of bid-bank matches in advised deals
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 shows the primary regressions of structural equations [4] and [5] on subsample B affected by selection. The chosen bank
advisors' industry expertise and advisory relationship strength are approximated by IEDT and ARSD. The diagnostic statistics of the
models' fit, the distribution and mean of the error terms are reported as well (D'Agostino, Belanger, & D'Agostino Jr., 1990). The
standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation by bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions, clustered by
bidders and their bid-bank matches (Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003; Efron, 1979).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
IEVT 0.0109* 0.0368*** 0.0368*** 0.0244*** 0.0247***
(1.682) (3.347) (3.383) (2.799) (2.808)
ARSV -0.0082 0.0290** 0.0292** 0.0115 0.0120
(-1.232) (2.053) (2.046) (1.064) (1.201)
PASTBBCAR -0.0153 0.0141 0.0143 0.0077 0.0081
(-0.476) (0.434) (0.434) (0.223) (0.249)
TADVISORTIER -0.0011 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0021
(-0.641) (-0.092) (0.118) (-0.388) (-0.536)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0016** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0016** -0.0015**
(-2.500) (-2.595) (-2.693) (-2.196) (-2.194)
ATobinsQ 0.0026* 0.0025* 0.0025* 0.0025* 0.0025*
(1.899) (1.766) (1.739) (1.811) (1.853)
AROA -0.0482** -0.0496** -0.0499** -0.0487** -0.0491**
(-2.276) (-2.496) (-2.487) (-2.400) (-2.464)
ALEVERAGE 0.0053 0.0055 0.0054 0.0050 0.0050
(0.369) (0.372) (0.377) (0.333) (0.336)
LOGME -0.0079*** -0.0078*** -0.0076*** -0.0079*** -0.0078***
(-3.239) (-3.232) (-3.184) (-3.397) (-3.156)
SIXTH 0.0010 0.0012 0.0012 0.0010 0.0011
(0.259) (0.323) (0.318) (0.281) (0.292)
invmills_1_v 0.0022
(0.501)
invmills_2_v 0.0108***
(3.023)
invmills_3_v 0.0034
(0.801)
invmills_4_v 0.0108***
(3.042)
invmills_1_p_v -0.0014
(-0.173)
invmills_2_p_v 0.0055**
(2.310)
invmills_3_p_v -0.0026
(-0.315)
invmills_4_p_v 0.0056**
(2.445)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886
N of acquirers 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164
Chi²-statistic 1,082.81 971.69 897.40 1,028.94 1,071.20
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RMSE 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814
R² adjusted 0.1540 0.1553 0.1555 0.1543 0.1543
N of bootstrap repetitions 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
F-Statistic of fixed effects 364.48 321.22 306.08 334.68 352.33
F-Statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skewness-Kurtosis test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T-test vit
*
=0 p-value 0.8063 0.8788 0.8857 0.8342 0.8304
CAR_(-2,2)_BETA1_vw
Table 5: Regressions of the announcement returns of bid-bank matches in advised deals
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5 shows the primary regressions of structural equat ions [4] and [5] on subsample B affected by selection. The
chosen bank advisors' industry expert ise and advisory relat ionship strength are approximated by IEVT and ARSV. The
diagnostic statist ics of the models' fit , the distribution and mean of the error terms are reported as well (D'Agostino,
Belanger, & D'Agost ino Jr., 1990). T he standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation by bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions, clustered by bidders and their bid-bank matches (Adkins & Hill,
2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003; Efron, 1979).
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The regression analysis in table 5 is similar to the one in table 4. The banks’ target 
industry expertise and advisory relationship strength are approximated by the 
relative dollar deal volume based definitions IEVT and ARSV. The empirical 
observations are similar. At the mean of 0.0743 and 0.1190 of IEDT or IEVT the 
average increase of the announcement return is 0.0573 0.0743 0.0043× =  or 
0.0368 0.1190 0.0044× = . The average 0.435 percentage points higher 
announcement returns imply a capital gain of 0.0043878,00 5 3,80,0 1900 ,300× =
dollar for the bidder11. Hiring a bank that has advised one more deal in the last 
three years in the target’s industry has an effect on the announcement return of 
0.0573 0.0185 0.0011× = , or in economic terms 965,800 dollar for the bidder. 
Measuring the economic value of a higher industry expertise of one more deal by 
its deal value the economic effect is 0.0368 0.0527 0.0019× = or 1,668, 200  
dollar12.  
Similarly hiring a bank with average advisory relationship strength ARSD or 
ARSV the positive effect for the bidder is 
( )0.0223 0.05878,000,00 53 1,082 410 ,7× × =  or 
( )0.0290 0.05878,000,00 57 1, 418 330 ,2× × = dollar. In other terms having advised 
one more deal of the bidder in the last three years measured by the relative deal 
                                                          
11 The market value of equity two days before the M&A announcement MV_(-2) has a mean of 
7,920,000,000 dollar and a median of 878,000,000 dollar. The market value is the product of the 
outstanding shares and market price _( ) t tMV t shout prc= ×  in CRSP. MV_(-3) has a mean of 
7,910,000,000 and median of 877,000,000. MV_(-1) has a mean of 7,920,000,000 and median of 
886,000,000. The mean of the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year before the M&A 
announcement year LOGME is 21.0566 1,395,613,583e = .  
12 The increase of IEDT and IEVT by one more deal is calculated as if one more deal had been advised: 
For one more deal by number ( )IEDT+1=IEDT+ 1/advised_industry_deal_number_3years  and for a 
one deal increase by value 
( )IEVT+1=IEVT+ average_deal_value/advised_industry_deal_volume_3years . The computations are 
similar for ARSD+1  and ARSV+1 . The means are 0.0185 for IEDT+1, 0.0527 for IEVT+1, 0.0418 
for ARSD+1 and 0.0424 for ARSV+1 
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number increases the bidder’s equity value by 0.0223 0.0421 0.0009× = or 
878,000,000 0.0009 790, 200× = dollar. Measured by the deal volume of advising 
one more deal of the bidder in the past three years the economic effect is 
0.0290 0.0428 0.0012× =  or 878,000,000 0.0012 1,053,600× = dollar. Compared 
to an average cumulative abnormal return of 0.0085, implying an equity gain of 
7, 463,000 dollar, the economic effects of hiring more experienced and familiar 
investment banks as advisors are fairly high. The hiring of banks based on their 
target industry expertise, strength of advisory relationship with the bidder and track 
record of past advisory performance aligns the bidders’ and banks’ incentives and 
interests (McLaughlin, 1990; 1992; Hunter & Walker, 1990). Banks earn higher 
fees while bidders benefit from gains of the market value of their equity.  
 
4.3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
The sensitivity analysis of alternative definitions of the cumulative announcement 
returns (CARs) are shown in tables 6 and 7. The cumulative announcement returns 
are calculated either by the BETA-1 Model or the CAPM, estimated on the returns 
from -270 to -21 days before the announcement date, and with the value- or 
equally-weighted CRSP index as market return proxy.  
Table 6 panel A shows that the past bidder-bank matched announcement returns 
are always significant for event windows (-3, 3). In the case of CARs with a longer 
event window of (-3, 3) the economic effect of hiring a past bank advisor with a 
one-standard deviation higher past announcement returns is associated with a 
0.0832 0.0205 0.0017× =  percent higher announcement return. 
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Panel A: BETA-1 Model CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES (-1, 1) (-3, 3) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3)
IEVT 0.0302*** 0.0560*** 0.0275*** 0.0355*** 0.0562***
(2.784) (5.295) (2.729) (3.602) (4.991)
ARSV 0.0283** 0.0440*** 0.0257** 0.0282** 0.0452***
(2.089) (3.149) (2.022) (2.108) (3.287)
PASTBBCAR_(*, *) 0.0668* 0.0832** 0.0572 0.0095 0.0871**
(1.750) (2.450) (1.485) (0.293) (2.565)
TADVISORTIER 0.0008 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0009
(0.375) (0.211) (0.091) (-0.120) (0.319)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0014** -0.0019*** -0.0014** -0.0017** -0.0018**
(-2.502) (-2.613) (-2.374) (-2.499) (-2.289)
ATobinsQ 0.0012 0.0026* 0.0011 0.0024* 0.0026*
(0.927) (1.712) (0.854) (1.783) (1.679)
AROA -0.0359* -0.0432* -0.0433** -0.0589*** -0.0566**
(-1.936) (-1.938) (-2.372) (-2.908) (-2.434)
ALEVERAGE 0.0079 0.0052 0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0018
(0.597) (0.316) (0.117) (-0.074) (-0.108)
LOGME -0.0065*** -0.0109*** -0.0061*** -0.0072*** -0.0099***
(-3.071) (-4.000) (-2.940) (-3.169) (-3.762)
SIXTH 0.0001 0.0022 0.0011 0.0019 0.0030
(0.035) (0.517) (0.351) (0.510) (0.709)
invmills_1_v 0.0055 0.0011 0.0041 0.0012 0.0007
(1.520) (0.231) (1.188) (0.318) (0.153)
invmills_2_v 0.0091*** 0.0155*** 0.0087*** 0.0106*** 0.0160***
(2.602) (4.682) (2.585) (3.269) (4.725)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886
N of acquirers 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164
Chi²-statistic 882.06 806.04 729.24 961.83 731.06
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RMSE 0.0723 0.0898 0.0705 0.0793 0.0879
R² adjusted 0.1509 0.1228 0.1429 0.1449 0.1077
N of bootstrap repetitions 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
F-Statistic of fixed effects 198.92 228.87 178.06 361.17 214.54
F-Statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skewness-Kurtosis test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T-test vit
*=0 p-value 0.8622 0.8970 0.8675 0.8938 0.9193
Table 6: Regressions of alternative announcement returns (CAR) of advised deals
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted CRSP
Table 6 shows the regressions of alternative CARs. The CARs are based on the BETA-1 Model with the CRSP value- or equally-
weighted index as market proxy and different event windows. The chosen bank advisors' industry expertise and advisory relationship
strength are approximated by IEVT and ARSV. PASTBBCAR_(*, *) is calculated with the same CARs used as dependent variable.
The diagnostic statistics of the models' fit, the distribution and mean of the error terms are reported as well (D'Agostino, Belanger, &
D'Agostino Jr., 1990). The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation by bootstrapping with
1,000 repetitions, clustered by bidders and their bid-bank matches (Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender, 2003; Efron, 1979).
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Panel B: CAPM Model CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3)
IEVT 0.0287*** 0.0389*** 0.0581*** 0.0247** 0.0337*** 0.0530***
(2.799) (3.468) (5.607) (2.359) (3.087) (5.061)
ARSV 0.0262** 0.0329** 0.0490*** 0.0237* 0.0304** 0.0473***
(2.016) (2.291) (3.653) (1.798) (2.272) (3.515)
PASTBBCAR_(*, *) 0.0934** 0.0563* 0.1349*** 0.0835** 0.0436 0.1255***
(2.436) (1.650) (3.666) (2.277) (1.310) (3.582)
TADVISORTIER 0.0012 0.0002 0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0004
(0.594) (0.100) (0.492) (-0.172) (-0.412) (0.153)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0011** -0.0013* -0.0012 -0.0011* -0.0013* -0.0012
(-2.019) (-1.924) (-1.616) (-1.940) (-1.846) (-1.623)
ATobinsQ 0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004
(0.671) (0.235) (0.214) (0.556) (0.154) (0.328)
AROA -0.0373** -0.0492** -0.0448* -0.0457** -0.0573*** -0.0610***
(-2.153) (-2.504) (-1.933) (-2.573) (-3.025) (-2.703)
ALEVERAGE 0.0058 0.0029 0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0052
(0.454) (0.195) (0.122) (-0.085) (-0.187) (-0.328)
LOGME -0.0059*** -0.0071*** -0.0097*** -0.0059*** -0.0070*** -0.0091***
(-2.751) (-3.014) (-3.788) (-2.949) (-3.252) (-3.534)
SIXTH 0.0013 0.0023 0.0037 0.0026 0.0034 0.0049
(0.437) (0.648) (0.891) (0.904) (0.966) (1.215)
invmills_1_v 0.0066* 0.0038 0.0023 0.0038 0.0015 0.0002
(1.804) (0.943) (0.514) (1.202) (0.371) (0.052)
invmills_2_v 0.0080** 0.0110*** 0.0160*** 0.0077** 0.0101*** 0.0154***
(2.360) (2.984) (4.981) (2.234) (2.892) (4.792)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886
N of acquirers 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164
Chi²-statistic 799.04 774.50 699.72 736.61 825.91 665.77
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RMSE 0.0685 0.0777 0.0860 0.0663 0.0755 0.0841
R² adjusted 0.1468 0.1394 0.1045 0.1453 0.1372 0.0985
N of bootstrap repetitions 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
F-Statistic of fixed effects 152.50 217.76 180.33 147.37 239.76 189.28
F-Statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skewness-Kurtosis test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T-test vit=0 p-value 0.8669 0.8719 0.9002 0.8665 0.8775 0.9047
Table 6 (cont.): Regressions of alternative announcement returns (CAR) of advised deals
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted CRSP 
 
This higher announcement return implies an equity gain of 
0.001877,0 7 1,00,00 490 00 ,9 0× = dollar. The past performance of banks as 
advisors in the M&A market is of economic significance to be hired as advisor and 
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for the bidder to maximize his gains in the acquisition, contrary to previous 
empirical observations of (Bao & Edmans, 2011) and (Rau, 2000).  
Table 6 panel B shows similar empirical observations that a greater industry 
expertise IEVT, advisory relationship strength ARSV and past bidder-bank 
matched announcement return have significant positive effects on the acquisition 
return. The effect of the past bidder-bank matched returns PASTBBCAR_(*, *) is 
larger economically if the CARs are estimated with the CAPM. A one standard 
deviation higher past announcement return for the largest event window (-3, 3) is 
associated with a 0.1349 0.0194 0.0026× =  percent higher returns. This higher 
return implies an equity gain of 877,000,000 0.0026 2, 280, 200× = dollar. Hence 
the economic effect of the track-record of past returns is significant. 
Table 7 panels A and B are similar to table 6 panels A and B except with IEDT and 
ARSD as approximations of hired banks’ target industry expertise and advisory 
relationship strength. The empirical observations are similar to the ones shown in 
tables 4 to 6. Interesting is the observation that the dollar deal volume based 
definitions IEVT and ARSV appear to be better, and more often significant, 
approximation of banks’ skills and client relationships than the deal number based 
proxies IEDT and ARSD. The regression coefficients of PASTBBCAR_(*, *) for 
the event window (-2, 2) are insignificant in table 7 as well as in tables 4 and 5. A 
larger event window like (-3, 3) is more suitable to detect changes in the market 
value of equity of the bidder related to the hiring of a skilled and familiar bank as 
advisor. 
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Panel A: BETA-1 Model CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES (-1, 1) (-3, 3) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3)
IEDT 0.0448** 0.0887*** 0.0433** 0.0582*** 0.0923***
(2.557) (4.656) (2.351) (3.320) (4.731)
ARSD 0.0225* 0.0347*** 0.0223* 0.0246** 0.0388***
(1.870) (2.716) (1.913) (2.014) (2.895)
PASTBBCAR_(*, *) 0.0610* 0.0762** 0.0532 0.0041 0.0816**
(1.663) (2.314) (1.397) (0.131) (2.360)
TADVISORTIER 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0005
(0.131) (0.132) (-0.203) (-0.304) (0.175)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0013** -0.0019** -0.0013** -0.0017** -0.0018**
(-2.419) (-2.519) (-2.373) (-2.400) (-2.300)
ATobinsQ 0.0011 0.0025* 0.0010 0.0023 0.0024
(0.870) (1.663) (0.805) (1.614) (1.610)
AROA -0.0346** -0.0408* -0.0422** -0.0574*** -0.0543**
(-1.968) (-1.695) (-2.284) (-2.773) (-2.355)
ALEVERAGE 0.0083 0.0056 0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0013
(0.606) (0.336) (0.148) (-0.052) (-0.082)
LOGME -0.0063*** -0.0105*** -0.0060*** -0.0070*** -0.0095***
(-2.830) (-3.787) (-2.796) (-3.118) (-3.606)
SIXTH 0.0004 0.0028 0.0015 0.0024 0.0037
(0.134) (0.645) (0.471) (0.664) (0.842)
invmills_1 0.0040 0.0003 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0006
(1.089) (0.075) (0.633) (-0.039) (-0.129)
invmills_2 0.0078** 0.0134*** 0.0081*** 0.0098*** 0.0146***
(2.536) (4.515) (2.599) (3.312) (4.593)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886
N of acquirers 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164
Chi²-statistic 815.53 868.41 766.29 861.93 707.42
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RMSE 0.0724 0.0898 0.0705 0.0793 0.0879
R² adjusted 0.1502 0.1224 0.1425 0.1449 0.1075
N of bootstrap repetitions 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
F-Statistic of fixed effects 184.60 228.59 179.47 360.36 203.35
F-Statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skewness-Kurtosis test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T-test vit=0 p-value 0.8678 0.8960 0.8736 0.8959 0.9195
Table 7: Regressions of alternative announcement returns (CAR) of advised deals
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted CRSP
Table 7 shows the regressions of alternative CARs, using IEDT and ARSD as bank variables. The CARs are based on
the BETA-1 Model with the CRSP value- or equally-weighted index as market proxy and different event windows.
PASTBBCAR_(*, *) is calculated with the same CARs used as dependent variable. The diagnostic statistics of the
models' fit and the distribution and mean of the error terms are reported as well (D'Agostino, Belanger, & D'Agostino
Jr., 1990). The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation by bootstrapping
with 1,000 repetit ions, clustered by bidders and their bid-bank matches (Adkins & Hill, 2004; Hill, Adkins, & Bender,
2003; Efron, 1979).
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Panel B: CAPM Model CARs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-3, 3)
IEDT 0.0424** 0.0588*** 0.0908*** 0.0379** 0.0511*** 0.0812***
(2.358) (3.202) (4.818) (2.132) (2.745) (4.549)
ARSD 0.0214* 0.0268** 0.0403*** 0.0208* 0.0267** 0.0402***
(1.794) (2.137) (3.218) (1.743) (2.117) (3.303)
PASTBBCAR_(*, *) 0.0885** 0.0492 0.1281*** 0.0798** 0.0378 0.1195***
(2.378) (1.419) (3.526) (2.194) (1.112) (3.263)
TADVISORTIER 0.0008 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0002
(0.398) (0.022) (0.415) (-0.429) (-0.572) (0.078)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0010* -0.0013* -0.0012 -0.0010* -0.0013* -0.0012*
(-1.873) (-1.939) (-1.618) (-1.898) (-1.887) (-1.682)
ATobinsQ 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003
(0.621) (0.154) (0.100) (0.483) (0.077) (0.223)
AROA -0.0361* -0.0474** -0.0422* -0.0447*** -0.0559*** -0.0588***
(-1.946) (-2.356) (-1.891) (-2.580) (-2.813) (-2.640)
ALEVERAGE 0.0062 0.0033 0.0025 -0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0048
(0.469) (0.226) (0.148) (-0.057) (-0.166) (-0.296)
LOGME -0.0057*** -0.0068*** -0.0093*** -0.0057*** -0.0068*** -0.0087***
(-2.625) (-2.853) (-3.717) (-2.860) (-3.068) (-3.511)
SIXTH 0.0016 0.0027 0.0043 0.0029 0.0037 0.0055
(0.510) (0.741) (1.044) (0.937) (1.026) (1.371)
invmills_1 0.0053 0.0029 0.0016 0.0022 0.0003 -0.0007
(1.469) (0.728) (0.353) (0.683) (0.076) (-0.156)
invmills_2 0.0070** 0.0095*** 0.0139*** 0.0072** 0.0092*** 0.0137***
(2.312) (3.038) (4.728) (2.318) (2.867) (4.809)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Transaction characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886 8,886
N of acquirers 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164 4,164
Chi²-statistic 792.29 777.65 733.68 657.88 738.45 621.74
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RMSE 0.0685 0.0777 0.0860 0.0664 0.0755 0.0841
R² adjusted 0.1463 0.1391 0.1040 0.1451 0.1372 0.0981
N of bootstrap repetitions 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
F-Statistic of fixed effects 162.00 225.39 170.78 152.10 236.29 181.88
F-Statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skewness-Kurtosis test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
T-test vit=0 p-value 0.8720 0.8748 0.9002 0.8710 0.8797 0.9039
Table 7 (cont.): Regressions of alternative announcement returns (CAR) of advised deals
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
value-weighted CRSP equally-weighted CRSP 
 
4.4 Discussion and conclusion  
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The Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data with fixed effects is a direct 
extension of the Two-step Heckit estimator developed by (Wooldridge, 1995). The 
problems arising in its application are similar. The annual estimation of the 
bivariate probit model with selection is difficult if the number of observations 
affected by selection ( )2 1ity =  is relatively small compared to the annual sample 
size. The small fraction of observations affected by selection causes the 
distribution of the observations to be clustered at ( )2 0ity = . The relatively small 
number of observations affected by selection can also cause non-convergence and 
multicollinearity, caused by to little variation in the explanatory variables. In such 
a case the regression coefficients βˆ  and γˆ  and calculated inverse mills ratios are 
weakly determined. If the number of observations per year, particularly the number 
of observations affected by selection ( )2 1ity =  or ( )1 1ity = , is too small to ensure 
convergence of the likelihood model and unevenly distributed among the time 
periods a pooled model is preferable. (Wooldridge, 1995) developed his Two-step 
Heckit estimator mostly for balanced panels and suggested a pooled estimation of 
the selection equation if the panel is unbalanced as well. In this case nevertheless, 
after excluding explanatory variables causing multicollinearity and pooling the first 
years with few observations affected by selection, the annual selection regressions 
work well. Another advantage of the proposed Three-step Heckit estimator for 
panels is the analysis whether sequential selection matters at all. The trick to define 
( )1 0ity =  as ( )1 20 0it ity y= ∩ =  makes it possible to combine the two selection 
mechanisms in one bivariate probit model. Depending on the observability of the 
possible selection outcomes the bivariate probit model with parallel partial 
observability by (Poirier, 1980) or sequential partial observability by (Abowd & 
Farber, 1982) are other modeling options, explained in more detail by (Maddala, 
1983b). If only one selection mechanism matters the selection equation that affects 
the outcome of the structural equation can be combined with the structural equation 
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in Two-step Heckit estimation similar to (Wooldridge, 1995) or in a pooled model 
proposed by (Heckman, 1976; 1979). The proof in econometric appendix E.3 
shows that the Two-step Heckit estimator is implied by the Three-step Heckit 
estimator.  
Furthermore, it is known since (Palepu, 1986) that companies do not become 
acquisition targets randomly but are mostly underperforming relative to their 
industry peers. This selection mechanism can be modeled with the Three-step 
Heckit estimator as a first-step before the second-step decision whether the target 
hires an investment bank as advisor and finally whether the target’s advisor choice 
affects the gains in takeovers, complementary to the analysis of (Kale, Kini, & 
Ryan, 2003), (Forte, Iannotta, & Navone, 2010) and others. Besides the application 
in a panel of mergers and acquisitions the modeling of sequential two-step 
selection in bond and equity underwriting for initial and seasoned public offerings 
is another possibility, extending the analyses of underwriters’ influence on the 
issuers’ proceeds of (Carter & Manaster, 1990), (Benveniste, Busaba, & Wilhelm, 
2002), (Ljungqvist, Marston, & Wilhelm, 2006) and others.  
In the shown application in a panel of M&As with matched banks the selection of 
the particular bank advisor has a significantly positive effect on the bidder’s 
announcement returns. Modeling the advisor selection directly the preceding 
decision whether to hire an advisor at all is insignificant, seen by the significant 
pooled regression coefficients of inverse mills ratios 2 and 4 and the insignificant 
ones of inverse mills ratios 1 and 3. Finally the sequential two-step selection 
analysis of the choice of the particular bank advisor shows that banks with 
advisory experience in the target’s industry, a close client relationship with the 
bidder, and a good track-record of value increasing past advised acquisitions of the 
bidder are good advisors. For the bidder the equity gain of millions of dollar 
associated with the hiring of more experienced and familiar banks pays of for 
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banks as well, because a higher expertise, relationship strength and past acquisition 
advisory performance increases their chances to win the advisory mandate and to 
earn the fees. In the end the observation of banks with a good track-record and 
advisory experience winning advisory mandates is economic efficient. 
 
5. The influence of taxes and tax factors on debt shifting in mergers and 
acquisitions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In mergers and acquisitions the structure of a company changes immediately, 
serving as a natural experiment of capital structure adjustments. The acquired 
company that before the M&A was part of another conglomerate or an independent 
entity is now a subsidiary. As a new subsidiary it has access to the internal capital 
market of the company that acquired it. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) therefore 
offer the opportunity to examine the economic effects of trade-off theory based tax 
incentives and tax-related factors to shift debt during and directly after the M&A 
when the merged companies’ structures change immediately (Graham J. R., 1996; 
2000; Ruf, Belz, & Steffens, 2011; Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). The 
theoretical foundation of the analyses is the tax-based trade-off theory of (Kraus & 
Litzenberger, 1973), (Miller, 1977) and (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). Form the 
tax-based trade-off theory the tax-related debt shifting hypothesis is derived 
particular relevant in M&As. The debt shifting hypothesis argues that during and 
after the M&A the new subsidiary ought to carry more debt if it enjoys a greater 
tax advantage of debt regarding its debt capacity and bankruptcy risk relative to its 
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acquirer. The hypothesis is supported by the empirical observations in a sample of 
1,844 domestic and cross-border M&As from 2000 to 2008.  
During and immediately after the M&A the extended company exploits differences 
in corporate tax rates and tax-related constructs like holdings to place debt in the 
extended conglomerate where its tax advantages are maximized. The new 
subsidiary adjusts its debt-to-asset ratio after the M&A according to the tax 
incentives it faces regarding its relative profitability, size and tangibility as well as 
the simple differences in corporate tax rates compared to its acquirer. The 
significant economic effect of the difference in corporate taxes in cross-border 
transactions is driven by the tax rate of the target. The economic effect of the tax 
rate difference of 0.54 percentage points is comparable to the tax effects of debt 
shifting between subsidiaries found by (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). 
The trade-off theory based tax incentives have additional economic effects of 0.40 
to 1.91 percentage points on target’s leverage. Especially the use of holdings by 
financial acquirers to take over companies, particularly loss-making ones, in cross-
border transactions has an economic positive effect on target’ leverage of 7 to 8 
percentage points (Ruf, 2011; Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010). The analysis of 
holdings used by financial investors is challenging, because the economic effects 
on debt shifting are restricted to a subsample of 2.4% of transactions involving 
holdings used by financial acquirers. On the other hand an unrestricted loss 
compensation of targets’ loss carry forwards has a significant negative crowding-
out effect on leverage, because it reduces the interest tax shield of additional debt. 
After the M&A the debt-to-assets ratio of the target decreases significantly.  
This study extends the previous research in several ways. The international sample 
provides a greater variation of corporate tax rates that influence capital structures. 
The analysis of taxes and tax-related factors on capital structure in a multinational 
setting is possible in M&As, because they are natural experiments of the dynamic 
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process in which the acquired company becomes a new subsidiary in an extended 
conglomerate. This dynamic research design is complementary to the stationary 
design that takes the conglomerate’s structure at a point in time as given (Desai, 
Foley, & Hines Jr., 2004; Huizinga & Voget, 2009; Huizinga, Laeven, & 
Nicodeme, 2008). The study advances the tax incentives of (Huizinga, Laeven, & 
Nicodeme, 2008)  according to the trade-off theory and considers tax-related 
factors that (Ruf, Belz, & Steffens, 2011) in their matching analysis of debt shifting 
in M&As and (Ruf, 2011) and others in the analysis of holdings did not consider. 
The study follows with the literature review and hypothesis development in section 
2. Section 3 describes the data set and sample characteristics. Section 4 contains 
the univariate statistics. Section 5 presents the multivariate analysis. Section 6 
finishes with the discussion and conclusion.  
 
5.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Taking the conglomerate structure at a point in time as given (Desai, Foley, & 
Hines Jr., 2004) investigate debt shifting within US multinationals and their 
subsidiaries using internal payments data from 1982, 1989 and 1994. A 10% higher 
local corporate tax rate is associated with 2.8% more affiliate leverage. Similarly 
using European data from Amadeus multinational corporations shift debt to 
subsidiaries located in host countries with high corporate tax rates or use transfer 
pricing to reduce taxes (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008; Huizinga, Laeven, & 
Nicodeme, 2008). According to (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008)  the tax 
incentive to shift debt has an economic effect of 0.8 percentage points in addition 
to the regular tax effect for a total of 1.3 to 1.6 percentage points higher subsidiary 
leverage for a one standard deviation increase in its effective corporate tax rate. 
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Extending the analyses of debt and income shifting to avoid taxes (Ruf, 2011) 
examines debt as a tax planning tool for large multinationals that have subsidiaries 
in Germany. He particularly analyses holding companies and international transfer 
pricing as means to reduce the tax burden. He finds evidence for the use of holding 
companies and transfer pricing as tax planning tools but not for the use of debt. All 
studies have in common that in the USA, Europe and other countries multinational 
companies use debt on the subsidiary level to shield income from taxes.  
Regarding changes in a conglomerate’s structure the literature that analyzed 
leverage in M&As focused on the returns for target and acquirer shareholders 
(Raad, Ryan, & Sinkey, 1999), the probability of a company being acquired 
(Billett, 1996), the adjustment of acquirers’ debt ratios towards leverage targets 
(Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009), the deviation of acquirers’ debt ratios from 
leverage targets and the deviation’s influence on the probability and financing of 
acquisitions (Uysal, 2011), theoretical considerations of optimal leverage to 
maximize target shareholder synergy gains, overall firm value of the target and 
acquirer, and the probability of being acquired (Israel, 1991; 1992), and the 
changes of leverage associated with mergers (Ghosh & Jain, 2000). These studies 
have in common that they focus on US M&As within the US tax system. Looking 
at international M&As extending the analyses of (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 
2008), (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008) and (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2004) further 
(Ruf, Belz, & Steffens, 2011) analyze the change of target’s leverage and transfer 
pricing directly after the M&A with respect to differences in acquirer’s and target’s 
effective tax rates using a matched sample. 
The dynamic analysis of a natural experiment of the immediate changes of the new 
subsidiary’s and acquirer’s capital structures by becoming parts of an extended 
conglomerate complements the static analysis of debt shifting by (Huizinga, 
Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008), (Ruf, 2011) and (Desai, Foley, & Hines Jr., 2004). 
163 
 
The tax-related debt shifting hypothesis assumes that comparatively higher tax rate 
related incentives faced by the newly acquired subsidiary have a positive effect on 
its leverage. In the primary multivariate analysis the debt shifting hypothesis takes 
corporate tax rate differences across countries into account with respect to their 
influence on the level of debt during and after the M&A. Furthermore, M&As are 
suitable to investigate taxes and tax-related effects that occur in M&As only. Tax-
related effects such as group taxation regimes, unlimited loss compensation and 
whether the acquirer is a financial investor who employs a holding company that 
possibly affect the target’s leverage are unique to M&As.  
The analysis of corporate tax rate differences affecting debt shifting is extended in 
the second part by advancing the tax incentive measure of (Huizinga, Laeven, & 
Nicodeme, 2008) according to the trade-off theory. Their measure of size weighted 
differences in tax rates between subsidiaries in the multinational conglomerate is 
extended to a bilateral tax incentive measure of size weighted tax rate differences 
between the acquirer and target with respect to their debt capacity. According to 
the tax-based trade-off theory of (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973), (DeAngelo & 
Masulis, 1980) and (Miller, 1977) a company that is larger, has more tangible 
assets and is more profitable has a higher debt capacity and therefore is better able 
to exploit the tax shield of interest payments on debt compared to a smaller, less 
profitable company with less tangibles assets. In a domestic M&A the corporate 
tax rate serves as a scaling factor on the trade-off theory based incentives to shift 
debt. The three measures make it possible to analyze debt shifting in cross-border 
and domestic M&As in a unified theoretical and empirical framework. 
The size of a company is associated with less information opaqueness and 
asymmetry, greater maturity with less risk and in general a higher debt capacity. 
According to the pecking-order theory the provision of access to the acquirer’s 
internal capital market solves the information asymmetry problem with the 
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subsidiary’s outside investors (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers S. C., 1984; 2001). 
The minimization of information problems associated with debt and equity 
according to the pecking-order theory allows the acquirer to set the leverage levels 
of the subsidiary at the margin of the costs of financial distress balanced with the 
benefits of the tax shield, which coincides with the trade-off theory. The tax-size 
measure TAX_INCENTIVE models the tax incentive to shift debt caused by 
differences in size.   
It follows that a larger acquirer might provide the missing collateral to issue debt to 
benefit from tax shields, which increases target’s leverage. The tax-tangibility 
measure TAX_TANGIBLES that models the relative tax advantage regarding 
differences in tangible assets and asset growth (ASSET_GROWTH) multiplied by 
the target’s and acquirer’s joint tangible assets post-merger 
(GROWTH_COLLATERAL) consider the collateral effect on debt shifting. Small 
high growth companies usually have less debt capacity and prefer retained earnings 
and equity to finance investment due to information asymmetry problems as 
uncertain future cash-flows are difficult to pledge as collateral. The importance of 
collateral to borrow are analyzed by (Campello & Giambona, 2010) rearding 
redeployable assets in the case of companies in financial distress and by (Rauh & 
Sufi, 2010) considering bank relations as substitutes for physical collateral. 
Furthermore, redeployable assets are associated with lower costs of debt due to 
lower yield spreads and higher credit ratings and loan-to-value ratios (Benmelech 
& Bergman, 2009). Another reason to provide the missing collateral is the 
spreading of a negative spillover effect of the decrease in asset value for the 
acquirer if similar assets are used by his subsidiaries in financial distress 
(Benmelech & Bergman, 2011). To avoid this negative spread through the 
collateral channel the acquirer or subsidiary provides the missing collateral to 
avoid financial distress by increasing the borrowing capacity.  
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The tax-profitability measure TAX_PROFITABILITY models tax incentives to 
shift debt with respect to the target’s and acquirer’s differences in earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT). This construct takes financial distress into account. The 
advantage of conglomeration to reduce the risk of financial distress if access to 
extrenal financial markets is limited is analyzed by (Stein, 1997). Less leverage in 
face of higher distress risks is desirable to avoid a shortfall of corporate 
investments and the need of cross-subsidization of retained earnings among 
subsidiaries (Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). The 
influence of financial distress in leveraged buyouts and M&As has been analyzed 
in the USA empirically  by (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998) and (Almeida, Campello, & 
Hackbarth, 2011) and theoretically by (Parnes, 2009). (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 
2012) analyse cash holdings and changes in the cash-to-asset ratio of targets and 
acquirers in an international setting after the M&A. They relate changes in fixed 
assets as a measure of capital expenditures and the changes in cash to financial 
distress. The analysis of the tax-related debt shifting hypothesis requires a sample 
of M&As with target and acquirer data before, during, and after the M&A. The use 
of M&As to test the relevance of tangibles assets, profitablity, size and taxes for 
the capital structure after 2000 is likely to show whether the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 affected firms’ leverage.  
 
5.3 Sample preparation and description 
 
The analysis combines an event study with a window of at least (-3, 3) years 
around the M&A completion year with a classical capital structure analysis to 
analyze the capital structure shock caused by the takeover during and after the 
M&A completion year. Hence for each deal at least 7 years of financial statement 
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data for the target and acquirer are needed, including the M&A completion year, to 
calculate for instance the net operating loss carry forwards (NOLC) in the years 
before the M&A. Furthermore, the period of three to four years before the M&A 
completion year is used to control for the run-up period in which the acquirer’s and 
target’s management position the companies strategically. Target managers 
anticipating acquisitions usually increase the company’s leverage to extract more 
value for their shareholders or to reduce the likelihood of being acquired (Billett, 
1996; Raad, Ryan, & Sinkey, 1999; Israel, 1991; 1992). Managers of acquiring 
companies reduce leverage to have spare debt capacity to finance the upcoming 
acquisitions (Uysal, 2011).  
Econometrically the analysis of capital structure panel characteristics by (Flannery 
& Hankins, 2013) inspired the preparation of a panel with at least 3 periods before 
and after the M&A completion year to have a panel length of at least 7 periods of 
complete deal-company-year data. The analyses of the influence of the employed 
econometric model on the coefficients of leverage determinants by (Huang & 
Ritter, 2009), (Flannery & Hankins, 2013), (Elsas & Florysiak, 2011; 2012) and 
summarized by (Graham & Leary, 2011) shows that a panel as long as possible is 
needed with at least T=7 periods for each company. Following (Flannery & 
Rangan, 2006) and (Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender, 2008) the hypothesis is tested 
with fixed effects feasible GLS panel regressions (Wooldridge, 2002b). (Huang & 
Ritter, 2009) and (Flannery & Hankins, 2013) show that a fixed effects panel 
regression of capital structure determinants is very sensitive to the panel length. To 
avoid the serial autocorrelation of error terms caused by lagged leverage as 
benchmark in the regressions on a short panel the median and mean industry 
leverage is used (Flannery & Hankins, 2013; D'Mello & Farhat, 2008; Frank & 
Goyal, 2009). Additionally the differences in tax rates between the target and 
acquirer across multiple countries as well as country specific tax-related effects 
have to be observable as well.  
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From these data requirements it follows that an international sample of companies 
with financial statements over a long as possible time period is needed. The non-
consolidated financial statements reflect the financial activity of the company as a 
stand-alone firm or subsidiary itself. Consolidated financial statements summarize 
the financial activities of the conglomerate or public corporation including all its 
subsidiaries. Different to (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) the consolidated 
financial statements are preferred, because the acquirer is considered with all its 
subsidiaries already in place as one entity that acquires and integrates the target, 
with all its own subsidiaries, as new subsidiary into his conglomerate structure. 
This simplifying assumption is made, because the acquirer’s and target’s 
subsidiary structure is not observable in the M&A completion year13. 
Similar to (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012) and (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 
2008) the financial statement data is obtained from Amadeus and Orbis, because 
consolidated and non-consolidated financial statements of worldwide public and 
private companies are needed. Furthermore, these databases can be merged with 
the Zephyr database of international mergers and acquisition. These advantages of 
international M&As and consolidated as well as non-consolidated financial 
statements before and after the M&A are not offered by Compustat or Compustat 
Global merged with the SDC M&A database. The sample reducing bottleneck is 
the fact that Amadeus and Orbis keep only the most recent 10 years of data of a 
company until it vanishes. It is difficult to obtain panels around the M&A with at 
least three years before and after the M&A. The data of companies outside Europe 
is taken from Orbis. Amadeus and Orbis share the same global financial statement 
                                                          
13 (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) observe the multinational conglomerate’s subsidiary, or 
ownership, structure at a point in time, in 2003, when Amadeus recorded it. The ownership structure is 
updated annually with the historical ownership structure not being stored. Thus only the most recent 
ownership structure is available. (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) make the implicit assumption 
that during the 10 years before 2003 from 1994 onwards the ownership structure did not change 
significantly. Therefore, in this study the assumption is made that the consolidated acquiring company 
as a whole is the target’s counterparty that has an effect on tax-based debt shifting. The target as 
complete entity including all its subsidiaries is assumed to be taken over. 
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format. After merging the Zephyr M&A data in which the acquirer owns less than 
50% of the target ex-ante and holds at least 50.1%, and on average 93.1%, ex-post 
for a controlling majority with Orbis and Amadeus, and after cleaning the sample 
from observations with incomplete basic capital structure variables and leverage, 
15,554 company-deal-years in 1,844 M&As are left14. The sample preparation 
process is summarized in table 1 and shared with the following chapter. The M&A 
completion year is centered in the middle of the deal period15, following (Harford, 
Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). Table 2 includes the descriptive statistics of the final 
sample. The majority of M&As are announced between 2005 and 2008 in the 
period of the financial downturns. 
The latest event year is 2008 due to the fact that after the M&A at least 3 years of 
data until the end of 2011 are needed. The sample is used in chapter 6 as well. The 
USA is underrepresented, because in Orbis almost only consolidated financial 
statements of public acquirers and independent public targets are available for the 
USA with the new subsidiary’s financial statements usually no longer filed after its 
takeover16. The transactions are distributed over 47 countries with the majority 
occurring in Europe. 
                                                          
14 The deal years with total debt exceeding total assets were mostly British limited liability companies 
with minimal assets but lots of debt such that total equity was negative. These appeared to be empty 
corporate shells. Accumulating acquisitions occurred mostly in China in which acquirers used small 
increments of 2-5 percentage acquisitions to buy up targets. The overlapping deals occurred in Brazil, 
Czech Republic, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Norway, Russia and the Ukraine. The targets 
excluded with several takeover completions on the same date appeared to be bought by a consortium of 
subsidiaries of the same company, because the immediate acquirers’ names were similar. In these 
excluded cases the multiple records referred to one acquisition.  
15 The M&A completion and announcement year coincide in 93.6% of the deals that are small and 
executed quickly. In a previous version of the study the announcement year was used. According to 
(Schwert, 2000) the announcement date is not always identical in all sources and a run-up period occurs 
before this date. The empirical observations do not differ between analyses using the completion or 
announcement year. 
16 The same problem of missing post-merger subsidiary financial statements occurs in Compustat 
Global and North America, too. The new subsidiary is fully integrated, such that consolidated 
statements of the merged company are available only. This made it impossible to add a North American 
sample to the international sample for a more balanced representation of the larger economies. 
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M&As or 
Firm-years
Deal-Firm-
Years
1.) Extracting international M&As from Zephyr
Deals with target and acquirer identifiers in majority transactions 138,754
dropping incomplete transactions -22,672
dropping targets with several completion announcements on the same day -578
dropping transactions with a missing completion date -3
dropping accumulating acquisitions of the same target by the same acquirer -4,496
111,005
expanded with 9 years for each deal (-4 to +4 years) 999,045
2.) Extracting ORBIS international company data 964,297
matching with Zephyr for targets and acquirers 567,874
3.) Extracting Amadeus European company data 325,487
matching with Zephyr for targets and acquirers 313,449
4.) Merging Zephyr, Amadeus and Orbis into one data set 999,045
merging Zephyr with Zephyr-Orbis and Zephyr-Amadeus into one data set 578,534
dropping deal-years in which the target and acquirer coincide -3,057
dropping deal-years with total debt exceeding total assets and negative equity -53,208
dropping deal-years with missing target total assets -248,021
dropping finance targets with SIC core code 600 to 699 -46,004
228,244
5.) After generating the variables
dropping deal-company-years with incomplete target and acquirer variables -212,600
dropping deals in which the target is acquired and sold with overlapping time series -90
Final M&A sample with complete target and acquirer deal-company-year data 1,844 15,554
- thereof deals with 7 years of target and acquirer data and variables 63
- thereof deals with 8 years of target and acquirer data and variables 916
- thereof deals with 9 years of target and acquirer data and variables 865
Table 1: Data preparation and sample creation 
The extracted ORBIS and Amadeus data includes company-years with available total assets in unconsolidated (U1 or U2)
or consolidated (C1 or C2) financial statements. If consolidated and unconsolidated statements of a company are available 
the consolidated statements are taken. Consolidated financial statements are available in most cases for public
corporations. Subsidiaries, branches and independent private companies have mostly unconsolidated financial statements.
 
The sample characteristics are shown in panel D of table 2. The panel shows that 
the majority of targets and acquirers are relatively small private companies. The 
targets have median total assets of 7.14 million dollars in 1983 dollars. The mean is 
significantly larger due to some large public targets. The acquirers are on average 
17.8 times larger than the targets. Otherwise the sample extracted from Orbis and 
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Amadeus exhibits the same characteristics as the one of (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 
2012) and (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). On average 57.7% of targets 
are independent companies. Being acquired and integrated by a manifold larger 
company changes the acquired company’s access to internal funds, and thus its 
ability to adapt its capital structure17. The distribution of targets and acquirers 
among countries in panel E shows that countries hosting at least 10 transactions 
have companies with assets smaller than one billion dollar on average. Countries 
with a few transactions stand out with the large targets and acquirers they host. 
One could argue to drop these deals and countries. However, they are retained to 
maximize the variance in tax rates and tax effects between countries. The variables 
used are defined in table F in the statistical appendix. The independent variables 
are taken from the capital structure literature. Free cash-flow, depreciation and 
sales growth are not used, because these variables are less complete, which reduced 
the sample size considerably. Free cash-flow and return on assets are highly 
correlated, which holds for tangible assets and depreciation as well as sales and 
asset growth. The dependent variables of leverage are defined similar to (Frank & 
Goyal, 2009) and (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). The tax and control 
variables are obtained from various data sources and their definitions are adapted, 
described in table F in the statistical appendix. 
 
                                                          
17 For 17.1% of the deal-years the total assets and total debt of the vendor are available, which is not 
shown. This illustrates how difficult it is to obtain vendor data. Therefore, the influence of the access to 
the previous owner’s, the vendor’s, internal capital market on the target’s leverage cannot be analyzed 
or controlled for. 
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Year N Mergers Acquisitions Country Acquirer Target
2000 2 0 2 Austria 18 4
2001 1 0 1 Australia 10 2
2002 4 0 4 Belgium 107 122
2003 9 0 9 Brazil 5 8
2004 35 0 35 Canada 9 2
2005 392 3 389 Switzerland 26 2
2006 439 4 435 China 4 5
2007 525 2 523 Colombia 1 0
2008 437 1 436 Czech Republic 11 27
1,844 10 1,834 Germany 62 57
Denmark 8 1
Estonia 1 8
t Unbalanced Spain 200 205
-4 1,370 Finland 73 65
-3 1,844 France 313 326
-2 1,844 Great Britain 152 158
-1 1,844 Greece 23 26
0 1,844 Hong Kong 4 4
1 1,844 Croatia 15 22
2 1,844 Hungary 12 15
3 1,844 Indonesia 0 1
4 1,276 Ireland 16 5
15,554 Israel 2 0
Iceland 1 1
Italy 136 175
Japan 86 77
South Korea 0 3
Lithuania 2 0
Luxembourg 6 2
Mexico 2 0
Malaysia 4 4
Norway 96 106
New Zealand 2 1
Peru 1 6
Philippins 1 1
Poland 46 55
Portugal 36 37
Romania 14 36
Russia 54 59
Sweden 167 172
Singapore 4 2
Slovakia 3 9
Thailand 4 6
Turkey 1 2
Ukraine 14 20
United States 89 3
South Africa 3 2
1,844 1,844
Panel A: Distribution of M&As over time Panel C: Company Countries
Table 2: M&As over time and countries
t=0 is the M&A completion year.
Panel B: Panel without gaps
 
172 
 
Target's 
leverage
Acquirer's 
leverage
Year N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean
2000 2 0.27 0.27 6.39 6.39 0.55 0.64 50.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2001 1 1.26 1.26 1.56 1.56 0.46 0.89 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2002 4 9.07 3.76 15.66 12.84 0.80 0.76 100.00% 50.00% 75.00% 50.00%
2003 9 25.58 4.83 263.81 7.11 0.59 0.62 88.89% 33.33% 44.44% 22.22%
2004 35 25.10 5.27 658.92 64.27 0.58 0.56 85.71% 51.43% 48.57% 57.14%
2005 392 125.21 9.47 3,328.85 145.83 0.58 0.60 68.62% 56.38% 42.86% 68.37%
2006 439 107.02 6.39 2,415.54 118.46 0.59 0.60 63.55% 60.36% 32.57% 68.34%
2007 525 104.50 5.90 2,241.03 96.18 0.58 0.60 67.24% 57.52% 33.33% 63.24%
2008 437 143.42 7.95 1,760.16 199.50 0.58 0.57 69.11% 56.98% 38.44% 67.73%
1,844 116.46 7.14 2,351.72 126.98 0.58 0.59 67.62% 57.65% 36.77% 66.16%
Panel D: Characteristics of M&As over time (one year before the M&A)
Table 2 (cont.): M&As over time and countries
Public Targets 
(%)
Public 
Acquirers (%)
Target's total 
assets  ($mil)
Acquirer's total 
assets ($mil) Domestic 
Deals (%)
Independent 
Targets (%)
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Target's 
leverage
Acquirer's 
leverage
Target Country N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean
Austria 4 27.01 26.90 73.39 76.54 0.61 0.58 50.00% 25.00% 50.00% 100.00%
Australia 2 108.29 108.29 388.22 388.22 0.37 0.46 50.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Belgium 122 113.19 4.82 1,066.19 53.44 0.60 0.59 65.57% 70.49% 24.59% 47.54%
Brazil 8 2,037.26 342.82 6,430.87 4,663.14 0.54 0.64 37.50% 75.00% 50.00% 75.00%
Canada 2 738.34 738.34 8,868.15 8,868.15 0.44 0.44 50.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Switzerland 2 15.81 15.81 1,487.55 1,487.55 0.70 0.65 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 50.00%
China 5 426.43 231.07 3,761.09 1,088.11 0.51 0.55 60.00% 60.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Czech Republic 27 152.54 10.44 2,630.95 135.63 0.45 0.48 40.74% 51.85% 51.85% 92.59%
Germany 57 295.28 31.74 3,857.58 516.65 0.61 0.58 36.84% 42.11% 28.07% 82.46%
Denmark 1 2,264.16 2,264.16 9,544.15 9,544.15 0.53 0.68 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Estonia 8 4.25 3.11 276.62 62.47 0.53 0.58 12.50% 25.00% 50.00% 62.50%
Spain 205 54.69 8.79 2,186.76 73.13 0.62 0.63 76.59% 50.73% 64.88% 69.27%
Finland 65 12.27 3.40 581.70 14.96 0.56 0.60 75.38% 40.00% 1.54% 35.38%
France 326 112.79 4.94 2,311.63 93.33 0.58 0.60 73.01% 63.80% 19.94% 61.04%
Great Britain 158 24.55 6.68 1,394.35 157.50 0.58 0.58 57.59% 49.37% 1.90% 65.82%
Greece 26 207.67 23.71 1,529.33 218.68 0.57 0.58 76.92% 61.54% 100.00% 96.15%
Hong Kong 4 1,981.71 606.76 5,436.58 3,739.76 0.37 0.42 75.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Croatia 22 13.65 5.96 1,886.51 182.22 0.50 0.58 68.18% 77.27% 40.91% 81.82%
Hungary 15 283.74 13.37 7,601.46 794.06 0.51 0.52 60.00% 60.00% 13.33% 53.33%
Indonesia 1 164.16 164.16 307.20 307.20 0.55 0.50 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 2 (cont.): M&As over time and countries
Panel E: Characteristics of M&As by country (one year before the M&A)
Target's total 
assets  ($mil)
Acquirer's total 
assets ($mil) Domestic 
Deals (%)
Independent 
Targets (%)
Public Targets 
(%)
Public 
Acquirers (%)
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Target's 
leverage
Acquirer's 
leverage
Target Country N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean
Ireland 5 13.45 11.20 863.17 609.43 0.44 0.75 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Iceland 1 21.31 21.31 100.55 100.55 0.37 0.64 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Italy 175 187.71 12.61 3,395.24 231.43 0.69 0.64 66.29% 54.86% 62.86% 82.29%
Japan 77 242.61 69.88 5,060.83 1,829.26 0.54 0.58 98.70% 79.22% 98.70% 100.00%
South Korea 3 200.40 4.41 8,133.27 2,410.33 0.45 0.56 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 66.67%
Luxembourg 2 50.67 50.67 32,360.22 32,360.22 0.46 0.62 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Malaysia 4 90.70 48.34 2,174.95 1,916.39 0.24 0.59 75.00% 75.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Norway 106 47.77 3.11 617.24 66.92 0.64 0.62 66.04% 68.87% 3.77% 38.68%
New Zealand 1 230.42 230.42 5,410.25 5,410.25 0.57 0.61 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Peru 6 215.52 197.79 10,678.03 3,523.36 0.49 0.51 16.67% 50.00% 83.33% 100.00%
Philippins 1 421.43 421.43 767.79 767.79 0.26 0.42 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Poland 55 116.18 9.85 3,196.89 145.54 0.53 0.53 69.09% 43.64% 52.73% 80.00%
Portugal 37 171.42 19.87 2,158.19 146.98 0.69 0.64 70.27% 54.05% 91.89% 89.19%
Romania 36 30.19 3.14 6,738.21 200.66 0.46 0.52 36.11% 44.44% 61.11% 77.78%
Russia 59 38.84 9.01 4,098.30 231.57 0.52 0.56 86.44% 49.15% 62.71% 76.27%
Sweden 172 19.20 2.21 415.13 25.23 0.55 0.57 69.19% 61.63% 0.58% 44.77%
Singapore 2 128.16 128.16 793.87 793.87 0.29 0.30 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Slovakia 9 24.54 3.77 2,210.00 99.59 0.48 0.52 22.22% 55.56% 55.56% 88.89%
Thailand 6 16.01 12.56 3,744.63 608.89 0.60 0.47 50.00% 50.00% 16.67% 66.67%
Turkey 2 979.83 979.83 2,832.16 2,832.16 0.64 0.78 50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 50.00%
Ukraine 20 42.39 11.14 1,126.33 134.83 0.31 0.47 65.00% 45.00% 55.00% 50.00%
United States 3 29.58 8.38 1,093.21 1,564.08 0.53 0.54 66.67% 33.33% 66.67% 66.67%
South Africa 2 2,072.73 2,072.73 12,907.83 12,907.83 0.53 0.51 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
116.46 7.14 2,351.72 126.98 0.58 0.59 67.62% 57.65% 36.77% 66.16%
Table 2 (cont.): M&As over time and countries
Panel E (cont.): Characteristics of M&As by country (one year before the M&A)
Public 
Acquirers (%)
Target's total 
assets  ($mil)
Acquirer's total 
assets ($mil) Domestic 
Deals (%)
Independent 
Targets (%)
Public Targets 
(%)
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5.4 Univariate analysis  
 
The dependent variables total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE and adjusted 
leverage ADJLEVERAGE are defined according to (Huizinga, Laeven, & 
Nicodeme, 2008) and (Huizinga & Voget, 2009). Financial leverage 
FINLEVERAGE is defined according to (Frank & Goyal, 2009) as long-term 
interest bearing debt plus short-term interest bearing debt in current liabilities18. 
The median industry total leverage and adjusted leverage as well as the mean 
industry financial leverage are on average larger than targets’ means and medians, 
shown in table 319.  
The statutory corporate tax rate STR_T is the most important taxation variable 
used in the capital structure literature and associated with the tax-shield of debt 
according to the trade-off theory (Graham J. R., 1996; 2000). The differences in 
the statutory corporate tax rates are driven by international transactions. The 
identification of tax effects on leverage is difficult if national group taxation 
regimes allow the consolidated of gains and losses for tax purposes of subsidiaries 
as if they were one company (Hebous, Ruf, & Weichenrieder, 2011). The dummy 
                                                          
18 The US based capital structure and taxation literature often uses a different definition of leverage 
than the international, or rather European, literature. To compare the effects in this study with those 
studies using Compustat data the financial leverage defined as long-term debt (item #9) plus debt in 
current liabilities (item #34) is similar to financial leverage defined as long-term debt (Orbis item 417 or 
Amadeus item 15) plus loans (Orbis item 420 or Amadeus item 18) (see Amadeus and Orbis 
handbooks). 
19 The Amadeus universe downloaded annually from WRDS including all very large, large, medium and 
small companies with consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements is merged with the 964,297 
Orbis company years. The universe exhibits large positive outliers for total and adjusted leverage. To 
avoid skewness caused by outliers the median industry total and adjusted leverage is used. For financial 
leverage however the median was 0, because more than half of the companies have missing or negative 
financial leverage. For industry financial leverage the mean provides more reasonable values for those 
companies that have financial leverage above 0. In the final sample 12.5% of acquirers and 8.3% of 
targets are from Orbis outside Europe. 
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variable NOGROUPTAX approximates the missing possibility of tax planning if 
the target’s or acquirer’s host country does not allow group taxation (van Boeijen-
Ostaszewska & Schellekens, 2012).  
LOSSFORWARD is a dummy for unrestricted loss compensation, the ability to 
carry accumulated losses of the acquired company over into the new company to 
retain the tax shield of tax-loss carry forwards, multiplied with the pre-merger net 
operating loss carry forward (NOLC) (Erickson & Wang, 2007; Frank & Goyal, 
2009). 
On the acquirer’s side the motive to buy targets mostly for financial rather than 
strategic reasons is approximated with the financial investor and asset ratio 
variable FININV_RATIO_A (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998). This variable 
approximates the amount of relative assets invested by the acquirer into the target, 
given that the acquirer is a financial investor using a holding company. This 
variable is constructed with the dummy HOLDING_A whether the immediate 
acquirer is a holding or investment company (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010; 
Hebous, Ruf, & Weichenrieder, 2011). The variables FINANCIALINV_A and 
HOLDING_A are components of FININV_RATIO_A. The dummy 
FINANCEFIRM_A is 1 if the acquirer is a financial company of any type. In the 
primary regressions the financial investor ratio FININV_RATIO_A is used as the 
only financial acquirer variable to avoid multicollinearity. 
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Panel A: Dependent Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
LEVERAGE_T 15,523 0.5754 0.2351 0.0000 0.6006 0.9951
ADJLEVERAGE_T 15,346 0.4237 0.2909 0.0000 0.4318 1.0000
FINLEVERAGE_T 14,561 0.1494 0.1838 0.0000 0.0675 0.8534
Panel B: Target Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
SIZE_T 15,554 16.0108 2.1043 4.9242 15.7926 22.6000
TAR_T 15,539 0.2334 0.2394 0.0000 0.1471 0.9483
CASH_T 15,524 0.1230 0.1598 0.0000 0.0584 0.9967
ROA_T 15,544 0.0823 0.1519 -0.9377 0.0626 0.7604
RnD_T 15,554 0.0010 0.0131 0.0000 0.0000 0.6233
MLEVERAGE_T 15,554 0.6225 0.0627 0.3779 0.6421 0.7105
MADJLEVERAGE_T 15,554 0.4480 0.0878 0.1519 0.4798 0.5735
MFINLEVERAGE_T 15,554 0.1368 0.0302 0.0840 0.1340 0.2398
ASSET_GROWTH_T 15,554 0.0627 0.3926 -7.3316 0.0073 10.4821
INDEPENDENT 15,554 0.5761 0.4942 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
INFLATION_T 15,512 0.0267 0.0294 -0.0448 0.0213 0.4567
PRIVATE_T 15,554 0.6384 0.4805 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
AFTER_MERGER 15,554 0.5563 0.4968 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Panel C: Acquirer Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
SIZE_A 15,344 18.8226 2.5840 10.1475 18.7502 25.7373
TAR_A 15,342 0.2101 0.2041 0.0000 0.1445 0.8784
CASH_A 15,323 0.0980 0.1160 0.0000 0.0599 0.8569
ROA_A 15,341 0.0645 0.0902 -0.5197 0.0578 0.4518
ALEVERAGE_A 15,338 0.0178 0.2194 -0.5837 0.0282 0.6192
Panel D: Post-Merger Tax Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
STR_T 15,454 0.3062 0.0554 0.1250 0.3000 0.5160
TAXDIFF_T_A 15,464 -0.0033 0.0350 -0.2750 0.0000 0.2149
TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A 15,436 -0.1228 0.1434 -0.4068 -0.0588 0.3929
TAX_TANGIBLES_T_A 15,426 -0.0237 0.0482 -0.3193 0.0000 0.2558
TAX_PROFITABILITY_T_A 15,434 -0.0072 0.0232 -1.5918 0.0000 0.3517
Panel E: Post-Merger Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
ASSETRATIO_T_A 15,344 0.8581 0.1058 0.5003 0.8561 1.1921
GROWTH_COLLATERAL_T 15,500 0.0041 0.0695 -1.2790 0.0000 1.4762
LOSSFORWARD_T 15,554 -0.0278 0.2369 -7.2077 0.0000 0.0000
NOGROUPTAX_T 15,554 0.0728 0.2599 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
FININV_RATIO_A 15,513 0.0069 0.0813 0.0000 0.0000 1.2943
FINANCEFIRM_A 15,554 0.1353 0.3420 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
HOLDING_A 15,554 0.0244 0.1542 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
FINANCIALINV_A 15,554 0.0130 0.1132 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
The independent, target, acquirer and post-merger variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. The post-merger
and tax variables, except the statutory corporate tax rate STR_T, are 0 before the M&A completion year. Not for all
transactions are all variables in the years -4 and +4 available as Amadeus and Orbis have data only for the recent 10 years,
such that the panel is unbalanced. The statutory corporate tax rate STR_T is used according to (Graham, 1996; 2000). The
variables' definit ions are presented in table F in the statistical appendix.
 
178 
 
The political and economic control variables used by (Djankov, McLiesh, & 
Shleifer, 2007), (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; 1998), 
(Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001) and (Huizinga, Laeven, 
& Nicodeme, 2008) were analyzed but turned out to be highly correlated20. 
Therefore, only INFLATION as economic control variable is taken from the World 
Bank’s economic indicators. INDEPENDENT is a dummy whether the target was 
an independent company before the M&A. AFTER_MERGER is a dummy to 
control for the break the takeover constitutes, 0 before the M&A completion year 
and 1 for the completion year and afterwards (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009; 
Ghosh & Jain, 2000; Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012). After the M&A the tax and 
tax-related variables are nonzero and zero before the M&A as they can have an 
effect only during and after the M&A on targets’ leverage. The statutory corporate 
tax rates are nonzero before the M&A completion year. From the correlation 
analysis it followed that the capital structure control variables are correlated. Size, 
tangible assets, cash and the return on assets are correlated, which could cause 
multicollinearity. The tax variables are correlated due to their construction.  
The changes of the most important variables before and after the merger are shown 
in table 4. The univariate analysis over time shows that after the M&A targets’ 
total leverage decreases significantly. The acquirer’s abnormal leverage 
ALEVERAGE is negative before the M&A. The acquirer is underleveraged with 
spare debt capacity compared to his industry. Financing the acquisition with debt 
causes ALEVERAGE to jump up during and after the M&A. This financing effect 
is observed by (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) as well. 
                                                          
20 The economic and political control variables used in the literature were missing for some countries, 
such as the creditor rights rating and accounting disclosure ratings from (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; 1998), reducing the sample considerably, or highly correlated causing 
multicollinearity. In general economies with higher statutory corporate tax rates are politically less 
risky, have better creditor protection rights and a higher accounting disclosure as well as larger debt and 
equity markets and are more likely to restrict the carryover of accumulated losses after the acquisition. 
The tables of the preliminary regression analysis of possible control variables are available upon 
request.    
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On the target’s side the statutory corporate tax rate, its tangible asset ratio, cash 
ratio, profitability and asset growth decrease significantly. The decrease in cash 
and profitability of the target is observed by (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012), too. 
The tax differences adjusted for differences in size, tangible assets and profitability 
shown in panel D decrease in absolute value after the merger, which is likely to 
reduce the tax-based incentive to shift debt. However, the simple tax rate 
difference driven by international transactions is increasing in absolute value. 
Whether the tax differences and tax incentive related to the trade-off theory affect 
targets’ post-merger debt and associated debt shifting is analyzed further in the 
multivariate analysis. 
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t -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 T-test [-1 to 1] T-test [-3 to 3]
Panel A: Leverage Variables n 1,370 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,276 Diff p-value Diff p-value
LEVERAGE_T_w mean 0.6060 0.5965 0.5936 0.5820 0.5695 0.5647 0.5608 0.5579 0.5466 -0.0173 0.0000 -0.0386 0.0000
ADJLEVERAGE_T_w mean 0.4431 0.4346 0.4268 0.4152 0.4061 0.4181 0.4208 0.4265 0.4285 0.0029 0.3738 -0.0080 0.1767
FINLEVERAGE_T_w mean 0.1606 0.1618 0.1553 0.1523 0.1448 0.1445 0.1429 0.1449 0.1369 -0.0078 0.0073 -0.0169 0.0015
MLEVERAGE_T_w mean 0.6340 0.6323 0.6302 0.6296 0.6264 0.6209 0.6145 0.6084 0.6034 -0.0087 0.0000 -0.0239 0.0000
MADJLEVERAGE_T_w mean 0.4732 0.4691 0.4630 0.4587 0.4507 0.4427 0.4344 0.4231 0.4131 -0.0159 0.0000 -0.0460 0.0000
MFINLEVERAGE_T_w mean 0.1225 0.1247 0.1289 0.1333 0.1414 0.1450 0.1457 0.1453 0.1427 0.0116 0.0000 0.0206 0.0000
ALEVERAGE_A_w mean -0.0062 -0.0063 -0.0008 -0.0015 0.0234 0.0327 0.0358 0.0403 0.0421 0.0342 0.0000 0.0467 0.0000
SIZE_T_w mean 15.5846 15.7423 15.8799 16.0016 16.0692 16.1657 16.2033 16.1712 16.2408 0.1641 0.0000 0.4289 0.0000
TAR_T_w mean 0.2385 0.2433 0.2416 0.2364 0.2280 0.2315 0.2280 0.2251 0.2275 -0.0049 0.0506 -0.0182 0.0000
CASH_T_w mean 0.1399 0.1324 0.1294 0.1327 0.1352 0.1161 0.1096 0.1057 0.1042 -0.0166 0.0000 -0.0267 0.0000
ROA_T_w mean 0.0803 0.0888 0.0934 0.0991 0.0882 0.0842 0.0741 0.0646 0.0614 -0.0149 0.0000 -0.0242 0.0000
RnD_T_w mean 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0008 0.0013 0.0015 0.0011 0.0013 0.0010 0.0006 0.0200 0.0006 0.0193
ASSET_GROWTH_T mean 0.0000 0.1109 0.1376 0.1218 0.0676 0.0965 0.0376 -0.0321 -0.0161 -0.0253 0.0257 -0.1430 0.0000
GROWTH_COLLATERAL_T mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0131 0.0195 0.0073 -0.0045 -0.0019 0.0195 0.0000 -0.0045 0.0000
LOSSFORWARD_T mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0361 -0.0411 -0.0505 -0.0628 -0.0639 -0.0411 0.0000 -0.0628 0.0001
Table 4: Differences of variables before and after the M&A
Table 4 shows the time series of variables before and after the M&A. The values are the variables' means in the respective time period. The t-test shows the
differences of the variables before and after the M&A with the p-values. The variables are summarized in table 3 and the definitions are shown in table A in the
appendix.
Panel B: Target Variables
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t -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 T-test [-1 to 1] T-test [-3 to 3]
Panel C: Acquirer Variables n 1,370 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,276 Diff p-value Diff p-value
SIZE_A_w mean 18.2172 18.3475 18.5247 18.7359 18.9582 19.0867 19.1378 19.1284 19.1711 0.3508 0.0000 0.7809 0.0000
TAR_A_w mean 0.2142 0.2231 0.2197 0.2133 0.2054 0.2062 0.2038 0.2018 0.2029 -0.0071 0.0005 -0.0213 0.0000
CASH_A_w mean 0.1108 0.1083 0.1092 0.1078 0.0910 0.0889 0.0894 0.0892 0.0891 -0.0188 0.0000 -0.0192 0.0000
ROA_A_w mean 0.0612 0.0699 0.0761 0.0803 0.0715 0.0627 0.0546 0.0510 0.0456 -0.0176 0.0000 -0.0188 0.0000
ASSETRATIO_T_A_w mean 0.8657 0.8672 0.8654 0.8616 0.8538 0.8528 0.8526 0.8515 0.8538 -0.0088 0.0046 -0.0158 0.1274
STR_T mean 0.3287 0.3205 0.3151 0.3110 0.3048 0.2994 0.2945 0.2912 0.2908 -0.0116 0.0000 -0.0293 0.0000
TAXDIFF_T_A mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0054 -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.0065 -0.0058 0.0163 -0.0063 0.0569
TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2264 -0.2250 -0.2213 -0.2197 -0.2165 -0.2250 0.0000 -0.2197 0.0000
TAX_TANGIBLES_T_A mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0439 -0.0436 -0.0425 -0.0418 -0.0418 -0.0436 0.0006 -0.0418 0.0003
TAX_PROFITABILITY_T_A mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0163 -0.0139 -0.0123 -0.0114 -0.0097 -0.0139 0.0000 -0.0114 0.0000
Table 4 (cont.): Differences of variables before and after the M&A
Table 4 shows the time series of variables before and after the M&A. The values are the variables' means in the respective time period. The t-test shows the
differences of the variables before and after the M&A with the p-values. The variables are summarized in table 3 and the definitions are shown in table A in the
appendix.
Panel D: Post-Merger Tax Variables
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5.5 Multivariate analysis 
 
5.5.1 Analysis of primary tax incentives to shift debt  
 
Before estimating the equations using fixed effects feasible GLS panel models the 
multivariate outliers are analyzed with the Mahalanobis distance D² measure 
(Mahalanobis, 1936; Bar-Hen & Daudin, 1995). The Mahalanobis distance 
measure has the useful property of rescaling the variables onto a common scale, be 
they continuous or binary. The measure calculates the joint distance of an 
observation from the average observation, the centroid, in the middle of the 
sample. Under the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution the 99% and 
99.9% confidence intervals for all observations are computed. Multivariate outliers 
are calculated whether they fall outside the confidence interval of the normal 
distribution around the n-dimensional sphere in which all observations around the 
centroid are clustered (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). At the 1% and 
0.1% level multivariate outliers with n=23 target and acquirer variables and 
degrees of freedom are not detected. 
The (Breusch & Pagan, 1980) LM test does not reject the hypothesis of the random 
effects model being appropriate. The (Hausman, 1978) test on the other hand 
rejects the random effects model in favor of the fixed effects model. With year 
dummies the remaining degrees of freedom are not sufficient to cluster the error 
terms by targets to correct for potential heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White 
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sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980)21. Including year dummies and 
using the conventional variance-covariance estimator the year dummies are mostly 
insignificant. Controlling for heteroscedasticity is therefore more important than 
controlling for possible unobservable time effects. The year dummies are highly 
correlated with the statutory corporate tax rates, because the larger European 
economies reduced corporate taxes during and after the financial crisis. 
In the basic tax-related debt shifting regressions of the target the coefficients of the 
capital structure control variables are similar to (Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender, 
2008), (Frank & Goyal, 2009), and (Wald, 1999). The statutory corporate tax rate 
in the target’s country is significantly positively correlated with its debt-to-assets 
ratio. In table 5 of the target’s leverage the basic tax-related debt shifting effect 
caused by differences in the statutory corporate tax rates is shown. A one-standard 
deviation increase in the target’s statutory corporate tax rate increases its total debt-
to-assets ratio by 0.6627 0.0554 0.0367× = or 3.67 percentage points. The 
economic effect of the tax rate difference is 0.1542 0.0350 0.0054× =
0.1542x0.0350=0.0054 or 0.54 percentage points for a one standard deviation 
increase. The total effect of 4.21 percentage points during and after the M&A is 
larger than the combined economic effect of the tax rate and tax incentive 
according to (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008).  
In addition to the tax rates the other tax-related effects have the expected signs. 
Their individual economic effects are smaller than the tax effects whereas their 
joint effect on leverage is economic significant. A one standard deviation increase 
                                                          
21 (Wooldridge, 2002b) explains the differences in panel models in detail. The loss of degrees of 
freedom due to year dummies causes the robust variance-covariance matrix to be singular, such that the 
F-statistic for the fixed effects model cannot be computed. Therefore, a fixed effects model without year 
dummies and a target clustered robust variance-covariance estimator is estimated to control for potential 
heteroscedasticity. The Root MSE is shown to compare the fit with the fixed effects capital structure 
regressions estimated on short Compustat panels by (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). The fit of the models 
estimated around the M&A is as good as the fit of (Flannery & Hankins, 2013) who use Compustat 
data. 
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in net operating loss carry forwards, being less negative, that can be transferred 
after the merger or acquisition by the target is associated with 
0.0446 0.2369 0.0106− × = −  or 1.06 percentage points less leverage. Less 
accumulated losses means less leverage and more retrained earnings. A missing 
group taxation regime is associated with 2.66 percentage points less target 
leverage. 
These effects are significant for adjusted net leverage that takes out trade credit and 
cash as net leverage of external and internal debt, as well as financial leverage 
(Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). Inflation has a significant positive effect 
on target’s leverage as in previous studies (Frank & Goyal, 2009). The tax rate 
difference matters only for total debt, which includes accounts payable compared 
to adjusted net leverage and financial leverage. Tax rate based debt shifting 
therefore occurs through a form of trade credit through the accounts payable and 
receivable between the new subsidiary and parent conglomerate. 
The difference in statutory corporate tax rates is insignificant if one controls for 
tax-related effects. The change in leverage during and after the M&A is likely to be 
related to means of financing the transactions (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009; 
Ghosh & Jain, 2000). The sensitivity analysis therefore analyses the tax rate and 
tax-related effects in more detail. The potential endogeneity of the target’s leverage 
and acquirer’s payment method is analyzed with a Heckman selection model with 
the selection equation whether the payment is cash (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 
2009; Heckman, 1976; 1979)22. 
                                                          
22 For 581 M&As is the method of payment available. 104 deals, or 17.9%, are share deals. The 
majority of 400, or 68.9%, use cash from retained earnings, debt or capital increases. The method of 
deal financing is available for 235 deals with 152 (64.7%) stated as capital increases through the vendor 
and 53 (22.6%) using bank lending. The missing information of the method of payment limits the 
sensitivity analysis of the influence of the payment method in deal financing and thus the shifting of 
debt. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ADJLEVERAGE_T FINLEVERAGE_T
VARIABLES pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post
STR_T 0.3263*** 0.6627*** 0.6282*** 0.4759*** 0.4437***
(3.365) (6.713) (6.272) (3.794) (4.934)
TAXDIFF_T_A 0.1542* 0.1294 0.0377 -0.0607
(1.692) (1.413) (0.333) (-0.920)
FININV_RATIO_A 0.0236 0.0365 0.0131
(0.817) (0.936) (0.443)
LOSSFORWARD_T -0.0446*** -0.0635*** -0.0103
(-3.673) (-4.660) (-1.449)
NOGROUPTAX_T -0.0266** -0.0311** -0.0054
(-2.203) (-2.057) (-0.522)
AFTER_MERGER -0.0383***
(-8.434)
SIZE_T 0.0387*** 0.0360*** 0.0380*** 0.0448*** 0.0371***
(6.784) (6.004) (6.334) (6.599) (8.759)
TAR_T 0.0101 0.0564** 0.0568** 0.2073*** 0.1573***
(0.391) (2.183) (2.209) (6.679) (6.361)
CASH_T -0.2077*** -0.0856***
(-9.608) (-6.696)
ROA_T -0.1865*** -0.2017*** -0.2034*** -0.3128*** -0.1023***
(-10.770) (-11.605) (-11.750) (-13.967) (-8.054)
RnD_T 0.3725 0.2600 0.2534 0.0065 0.0707
(1.408) (0.990) (0.962) (0.022) (0.846)
ASSET_GROWTH_T 0.0255*** 0.0302*** 0.0298*** 0.0310*** -0.0012
(4.216) (4.821) (4.798) (4.540) (-0.242)
INFLATION_T 0.3139*** 0.2309** 0.2176* 0.3703*** 0.0640
(2.772) (2.003) (1.904) (2.777) (0.707)
MLEVERAGE_T 0.1981 0.4477*** 0.4851***
(1.604) (3.525) (3.839)
MADJLEVERAGE_T 0.0801
(0.830)
MFINLEVERAGE_T -0.3455**
(-2.565)
Constant -0.2175* -0.4866*** -0.5299*** -0.5087*** -0.5560***
(-1.716) (-3.456) (-3.812) (-3.904) (-7.094)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15,385 15,407 15,379 15,210 14,418
Number of Targets 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,820
F-statistic 44.30 31.20 24.75 29.30 21.69
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Root MSE 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.10
Table 5: Primary Regressions of tax-based debt-shifting of the target
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variables are the target's total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE_T, adjusted debt-to-assets ratio
ADJLEVERAGE_T and financial debt-to-assets rat io FINLEVERAGE_T in 1,844 M&As in the three to four years before and
after the M&A completion year (7 to 9 years for each M&A). The error terms are corrected for potential heteroscedast icity
with the Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by targets (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). TAXDIFF_T_A,
LOSSFORWARD_T , FININV_RATIO_A and NOGROUPTAX_T are 0 before the M&A completion year t=0. SIZE_T,
TAR_T, CASH_T, ROA_T, RnD_T, INFLATION_T, ASSET_GROWTH_T and the median industry leverage variables are
capital structure controls. The variables are summarized in table 3 and their definit ions in table F in the stat ist ical appendix.
LEVERAGE_T
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Structural Eq. Selection Eq.
VARIABLES LEVERAGE_T CASHPAY Domestic Cross-border positive ROA negative ROA
STR_T 0.6416*** 0.5505*** 0.7592*** 0.6155*** 0.2948
(3.107) (4.787) (4.030) (6.179) (0.953)
TAXDIFF_T_A -0.1685 0.0265 0.1963** -0.4636
(-0.812) (0.294) (2.126) (-1.547)
FININV_RATIO_A 0.1018 -0.0121 0.1238* 0.0019 0.1346**
(1.154) (-0.364) (1.848) (0.067) (2.366)
LOSSFORWARD_T -0.0943** -0.0246 -0.0591*** -0.0478** -0.0328**
(-2.045) (-1.462) (-3.405) (-2.057) (-2.137)
NOGROUPTAX_T -0.0318 -0.0140 -0.0306* -0.0011 -0.0750**
(-0.879) (-0.879) (-1.714) (-0.089) (-2.556)
SIZE_T 0.0023 0.0532*** 0.0018 0.0249*** 0.0515***
(0.432) (7.488) (0.168) (3.824) (4.451)
TAR_T -0.0449 0.0289 0.1255*** 0.0394 0.0915*
(-0.925) (0.930) (2.845) (1.380) (1.774)
ROA_T -0.2813*** -0.1941*** -0.2142*** -0.2364*** -0.1979***
(-3.344) (-8.764) (-8.033) (-8.354) (-5.017)
RnD_T -0.2387* 0.0672 0.3422 -0.1605 0.4164
(-1.875) (0.353) (0.783) (-0.558) (1.262)
ASSET_GROWTH_T 0.1339*** 0.0240*** 0.0429*** 0.0357*** 0.0144
(3.969) (3.260) (4.127) (5.197) (1.250)
INFLATION_T -0.0062 0.0412 0.4596** 0.2303* -0.0428
(-0.011) (0.337) (2.304) (1.820) (-0.186)
MLEVERAGE_T 0.1016 0.4507*** 0.4179* 0.5854*** -0.3179
(0.560) (2.958) (1.878) (4.365) (-0.987)
L1.ALEVERAGE_A 0.1406
(0.482)
L1.ROA_A 1.8272***
(2.756)
L1.CASH_A -0.6578
(-1.318)
L1.ASSETRATIO_T_A -0.0760
(-0.100)
L1.PRIVATE_T -0.0749
(-0.506)
L1.INDEPENDENT -0.1862
(-1.573)
Constant 0.2490 0.6618 -0.7110*** 0.0302 -0.3694** -0.1570
(1.588) (0.979) (-4.230) (0.124) (-2.429) (-0.671)
Fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 582 582 10,380 4,999 12,354 3,025
Number of Targets 582 582 1,247 597 1,820 1,115
F-/Chi²-statistic 63.78 63.78 15.47 13.60 18.69 6.60
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of selection 0.85 0.85
p-value of selection 0.3561 0.3561
Root MSE 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12
Robust t- and z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variable is the target's total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE_T in the three to four years before and after the M&A completion year. For the
Heckman selection model the selection equation is comparable to (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). Regressions (3) and (4) include domestic and cross-
border deals. Regressions (5) and (6) distinguish between target-years with a positive or negative ROA. The variables are summarized in table 3 and their
definitions in table F in the statistical appendix.
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis of Tax-based Debt-Shifting of the Target
Heckman Selection Model at t=0
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In economic terms a higher probability of a cash payment is associated with higher 
acquirer profitability and less likely if the target is an independent company. 
Analyzing domestic and cross-border transactions separately the tax rate difference 
is insignificant in cross-border deals if one controls for tax-related effects. The use 
of holdings by financial acquirers is positively correlated with target’s leverage the 
larger the target is relative to the acquirer. Distinguishing between targets with 
positive or negative ROA the effect of the tax rate difference and statutory tax rate 
is positive for target-years with profits and insignificant for target-years with 
losses. The tax shield of debt arising from higher corporate tax rates can be used 
only if EBIT is positive. In the case of target-years with losses the use of holding 
by financial acquirers is significant positive as well. 
Similarly the lack of a group taxation regime in the target’s country in the case of 
losses and cross-border deals is significantly negative regarding leverage. Without 
group taxation the losses cannot be used to reduce the overall tax burden of all 
subsidiaries and have to be carried fully by the loss-making target, making 
leverage for loss-making targets unattractive due to the bankruptcy risk.  
 
5.5.2 Analysis of trade-off theory based tax incentives to shift debt 
 
The difference in the statutory corporate tax rates during and after the M&A 
completion year is the primary as yet relatively crude and mostly insignificant 
measure that is nonzero only in international transactions. The ability to exploit the 
tax shield of debt depends according to the trade-off theory on the debt carrying 
capacity and repayment capability (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Miller, 1977; 
DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). The tax rate difference is adjusted for differences in 
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size, tangible assets and earnings before interest and taxes between the target and 
acquirer, weighted by their total assets (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). 
The tax incentive variables are described in table F in the statistical appendix. The 
tax incentive variables are nonzero also in domestic transactions. In domestic 
transactions the statutory corporate tax rate is a scaling factor that indicates the 
incentives to shift debt based on differences in size, tangibles assets and EBIT. 
The first variable of the tax incentive to shift debt is related to size and based 
directly on the tax incentive measure of (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). 
They design their tax incentive measure as asset weighted tax rate differences 
between the multinational’s subsidiaries as a multilateral construct. In this study 
the size related tax incentive to shift debt TAX_ICENTIVE_T_A is a bilateral 
measure between the target and acquirer23. On average the tax incentives to shift 
debt related to the elements of the trade-off theory are negative for the target, to 
shift debt away from it. This average effect is caused by the acquirer’s larger size, 
more tangible assets and higher earnings compared to the target. 
For the target the tax incentive to shift debt approximated by the three tax incentive 
measures is shown in table 7 panels A to C. The tax incentive to shift debt related 
to the differences in size in panel A is statistical significant. A one standard 
deviation increase in the size based tax incentive measure for the target, either 
because it is larger than the acquirer or faces a higher tax rate, increases its 
leverage by 0.1334 0.1434 0.0191× =  or 1.9 percentage points. The economic 
effect is almost four times larger than the economic effect of the pure tax rate 
                                                          
23 The minimum and maximum of the size related tax incentive to shift debt are quite similar to the tax 
incentive measure of (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). The tax incentive measures to shift debt 
based on the trade-off theory can be advanced by calculating them with the effective marginal tax rate 
that accounts for withholding taxes within the international tax regimes after the M&A completion year 
similar to (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). During the M&A completion year the specific tax 
regulations determining the effective marginal tax rate of the acquirer and target given the form of the 
deal can be derived from the KPMG reports of taxation of cross-border M&As. 
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differences shown in table 5 (3). The effect is half as large for adjusted and 
financial leverage.  
Measuring the debt carrying capacity more directly by the relative advantage of 
more tangibles assets the economic effect is smaller than the effect of tax 
incentives with respect to size differences. A one standard deviation increase in the 
tangible assets related tax incentive to shift debt increases target’s leverage by 
0.2731 0.0482 0.0132× =  or 1.32 percentage points. In addition to the tax-related 
effects of tangible assets the multiplication of target’s asset growth with the post-
merger joint tangible assets has a smaller economic effect on leverage to finance 
further growth than its asset growth alone, namely 0.1322 0.0695 0.0040× =  or 
0.40% versus 0.0298 0.3926 0.0117× =  or 1.17% for a one standard deviation 
increase. 
Finally the profitability related tax incentive to shift debt is significant only for 
interest bearing financial leverage. A one standard deviation increase in the 
profitability related tax incentive to shift debt increases target’s financial leverage 
by 0.1306 0.0232 0.0030× =  or 0.30 percentage points. Controlling for tax-related 
effects on leverage the effect vanishes for total and adjusted leverage.  
The major trade-off theory based effect of the tax incentive to shift debt occurs due 
to the acquirer’s and target’s size differences. The tax rate differences themselves 
are not as economic significant as the differences in the debt capacity and 
repayment capability, which the analysis in table 7 shows. In the following 
subsample analysis of acquisitions by strategic and financial acquirers that use 
holding structures the size related tax incentive to shift debt is used as primary debt 
shifting variable besides the statutory corporate tax rates and the holding dummy. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ADJLEVERAGE_T FINLEVERAGE_T
VARIABLES pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post
STR_T 0.1973** 0.1884* 0.1638 0.1759**
(2.032) (1.928) (1.302) (1.982)
TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A 0.1473*** 0.1277*** 0.1334*** 0.0645*** 0.0734***
(9.089) (7.625) (7.783) (2.765) (4.635)
FININV_RATIO_A 0.0230 0.0376 0.0073
(0.766) (0.938) (0.247)
LOSSFORWARD_T -0.0449*** -0.0585*** -0.0086
(-3.631) (-4.224) (-1.205)
NOGROUPTAX_T -0.0023 -0.0154 0.0100
(-0.189) (-1.000) (0.965)
TAR_T 0.0226 0.0607** 0.0612** 0.2171*** 0.1578***
(0.861) (2.305) (2.336) (6.851) (6.056)
CASH_T -0.2211*** -0.1098***
(-9.888) (-8.605)
ROA_T -0.1819*** -0.2025*** -0.2031*** -0.3096*** -0.1010***
(-10.353) (-11.565) (-11.678) (-13.754) (-7.741)
RnD_T 0.3395 0.2614 0.2541 -0.0122 0.0678
(1.320) (1.013) (0.990) (-0.042) (0.797)
ASSET_GROWTH_T 0.0430*** 0.0446*** 0.0452*** 0.0501*** 0.0139**
(6.623) (6.859) (6.902) (6.663) (2.371)
INFLATION_T 0.2948*** 0.2733** 0.2784** 0.3655*** 0.0268
(2.740) (2.427) (2.497) (2.775) (0.298)
MLEVERAGE_T 0.1524 0.0394 0.0733
(1.261) (0.313) (0.583)
MADJLEVERAGE_T -0.1551
(-1.531)
MFINLEVERAGE_T 0.1390
(0.908)
Constant 0.5257*** 0.4994*** 0.4802*** 0.4128*** 0.0660*
(6.956) (6.260) (6.020) (7.276) (1.769)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15,367 15,379 15,379 15,210 14,418
Number of Targets 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,820
F-statistic 50.64 33.95 26.20 29.67 20.25
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Root MSE 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.11
Table 7: Alternative measures of Tax-based Debt-Shifting of the Target
LEVERAGE_T
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variables are the target 's total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE_T, adjusted debt-to-assets ratio ADJLEVERAGE_T and
financial debt-to-assets rat io FINLEVERAGE_T in the three to four years before and after the M&A complet ion year (7 to 9 years for
each M&A). The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by
targets (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A, LOSSFORWARD_T, FININV_RATIO_A and NOGROUPTAX_T are 0
before the M&A completion year t=0. TAR_T, CASH_T, ROA_T, RnD_T, INFLATION_T, ASSET_GROWTH_T and the median
industry leverage variables are capital structure controls. The variables are summarized in table 3 and their definit ions in table F in the
stat ist ical appendix.
Panel A: size related tax incentive 
to shift debt
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ADJLEVERAGE_T FINLEVERAGE_T
VARIABLES pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post
STR_T 0.3859*** 0.3653*** 0.2405* 0.2326***
(3.904) (3.661) (1.904) (2.595)
TAX_TANGIBLES_T_A 0.3392*** 0.2715*** 0.2731*** 0.1669** 0.1967***
(6.487) (5.113) (5.031) (2.456) (4.048)
FININV_RATIO_A 0.0191 0.0340 0.0047
(0.647) (0.851) (0.164)
LOSSFORWARD_T -0.0396*** -0.0562*** -0.0063
(-3.062) (-4.051) (-0.891)
NOGROUPTAX_T -0.0139 -0.0203 0.0060
(-1.139) (-1.322) (0.582)
TAR_T 0.0174 0.0533** 0.0540** 0.2065*** 0.1567***
(0.656) (2.005) (2.044) (6.472) (6.052)
CASH_T -0.2202*** -0.1080***
(-9.591) (-8.406)
ROA_T -0.1654*** -0.1865*** -0.1875*** -0.2949*** -0.0966***
(-9.238) (-10.472) (-10.587) (-12.894) (-7.626)
RnD_T 0.2771 0.2075 0.2007 -0.0522 0.0331
(0.995) (0.745) (0.722) (-0.169) (0.402)
GROWTH_COLLATERAL_T 0.1269*** 0.1279*** 0.1322*** 0.1778*** 0.0787***
(4.779) (4.736) (4.877) (5.510) (3.731)
INFLATION_T 0.2842** 0.2148* 0.2073* 0.3281** 0.0306
(2.566) (1.885) (1.839) (2.495) (0.342)
MLEVERAGE_T 0.4926*** 0.2960** 0.3270***
(4.019) (2.344) (2.591)
MADJLEVERAGE_T -0.0565
(-0.574)
MFINLEVERAGE_T 0.0246
(0.170)
Constant 0.3061*** 0.2769*** 0.2638*** 0.3463*** 0.0605
(4.019) (3.510) (3.335) (6.341) (1.606)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 15,366 15,378 15,378 15,209 14,417
Number of Targets 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,820
F-statistic 40.36 26.30 20.40 24.99 20.31
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Root MSE 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.11
Table 7: Alternative measures of Tax-based Debt-Shifting of the Target
LEVERAGE_T
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variables are the target 's total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE_T, adjusted debt-to-assets ratio ADJLEVERAGE_T and
financial debt-to-assets rat io FINLEVERAGE_T in the three to four years before and after the M&A complet ion year (7 to 9 years for
each M&A). The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by
targets (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). TAX_TANGIBLES_T_A, LOSSFORWARD_T, FININV_RATIO_A and NOGROUPTAX_T are 0
before the M&A complet ion year t=0. TAR_T, CASH_T, ROA_T, RnD_T, INFLATION_T, GROWTH_COLLATERAL_T and the
median industry leverage variables are capital structure controls. The variables are summarized in table 3 and their definit ions in table F
in the statistical appendix.
Panel B: tangibility related tax 
incentive to shift debt
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LEVERAGE_T ADJLEVERAGE_T
VARIABLES pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post pre & post
STR_T 0.2426*** 0.2717*** 0.4334*** 0.2642**
(2.783) (3.033) (4.362) (2.089)
TAX_PROFITABILITY_T_A 0.1437** 0.1391** 0.1306** 0.1657 0.1318
(2.179) (2.166) (2.122) (1.434) (1.052)
FININV_RATIO_A 0.0110 0.0263 0.0392
(0.377) (0.886) (0.979)
LOSSFORWARD_T -0.0046 -0.0383*** -0.0557***
(-0.669) (-2.993) (-4.009)
NOGROUPTAX_T 0.0028 -0.0178 -0.0220
(0.273) (-1.496) (-1.460)
TAR_T 0.1663*** 0.1811*** 0.1635*** 0.0681** 0.2198***
(6.470) (7.128) (6.359) (2.577) (6.932)
CASH_T -0.1036*** -0.1055***
(-8.138) (-8.265)
ROA_T -0.0981*** -0.1087*** -0.0995*** -0.2021*** -0.3094***
(-7.527) (-8.183) (-7.628) (-11.569) (-13.762)
RnD_T 0.0413 0.0114 0.0462 0.2183 -0.0292
(0.502) (0.141) (0.559) (0.813) (-0.099)
ASSET_GROWTH_T 0.0154*** 0.0156*** 0.0150** 0.0468*** 0.0509***
(2.619) (2.664) (2.547) (7.064) (6.737)
INFLATION_T 0.0832 0.0121 0.0179 0.1998* 0.3391**
(0.951) (0.133) (0.199) (1.746) (2.557)
MFINLEVERAGE_T -0.2303* -0.0558 -0.0907
(-1.724) (-0.398) (-0.655)
MLEVERAGE_T 0.3396***
(2.705)
MADJLEVERAGE_T -0.0615
(-0.639)
Constant 0.1594*** 0.0475 0.0587 0.2258*** 0.3336***
(8.097) (1.264) (1.553) (2.889) (6.316)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14,428 14,438 14,417 15,378 15,209
Number of Targets 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,844 1,844
F-statistic 27.08 20.30 18.56 21.36 29.02
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Root MSE 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.17
Table 7: Alternative measures of Tax-based Debt-Shifting of the Target
FINLEVERAGE_T
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variables are the target 's total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE_T, adjusted debt-to-assets ratio
ADJLEVERAGE_T and financial debt-to-assets ratio FINLEVERAGE_T in the three to four years before and after the M&A
completion year (7 to 9 years for each M&A). The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity with the
Huber & White sandwich est imator clustered by targets (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). TAX_PROFITABILITY_T_A,
LOSSFORWARD_T, FININV_RATIO_A and NOGROUPTAX_T are 0 before the M&A completion year t=0. TAR_T,
CASH_T, ROA_T, RnD_T, INFLATION_T, ASSET_GROWTH_T and the median industry leverage variables are capital
structure controls. The variables are summarized in table 3 and their definitions in table F in the statistical appendix.
Panel C: profitability related tax 
incentive to shift debt
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5.5.3 Analyses of the tax incentive to shift debt through holdings 
 
Given that the effect of financial investors using holdings for acquisitions is 
different in domestic and cross-border transactions shown in table 6 the debt-
related effect of the use of holdings is further analyzed. Form the target’s 
perspective holding structures are associated with higher leverage only if the 
acquirer is a financial company in cross-border deals, shown in table 8. Acquirers 
that are not finance firms do not appear to employ holding structures for 
acquisitions. The economic effect of holdings in cross-border transactions of 7% to 
8% more target leverage is significant. Furthermore, the dummy HOLDING is one 
in 2.4% of transactions, which is rarer than the observation of the use of holdings 
in 6% of German multinationals made by (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010; 2005) 
and (Ruf, 2011).  
These former studies examining holding structures, so-called “conduits”, use 
German multinationals and internal payments data of related companies from the 
Bundesbank’s Midi database. In this study the modeling of the use of holdings in 
domestic and international M&As shows that conduits are employed across 25 
target and acquirer countries to shift debt. Related to finance acquirer’s use of 
holding structures affecting target’s leverage is the significantly negative influence 
of unrestricted loss compensation, to be able to use net operating loss carry 
forwards after the M&A to shield target’s income from taxes. The economic effect 
of 0.4139 0.2369 0.0981− × = −  or -9.81% less leverage for a one standard 
deviation smaller absolute value, or less negative, loss carry forwards is relatively 
large.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
STR_T 0.6242*** 0.3434*** 0.7496*** 0.5092** 0.9647** 0.5933
(5.707) (3.252) (3.134) (2.213) (2.493) (1.651)
TAXDIFF_T_A 0.1178 0.1106 -0.0041
(1.218) (0.408) (-0.017)
TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A 0.1648*** 0.1757*** 0.2270***
(8.760) (4.130) (2.726)
HOLDING -0.0445 -0.0279 0.0242 0.0251 0.0704** 0.0797**
(-1.430) (-0.889) (0.846) (0.882) (2.119) (2.415)
LOSSFORWARD_T -0.0438*** -0.0529*** -0.0365 -0.0528 -0.4139* -0.4753**
(-3.718) (-4.686) (-0.865) (-1.438) (-1.875) (-2.312)
NOGROUPTAX_T -0.0185 -0.0019 -0.0538* -0.0341 -0.0949*** -0.0514
(-1.458) (-0.153) (-1.849) (-1.262) (-2.824) (-1.275)
SIZE_T 0.0318*** 0.0376*** 0.0434** 0.0513*** 0.0503 0.0671
(5.517) (6.515) (2.406) (2.793) (1.024) (1.461)
TAR_T 0.0367 0.0250 -0.0485 -0.0573 0.1487 0.1310
(1.351) (0.931) (-0.665) (-0.790) (1.565) (1.397)
CASH_T -0.2011*** -0.2072*** -0.1934*** -0.1803*** -0.3031** -0.2775**
(-8.727) (-9.151) (-2.968) (-2.932) (-2.517) (-2.549)
ROA_T -0.1857*** -0.1880*** -0.1817*** -0.1843*** -0.1025 -0.1027
(-10.066) (-10.228) (-3.668) (-3.796) (-1.192) (-1.248)
RnD_T 0.3567 0.3991 -0.3087 -0.3072 0.5045 0.5130
(1.313) (1.507) (-0.318) (-0.318) (0.637) (0.666)
ASSET_GROWTH_T 0.0317*** 0.0272*** 0.0180 0.0121 -0.0373 -0.0499
(4.730) (4.263) (1.074) (0.726) (-0.800) (-1.083)
INFLATION_T 0.1410 0.2647** 0.4761** 0.5548** 0.8168 1.1347**
(1.099) (2.096) (2.173) (2.473) (1.375) (2.054)
MLEVERAGE_T 0.6045*** 0.2750** 0.2401 0.0111 0.4167 0.1616
(4.361) (2.041) (0.811) (0.039) (0.892) (0.392)
Constant -0.4735*** -0.2555** -0.4654 -0.3644 -0.7793 -0.7699
(-3.481) (-1.994) (-1.075) (-0.849) (-0.876) (-0.919)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13,301 13,281 2,083 2,075 489 486
Number of Targets 1,596 1,596 248 248 58 58
F-statistic 29.05 34.35 5.11 5.71 9.41 10.52
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Root MSE 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Table 8: Analysis of tax-based debt-shifting in deals with financial acquirers using holdings
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variable is the target 's total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE_T in the three to four years before and after the
M&A completion year (7 to 9 years for each M&A). The fixed effects panel analysis distinguishes between M&As with and
without financial acquirers using holding structures. The standard errors are corrected for potential heteroscedasticity with the
Huber & White sandwich estimator clustered by targets (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A, TAXDIFF_T_A,
LOSSFORWARD_T, HOLDING and NOGROUPTAX_T are 0 before the M&A completion year t=0. SIZE_T, TAR_T,
CASH_T, ROA_T , RnD_T, INFLATION_T, ASSET _GROWT H_T and the median industry leverage variables are capital
structure controls. The variables are summarized in table 3 and their definitions in table F in the statistical appendix.
LEVERAGE_T
FINANCEFIRM_A=0 FINANCEFIRM_A=1 FINANCEFIRM_A=1
cross-border M&Asall M&Asall M&As
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Higher loss carry forwards in absolute value are associated with more leverage, 
because the target company has financed its past losses with retained earnings. The 
large economic effect of loss carry forwards occurs in deals with financial 
acquirers using holdings, because mostly loss-making targets are acquired through 
holding companies, shown in table 6. 
 
5.6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The empirical analyses show that tax-based debt shifting on the target’s side 
prevails during and after the M&A. The primary analysis in particular reveals the 
relevance of differences in the target’s and acquirer’s corporate tax rates for debt 
shifting. Advancing the tax incentive measure according to the trade-off theory the 
tax differences augmented by differences in size is the primary driver of the tax 
incentive to shift debt. Besides the tax rates and their differences the tax-related 
factors of loss carry forwards with unlimited loss restriction when the target is 
taken over as well as the absence of group taxation regimes matter. The economic 
effects of the tax incentives to shift debt in the range of 0.30 to 1.9 percentage 
points for the target during and directly after the M&A are slightly larger than the 
economic effects found by (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008), while the 
economic effect of the pure tax rate difference of 0.54 percentage points is similar 
to their observation. For the target the tax incentive to shift debt away from it is 
significant mostly because the acquirer is 17.8 times larger, more profitable and 
has more tangible assets and considers the tax implications of financing the 
transaction with debt. Finally the use of holdings by financial acquirers with an 
economic influence of 7% to 8% exceeds the influence of the tax rates and tax 
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incentive measures on target’s leverage. Further research might analyze the use of 
holdings in international acquisitions in more detail. 
 
6. Do firms have tax-influenced capital structure targets? Evidence from 
taken over companies that became subsidiaries 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In mergers and acquisitions the capital structure of a company changes 
immediately, serving as a natural experiment of capital structure adjustments 
according to the trade-off theory. The acquired company that before the M&A was 
part of another conglomerate or an independent entity is now a subsidiary. As a 
new subsidiary it has access to the internal capital market of the enlarged 
conglomerate. The new subsidiary’s convergence towards a target capital structure 
is influenced by the capital structure of the acquirer and tax factors relevant in 
M&As that influence both parties’ capital structure choices (Graham J. R., 1996; 
2000; Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). The target capital structure hypothesis 
influenced by differences in taxes and debt capacity is supported by the empirical 
observations in a sample of 1,844 domestic and international M&As from 2000 to 
2008. The acquired company’s pre-merger deviation from its leverage target is 
positively correlated with the change in its leverage around the M&A completion 
year. Furthermore, the change in the statutory corporate tax rate faced by the target 
as well as the pre-merger leverage deviation of the acquirer are positively 
correlated with the target’s change in leverage around the M&A completion year.  
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Approximately 26% of the pre-merger leverage deviation is reversed until the third 
year after the M&A. This convergence of the target’s leverage towards a 
benchmark is half as fast as acquirers’ adjustment speed of 54% to 75% found by 
(Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). After the M&A the debt-to-assets ratio of the 
target decreases significantly, even though it was on average underleveraged 
before the merger. The new subsidiary’s leverage deviation becomes more 
negative. These empirical observations of decreasing leverage after the M&A are 
different to the findings for acquirers and the joint company of (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009) and (Ghosh & Jain, 2000). 
Besides those empirical observations that are related to the trade-off theory the 
convergence of the new subsidiary’s capital structure towards a target or 
benchmark is influenced by the use of holdings by financial acquirers. The use of 
holdings is associated with an economic effect of a 4.52 percentage points increase 
in target’s leverage during the M&A completion year (Ruf, 2011; Mintz & 
Weichenrieder, 2010). In the third year after M&A completion the financial 
acquirer reduces the debt shifted to the new subsidiary. After the M&A completion 
year this leverage increasing effect is reversed by a faster adjustment speed of the 
new subsidiary’s debt-to-assets ratio. The analysis of holdings by financial 
investors is difficult as the economic effects are restricted to the 13.4% of M&As 
involving financial acquirers.  
Comparable to (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) and (Kayhan & Titman, 2007) 
the mostly private target companies adjust their leverage towards their regression 
based target capital structure after the M&A. The benchmark is the target capital 
structure calculated from tobit regressions estimated annually on the Amadeus and 
Orbis databases. The methodology of (Kayhan & Titman, 2007) and (Harford, 
Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) is adapted to include private companies, because the 
market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities is unavailable for private 
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firms. Instead of the market-to-book ratio the anticipated growth in total assets is 
used as a proxy for growth opportunities with similar economic effects, and the 
mean or median industry leverage as benchmark (D'Mello & Farhat, 2008; Graham 
& Harvey, 2001; Fama & French, 1997).  
During the adjustment of leverage after the M&A the potentially high costs of 
distressed are considered by reducing leverage further if the risk, the standard 
deviation of changes in past ROA, is higher (Andrade & Kaplan, 1998; Parnes, 
2009; Wald, 1999). New subsidiaries that expect a higher growth in assets reduce 
their leverage deviation faster to have financial slack for financing future growth. 
This observation corresponds to the model of (Miller, 1977) that overleveraged 
firms can face an underinvestment problem, making excess leverage costly 
especially for high-growth companies. (Graham & Harvey, 2001) report as well 
that financial managers of high-growth firms consider the maintenance of target 
leverage to be important to avoid the underinvestment problem. (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009) make a similar observation for acquirers to reduce leverage faster if 
they have good growth opportunities.  
The study follows with the literature review and hypothesis development in section 
2. Section 3 describes the data set and sample characteristics. Section 4 presents 
the analysis of leverage changes around the M&A completion year. Section 5 
presents the multivariate analysis of targets’ capital structure convergence after the 
M&A. Section 6 finishes with the discussion and conclusion.  
 
6.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
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From the survey of (Graham & Harvey, 2001) it is known that executives have 
capital structure targets. The target capital structure hypothesis refers to the 
adjustment of the debt-to-assets ratio towards a leverage target of the new 
subsidiary after the M&A, based on the trade-off theory. Considering public US 
acquirers the studies of (Ghosh & Jain, 2000), (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) 
and (Uysal, 2011) examine changes in leverage and adjustments towards a new 
leverage target. (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) and (Uysal, 2011) look at the 
bidder’s deviation from his leverage target and the influence of that deviation on 
his financing decision in the acquisition or merger. (Ghosh & Jain, 2000) examine 
the industry and size adjusted leverage deviations of the acquirer and target before 
and of the combined firm after the M&A. All these studies have in common that 
they estimate public companies’ leverage targets with regression models including 
market-to-book ratios of assets and market leverage adapted from the models 
developed first by (Kayhan & Titman, 2007). For private companies target capital 
structure regressions have to be adapted as stock market data is missing24. To test 
whether the new subsidiaries adapt their debt-to-assets ratios towards a leverage 
target their industry means and medians as benchmarks according to (D'Mello & 
Farhat, 2008) could be used in the empirical analysis. The speed of adjustment 
estimate is affected little whether one assumes a company-specific time invariante 
target or one that changes over time, like an annual leverage target obtained from 
regressions or the median industry leverage as a benchmark (Lemmon, Roberts, & 
Zender, 2008). 
                                                          
24 The first version of the paper used the median industry leverage as target capital structure benchmark 
with similar empirical results (D'Mello & Farhat, 2008; Frank & Goyal, 2009). The tables are available 
upon request. The book-value based capital structure target regressions are estimated annually on the 
Amadeus database merged with the extracted 946,297 Orbis company-years, shown in tables 1 and H in 
the statistical appendix. Estimating the regressions annually for each country individually was not 
possible because of too few observations for smaller countries. The inclusion of country dummies was 
difficult as well, because some country dummies were nonzero for a few companies only, causing 
singularities in the variance-covariance matrix and missing standard errors for the country dummies’ 
coefficients. The same problem of singularities occurs with industry dummies. The mean or median 
industry leverage is therefore included directly. 
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The mean reversion of leverage using partial adjustment models is significant in 
panels (Auerbach, 1985; Jalilvand & Harris, 1984). The recent studies summarized 
by (Graham & Leary, 2011) using US panels from Compustat get different 
estimates of the persistence of leverage and adjustments speed ranging from 9% to 
39% per year. The estimation of the adjustment speed towards a leverage target is 
affected by debt and equity issues (Fama & French, 2002; Baker & Wurgler, 2002; 
Welch, 2004; Iliev & Welch, 2010). A further problem with the former analyses is 
the bias introduced by short panels and the econometric method employed 
(Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Elsas & Florysiak, 2011; 2012).  
M&As as natural experiments avoid these shortcomings. The immediate change of 
the company’s structure caused by a M&A might trigger a faster, more significant 
adjustment towards a leverage target. None of the mentioned studies has 
considered the acquired companies’ leverage targets ex-post. Being part of a larger 
conglomerate after the M&A changes the capital structure of the new subsidiary as 
it is usually smaller than the acquirer. The new subsidiary’s capital structure is 
expected to be influenced by the acquirer’s capital structure choices, his means of 
financing the takeover, and its debt capacity relative to the larger acquirer’s one. 
The target capital structure hypothesis argues further that during and after the 
M&A the capital structure of the newly integrated subsidiary is adjusted towards a 
target debt-to-assets ratio according to its profitability, tangible assets and size, risk 
and growth prospects as well as its comparative tax advantage to benefit from debt 
tax shields.  
According to the tax-based trade-off theory of (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973), 
(DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) and (Miller, 1977) a new subsidiary that is larger, has 
more tangible assets and is more profitable has a higher debt capacity and therefore 
is better able to exploit the tax shield of interest payments than a smaller, less 
profitable subsidiary or acquirer with less tangible assets. According to the 
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pecking-order theory the provision of access to the acquirer’s internal capital 
market solves information asymmetry problems and financial frictions associated 
with issuing securities, which influences the new subsidiary’s capital structure as 
well (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers S. C., 1984; 2001).  
The target capital structure hypothesis assumes that higher corporate tax rates 
faced by either the newly acquired subsidiary or the acquirer affect the 
convergence towards a target debt-to-assets ratio. In the multivariate analysis tax 
rate differences to shift debt are considered with respect to their influence on the 
changes and convergence of target’s debt during and after the M&A. Regarding 
taxes the new subsidiary’s debt-to-assets ratio can deviate from its target capital 
structure if the costs of deviation are smaller than the benefits for the subsidiary 
and the conglomerate, for instance greater tax savings of a debt-to-assets ratio 
above target leverage, whose estimation excludes tax considerations. Issuing 
additional debt or shifting debt to the new subsidiary to benefit from tax debt 
shields is feasible only for those new subsidiaries that are underleveraged and have 
spare debt capacity. Furthermore, M&As are suitable to investigate taxes and tax-
related effects that occur in M&As only. Tax-related effects such as the use of 
holdings by financial investors that possibly affect target’s leverage are unique to 
M&As (Ruf, 2011; Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010).  
 
6.3 Sample preparation and description 
 
A sample similar to the one of the previous chapter is used for the empirical 
analysis. For each M&A at least seven years of financial data of the target and 
acquirer are needed, because the analysis is an event study with a window of at 
least (-3, 3) years around the M&A completion year combined with a capital 
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structure convergence analysis. The three year period before the M&A completion 
year is used to control for the run-up period in which acquirer’s and target’s 
management strategically position their companies. Managers anticipating being 
taken over increase their company’s leverage to extract more value for their 
shareholders or to reduce the likelihood of being acquired (Billett, 1996; Raad, 
Ryan, & Sinkey, 1999; Israel, 1991; 1992). Managers of acquiring companies 
reduce leverage to have sufficient debt capacity to finance the upcoming 
acquisitions (Uysal, 2011). Therefore, calculation of the pre-merger deviation from 
the target capital structure requires the pre-merger debt data. 
Similar to (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012) and (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 
2008) the financial statement data is obtained from Amadeus and Orbis, because 
consolidated and non-consolidated financial statements of worldwide public and 
private companies are available. Different to (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 
2008) the consolidated financial statements are preferred, because the acquirer is 
considered with all its subsidiaries already in place as one entity that acquires and 
integrates the complete target as new subsidiary into its conglomerate structure. 
The simplifying assumption is made as the ultimate acquirer’s and target’s 
subsidiary structure is not observable in the M&A completion year25. After 
merging the Zephyr data of M&As in which the acquirer owns less than 50% of the 
target ex-ante and holds at least 50.1%, and on average 93.1%, ex-post with Orbis 
and Amadeus, and after deleting observations with incomplete basic capital 
                                                          
25 (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) observe the multinational conglomerate’s subsidiary, or 
ownership, structure in 2003 when Amadeus recorded it. The ownership structure is updated annually 
with the historical ownership structure being overwritten, such that the most recent ownership structure 
is available only. (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) implicitly assume that in the 10 years before 
2003 the ownership structure did not change significantly, which is unlikely giving issues of securities, 
M&As, spin-offs, split-offs, asset sales etc..  
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structure variables and leverage 15,554 company-deal-years in 1,844 M&As are 
left, which is shown in table 126.  
The descriptive statistics of the sample are presented in table 2. The M&A 
completion year is centered in the middle of the deal period, following (Harford, 
Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). The majority of M&As are completed between 2005 and 
2008. The latest event year is 2008 due to the fact that after the M&A at least 3 
years of data until the end of 2011 are needed. The M&As occur in 47 countries 
and mostly in Europe. Most targets and acquirers are private companies. The 
acquiring companies are on average 17.8 times larger than the target companies 
that have median total assets of 7.14 million dollars in 1983 dollars. Otherwise the 
sample is comparable to the ones of (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012), (Huizinga, 
Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) and identical to the one in the previous chapter. On 
average 57.7% of acquired companies are independent. Countries with few deals 
host large firms. These countries and deals are retained to maximize the variance in 
tax rates and tax effects internationally. The variables used are defined in table G 
in the statistical appendix and their descriptive statistics are shown in table 3. The 
independent variables for the acquirer and target are taken from the capital 
structure literature27.  
                                                          
26 The deal years with total debt exceeding total assets were mostly British limited liability companies 
with minimal assets but lots of debt such that total equity was negative. These appeared to be empty 
corporate shells. Accumulating acquisitions occurred mostly in China in which acquirers used small 
increments of two to five percentage acquisitions to buy up targets. The overlapping deals occurred in 
Brazil, Czech Republic, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Norway, Russia and the Ukraine. The 
targets excluded with several completions on the same date appeared to be bought by a consortium of 
subsidiaries of the same company, because the immediate acquirers’ names were similar. In these 
excluded cases the multiple records referred to one acquisition.  
27 Free cash-flow, depreciation and sales growth are not used, because these variables are less complete 
which reduced the sample size considerably. Free cash-flow and return on assets are highly correlated, 
which holds for tangible assets and depreciation as well. 
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M&As or 
Firm-years
Deal-Firm-
Years
1.) Extracting international M&As from Zephyr
Deals with target and acquirer identifiers in majority transactions 138,754
dropping incomplete transactions -22,672
dropping targets with several completion announcements on the same day -578
dropping transactions with a missing completion date -3
dropping accumulating acquisitions of the same target by the same acquirer -4,496
111,005
expanded with 9 years for each deal (-4 to +4 years) 999,045
2.) Extracting ORBIS international company data 964,297
matching with Zephyr for targets and acquirers 567,874
3.) Extracting Amadeus European company data 325,487
matching with Zephyr for targets and acquirers 313,449
4.) Merging Zephyr, Amadeus and Orbis into one data set 999,045
merging Zephyr with Zephyr-Orbis and Zephyr-Amadeus into one data set 578,534
dropping deal-years in which the target and acquirer coincide -3,057
dropping deal-years with total debt exceeding total assets and negative equity -53,208
dropping deal-years with missing target total assets -248,021
dropping finance targets with SIC core code 600 to 699 -46,004
228,244
5.) After generating the variables
dropping deal-company-years with incomplete target and acquirer variables -212,600
dropping deals in which the target is acquired and sold with overlapping panels -90
Final M&A sample with complete target and acquirer deal-company-year data 1,844 15,554
- thereof deals with 7 years of target and acquirer data and variables 63
- thereof deals with 8 years of target and acquirer data and variables 916
- thereof deals with 9 years of target and acquirer data and variables 865
Table 1: Data preparation and sample creation 
The extracted ORBIS and Amadeus data includes company-years with available total assets in unconsolidated (U1 or U2)
or consolidated (C1 or C2) financial statements. If consolidated and unconsolidated statements of a company are available 
the consolidated statements are taken. Consolidated financial statements are available in most cases for public
corporations. Subsidiaries, branches and independent  private companies have most ly unconsolidated financial statements.
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Year N Mergers Acquisitions Country Acquirer Target
2000 2 0 2 Austria 18 4
2001 1 0 1 Australia 10 2
2002 4 0 4 Belgium 107 122
2003 9 0 9 Brazil 5 8
2004 35 0 35 Canada 9 2
2005 392 3 389 Switzerland 26 2
2006 439 4 435 China 4 5
2007 525 2 523 Colombia 1 0
2008 437 1 436 Czech Republic 11 27
1,844 10 1,834 Germany 62 57
Denmark 8 1
Estonia 1 8
t Unbalanced Spain 200 205
-4 1,370 Finland 73 65
-3 1,844 France 313 326
-2 1,844 Great Britain 152 158
-1 1,844 Greece 23 26
0 1,844 Hong Kong 4 4
1 1,844 Croatia 15 22
2 1,844 Hungary 12 15
3 1,844 Indonesia 0 1
4 1,276 Ireland 16 5
15,554 Israel 2 0
Iceland 1 1
Italy 136 175
Japan 86 77
South Korea 0 3
Lithuania 2 0
Luxembourg 6 2
Mexico 2 0
Malaysia 4 4
Norway 96 106
New Zealand 2 1
Peru 1 6
Philippins 1 1
Poland 46 55
Portugal 36 37
Romania 14 36
Russia 54 59
Sweden 167 172
Singapore 4 2
Slovakia 3 9
Thailand 4 6
Turkey 1 2
Ukraine 14 20
United States 89 3
South Africa 3 2
1,844 1,844
Panel A: Distribution of M&As over time Panel C: Company Countries
Table 2: M&As over time and countries
t=0 is the M&A completion year.
Panel B: Panel without gaps
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Target's 
leverage
Acquirer's 
leverage
Year N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean
2000 2 0.27 0.27 6.39 6.39 0.55 0.64 50.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2001 1 1.26 1.26 1.56 1.56 0.46 0.89 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2002 4 9.07 3.76 15.66 12.84 0.80 0.76 100.00% 50.00% 75.00% 50.00%
2003 9 25.58 4.83 263.81 7.11 0.59 0.62 88.89% 33.33% 44.44% 22.22%
2004 35 25.10 5.27 658.92 64.27 0.58 0.56 85.71% 51.43% 48.57% 57.14%
2005 392 125.21 9.47 3,328.85 145.83 0.58 0.60 68.62% 56.38% 42.86% 68.37%
2006 439 107.02 6.39 2,415.54 118.46 0.59 0.60 63.55% 60.36% 32.57% 68.34%
2007 525 104.50 5.90 2,241.03 96.18 0.58 0.60 67.24% 57.52% 33.33% 63.24%
2008 437 143.42 7.95 1,760.16 199.50 0.58 0.57 69.11% 56.98% 38.44% 67.73%
1,844 116.46 7.14 2,351.72 126.98 0.58 0.59 67.62% 57.65% 36.77% 66.16%
Panel D: Characteristics of M&As over time (one year before the M&A)
Table 2 (cont.): M&As over time and countries
Public Targets 
(%)
Public 
Acquirers (%)
Target's total 
assets  ($mil)
Acquirer's total 
assets ($mil) Domestic 
Deals (%)
Independent 
Targets (%)
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Target's 
leverage
Acquirer's 
leverage
Target Country N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean
Austria 4 27.01 26.90 73.39 76.54 0.61 0.58 50.00% 25.00% 50.00% 100.00%
Australia 2 108.29 108.29 388.22 388.22 0.37 0.46 50.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Belgium 122 113.19 4.82 1,066.19 53.44 0.60 0.59 65.57% 70.49% 24.59% 47.54%
Brazil 8 2,037.26 342.82 6,430.87 4,663.14 0.54 0.64 37.50% 75.00% 50.00% 75.00%
Canada 2 738.34 738.34 8,868.15 8,868.15 0.44 0.44 50.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Switzerland 2 15.81 15.81 1,487.55 1,487.55 0.70 0.65 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 50.00%
China 5 426.43 231.07 3,761.09 1,088.11 0.51 0.55 60.00% 60.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Czech Republic 27 152.54 10.44 2,630.95 135.63 0.45 0.48 40.74% 51.85% 51.85% 92.59%
Germany 57 295.28 31.74 3,857.58 516.65 0.61 0.58 36.84% 42.11% 28.07% 82.46%
Denmark 1 2,264.16 2,264.16 9,544.15 9,544.15 0.53 0.68 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Estonia 8 4.25 3.11 276.62 62.47 0.53 0.58 12.50% 25.00% 50.00% 62.50%
Spain 205 54.69 8.79 2,186.76 73.13 0.62 0.63 76.59% 50.73% 64.88% 69.27%
Finland 65 12.27 3.40 581.70 14.96 0.56 0.60 75.38% 40.00% 1.54% 35.38%
France 326 112.79 4.94 2,311.63 93.33 0.58 0.60 73.01% 63.80% 19.94% 61.04%
Great Britain 158 24.55 6.68 1,394.35 157.50 0.58 0.58 57.59% 49.37% 1.90% 65.82%
Greece 26 207.67 23.71 1,529.33 218.68 0.57 0.58 76.92% 61.54% 100.00% 96.15%
Hong Kong 4 1,981.71 606.76 5,436.58 3,739.76 0.37 0.42 75.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Croatia 22 13.65 5.96 1,886.51 182.22 0.50 0.58 68.18% 77.27% 40.91% 81.82%
Hungary 15 283.74 13.37 7,601.46 794.06 0.51 0.52 60.00% 60.00% 13.33% 53.33%
Indonesia 1 164.16 164.16 307.20 307.20 0.55 0.50 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 2 (cont.): M&As over time and countries
Panel E: Characteristics of M&As by country (one year before the M&A)
Target's total 
assets  ($mil)
Acquirer's total 
assets ($mil) Domestic 
Deals (%)
Independent 
Targets (%)
Public Targets 
(%)
Public 
Acquirers (%)
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Target's 
leverage
Acquirer's 
leverage
Target Country N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean
Ireland 5 13.45 11.20 863.17 609.43 0.44 0.75 40.00% 60.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Iceland 1 21.31 21.31 100.55 100.55 0.37 0.64 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Italy 175 187.71 12.61 3,395.24 231.43 0.69 0.64 66.29% 54.86% 62.86% 82.29%
Japan 77 242.61 69.88 5,060.83 1,829.26 0.54 0.58 98.70% 79.22% 98.70% 100.00%
South Korea 3 200.40 4.41 8,133.27 2,410.33 0.45 0.56 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 66.67%
Luxembourg 2 50.67 50.67 32,360.22 32,360.22 0.46 0.62 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Malaysia 4 90.70 48.34 2,174.95 1,916.39 0.24 0.59 75.00% 75.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Norway 106 47.77 3.11 617.24 66.92 0.64 0.62 66.04% 68.87% 3.77% 38.68%
New Zealand 1 230.42 230.42 5,410.25 5,410.25 0.57 0.61 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Peru 6 215.52 197.79 10,678.03 3,523.36 0.49 0.51 16.67% 50.00% 83.33% 100.00%
Philippins 1 421.43 421.43 767.79 767.79 0.26 0.42 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Poland 55 116.18 9.85 3,196.89 145.54 0.53 0.53 69.09% 43.64% 52.73% 80.00%
Portugal 37 171.42 19.87 2,158.19 146.98 0.69 0.64 70.27% 54.05% 91.89% 89.19%
Romania 36 30.19 3.14 6,738.21 200.66 0.46 0.52 36.11% 44.44% 61.11% 77.78%
Russia 59 38.84 9.01 4,098.30 231.57 0.52 0.56 86.44% 49.15% 62.71% 76.27%
Sweden 172 19.20 2.21 415.13 25.23 0.55 0.57 69.19% 61.63% 0.58% 44.77%
Singapore 2 128.16 128.16 793.87 793.87 0.29 0.30 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Slovakia 9 24.54 3.77 2,210.00 99.59 0.48 0.52 22.22% 55.56% 55.56% 88.89%
Thailand 6 16.01 12.56 3,744.63 608.89 0.60 0.47 50.00% 50.00% 16.67% 66.67%
Turkey 2 979.83 979.83 2,832.16 2,832.16 0.64 0.78 50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 50.00%
Ukraine 20 42.39 11.14 1,126.33 134.83 0.31 0.47 65.00% 45.00% 55.00% 50.00%
United States 3 29.58 8.38 1,093.21 1,564.08 0.53 0.54 66.67% 33.33% 66.67% 66.67%
South Africa 2 2,072.73 2,072.73 12,907.83 12,907.83 0.53 0.51 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
116.46 7.14 2,351.72 126.98 0.58 0.59 67.62% 57.65% 36.77% 66.16%
Table 2 (cont.): M&As over time and countries
Panel E (cont.): Characteristics of M&As by country (one year before the M&A)
Public 
Acquirers (%)
Target's total 
assets  ($mil)
Acquirer's total 
assets ($mil) Domestic 
Deals (%)
Independent 
Targets (%)
Public Targets 
(%)
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The dependent variables of leverage are defined similar to (Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
and (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008). The changes in leverage deviations 
after the M&A completion year are calculated similar to (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009) with the adapted annual target capital structure regressions shown 
in table H in the statistical appendix. The statutory corporate tax rates, differences 
in tax rates, tax-related variables such as holdings of financial investors as well as 
control variables are obtained from various data sources and are similar to the ones 
of the previous chapter. To assess the influence of the target’s pre-merger leverage 
deviation on the change of its debt-to-assets ratio the dependent variables of the 
total debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE and adjusted net debt-to-assets ratio 
ADJLEVERAGE are defined according to (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) 
and (Huizinga & Voget, 2009). 
Financial debt FINLEVERAGE is defined according to (Frank & Goyal, 2009) as 
long-term interest bearing debt plus short-term interest bearing debt in current 
liabilities to analyze the influence of taxes on the change of financial debt in 
particular28. The changes in leverage targets are calculated comparable to (Harford, 
Klasa, & Walcott, 2009)29. 
The difference in tax rates shows that during the merger debt is preferably shifted 
from the target to the acquirer, illustrated in table 3. The differences in tax rates 
occur in international transactions. Different to previous studies is the inclusion of 
                                                          
28 The US American capital structure and taxation literature often uses leverage definitions different to 
the ones in the international literature. To compare the empirical observations of this study with those 
using Compustat data financial debt defined as long-term debt (item #9) plus debt in current liabilities 
(item #34) is similar to a definition using long-term debt (Orbis item 417 or Amadeus item 15) plus 
loans (Orbis item 420 or Amadeus item 18) in the global balance sheets shared by Amadeus and Orbis. 
29 The Amadeus universe downloaded from WRDS includes all very large, large, medium and small 
companies with consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements. The Amadeus database is merged 
with 964,297 Orbis company years. The Amadeus companies have many outliers for total and adjusted 
leverage below 0 and above 1. To avoid the skewness caused by outliers the median industry total and 
adjusted leverage is used. For financial leverage the median is 0 as half of the companies have no or 
negative financial leverage. For industry financial leverage the mean is a more reasonable value for 
those companies in the industries that have financial leverage above 0. In the final sample 12.5% of 
acquirers and 8.3% of targets are extracted from Orbis outside Europe. 
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constructs that approximate the tax planning opportunities of financial acquirers 
that use holdings. On the acquirer’s side the incentive to shift debt through 
holdings is approximated with the construct FININV_RATIO_A (Andrade & 
Kaplan, 1998). This variable approximates the amount of relative assets invested 
by the financial investor into the new subsidiary through the holding. This variable 
is constructed with the dummy HOLDING_A whether the immediate acquirer is a 
holding or investment company, also called “conduit”, which is used for tax 
planning (Hebous, Ruf, & Weichenrieder, 2011; Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010). 
The variables FINANCIALINV_A and HOLDING_A are elements of 
FININV_RATIO_A. The dummy FINANCEFIRM_A is 1 if the acquirer is a 
financial firm of any type according to its SIC code. In the regressions only the 
financial investor ratio FININV_RATIO_A is used to avoid multicollinearity with 
its components. Financial investors are assumed to be less risk averse than strategic 
investors, such that the risk exposure of the equity at stake is controlled with the 
target’s total equity relative to the acquirer’s total equity EQUITYRATIO_T_A 
(Ruf, 2011; Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010).  
The capital structure variables approximating the debt capacity of the target as well 
as risk and asset growth are taken from (Frank & Goyal, 2009), (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995) and (Wald, 1999). The control variables of inflation, independent target 
companies, whether the target and acquirer are from difference industries and 
countries and whether they are private firms are similar to (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009), (Ghosh & Jain, 2000) and (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012). The 
independent variables are used in the previous chapter as well. 
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Panel A: Dependent variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
LEVERAGE_T 1,844 0.5695 0.2325 0.0000 0.5919 0.9951
FINLEVERAGE_T 1,751 0.1448 0.1804 0.0000 0.0564 0.8125
ADJLEVERAGE_T 1,827 0.4061 0.2923 0.0000 0.4144 1.0000
LEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 1,844 -0.0173 0.1892 -0.9047 -0.0136 0.9257
FINLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 1,711 -0.0097 0.1649 -0.7790 0.0000 0.8523
ADJLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 1,817 0.0020 0.2644 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Panel B: Independent variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
SIZE_T 1,844 16.0692 2.0390 10.4748 15.8325 22.6000
TAR_T 1,844 0.2280 0.2369 0.0000 0.1367 0.9483
CASH_T 1,844 0.1352 0.1661 0.0000 0.0692 0.9967
ROA_T 1,844 0.0882 0.1718 -0.9377 0.0675 0.7604
RnD_T 1,844 0.0013 0.0170 0.0000 0.0000 0.4192
RISK_T 1,844 0.1054 0.0974 0.0010 0.0785 1.0006
ASSET_GROWTH_T 1,844 0.0641 0.3738 -1.4983 0.0464 1.7294
EQUITYRATIO_T_A 1,844 0.5779 2.8073 0.0000 0.0652 29.9397
ALEVERAGE_T 1,844 -0.1328 0.2360 -0.6652 -0.1165 0.3319
AFINLEVERAGE_T 1,751 -0.0913 0.1804 -0.4691 -0.1049 0.4585
AADJLEVERAGE_T 1,827 -0.1381 0.2958 -0.6795 -0.1455 0.5272
ALEVERAGE_A 1,844 -0.1515 0.2086 -0.6518 -0.1459 0.3094
AFINLEVERAGE_A 1,816 -0.1394 0.2001 -0.5367 -0.1577 0.4193
AADJLEVERAGE_A 1,837 -0.1594 0.2578 -0.7264 -0.1578 0.4448
LEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 1,844 -0.0035 0.0298 -0.1142 -0.0030 0.1893
FINLEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 1,844 0.0240 0.0590 -0.4995 0.0159 0.4292
ADJLEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 1,844 0.0004 0.0416 -0.1739 -0.0008 0.2660
Panel C: Tax variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
STR_T 1,844 0.3048 0.0563 0.1250 0.3140 0.4069
STR_A 1,844 0.3101 0.0578 0.1250 0.3250 0.4069
TAXDIFF_T_A 1,844 -0.0054 0.0486 -0.2750 0.0000 0.2149
STR_T_L1_F1 1,844 -0.0116 0.0212 -0.1000 0.0000 0.0700
STR_A_L1_F1 1,844 -0.0105 0.0210 -0.0900 0.0000 0.0700
TAXDIFF_T_A_L1_F1 1,844 -0.0011 0.0175 -0.0905 0.0000 0.0900
Panel D: Control variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
INDEPENDENT 1,844 0.5765 0.4943 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
PRIVATE_T 1,844 0.6323 0.4823 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
INFLATION_T 1,844 0.0303 0.0263 -0.0027 0.0233 0.2523
FININV_RATIO_A 1,844 0.0123 0.1073 0.0000 0.0000 1.0893
DIFF_IND 1,844 0.5472 0.4979 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
CROSSBORDER 1,844 0.3238 0.4680 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
The values of the variables are shown during the deal completion year (t=0). L1_F1 refers to the change from t=-1 to t=1 around the M&A 
completion year. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. The variables are similar to (Rajan & Zingales, 1995),
(Wald, 1999) and (Frank & Goyal, 2009). The statutory corporate tax rates STR_T and STR_A are used according to (Graham, 1996,
2000). The variables are defined in table G in the statistical appendix.
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6.4 Analysis of new subsidiaries’ leverage changes during M&A completion 
 
The multivariate analysis in table 4 of the change in the newly acquired 
subsidiary’s leverage around the M&A completion year shows that the target’s 
statutory corporate tax rate is positively correlated with its leverage and change in 
leverage. A one standard deviation increase in the target’s statutory tax rate change 
is associated with a 0.4233 0.0212 0.0090× =  or 0.90 percentage points leverage 
change compared to a standard deviation of the change in leverage of 0.1892, 
which is a relative change of 0.0090 0.1892 0.0476=  or 4.76%. A higher level of 
leverage in the deal completion year arises from a higher statutory corporate tax 
rate as well. The statutory corporate tax rates on average decrease before and after 
the merger, because the sample falls into the period of the recent financial crisis in 
which most countries reduced tax rates.  
Comparable to (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) the change in the leverage target 
around the M&A completion year is significantly positively correlated with the 
change in leverage. Excess leverage compared to the benchmark is positively 
correlated with the level of leverage but negative correlated with its change. The 
new subsidiary reduces leverage if overleveraged and increases its leverage if it is 
underleveraged with spare debt capacity. The change in leverage is more negative 
to reduce the bankruptcy risk of debt if the target is overleveraged and more risky 
in terms of a higher standard deviation of ROA.   
Similarly excess leverage of the acquirer increases target’s leverage, because the 
acquirer shifts debt to the target, as observed in the previous chapter. The 
economic effect of a one standard deviation increase of the acquirer’s pre-merger 
leverage deviation on target’s leverage change of 0.0655 0.2086 0.0137× = or 1.37 
percentage points is significant given a standard deviation of the change in debt-to-
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assets of 0.1892. An overleveraged acquirer shifts excess debt to the newly 
acquired subsidiary whereas an underleveraged acquirer takes debt from the new 
subsidiary onto his balance sheet. 7.2% of the target’s change in leverage around 
the M&A is attributed to the acquirer’s ex-ante leverage deviation, which is in 
relation of the target having on average 5.5% of the total assets of the acquirer 
economic significant. (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) do not consider the 
potential influence of the target’s pre-merger leverage deviation on the acquirer’s 
change in leverage and financing decision, even though they focus in their analysis 
on large acquisitions in which the target has at least 20% of the acquirer’s assets. 
Finally expected growth in assets is positively correlated with debt to finance 
growth.  
Furthermore, the influence of the factors determining debt capacity and leverage is 
controlled directly with ROA, cash, and R&D that have the expected signs (Frank 
& Goyal, 2009). Research and development intensive new subsidiaries are more 
leveraged to finance the creation of intangible assets. Tangible assets are 
significantly negatively correlated with the change in leverage, which is contrary to 
expectations. The negative correlation of ROA and cash with debt is explained by a 
preference for internal retained earnings over external debt according to the 
pecking-order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Frank & Goyal, 2009). Cash is used 
to pay back debt to create financial slack through the accumulation of retained 
earnings (Graham & Leary, 2011).  
The same empirical observations are made for financial leverage and adjusted net 
leverage. The tax effects however are significant only for the total debt-to-assets 
ratio. The acquirer’s statutory corporate tax rate is significantly positively 
correlated with the target’s financial leverage due to financing effects (Erickson, 
1998; Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). 
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Panel A: Total leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0
STR_T 0.4880*** 0.1845**
(3.740) (2.110)
STR_A -0.0420 0.0166
(-0.358) (0.210)
STR_T_L1_F1 0.4233*
(1.779)
STR_A_L1_F1 -0.2922
(-1.304)
TAXDIFF_T_A_L1_F1 0.3596* 0.4045*
(1.702) (1.908)
LEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 1.5216*** 1.5337*** 1.1418***
(8.080) (8.274) (5.919)
L1.ALEVERAGE_T 0.7524*** -0.3164*** -0.3173*** -0.2158***
(42.276) (-15.192) (-15.274) (-8.300)
L1.ALEVERAGE_A 0.0118 0.0722*** 0.0720*** 0.0655***
(0.640) (3.227) (3.222) (3.048)
L1.RISK_T 0.0291
(0.518)
-0.8545***
(-4.540)
0.0448***
(2.602)
-0.1152
(-1.488)
F1.ROA_T -0.1103*** -0.0667* -0.1794*** -0.1802*** -0.1737***
(-2.700) (-1.938) (-5.256) (-5.302) (-5.313)
F1.CASH_T -0.2498*** -0.2005*** -0.1281*** -0.1272*** -0.1259***
(-6.659) (-7.539) (-3.876) (-3.851) (-3.899)
F1.TAR_T -0.0904*** -0.0238 -0.0864*** -0.0869*** -0.0622***
(-3.593) (-1.391) (-4.434) (-4.470) (-3.094)
F1.RnD_T -0.1521 0.2724 0.3526*** 0.3464*** 0.3750***
(-0.795) (0.881) (3.683) (3.699) (2.660)
F1.EQUITYRATIO_T_A -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0042* -0.0042* -0.0041*
(-1.544) (-1.170) (-1.712) (-1.712) (-1.718)
Constant 0.5304*** 0.6819*** 0.0209 0.0186 0.0139
(11.868) (22.943) (1.643) (1.529) (1.110)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844
F-statistic 10.70 177.84 21.49 22.80 19.71
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.0662 0.5860 0.2040 0.2043 0.2336
Root MSE 0.2246 0.1496 0.1688 0.1688 0.1656
Table 4: Regressions of the change in leverage around the M&A
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
L1.ALEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
The dependent variable is the target's debt-to-assets ratio LEVERAGE and its change from the year before (L1)
to one year after (F1) the M&A completion year. L1 refers to the variables at the end of the fiscal year before
the M&A completion year. F1 refers to the first year after the M&A completion year. All other variables are
centered at the M&A complet ion year t=0. The standard errors of the pooled OLS regressions are corrected for
heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980, 1982). Control
variables are included but not reported. The variables are summarized in table 3 and described in table G in the
stat istical appendix.
LEVERAGE_T_L1_F1LEVERAGE_T
L1.ALEVERAGE_T x L1.RISK_T
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Panel B: Adjusted leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0
STR_T 0.3770** 0.1830
(2.384) (1.548)
STR_A -0.0406 -0.0067
(-0.287) (-0.063)
STR_T_L1_F1 0.0312
(0.110)
STR_A_L1_F1 0.0814
(0.280)
TAXDIFF_T_A_L1_F1 -0.0224 0.0284
(-0.086) (0.112)
ADJLEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 1.0774*** 1.0793*** 0.7718***
(6.341) (6.361) (4.581)
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_T 0.6304*** -0.4573*** -0.4577*** -0.3843***
(32.736) (-22.503) (-22.618) (-13.168)
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_A 0.0165 0.1241*** 0.1242*** 0.1177***
(0.865) (5.425) (5.426) (5.370)
L1.RISK_T 0.2108***
(2.821)
-0.6806***
(-3.188)
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T 0.0609***
(3.174)
-0.1041
(-1.597)
F1.ROA_T -0.1779*** -0.1474*** -0.2096*** -0.2100*** -0.2024***
(-3.510) (-3.313) (-4.965) (-4.975) (-4.693)
F1.CASH_T -0.5524*** -0.3910*** -0.3769*** -0.3763*** -0.3913***
(-11.197) (-8.802) (-6.591) (-6.581) (-6.669)
F1.TAR_T 0.0194 0.1195*** -0.1548*** -0.1550*** -0.1149***
(0.661) (5.623) (-6.433) (-6.454) (-4.724)
F1.RnD_T -0.4264*** -0.2917 0.2421** 0.2364** 0.2582*
(-2.816) (-1.283) (2.333) (2.319) (1.799)
F1.EQUITYRATIO_T_A -0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0070** -0.0069** -0.0065**
(-1.145) (-0.925) (-2.470) (-2.478) (-2.296)
Constant 0.4287*** 0.5271*** 0.0444*** 0.0425** 0.0225
(8.059) (13.901) (2.613) (2.574) (1.339)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,827 1,823 1,815 1,815 1,815
F-statistic 18.77 111.12 38.13 40.44 33.66
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.1176 0.5004 0.3003 0.3006 0.3250
Root MSE 0.2746 0.2066 0.2213 0.2212 0.2173
Table 4 (cont.): Regressions of the change in leverage around the M&A
The dependent variable is the target 's adjusted debt-to-assets ratio ADJLEVERAGE and its change from the year
before (L1) to one year after (F1) the M&A completion year. L1 refers to the variables at the end of the fiscal
year before the M&A completion year. F1 refers to the first year after the M&A completion year. All other
variables are centered at the M&A complet ion year t=0. The standard errors of the pooled OLS regressions are
corrected for heteroscedast icity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980, 1982).
Control variables are included but not reported. The variables are summarized in table 3 and described in table G in
the statist ical appendix.
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_T x 
L1.RISK_T
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
ADJLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1ADJLEVERAGE_T
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Panel C: Financial leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0
STR_T 0.3223*** 0.1852** -0.0480
(2.986) (2.064) (-0.508)
STR_A 0.0133 0.0920 0.1780**
(0.139) (1.188) (2.160)
STR_T_L1_F1 0.1283
(0.605)
STR_A_L1_F1 0.0796
(0.384)
TAXDIFF_T_A_L1_F1 0.0272
(0.143)
FINLEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 0.6515*** 0.6474*** 0.6513***
(7.636) (7.526) (7.587)
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T 0.5464*** -0.3782*** -0.3762*** -0.3781***
(21.523) (-10.692) (-10.565) (-10.659)
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_A -0.0366* 0.1398*** 0.1353*** 0.1359***
(-1.750) (6.137) (5.948) (5.973)
L1.RISK_T -0.0055 -0.0115 -0.0088
(-0.141) (-0.296) (-0.228)
-0.5810** -0.5825** -0.5786**
(-2.443) (-2.428) (-2.415)
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T 0.0170 0.0168 0.0172
(1.204) (1.189) (1.218)
-0.1157 -0.1137 -0.1145
(-1.637) (-1.605) (-1.611)
F1.ROA_T -0.0653** -0.0749*** -0.0888*** -0.0900*** -0.0903***
(-2.464) (-3.026) (-3.514) (-3.564) (-3.579)
F1.CASH_T -0.2044*** -0.1815*** -0.0446** -0.0455** -0.0446**
(-10.205) (-10.227) (-2.113) (-2.172) (-2.123)
F1.TAR_T 0.2220*** 0.2633*** -0.0366* -0.0389* -0.0391*
(10.264) (14.520) (-1.807) (-1.938) (-1.948)
F1.RnD_T -0.0997 -0.1462 0.4043*** 0.4410*** 0.4326***
(-1.190) (-1.523) (4.825) (5.381) (5.493)
F1.EQUITYRATIO_T_A -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0038** -0.0038** -0.0038**
(-0.162) (0.560) (-2.175) (-2.134) (-2.174)
Constant 0.0304 0.0994*** -0.0746** -0.0266** -0.0306**
(0.883) (3.559) (-2.557) (-2.031) (-2.426)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,751 1,721 1,702 1,702 1,702
F-statistic 32.99 68.07 19.37 18.76 19.66
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.1702 0.4479 0.2591 0.2571 0.2570
Root MSE 0.1644 0.1337 0.1421 0.1422 0.1423
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
FINLEVERAGE_T
Table 4 (cont.): Regressions of the change in leverage around the M&A
The dependent variable is the target's financial debt-to-assets rat io FINLEVERAGE and its change from the year
before (L1) to one year after (F1) the M&A completion year. L1 refers to the variables at the end of the fiscal
year before the M&A completion year. F1 refers to the first year after the M&A completion year. All other
variables are centered at the M&A completion year t=0. The standard errors of the pooled OLS regressions are
corrected for heteroscedast icity with the Huber & White sandwich est imator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980, 1982).
Control variables are included but not reported. The variables are summarized in table 3 and described in table G
in the statistical appendix.
FINLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T x 
L1.RISK_T
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
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In the sensitivity analysis the potential influence of the financing choice of the 
acquiring company on the new subsidiary’s financial leverage change is tested with 
a classical Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1976; 1979)30. The selection 
equation whether the acquiring company pays with cash, which is associated with 
debt financing of the M&A, is adapted from (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). 
The financing decision has a significant influence on the change of target’s 
financial leverage around the M&A. For overleveraged targets the coefficient of 
the tax rate difference is insignificant, as expected, compared to a significant tax 
effect of debt shifting to underleveraged targets with spare debt capacity.  
Financial acquirers shift debt to the newly acquired subsidiary during the M&A 
completion year through holdings. The use of holdings is associated with a 4.52 
percentage points increase in subsidiary’s total debt-to-assets ratio, which is 
equivalent in magnitude to the four percentage points jump of financial leverage of 
acquirers shown in table 6. Financial acquirers using holdings therefore shift the 
debt used to finance the acquisition in such a manner to the new subsidiary that 
both, the new subsidiary and the parent holding, experience a similar relative 
increase in total debt of 4%. The empirical observation of debt shifting trough 
holdings was observed previously in German acquisitions by (Ruf, 2011) and 
(Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010).  
However, risk considerations concerning new subsidiaries’ pre-merger excess 
leverage are made by financial investors similar to corporate investors, because the 
interaction effects of risk and excess total and adjusted net debt have negative signs 
as well (Graham & Harvey, 2001; Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009; Frank & 
Goyal, 2009). 
                                                          
30 For 581 M&As is the method of payment available. 104 deals, or 17.9%, are share deals. The 
majority of 400, or 68.9%, use cash from retained earnings, debt or capital increases. The method of 
deal financing is available for 235 deals with 152 (64.7%) stated as capital increases through the vendor 
and 53 (22.6%) using bank lending. The missing payment method information limit the sensitivity 
analysis of the influence of the payment method in deal financing on the change in debt. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
TAXDIFF_T_A_L1_F1 0.6409** 0.2975 0.4476* 0.2227 0.3821*
(2.354) (0.640) (1.890) (0.366) (1.694)
FINLEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 0.8957***
(4.882)
L1.AFINALEVERAGE_T -0.3977***
(-4.215)
L1.AFINALEVERAGE_A 0.1266**
(2.222)
L1.RISK_T -0.4017*** -0.0272 0.0496 0.0979 0.0279
(-3.878) (-0.187) (0.384) (0.498) (0.484)
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T -0.0010 0.1011** 0.0245 -0.0039 0.0575***
(-0.046) (2.261) (0.903) (-0.119) (3.115)
-1.8294***
(-4.682)
0.0915
(1.137)
L1.FINLEVERAGE_A 0.5489
(1.507)
L1.ASSET_GROWTH_A -0.4187***
(-2.708)
1.5381**
(2.165)
LEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 1.1521*** 1.1848*** 1.1491* 1.1117***
(3.342) (5.030) (1.821) (5.478)
L1.ALEVERAGE_T -0.2525** -0.1939*** -0.0890 -0.2341***
(-2.013) (-4.573) (-1.116) (-8.624)
L1.ALEVERAGE_A 0.0900** 0.0581** -0.0225 0.0926***
(2.468) (2.225) (-0.541) (3.636)
-0.6198 -0.8385** -1.0969* -0.8256***
(-0.648) (-2.464) (-1.697) (-4.299)
-0.4468* -0.1379 -0.3458** -0.0715
(-1.767) (-1.213) (-2.059) (-0.860)
HOLDING_A 0.0452*
(1.893)
Constant -0.1204*** -2.6420*** 0.0193 0.0203 0.0396 0.0116
(-3.374) (-2.757) (0.847) (1.048) (1.171) (0.869)
Control variables Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Capital structure variables Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables (L1) No Yes No No No No
Capital structure variables (L1) No Yes No No No No
N 538 538 615 1,229 248 1,596
R² adjusted 0.1823 0.1892 0.2104 0.2439
p-value of selection 0.0000 0.0000
corporate 
acquirer
L1.ALEVERAGE_T x L1.RISK_T
L1.ALEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis of the target's change in leverage around the M&A
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T x 
L1.RISK_T
Robust z- and t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variables are the change in FINLEVERAGE_T and LEVERAGE_T from L1 to F1 around the M&A completion year.
The (Heckman, 1976, 1979) select ion model uses CASHPAY that is 1 if the method of payment is cash in Zephyr as select ion
dummy (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott , 2009). Regression (2) includes the acquirer's lagged control and capital structure variables.
Regressions (3) and (4) distinguish between over- and underleveraged targets, (5) and (6) between financial and nonfinancial, or
corporate, acquirers. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedast icity with the Huber & White sandwich est imator (Huber,
1967; White, 1980). The variables are summarized in table 3 and described in table G in the statist ical appendix.
LEVERAGE_T_L1_F1Heckman ML Model 
FINLEVERAGE_
T_L1_F1
CASHPAY
Panel A: Sensitivity Analysis
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
L1.FINLEVERAGE_A x 
L1.ASSET_GROWTH_A
Over- 
leveraged
Under- 
leveraged
financial 
acquirer
219 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0 t=0
TAXDIFF_T_A_L1_F1 0.2614 0.2227 -0.3974 -0.3722 0.2627 0.2291
(0.421) (0.366) (-1.089) (-1.018) (0.474) (0.412)
FININV_RATIO_A 0.0230 0.0158 -0.0130
(0.813) (0.390) (-0.372)
HOLDING_A 0.0452* 0.0005 0.0089
(1.893) (0.015) (0.278)
LEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 1.1831* 1.1491*
(1.870) (1.821)
L1.ALEVERAGE_T -0.0910 -0.0890
(-1.141) (-1.116)
L1.ALEVERAGE_A -0.0275 -0.0225
(-0.672) (-0.541)
FINLEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 0.7655*** 0.7656***
(2.694) (2.691)
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T -0.2341** -0.2364**
(-2.016) (-2.046)
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_A 0.1088* 0.1095*
(1.806) (1.813)
ADJLEVERAGE_T_target_L1_F1 0.9177** 0.9209**
(2.279) (2.292)
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_T -0.2114*** -0.2119***
(-2.723) (-2.723)
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_A 0.0332 0.0335
(0.585) (0.592)
L1.RISK_T 0.1039 0.0979 0.1352 0.1355 0.3836 0.3810
(0.523) (0.498) (0.724) (0.725) (1.628) (1.630)
-1.0853* -1.0969*
(-1.669) (-1.697)
-1.7342 -1.7460
(-1.452) (-1.461)
-1.0850* -1.0764*
(-1.762) (-1.752)
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T -0.0045 -0.0039 0.0329 0.0331 0.0332 0.0327
(-0.139) (-0.119) (1.395) (1.402) (0.979) (0.969)
-0.3470** -0.3458**
(-2.048) (-2.059)
0.1227 0.1214
(0.906) (0.901)
-0.3569*** -0.3549**
(-2.609) (-2.588)
Constant 0.0424 0.0396 -0.0100 -0.0099 0.0618 0.0610
(1.240) (1.171) (-0.294) (-0.289) (1.507) (1.483)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Capital structure variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 248 248 232 232 243 243
R² adjusted 0.2037 0.2104 0.2094 0.2087 0.2505 0.2504
Table 5 (cont.): Sensitivity analysis of the target's change in leverage around the M&A
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
L1.ALEVERAGE_T x L1.RISK_T
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T x 
L1.RISK_T
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_T x 
L1.RISK_T
L1.ALEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
Panel B: Financial acquirers
The dependent variables are the changes in the target's leverage rat ios from the year before to one year after the M&A completion 
year. Financial acquirers have SIC code 600 to 699. The standard errors are based on the Huber & White sandwich estimator
(Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The variables are summarized in table 3 and described in table G in the stat ist ical appendix.
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T x 
F1.ASSET_GROWTH_T
LEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 FINLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 ADJLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1
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If future growth is expected excess leverage is reduced to create financial slack to 
finance investments. Finally tax rate differences between the financial investor, 
rather its holding, and the target do not matter. 
 
6.5 Analysis of new subsidiaries’ convergence towards a leverage target 
 
The change of leverage before and after the M&A over time is shown in table 6. 
The difference between target companies’ total debt-to-assets ratio, adjusted net 
debt-to-assets ratio and financial debt-to-assets ratio less the estimated leverage 
targets are negative before the M&A completion year and decrease after the M&A. 
The abnormal adjusted net leverage is decreasing by 1.6 percentage point in the 3 
years after the M&A, with abnormal total and financial leverage decreasing even 
more. The on average underleveraged target companies become more 
underleveraged after the M&A. For comparison the acquirer’s financial debt-to-
assets ratio jumps up by 4 percentage points after the M&A, or relatively by 25%, 
and stays constant afterwards similar to (Ghosh & Jain, 2000) and (Harford, Klasa, 
& Walcott, 2009).  
During the financial crisis the statutory corporate tax rates on average fell, before 
and after the M&A. With falling tax rates the post-merger incentive to shift debt 
from the newly acquired subsidiary to the larger acquiring conglomerate company 
increases. Whether the decreasing tax incentives to shift debt affect the newly 
acquired subsidiaries’ post-merger change in leverage and convergence towards its 
capital structure target is analyzed in table 8. The variables used in the regression 
analysis are summarized in table 7. 
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t -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 T-test [-1 to 1] T-test [-3 to 3]
Panel A: Leverage Variables n 1,370 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,276 Diff p-value Diff p-value
LEVERAGE_T mean 0.6060 0.5965 0.5936 0.5820 0.5695 0.5647 0.5608 0.5579 0.5466 -0.0173 0.0000 -0.0386 0.0000
ADJLEVERAGE_T mean 0.4431 0.4346 0.4268 0.4152 0.4061 0.4181 0.4208 0.4265 0.4285 0.0029 0.3738 -0.0080 0.1767
FINLEVERAGE_T mean 0.1606 0.1618 0.1553 0.1523 0.1448 0.1445 0.1429 0.1449 0.1369 -0.0078 0.0073 -0.0169 0.0015
ALEVERAGE_T mean -0.0782 -0.0923 -0.1026 -0.1204 -0.1328 -0.1339 -0.1315 -0.1330 . -0.0135 0.0008 -0.0408 0.0000
AADJLEVERAGE_T mean -0.0850 -0.0959 -0.1078 -0.1287 -0.1381 -0.1258 -0.1191 -0.1122 . 0.0029 0.3597 -0.0163 0.1022
AFINLEVERAGE_T mean -0.0212 -0.0324 -0.0530 -0.0686 -0.0913 -0.1009 -0.1020 -0.1105 . -0.0322 0.0000 -0.0781 0.0000
Panel B: Target Variables
SIZE_T mean 15.5846 15.7423 15.8799 16.0016 16.0692 16.1657 16.2033 16.1712 16.2408 0.1641 0.0000 0.4289 0.0000
TAR_T mean 0.2385 0.2433 0.2416 0.2364 0.2280 0.2315 0.2280 0.2251 0.2275 -0.0049 0.0348 -0.0182 0.0000
CASH_T mean 0.1399 0.1324 0.1294 0.1327 0.1352 0.1161 0.1096 0.1057 0.1042 -0.0166 0.0000 -0.0267 0.0000
ROA_T mean 0.0803 0.0888 0.0934 0.0991 0.0882 0.0842 0.0741 0.0646 0.0614 -0.0149 0.0000 -0.0242 0.0000
RnD_T mean 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0008 0.0013 0.0015 0.0011 0.0013 0.0010 0.0006 0.0200 0.0006 0.0193
EQUITYRATIO_T_A mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 327.9414 321.6827 277.5401 307.1381 273.6794 -6.2587 0.4485 -20.8033 0.3489
ASSET_GROWTH_T mean 0.0000 0.1109 0.1376 0.1218 0.0676 0.0965 0.0376 -0.0321 -0.0161 -0.0253 0.0257 -0.1430 0.0000
Panel C: Acquirer Variables
LEVERAGE_A mean 0.6029 0.6005 0.5955 0.5910 0.6076 0.6099 0.6058 0.6045 0.6025 0.0189 0.0000 0.0040 0.1950
ADJLEVERAGE_A mean 0.4698 0.4741 0.4639 0.4596 0.4920 0.4993 0.4970 0.4991 0.4975 0.0398 0.0000 0.0251 0.0000
FINLEVERAGE_A mean 0.1986 0.2020 0.1970 0.2024 0.2309 0.2405 0.2426 0.2459 0.2435 0.0381 0.0000 0.0439 0.0000
FININV_RATIO_A mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0123 0.0123 0.0125 0.0125 0.0121 0.0001 0.2942 0.0003 0.0515
Panel D: Post-Merger Tax Variables
STR_T mean 0.3287 0.3205 0.3151 0.3110 0.3048 0.2994 0.2945 0.2912 0.2908 -0.0116 0.0000 -0.0293 0.0000
STR_A mean 0.3306 0.3223 0.3183 0.3157 0.3101 0.3052 0.3006 0.2975 0.2973 -0.0105 0.0000 -0.0249 0.0000
TAXDIFF_T_A mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0054 -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.0065 -0.0005 0.0163 -0.0009 0.0569
Table 6: Differences of variables before and after the M&A
Table 6 shows the time series of variables before and after the M&A. T he values are the variables' means in the respective time period. The t-tests and p-values show the differences of the
variables before and after the M&A. The variables are summarized in table 3 and the definitions are shown in table G in the stat istical appendix.
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n -1 0 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 3
ALEVERAGE_T_0_F. 1,844 -0.0011 0.0013 0.0082
AFINLEVERAGE_T_0_F. 1,712 -0.0096 -0.0132 -0.0145
AADJLEVERAGE_T_0_F. 1,817 0.0123 0.0192 0.0337
n -1 0 0 to 1/F1 0 to 2/F2 0 to 3/F3
TAXDIFF_T_A_F. 1,844 -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0063
TAR_T_0_F. 1,844 0.0035 -0.0001 -0.0029
CASH_T_0_F. 1,844 -0.0191 -0.0256 -0.0295
ROA_T_0_F. 1,844 -0.0040 -0.0141 -0.0236
RnD_T_0_F. 1,844 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000
EQUITYRATIO_T_A 1,844 0.5779
INDEPENDENT 1,844 0.5765
HIGHTECH_T 1,844 0.0211
SENSITIVE_INDUSTRY_T 1,844 0.1258
INFLATION_T 1,844 0.0303
DIFF_IND 1,844 0.5472
FININV_RATIO_A 1,844 0.0123
CROSSBORDER 1,844 0.3238
LEVERAGE_T 1,842 0.5820
LEVERAGE_T_target 1,842 0.7025
ALEVERAGE_T 1,842 -0.1204
Table 7: Changes in Variables after the Merger or Acquisition
Panel A: Dependent abnormal leverage changes
The variables are summarized in tables 3 and 6 and described in table G in the statistical appendix. The
change from t=0 to t=3 is not available for all M&As, because the panel is unbalanced with data in t=4 to
calculate the leverage target at t=3 missing for some M&As. t=0 is the M&A completion year. The values
of TAXDIFF_T_A are shown at F1, F2 and F3.
Panel B: Target variables changes
 
The distinction between the three leverage definitions shows that the abnormal 
total debt-to-assets ratio and abnormal adjusted net debt-to-assets ratio are 
increasing after the M&A whereas the abnormal financial debt-to-assets ratio is 
decreasing. From the univariate statistics in tables 6 and 7 the conclusion can be 
drawn that in the new subsidiary and the acquiring conglomerate a debt 
substitution effect occurs in which trade credit is increasing while interest bearing 
debt is decreasing. This substitution effect is likely to be caused by internal debt 
shifting. The internal debt appears as a form trade credit from the parent company 
going through the accounts payable and receivable of the subsidiary and parent. 
The new subsidiaries’ debt capacity appears to decrease in the post-merger period 
as well, because tangible assets and profitability are falling together with cash 
whereas the tax incentive to shift debt to the target is decreasing, too. 
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Nevertheless, the post-merger changes of new subsidiaries’ leverage deviation 
show in table 8 that a one standard deviation of the pre-merger leverage deviation, 
or abnormal leverage, is reversed by 26.57% until the third year after the M&A 
completion year. Similar empirical observations of 25.50% and 24.89% of the 
revision of deviations from the financial and adjusted net debt targets are made. 
The acquired companies’ pre-merger underleverage is reversed, thus reduced in 
terms of increasing leverage compared to the leverage target.  
The revision of pre-merger underleverage is accompanied by the positive influence 
that the acquirer’s pre-merger leverage deviation has up to the third year after the 
merger. The economic effect of a one standard deviation increase of the acquirer’s 
pre-merger leverage deviation on the target’s change in its leverage deviation up to 
the third year is 0.0751 0.2086 0.0157× = or 1.57 percentage points, which is a 
relatively large effect compared to an average change of the leverage deviation of 
0.82 percentage points. The economic effects of the acquirer’s pre-merger 
deviations in his financial and adjusted net leverage are comparable. 
Besides the direct debt shifting effects of pre-merger deviations from leverage 
targets the post-merger anticipated tax rate difference in the first through third year 
has a significant positive effect on the change of new subsidiaries’ leverage 
deviation regarding their total debt-to-assets ratio only. Tax-related debt shifting 
affecting the post-merger leverage deviation occurs through the use of internal 
trade credit, because financial and adjusted net debt do not include trade credit 
denoted as accounts payable to creditors. The economic effect of a one standard 
deviation increase in the tax rate difference in the third year is a 
0.2346 0.0486 0.0114× =  or 1.14 percentage points greater change in the leverage 
deviation, which is given an average increase of 0.0082 or 0.82 percentage points 
an economic large effect.  
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Panel A: Abnormal leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 3 0 to 1 0 to 3 0 to 1 0 to 3
F1.STR_A -0.1881***
(-2.780)
F1.STR_T 0.1596**
(2.129)
TAXDIFF_T_A_F. 0.1925** 0.2346** 0.0478 0.0726 0.1418 0.1472
(2.407) (1.983) (0.724) (0.701) (1.344) (0.943)
L1.ALEVERAGE_T -0.1156*** -0.1898*** -0.2657***
(-7.123) (-10.158) (-10.658)
L1.ALEVERAGE_A 0.0421** 0.0381* 0.0751***
(2.524) (1.880) (2.710)
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_T -0.1603*** -0.2550***
(-7.503) (-7.614)
L1.AFINLEVERAGE_A 0.0782*** 0.1042***
(4.480) (3.851)
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_T -0.1305*** -0.2489***
(-7.220) (-10.023)
L1.AADJLEVERAGE_A 0.0514*** 0.0478*
(2.624) (1.743)
Constant 0.0081 -0.0041 -0.0092 -0.0150* -0.0102 -0.0099 -0.0127
(0.341) (-0.392) (-0.614) (-1.845) (-0.741) (-0.818) (-0.649)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Capital structure variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,844 1,844 1,272 1,684 1,147 1,813 1,243
F-statistic 8.23 25.23 14.70 11.04 10.83 12.95 16.16
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.0852 0.1420 0.1442 0.0785 0.1241 0.1546 0.2018
Root MSE 0.1257 0.1585 0.1851 0.1133 0.1473 0.1880 0.2389
Table 8: New subsidiaries' post-merger changes in abnormal leverage
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variable is the change in abnormal leverage from t=0 to t=1, 2, and 3 after the M&A completion year. The tax difference
TAXDIFF_T_A at t=1, 2 and 3 is used in the regressions with the control variables at t=0. T he standard errors of the pooled OLS
regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). T he variables are
summarized in table 6 and 7 and described in table G in the statistical appendix. 
ALEVERAGE_T_0_F. AFINLEVERAGE_T_0_F. AADJLEVERAGE_T_0_F.
 
The analysis of new subsidiaries’ conversion towards the anticipated leverage 
target shown in table 9 provides the same empirical observations. The leverage 
deviation, or abnormal leverage, is replaced by its components of leverage itself 
and the regression based expected leverage target. High pre-merger leverage is 
reversed in the post-merger period similar to abnormal leverage. The expected 
target leverage has a significant positive effect on leverage, less on financial 
leverage and no effect on adjusted net debt at all. Hence subsidiaries adjust their 
total debt-to-assets ratio towards an anticipated total debt target. 
225 
 
Panel B: Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 3 0 to 1 0 to 3 0 to 1 0 to 3
TAXDIFF_T_A_F. 0.1904*** 0.2082** 0.2634** 0.0643 0.1164 0.1532 0.1973
(2.919) (2.565) (2.196) (0.969) (1.145) (1.441) (1.246)
L1.LEVERAGE_T -0.1235*** -0.2015*** -0.2730***
(-7.403) (-10.373) (-10.356)
L1.LEVERAGE_A 0.0268 0.0083 0.0477*
(1.611) (0.409) (1.690)
F.LEVERAGE_T_target 0.1150*** 0.1551*** 0.2634**
(2.944) (3.078) (2.196)
L1.FINLEVERAGE_T -0.1719*** -0.2783***
(-7.472) (-7.974)
L1.FINLEVERAGE_A 0.0418** 0.0630**
(2.362) (2.281)
F.FINLEVERAGE_T_target 0.0629*** 0.0991***
(2.740) (2.754)
L1.ADJLEVERAGE_T -0.1446*** -0.2650***
(-7.652) (-10.533)
L1.ADJLEVERAGE_A 0.0373* -0.0007
(1.893) (-0.024)
F.ADJLEVERAGE_T_target 0.0093 0.0117
(0.293) (0.230)
Constant -0.0307 -0.0027 -0.0008 -0.0019 0.0006 0.0461** 0.1094***
(-0.984) (-0.065) (-0.014) (-0.227) (0.041) (1.962) (2.857)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Capital structure variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,844 1,844 1,272 1,684 1,147 1,813 1,243
F-statistic 9.27 22.75 13.91 6.55 7.87 12.28 18.86
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.0862 0.1305 0.1316 0.0702 0.1156 0.1525 0.2236
Root MSE 0.1300 0.1634 0.1885 0.1166 0.1506 0.1899 0.2365
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The dependent variable is the change in leverage from t=0 to t=1, 2, and 3 after the M&A completion year. The tax difference
TAXDIFF_T_A and leverage targets at t=1, 2 and 3 are used in the regressions with the control variables at t=0. The standard errors of the
pooled OLS regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). The
variables are summarized in table 6 and 7 and described in table G in the statistical appendix. 
Table 9: New subsidiaries' post-merger convergence towards target leverage 
LEVERAGE_T_0_F. FINLEVERAGE_T_0_F. ADJLEVERAGE_T_0_F.
 
Similar to the empirical observations in table 8 a standard deviation higher 
expected target total debt-to-assets ratio is incorporated into subsidiary’s leverage 
by 26.34% until the third year. The conversion towards target leverage is half as 
fast as observed for acquirers by (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009). The slower 
conversion towards the anticipated leverage target is caused by debt shifting of 
acquirer’s excess debt to the new subsidiary and tax-related debt shifting through 
internal trade credit. The positive effect of acquirers’ pre-merger financial leverage 
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nevertheless remains if his financial leverage deviation is replaced by financial 
leverage.  
Distinguishing between pre-merger underleveraged and overleveraged taken over 
companies the differences in tax rates and acquirers’ pre-merger leverage deviation 
have a significant positive effect only for underleveraged new subsidiaries with 
spare debt capacity, which is shown in table 10. Underleveraged new subsidiaries 
can carry more debt to exploit a comparative tax advantage that is used by the 
acquirer to shift a part of the financial debt used for financing the takeover to the 
new subsidiary in the form of trade credit. For ex-ante overleveraged targets their 
debt-to-assets ratio can be adjusted downwards only, such that a comparative tax 
advantage to shift debt to them does not matter. The differences in size, as a 
general proxy for debt capacity differences according to the trade-off theory, 
matters mostly for underleveraged new subsidiaries (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; 
Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973).  
The negative effect of a pre-merger leverage deviation for newly acquired 
subsidiaries holds for underleveraged companies as well. This confirms the prior 
observation that pre-merger underleverage is reversed in terms of leveraging up the 
new subsidiary. This effect of increasing subsidiaries’ leverage occurs through 
holdings if the companies are taken over by financial investors. The previously 
observed effect of shifting debt in the form of trade credit through the holding to 
the new subsidiary during the M&A completion year is reversed in the third year 
after the M&A. The more assets the financial acquirer has invested into the 
subsidiary compared to his total assets the faster does the investor reduce 
subsidiary’s total debt.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 3 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 3
TAXDIFF_T_A_F. 0.2490*** 0.2103** 0.2403* 0.2477*** 0.2130** 0.2354*
(3.253) (2.180) (1.763) (3.223) (2.196) (1.724)
SIZEDIFF_T_A_0_F. 0.0307** 0.0346*** 0.0395***
(2.523) (3.385) (3.822)
L1.ALEVERAGE_T -0.1380*** -0.1939*** -0.2287*** -0.1418*** -0.2003*** -0.2368***
(-5.323) (-6.693) (-5.851) (-5.494) (-6.970) (-6.106)
L1.ALEVERAGE_A 0.0531** 0.0580** 0.0925*** 0.0552** 0.0596** 0.0932***
(2.369) (2.306) (2.708) (2.502) (2.420) (2.781)
ROA_T_0_F. -0.0769** -0.1605*** -0.1327*** -0.0795** -0.1677*** -0.1380***
(-2.227) (-5.202) (-3.235) (-2.326) (-5.489) (-3.404)
CASH_T_0_F. -0.1115** -0.1334*** -0.1378*** -0.1084** -0.1297*** -0.1377***
(-2.435) (-3.595) (-3.124) (-2.434) (-3.622) (-3.249)
TAR_T_0_F. -0.0293 -0.0080 0.0899* -0.0266 -0.0114 0.0888*
(-0.566) (-0.160) (1.757) (-0.518) (-0.229) (1.797)
RnD_T_0_F. -0.0339 1.7925*** 1.3597*** 0.0635 1.8333*** 1.4393***
(-0.040) (13.749) (2.593) (0.075) (12.750) (2.673)
EQUITYRATIO_T_A 0.0018 0.0010 -0.0002 0.0030* 0.0023 0.0012
(1.232) (0.713) (-0.149) (1.710) (1.361) (0.615)
INDEPENDENT -0.0055 -0.0031 0.0062 -0.0054 -0.0024 0.0068
(-0.750) (-0.340) (0.473) (-0.734) (-0.262) (0.529)
INFLATION_T 0.0224 -0.1069 0.1647 0.0135 -0.1101 0.1294
(0.150) (-0.628) (0.626) (0.092) (-0.649) (0.504)
PRIVATE_T -0.0088 -0.0097 -0.0029 -0.0066 -0.0082 -0.0026
(-1.160) (-1.071) (-0.225) (-0.876) (-0.904) (-0.203)
FININV_RATIO_A -0.0321 -0.0298 -0.0908* -0.0378* -0.0463* -0.1144**
(-1.518) (-1.197) (-1.789) (-1.794) (-1.898) (-2.327)
DIFF_IND 0.0096 0.0123 0.0238* 0.0083 0.0109 0.0223*
(1.287) (1.323) (1.836) (1.130) (1.188) (1.737)
CROSSBORDER -0.0084 0.0014 -0.0045 -0.0100 -0.0010 -0.0047
(-1.124) (0.142) (-0.314) (-1.355) (-0.107) (-0.337)
Constant -0.0089 -0.0125 -0.0203 -0.0086 -0.0118 -0.0192
(-0.808) (-0.884) (-1.032) (-0.782) (-0.837) (-0.988)
N 1,229 1,229 865 1,229 1,229 865
F-statistic 4.57 21.57 5.51 4.53 17.91 6.24
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.1297 0.1582 0.1852 0.1289 0.1569 0.1832
Root MSE 0.0627 0.1051 0.0979 0.0741 0.1204 0.1171
The dependent variable is the change in abnormal leverage from t=0 to t=1, 2, and 3 after the M&A completion year.
The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967;
White, 1980). Overleveraged targets are those with L1.ALEVERAGE_T>=0. Underleveraged targets are those with
L1.ALEVERAGE_T<0. SIZEDIFF_T_A is the difference in the natural logarithm of total assets between the target and
acquirer. The variables are summarized in table 6 and 7 and described in table G in the statist ical appendix.
Table 10: Subsample analysis of post-merger changes in abnormal leverage of new subsidiaries
ALEVERAGE_T
Panel A: Underleveraged
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
228 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 3 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 3
TAXDIFF_T_A_F. -0.0188 0.1005 0.3035 -0.0048 0.1153 0.3071
(-0.184) (0.654) (1.142) (-0.046) (0.745) (1.157)
SIZEDIFF_T_A_0_F. 0.0383** 0.0257* 0.0218
(2.360) (1.671) (1.341)
L1.ALEVERAGE_T -0.1118* -0.0802 -0.1776 -0.1196* -0.0956 -0.1957*
(-1.774) (-1.015) (-1.572) (-1.892) (-1.209) (-1.742)
L1.ALEVERAGE_A 0.0263 -0.0052 0.0412 0.0311 -0.0045 0.0449
(1.168) (-0.156) (0.890) (1.417) (-0.135) (0.988)
ROA_T_0_F. -0.2039*** -0.2940*** -0.2198*** -0.2137*** -0.2992*** -0.2198***
(-4.873) (-6.773) (-3.244) (-5.557) (-7.011) (-3.244)
CASH_T_0_F. -0.1121* -0.0685 -0.1574** -0.0911* -0.0536 -0.1574**
(-1.877) (-1.058) (-2.287) (-1.919) (-0.958) (-2.287)
TAR_T_0_F. -0.1706* -0.1346 -0.1126 -0.1463 -0.1038 -0.1126
(-1.907) (-1.446) (-1.026) (-1.378) (-1.003) (-1.026)
RnD_T_0_F. 0.5313* -0.3076 10.2947 0.5149* -0.2486 10.2947
(1.666) (-0.218) (1.322) (1.691) (-0.183) (1.322)
EQUITYRATIO_T_A 0.0004 0.0004 0.0036 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0042
(0.209) (0.122) (1.238) (-0.052) (0.098) (1.446)
INDEPENDENT 0.0084 0.0074 0.0247 0.0075 0.0069 0.0231
(0.820) (0.550) (1.334) (0.737) (0.517) (1.247)
INFLATION_T -0.0423 -0.3556 -1.2140** 0.0869 -0.2918 -1.1997*
(-0.154) (-0.840) (-1.966) (0.307) (-0.673) (-1.939)
PRIVATE_T -0.0196* -0.0208 -0.0430** -0.0167 -0.0181 -0.0398**
(-1.760) (-1.432) (-2.128) (-1.529) (-1.263) (-1.991)
FININV_RATIO_A 0.0108 -0.0763 -0.0567 0.0196 -0.0665 -0.0529
(0.526) (-1.519) (-0.553) (0.921) (-1.297) (-0.544)
DIFF_IND -0.0063 -0.0291** -0.0325* -0.0072 -0.0289** -0.0311*
(-0.699) (-2.353) (-1.828) (-0.814) (-2.347) (-1.739)
CROSSBORDER -0.0130 -0.0220 -0.0158 -0.0151 -0.0233* -0.0169
(-1.128) (-1.583) (-0.865) (-1.280) (-1.654) (-0.917)
Constant 0.0074 0.0025 0.0263 0.0055 0.0020 0.0273
(0.594) (0.119) (0.917) (0.441) (0.096) (0.944)
N 615 615 407 615 615 407
F-statistic 3.20 4.75 4.11 4.73 4.97 4.03
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R² adjusted 0.1029 0.1241 0.1140 0.1286 0.1329 0.1195
Root MSE 0.1158 0.1571 0.1812 0.1142 0.1563 0.1806
The dependent variable is the change in abnormal leverage from t=0 to t=1, 2, and 3 after the M&A completion year.
The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967;
White, 1980). Overleveraged targets are those with L1.ALEVERAGE_T>=0. Underleveraged targets are those with
L1.ALEVERAGE_T<0. SIZEDIFF_T_A is the difference in the natural logarithm of total assets between the target and
acquirer. The variables are summarized in table 6 and 7 and described in table G in the statist ical appendix.
Table 10 (cont.): Subsample analysis of post-merger changes in abnormal leverage of new subsidiaries
ALEVERAGE_T
Panel B: Overleveraged
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 
A new subsidiary experiences a reduction of its total debt by 9.08% to 11.44% of a 
standard deviation larger total assets ratio in comparison to the financial acquirer in 
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the third year after the merger. This reduction of its total debt by the financial 
investor to reduce his share of assets invested into the new subsidiary occurs in 
addition to the effects of tax rate differences and adjustments of acquirer’s and 
subsidiary’s leverage deviations. None of these effects are observed for 
overleveraged new subsidiaries. 
 
6.6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The analyses of the changes in leverage of the newly acquired subsidiary around 
the M&A and in the post-merger period show that the convergence towards a 
target capital structure are determined by changes in the subsidiary’s debt capacity 
with respect to its profitability, cash, tangible assets, R&D as well as size relative 
to the acquiring conglomerate of which it becomes a part. Not only does the 
subsidiary’s debt capacity itself determine its debt changes, because the acquirer’s 
pre-merger leverage deviation, particular in financial leverage used to finance the 
acquisition, influence the subsidiary’s leverage changes, too. If the new subsidiary 
is initially underleveraged the acquirer shifts a part of his excess debt onto it. This 
aspect of the acquired target company’s spare debt capacity being available to 
carry a part of the excess debt of the acquirer complements the empirical 
observations of the acquirers post-merger leverage changes made by (Ghosh & 
Jain, 2000), (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) and (Uysal, 2011).  
Furthermore, the incentive to shift debt caused by differences in the acquirer’s and 
new subsidiary’s corporate tax rates holds only for underleveraged subsidiaries 
with spare debt capacity to exploit a comparative tax advantage of debt. 
Overleveraged targets cannot exploit the tax advantage as for them debt reduction 
to reduce the costs of excess leverage is more important (Graham & Harvey, 
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2001). Finally besides the tax rates the use of holdings by financial investors first is 
associated with an increase of 4.52% in the new subsidiary’s debt-to-assets ratio in 
the M&A completion year with the increase being reversed in the third year post-
merger. Financial investors acquirer underleveraged companies, because they can 
leverage these companies up with financial debt used to finance the acquisition 
shifted to them through the holding as trade credit. Controlling for the acquirer’s 
pre-merger leverage deviation as well as for tax-related effects such as the use of 
holdings therefore matters economically for the analysis of the target company’s 
convergence towards its target capital structure. This study of newly acquired 
subsidiaries’ convergence towards a leverage target influenced by taxes 
complements the former studies of (Ghosh & Jain, 2000), (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009) and (Uysal, 2011) who analyzed acquirer’s changes in leverage 
associated with mergers, the study of the previous chapter and (Huizinga, Laeven, 
& Nicodeme, 2008) who analyzed tax incentives to shift debt in established 
multinational conglomerates.  
 
7. Summary 
 
The five essays presented in the previous chapters show that the creation of value 
in M&As is improved by hiring bank as advisors with greater advisory experience 
in the target’s industry and stronger advisory relationships with the serial bidder, 
by extending the acquisition sequence to exploit investment opportunities, and by 
exploiting tax-related advantages of debt through capital structure adjustments. The 
first project comprising three essays shows that in the market for corporate control 
investment banks as advisors of acquirers are supporting value creation through 
skillful advice how to structure the transaction and the negotiation process to 
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minimize transaction and agency costs. The banks’ target industry expertise with 
access to information mitigates the information asymmetry. The approximation of 
banks’ advisory skills by their relative share of deals advised in an industry reveals 
the advantage of a competitive expertise for the bidder in terms of a higher equity 
gain. The same advantage of a relatively stronger advisory relationship with the 
bank, which has compared to other banks a competitive advantage in terms of 
better access to the bidder, on the creation of value is observed. 
The first and second essay show that the repeated loop of bank advisor hiring, 
retention, acquisition sequence continuation and accumulation of expertise and 
client relationship is beneficial for serial bidders and banks. From these two studies 
it follows that the mechanisms of the M&A advisory and corporate control markets 
are welfare increasing with investment banks as M&A advisors being better than 
expected given the most often mixed results of previous analyses. The two studies 
are therefore among the few besides (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003), (Golubov, 
Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012), (Sibilkov & McConnell, 2013), (Anand & Galetovic, 
2006) and (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994) that find positive economic effects. 
The positive economic effects are also dependent on the modeling of selection in 
the panel of acquisition sequences and bank advisors. The endogeneity caused by 
more reputable banks being selected or selecting themselves into larger and more 
complex transactions that have smaller announcement returns than smaller and less 
complex transactions advised by non-bulge-bracket banks or unadvised deals has 
to be considered. The endogeneity encountered and modeled with panel selection 
models taken from the econometrics and labor economics literature inspired the 
development of the Three-step Heckit estimator for panel data presented in chapter 
4. The estimator’s application to the panel revealed the statistical difficulties 
arising in the annual estimation of the bivariate probit model with selection and the 
preference for a pooled estimation of the bivariate selection models in a large 
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unbalanced panel. For future studies it is therefore advisable to use the pooled 
estimation with fixed effects of the bivariate probit model to calculate the inverse 
mills ratios. The inverse mills ratios are unique to each observation in each time 
period, even though the pooled bivariate selection models’ regression coefficients 
used for their computation are constant over time. The inverse mills ratios 
calculated from the pooled and annual estimates of the bivariate probit model with 
selection are very similar. A possible extension of double selection is endogenous 
switching between more than two alternatives regimes, for instance between 
unadvised, non-bulge-bracket banks or bulge-bracket banks, to analyze the 
hypothesis of alternative returns if another advisor type had been chosen. Multitier 
endogenous switching is subject of current research. 
The second study that comprises the two essays presented in chapters 5 and 6 
shows that in M&As value can be created as well by exploiting comparative tax 
advantages of debt. The tax-based trade-off theory is quite significant regarding the 
economic effects of tax rate differences interacted with comparative advantages in 
size, tangible assets and profitability. Within the enlarged conglomerate debt is 
shifted where its tax-shield is maximized. Financial investors exploit these 
comparative tax advantages in acquisitions as much as corporate acquirers do to 
distribute the financial debt used to finance the acquisition evenly.  
The comparative tax advantages can be exploited by the newly acquired subsidiary 
only if it is underleveraged compared to its benchmark, a regression based leverage 
target. The new subsidiary’s leverage changes during and after the M&A and 
convergence towards its target are influenced by tax rate differences. The 
convergence towards the leverage target is slower, because tax rate differences 
create a wedge between the target estimated without tax effects and the observed 
capital structure that incorporate comparative tax advantages. The analysis of 
financial investors using holdings shows that debt shifting towards the 
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underleveraged, and often loss-making, new subsidiary occurs during the M&A 
completion year and is quickly reversed in the post-merger years until the third 
year. The analysis of financial investors using holding companies however is 
challenging and requires further analysis. 
 
Econometric appendix 
 
E.1 Econometric appendix of chapter 2 
 
The two-step Heckit estimator is suggested as the easiest to apply selection model 
by (Li & Prabhala, 2007) and has recently been used by (Golubov, Petmezas, & 
Travlos, 2012). The binary selection dummy ADVISED is used in the first step 
selection regressions shown in table 5 panel A. For the dependent variables 
GOODADVICE and COMPLETED the binary selection model corresponding to 
the selection concept of (Heckman, 1976; 1979) is the bivariate probit model with 
selection explained by (Greene, 2008a; 2008b) and formalized first by (van de Ven 
& van Praag, 1981). Its likelihood function for the panel is 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2 E
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 , , , ,
n t n t N T
it it it UE it it U
i t i n t t i n t t
L z x z x zδ β δ ρ β δ ρ
= = = + = + = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= −Φ × Φ − − × Φ∏∏ ∏ ∏ ∏ ∏  
with correlation coefficient EUρ  between probit selection equation it it itd z uδ′= +  
and structural probit equation 
it it it
y x β ε′= +  with the bivariate normal cumulative 
probability function ( )2 E, ,it it Ux zβ δ ρ′ ′Φ  of bids 2 1,...,t t T= +  of serial acquirers 
2 1,...,n n N= +  affected by selection. The probabilities modeled and estimated are: 
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( ) ( )0it itP d z δ′= = Φ  
( ) ( )2 U1 0 , ,it it it it EP d y x zβ δ ρ′ ′= ∩ = = Φ − −  
( ) ( )2 U1 1 , ,it it it it EP d y x zβ δ ρ′ ′= ∩ = = Φ  
The insertion of an inverse mills ratio into 
it it it
y x β ε′= +  to control for selection in 
the structural probit regressions of GOODADVICE and COMPLETED is 
inappropriate and works only if the structural dependent variable is continuous like 
the cumulative abnormal returns CAR or RESOLSPEED (Greene, 2008b). The 
biprobit model with selection requires maximum likelihood estimation (Greene, 
2008a). To ensure commonality in the empirical analysis the (Heckman, 1976; 
1979) selection models and the bivariate probit models with selection are estimated 
as pooled models without fixed effects and the maximum likelihood procedure 
similar to (Lee, 1978).  
The (Heckman, 1976; 1979) selection models and its derivatives with binary 
selection indicator ADVISED are extended to cardinal selection models with 
Tobit-type selection indicator ADVISORCHOICE by viewing the selection model 
as one with a censored endogenous regressor similar to (Vella, 1998). The model 
is: 
(1) ;  1,..., , 1,...,
(2) ;  1,...,
it it it it
it it it
y x d i N t T
d z v i N
β θ ε
δ
′= + + = =
′= + =
 
The selection indicator 
it
d can be a dummy like ADVISED or a Tobit-type 
selection indicator like ADVISORCHOICE. Estimating (1) results in inconsistent 
estimates because of the correlation between 
it
d  and 
it
ε  caused by the nonzero 
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covariance 
vεσ . The estimation of (1) with itd  as selection indicator similar to 
(Nijman & Verbeek, 1992) and (Verbeek & Nijman, 1992) is not possible as well, 
because ADVISED and ADVISORCHOICE are positively correlated with the 
explanatory variables IEDT and ARSD, causing multicollinearity between β  and 
θ . The first procedure according to (Hausman, 1978) and (Heckman, 1978) to 
correct the correlation caused by selection is the projection of 
it
d  on 
it
z  to obtain 
residuals 
iˆt
v  that are inserted into (1) together with 
it
d  to obtain 
ˆ
it it it it i
y x d v cβ θ µ′= + + +  with 
i
c  usually being a fixed effect. The generalized 
probit residuals of selection equation (2) if 
it
d  is binary according to (Gourieroux, 
Monfort, Renault, & Trognon, 1987) and (Vella, 1998) are
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )2 2
ˆ ˆ
1
ˆ ˆ1
it it
v v
it it
v vit it
z z
d d
z z
ε ε
φ δ φ δσ σ
σ σδ δ
   ′ ′−
   × + − ×
   ′ ′Φ −Φ
   
. This is nothing else than the 
inverse mills ratio for the complete sample of the Two-step Heckit estimator 
explained in detail and used by (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). The 
(Heckman, 1976; 1979) selection correction is therefore a special case of the more 
general endogenous regressor model. Furthermore, the pooled Heckit estimator 
assumes strict exogeneity, the absence of fixed and random effects. Fixed effects 
estimation within the Two-step Heckit estimator for panel data is possible 
according to (Wooldridge, 1995), but cumbersome to implement with annual 
selection regressions and does not provide more insights than IV fixed effects 
panel regressions. 
The second selection correction procedure according to (Hausman, 1978) and 
(Heckman, 1978) is the projection of 
it
d  on 
it
z  to obtain ˆ
it
d  with 
it
z  serving as 
instruments. Then ˆ
it
d  replaces 
it
d  in (1) to obtain ˆ
it it it it
y x dβ θ ε′= + + . This 
procedure is more flexible, because 
it
d  can also be a Tobit-type selection indicator 
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like ADVISORCHOICE. The estimation of Tobit models to project 
it
d  on 
it
z  to 
obtain ˆ
it
d  is explained by (Amemiya, 1973; 1974) and (Tobin, 1958). The cardinal 
selection indicator ADVISORCHOICE is instrumented on the selection equations 
shown in table 5 panel B. 
The instrumental variables (IV) procedure furthermore allows the correction for 
fixed effects, too. The (Breusch & Pagan, 1980) LM test and (Hausman, 1978) 
specification tests confirm the existence of fixed effects in the estimation of the 
cumulative abnormal returns. However, mean differencing to control for fixed 
effects does not work if the dependent variables are discrete like GOODADVICE 
and COMPLETED (Chamberlain, 1980; 1982; Wooldridge, 2002d). The 
(Mundlak, 1978) version of the linear fixed effects assumption of (Chamberlain, 
1980) has the form 
i i i
c x aγ= +  with ( )2| ,i it i ac x N x γ σ≈  and ( )20,i aa N σ≈ , 
assuming bidder specific and time constant means 
i
x  of the explanatory variables 
it
x . The Chamberlain random effects probit panel estimator 
( )0it it i i ity x x aβ β γ ε′= + + + +  with (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects is a practical 
option for binary dependent variables GOODADVICE and COMPLETED 
(Chamberlain, 1980; Wooldridge, 2002d; 2002e). Adding the instrumented 
selection indicator ADVISORCHOICE the IV fixed effects probit panel 
regressions for GOODADVICE and COMPLETED have the form
( )0 ˆit it it i i ity x d x aβ β θ γ ε′= + + + + +  and are estimated with maximum likelihood. 
The IV fixed effects GLS regressions of the CARs and RESOLSPEED use mean 
differencing (Wooldridge, 2002b; 2002a).  
Finally the initial conditions problem of determining 0iy  and ic  for short panels 
with binary dependent variables GOODADVICE and COMPLETED has to be 
solved (Heckman, 1981; Wooldridge, 2002d). For these dependent variables’ 
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probit panel regressions it matters whether the start of bidders’ time series of 
takeover bids is exogenous or endogenously determined by an unobservable pre-
sample process. Therefore, the panel begins as early as possible in 1979 to start 
bidders’ acquisition sequence with their first available M&A. Data before 1979 is 
not available. The acquisition sequence is a stochastic process with attrition 
(Wooldridge, 2002e). The earliest available bid is defined as first bid of the 
acquisition sequence to fulfill the assumption of an exogenous start of the 
stochastic process as good as possible (Heckman, 1981). 
 
E.2 Econometric appendix of chapter 3 
 
The econometric models to analyze the extension of acquisition sequences and 
selection are taken from the econometrics and labor economics literature dealing 
with selection correction. The two-step Heckit estimator is the simplest selection 
model and used for instance by (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012) and 
recommended by (Li & Prabhala, 2007). The binary selection analysis with the 
dummy ADVISED is shown in table 5 with regression (2) serving as selection 
equation. For the dependent variables SUCCESSORBID and OLDADVISOR the 
bivariate probit model with selection explained by (Greene, 2008a; 2008b) and 
formalized by (van de Ven & van Praag, 1981) is comparable to the binary 
selection concept of (Heckman, 1976; 1979). The likelihood function for the panel 
with correlation coefficient 
UE
ρ , selection equation 
it it it
d z uδ′= + , structural 
equation 
it it it
y x β ε′= +  and bivariate cumulative probability function 
( )2 UE, ,it itx zβ δ ρ′ ′Φ  of bids 2 1,...,t t T= +  of serial bidders 2 1,...,n n N= +  affected 
by selection is: 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 U 2 UE
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 , , , ,
n t n t N T
it it it E it it
i t i n t t i n t t
L z x z x zδ β δ ρ β δ ρ
= = = + = + = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= −Φ × Φ − − × Φ∏∏ ∏ ∏ ∏ ∏
 
with probabilities 
( ) ( )0it itP d z δ′= = Φ  
( ) ( )2 U1 0 , ,it it it it EP d y x zβ δ ρ′ ′= ∩ = = Φ − −  
( ) ( )2 U1 1 , ,it it it it EP d y x zβ δ ρ′ ′= ∩ = = Φ  
The binary selection indicator ADVISED is extended to model ordered Tobit-type 
selection with the cardinal variable ADVISORCHOICE by considering it as a 
censored endogenous regressor similar to (Vella, 1998). The model is: 
(1) ;  1,..., , 1,...,
(2) ;  1,...,
it it it it
it it it
y x d i N t T
d z v i N
β θ ε
δ
′= + + = =
′= + =
 
The selection indicator 
it
d  is L1.ADVISORCHOICE. Estimating (1) with 
it
d  as 
selection indicator similar to (Nijman & Verbeek, 1992) and (Verbeek & Nijman, 
1992) is not possible, because of potential correlation between 
it
d  and 
it
ε  and of 
it
d with the explanatory variables IEDT and ARSD, causing multicollinearity 
between 
it
d  and 
it
x . It is shown for illustrative purposes anyway. 
The projection of 
it
d  on 
it
z  as instrumental variables to obtain ˆ
it
d  is the selection 
correction procedure suggested by (Hausman, 1978) and (Heckman, 1978). The 
estimate ˆ
it
d  of the lagged Tobit-type selection indicator L1.ADVISORCHOICE 
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replaces 
it
d  in (1) to obtain ˆ
it it it it
y x dβ θ ε′= + + . The estimation of tobit models to 
obtain ˆ
it
d  instrumented on 
it
z  is explained by (Amemiya, 1973; 1974) and (Tobin, 
1958). ADVISORCHOICE is instrumented on selection regression (4) shown in 
table 5. 
The instrumental variables (IV) procedure allows the inclusion of fixed effects. 
Mean differencing to control for fixed effects does not work, because the 
dependent variables OLDADVISOR and SUCCESSORBID are discrete 
(Chamberlain, 1980; 1982; Wooldridge, 2002d). The (Mundlak, 1978) version of 
the general linear fixed effects model of (Chamberlain, 1980) has the form 
i i i
c x aγ= +  with ( )2| ,i it i ac x N x γ σ≈  and ( )20,i aa N σ≈ , which are acquirer 
specific and time constant averages 
i
x  of the explanatory variables 
it
x . The 
Chamberlain random effects probit panel model ( )0it it i i ity x x aβ β γ ε′= + + + +  
with (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects is used to estimate the effects of banks’ 
expertise on OLDADVISOR and SUCCESSORBID (Chamberlain, 1980; 
Wooldridge, 2002d; 2002e). The intercept 0β  is suppressed because of collinearity 
with the independent variables, causing non-convergence of the Newton-Raphson 
algorithm of likelihood estimation31. Adding the instrumented selection indicator 
L1.ADVISORCHOICE the IV fixed effects probit panel regressions of 
OLDADVISOR and SUCCESSORBID have the form 
( )ˆit it it i i ity x d x aβ θ γ ε′= + + + + . 
To model the simultaneity between the retention of a familiar bank advisor with 
OLDADVISOR, the deal being advised with ADVISED, and the probability of a 
successor deal with SUCCESSORBID seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) 
                                                          
31 Depending on the literature references the (Mundlak, 1978) fixed effects are sometimes stated with a 
constant and sometimes without. The analysis is controlled for correlation between the constant and the 
fixed effects. The constant is excluded if it is highly correlated with the fixed effects. 
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bivariate simultaneous equation models are used. The model estimates all four 
possible combinations of probabilities of OLDADVISOR and ADVISED or 
OLDADVISOR and SUCCESSORBID. According to (Maddala, 1983a) and 
(Heckman, 1978) the SUR bivariate simultaneous equation model of 
OLDADVISOR and ADVISED or SUCCESSORBID and OLDADVISOR has the 
form: 
1 1
11 12
2 2
21 22
(3) ;  1,..., , 1,...,
(4) ;  1,..., , 1,...,
it it it it
it it it it
y x x i N t T
y x x u i N t T
β β ε
β β
′′= + + = =
′′= + + = =
 
The recursive bivariate simultaneous equation model of SUCCESSORBID and 
OLDAVISOR, with OLDADVISOR affecting SUCCESSORBID, has the form: 
1 1
11 12
2 2 1
21 22 23
(5) ;  1,..., , 1,...,
(6) ;  1,..., , 1,...,
it it it it
it it it it it
y x x i N t T
y x x y u i N t T
β β ε
β β β
′′= + + = =
′′= + + + = =
 
with the bivariate probabilities for both models of: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 221 1 , ,it it it it UEP y y y y ρ= ∩ = = Φ  
( ) ( )1 2 1 221 0 , ,it it it it UEP y y y y ρ= ∩ = = Φ − −  
( ) ( )1 2 1 220 1 , ,it it it it UEP y y y y ρ= ∩ = = Φ − −  
( ) ( )1 2 1 220 0 , ,it it it it UEP y y y y ρ= ∩ = = Φ − −  
The likelihood function for the panel with the four probabilities is: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1
3 3
2 2 3 3
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
, , , ,
                                  , , , ,
n t n t
it it UE it it UE
i t i n t t
n t N T
it it UE it it UE
i n t t i n t t
L y y y y
y y y y
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
= = = + = +
= + = + = + = +
= Φ × Φ − −
× Φ − − × Φ − −
∏∏ ∏ ∏
∏ ∏ ∏ ∏
 
After estimating the likelihood function the joint probability ( )1 21 1it itP y y= ∩ =  is 
calculated for the simultaneous observation of OLDADVISOR and ADVISED 
(Table 7 panel C) as well as OLDADVISOR and SUCCESSORBID (Table 9). 
The lagged selection indicator L1.ADVISORCHOICE is used, because it also 
solves the initial conditions problem. The instrumentation of ADVISORCHOICE 
on the first bid is meant to serve as initial conditions estimate, whether the bank 
hired in the first deal is retained and influences the successor bid probability. The 
initial conditions problem of determining 0iy  and ic  for panels is a concern, 
because the extension of acquisition sequences is a stochastic process with attrition 
(Heckman, 1981; Wooldridge, 2002e). For the estimation of acquisition sequence 
continuation it matters whether the beginning of bidders’ sequence of takeovers is 
endogenously determined by a pre-sample process or exogenous. The panel begins 
in 1979 to start as early as possible with bidders’ first available M&A. Data before 
1979 is not available. The earliest first bid is assumed to fulfill the assumption of 
an exogenous sequence beginning as good as possible (Heckman, 1981).  
 
E.3  Derivation of the limit of the bivariate inverse mills ratios for U 0ρ Ε →  
 
The proof is basically a simplification of the bivariate normal density function that 
converges to two univariate density functions whose integration gives two 
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univariate normal cumulative distribution functions (Greene, 2008d). Given is the 
bivariate normal cumulative distribution function ( )2 U, ,it itz xγ β ρ Ε′ ′Φ  = 
( ) ( )1 2 2 1 2 1 2Prob , , ,it it
z x
it it UEY z Y x d d
γ β
γ β φ δ δ ρ δ δ
′ ′
−∞ −∞
′ ′< < = ∫ ∫  with the bivariate 
normal probability density function  
( )
( )
2 1 2 1
2
2
2
2 2
2 1
, ,
1
exp 2
2 1
UE
UE
UE
u UE
it it
it it it ity y y y
u u
z x
x z x z
ε
ε ε
πσ σ ρ
φ γ β ρ
β µ γ µ β µ γ µ
ρ
σ σ σ σρ
                                  
−
′ ′ =
′ ′ ′ ′− − − −− + −
−
 
 (Greene, 2008c; 2008a). If the correlation 0uUE u
u
ε
ε
ε
σ
ρ σ
σ σ
= = =  the implication of 
1Y  and 2Y  being statistically independent is derived from the simplified bivariate 
normal density function, because  
( )
2 1
2 1
2 2
2
2 2
                         
2 2
   
1 1
, , exp
2 2
1 1 1 1
exp exp
2 2
y y
UE
y y
it it
it it
u u
it it
uu
x z
z x
x z
ε ε
εεπ π
β µ γ µ
φ γ β ρ
πσ σ σ σ
β µ γ µ
σ σσ σ
                      
      
   = ×   
      
      
′ ′− −−′ ′ = +
′ ′− −− −
( ) ( )                      it itx zφ β φ γ= ×′ ′
 
The product of two univariate normal density functions is used to derive the limit 
of the cumulative distribution function: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 U 2 1 2 1 2
0 0
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
lim , , lim , ,
                              
                              
it it
UE UE
it it it it
z x
it it UE
z x z x
it it
z x d d
d d d d
z x
γ β
ρ ρ
γ β γ β
γ β ρ φ δ δ ρ δ δ
φ δ φ δ δ δ φ δ δ φ δ δ
γ
′ ′
Ε −∞ −∞→ →
′ ′ ′ ′
−∞ −∞ −∞ −∞
′ ′Φ =
= × = ×
′ ′= Φ ×Φ
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
( )β
 
The bivariate inverse mills ratios converge to the univariate inverse mills ratios: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
U
2
U 1 11 3
0 0
2 U 1 1
1
lim lim
, ,UE UE
it it
it
it it it
it it
it it it it it
x z
z
z x z
z x x z zρ ρ
β ρ γ
φ γ
ρ φ γ β φ γ
λ λ
γ β ρ β γ γ
Ε
Ε
→ →
Ε
 ′ ′− ′ Φ
 − ′ ′ ′Φ = = = =
′ ′ ′ ′ ′Φ Φ Φ Φ
  
and for the second bivariate inverse mills ratio it follows:  
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
U
2
U2 4
0 0
2 U
1
lim lim
, ,UE UE
it it
it
it it it
it it
it it it it it
z x
x
x z x
z x x z xρ ρ
γ ρ β
φ β
ρ φ β γ φ β
λ λ
γ β ρ β γ β
Ε
Ε
→ →
Ε
 ′ ′− ′ Φ
 − ′ ′ ′Φ = = = =
′ ′ ′ ′ ′Φ Φ Φ Φ
  
q.e.d. 
 
E.4  Derivation of the correction terms if U 0ρ Ε ≠  
 
( ) ( )
1 2
UV V                                                
| , , | ,it it it it it it it it it it
it it
E v u z x E v u z xγ ε β γ ε β
ρ λ ρ λΕ
< <
= − −
′ ′ ′ ′> − > − = − −
 where 
( )
( )1 1 22
1
1
it UE
UE
P Pλ ρ
ρ
= −
−
 and ( )1 | ,it it it it itP E u u z xγ ε β= < <′ ′− −  and 
( )2 | ,it it it it itP E u z xε γ ε β= < <′ ′− −  so,  
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
U U
U2 2
U U
2 U1
2
U U
U U2 2
U U
2 U
1 1
, ,1
1
1 1
, ,
it it it it
it it
it it
it
UE
it it it it
it it
it it
x z z x
z x
z x
z x x z
x z
z x
β ρ γ γ ρ β
φ γ ρ φ β
ρ ρ
γ β ρ
λ
ρ γ ρ β β ρ γ
ρ φ β ρ φ γ
ρ ρ
γ β ρ
Ε Ε
Ε
Ε Ε
Ε
Ε Ε
Ε Ε
Ε Ε
Ε
    ′ ′ ′ ′− −   ′ ′− Φ − Φ
   − −   
′ ′Φ
=
−    ′ ′ ′ ′− −   ′ ′Φ + Φ
   − −   +
′ ′Φ

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
U
2
2
2
2 U
11
1
, ,1
it it
it
UE
UE
it itUE
x z
z
z x
β ρ γ
φ γ
ρ
ρ
γ β ρρ
Ε
Ε
  
′ ′−  ′ Φ   −  = − − ′ ′Φ−  
 
 
 
=
( )
( )
( )
U
2
2 U
1
, ,
it it
it
UE
it it
x z
z
z x
β ρ γ
φ γ
ρ
γ β ρ
Ε
Ε
 
′ ′− ′ Φ
  − −
′ ′Φ
. 
Similarly 
( )
( )
U
2
U2
2 U
1
, ,
it it
it
it
it it
z x
x
z x
γ ρ β
φ β
ρ
λ
γ β ρ
Ε
Ε
Ε
 ′ ′− ′ Φ
 − = −
′ ′Φ
. Thus 
( ) 1 2UV V| , ,it it it it it it itE v u z xγ ε β ρ λ ρ λΕ+′ ′> − > − = . The details are provided by 
(Maddala, 1983b; 1983c), (Rosenbaum, 1961) and (Arendt & Holm, 2006). 
 
E.5  The gradient vector, Hessian matrix, variance-covariance matrix and 
Huber & White sandwich estimator of the bivariate probit model with 
selection for panel data 
 
Beginning with the likelihood function  
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( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 UE 2 UE
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 , , , ,
n t n t N T
it it it it it
i t i n t t i n t t
L z x z x zγ β γ ρ β γ ρ
= = = + = + = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= −Φ × Φ − − × Φ∏∏ ∏ ∏ ∏ ∏  
Transforming it with the natural logarithm to  
( )( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
2 UE
1 1 1 1
2 UE
1 1
ln ln 1 ln , ,
                                                                               ln , ,
n t n t
it it it
i t i n t t
N T
it it
i n t t
L z x z
x z
γ β γ ρ
β γ ρ
= = = + = +
= + = +
′ ′ ′= −Φ + Φ − −
′ ′+ Φ
∑∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
The notation is simplifying to ( ) ( )itz γ γ′Φ = Φ , 
( ) ( )2 UE 2, , , ,it itx zβ γ ρ β γ ρ′ ′Φ − − = Φ − , ( ) ( )2 UE 2, , , ,it itx zβ γ ρ β γ ρ′ ′Φ = Φ . The first 
and second order derivatives of the univariate and bivariate normal cumulative 
distribution functions require integration of the single and double integrals of their 
probability density functions by the Leibniz rule, which is cumbersome (Zorich, 
2002). Therefore, the derivatives are given in general form. The first and second 
order derivatives of the probability distribution functions with respect to 
{ }, ,θ β γ ρ=  are denoted by ( ) ( )γ
γ
γ
γ
∂Φ
= Φ
∂
,
( ) ( )
2
γγγ γ
γ γ
∂ Φ
= Φ
∂ ∂
, 
( ) ( )2 2
, ,
, ,γ
β γ ρ
β γ ρ
γ
∂Φ −
= Φ −
∂
, 
( ) ( )
2
2
2
, ,
, ,γβ
β γ ρ
β γ ρ
γ β
∂ Φ
= Φ
∂ ∂
 and so on for all 
other first and second order derivatives. The log likelihood is 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
ln ln 1 ln , , ln , ,
n t n t N T
i t i n t t i n t t
L θ γ β γ ρ β γ ρ
= = = + = + = + = +
= −Φ + Φ − + Φ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
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The gradient vector of first derivatives is ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
ln
ln ln
ln
L
L L
G
L
θ
γ
θ θ
θ
θ β
θ
ρ
∂ 
 
∂ 
 ∂ ∂
 = =
∂ ∂ 
 ∂ 
 ∂ 
 with 
elements 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 12 2
ln , , , ,
1 , , , ,
n t n t N T
i t i n t t i n i t
L γ γ γθ γ β γ ρ β γ ρ
γ γ β γ ρ β γ ρ= = = + = + = + = +
∂ −Φ Φ − Φ
= + +
∂ −Φ Φ − Φ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 12 2
ln , , , ,
, , , ,
n t N T
i n t t i n i t
L β βθ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β β γ ρ β γ ρ= + = + = + = +
∂ Φ − Φ
= +
∂ Φ − Φ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , and 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 12 2
ln , , , ,
, , , ,
n t N T
i n t t i n i t
L ρ ρθ β γ ρ β γ ρ
ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ= + = + = + = +
∂ Φ − Φ
= +
∂ Φ − Φ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
The variance-covariance matrix is the inverse of the information matrix 
( ) ( )( ) 11 E Hθ θ −−Ι = −       . The Hessian matrix for  { }, ,θ β γ ρ=  has the form: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
ln ln ln
ln ln ln
ln ln ln
L L L
L L L
H
L L L
θ θ θ
γ γ γ β γ ρ
θ θ θ
θ
β γ β β β ρ
θ θ θ
ρ γ ρ β ρ ρ
 ∂ ∂ ∂
 
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂ ∂
 =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
∂ ∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 with the elements in the first row 
being 
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( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
22
2
1 1 1 1 2
2 2
2 2 2
1 12 2 2
ln , ,
1 1 , ,
, , , , , ,
               
, , , , , ,
n t n t
i t i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
γγ γ γγ
γ γγ γ
θ γ γ β γ ρ
γ γ γ γ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
= = = + = +
= + = +
 ∂ −Φ Φ Φ −
= + +  ∂ ∂ −Φ −Φ Φ − 
   Φ − Φ Φ
− + −      Φ − Φ Φ   
∑∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
, 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
γβ γ β
γβ γ β
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
γ β β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
∂ Φ − Φ − ×Φ −
= −
∂ ∂ Φ − Φ −
Φ Φ ×Φ
+ −
Φ Φ
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
, and 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
γρ γ ρ
γρ γ ρ
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
∂ Φ − Φ − ×Φ −
= −
∂ ∂ Φ − Φ −
Φ Φ ×Φ
+ −
Φ Φ
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
The elements of the second row are 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
βγ β γ
βγ β γ
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
∂ Φ − Φ − ×Φ −
= −
∂ ∂ Φ − Φ −
Φ Φ ×Φ
+ −
Φ Φ
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
, 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
22
2 2
1 1 2 2
2
2 2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
ββ β
ββ β
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β β β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
 ∂ Φ − Φ −
= −   ∂ ∂ Φ − Φ − 
 Φ Φ
+ −   Φ Φ 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
, and 
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
βρ β ρ
βρ β ρ
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
∂ Φ − Φ − ×Φ −
= −
∂ ∂ Φ − Φ −
Φ Φ ×Φ
+ −
Φ Φ
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
The elements of the third row are 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
ργ ρ γ
ργ ρ γ
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
ρ γ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
∂ Φ − Φ − ×Φ −
= −
∂ ∂ Φ − Φ −
Φ Φ ×Φ
+ −
Φ Φ
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
,  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
ρβ ρ β
ρβ ρ β
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
ρ β β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
∂ Φ − Φ − ×Φ −
= −
∂ ∂ Φ − Φ −
Φ Φ ×Φ
+ −
Φ Φ
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
, and 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
1 1
2 2
22
2 2
1 1 2 2
2
2 2
1 1 2 2
ln , , , ,
, , , ,
, , , ,
                 
, , , ,
n t
i n t t
N T
i n i t
L
ρρ ρ
ρρ ρ
θ β γ ρ β γ ρ
ρ ρ β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
= + = +
= + = +
 ∂ Φ − Φ −
= −   ∂ ∂ Φ − Φ − 
 Φ Φ
+ −  Φ Φ 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
Taking expectations the Hessian becomes ( ) ( )
2 ln L
E H E
θ
θ
θ θ
  ∂
=       ∂ ∂   
. Instead 
of expectations the sample estimates { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,θ β γ ρ=  are used to derive the observed 
information matrix (OIM) ( ) ( )
2 ˆln
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
L
H
θ
θ θ
θ θ
 ∂
  Ι = − = −   ∂ ∂
 
 with the variance-
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covariance matrix as the inverse of the observed information matrix 
( ) ( )
1
2
11
ˆln
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
L
H
θ
θ θ
θ θ
−
−−
 ∂
   Ι = − = −     ∂ ∂
 
. The OIM is more robust to potential 
heteroscedasticity than the expected Fisher information [ ] ( )( ) 11 E Hθ θ −−Ι = −     
according to (Efron & Hinkley, 1978). The elements on the diagonal are the 
variances of βˆ , γˆ  and ρˆ . The off-diagonal elements are the covariances of βˆ , γˆ  
and ρˆ . The likelihood function L  is estimated numerically with the hill-climbing 
Newton-Raphson algorithm that employs gradient ( )G θ  and Hessian matrix 
( )H θ  for the step function 
( ) ( )
1
2
1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆln ln
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆm m
m m m
L Lθ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ
−
−
− − −
  ∂ ∂  = − ×  ∂ ∂ ∂   
 for each step 
m  until θˆ  is found that fulfills the first order condition ( )ˆ 0G θ =  (Greene, 2008f). 
This algorithm is used in the empirical application to determine { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,s s s sθ β γ ρ=  
for each year s  and the pooled estimator { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,θ β γ ρ=  to calculate the inverse 
mills ratios.  
The derivatives of the probability density functions exist, because the bivariate 
normal probability density function ( )2 , ,φ β γ ρ  is continuous on the interval 
[ ],−∞ ∞  and twice differentiable with its bivariate normal cumulative distribution 
function ( )2 , ,β γ ρΦ   being continuous on the interval [ ]0,1  and twice 
differentiable as well. The same holds for the univariate normal probability density 
functions ( )φ γ  and ( )φ β  and their cumulative distribution functions ( )γΦ  and 
( )βΦ . Therefore, a solution in the form of an estimator { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,θ β γ ρ=  and/or 
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{ }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,t t t tθ β γ ρ=  for each period t  exists that fulfills the Cramer-Rao lower bound 
( ) ( )( )
1
ˆvar E Hθ θ
−
 ≥ −    for all other possible estimators 
ˆθ θ≠  or ˆt tθ θ≠ , such 
that { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,θ β γ ρ=  and { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,t t t tθ β γ ρ=  are efficient (Greene, 2008e). 
The Huber & White sandwich estimator of the variance-covariance matrix to 
obtain serial correlation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors has the form
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 11 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆvar G G H G G Hθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
− −− −′ ′        = Ι Ι = − −         
, 
which becomes with the above mentioned elements of the inverse of the observed 
information matrix and the gradient  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
1
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ln ln
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ln ln
ˆvar
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ln ln
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
L L L L
L L L L
L L L L
θ θ θ θ
γ γ γ ργ β γ
θ θ θ θ
θ
β γ β β β ρ β
θ θ θ θ
ρ γ ρ ρ ρρ β
−
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   − − −
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂
  
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  = − − −
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
− − −  
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂    
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ln
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ln ln ln ln
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ln
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ
L L L
L L L L L L
L L L
θ θ θ
γ γ γ ργ β
θ θ θ θ θ θ
γ ρβ β γ β β β ρ
θ θ θ
ρ γ ρ ρρ β
−









 ∂ ∂ ∂
 − − −
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂
 
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  × − − −
 ∂ ∂  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  
∂ ∂ ∂ 
− − − 
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ 
 
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As long as the Hessian matrix is of full rank its inverse exists, and therefore the 
observed information matrix and the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 
1967; White, 1980). In the empirical application the Huber & White sandwich 
estimator clustered by individuals i , in this case serial acquirers, is used in the 
estimation of the bivariate probit model with selection to determine the robust 
standard errors of { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,θ β γ ρ=  and { }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,s s s sθ β γ ρ= . 
 
E.6 The asymptotic variance of the pooled OLS estimator of the subsample 
affected by selection ( )2 1ity =  
 
Following the notation of (Wooldridge, 1995; 2002c) for each individual i  let 
( ){ }3 2 1, , , : 1,...,it it it itw y y y t T=  be a random draw from a population, where for  
( )2 11 1it ity y= ∩ =  one defines ( ) ( )( )2 3 41ˆ 1, ,..., , ,0,...,0, , ,0,...,0it it it iti t i Tw α α α λ λ+=  with 
dimension ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 3 3 2 21 1 T t K K T t T t× + − × + + − + − 32 and 3ity  is a scalar. The 
pair ( )3,it itw y  is observed only if the second step selection indicator 2 1ity =  is 
observed, such that ( )3 2 2| , 1it it it itE y w y w θ= = ×  [D.1] with 
                                                          
32 ( )2 31 T t K+ − × is the dimension of the general linear fixed effects operator without error terms (See 
Assumption 2b). 3K  are the elements of the regression coefficients 31 Kδ × , plus the 2 coefficients of the 
inverse mills ratios. In this general representation 2T t−  time period t  specific coefficients for each 
inverse mills ratio are assumed, if the bivariate probit model is estimated for each time period t  
separately with a coefficient for each period t  specific inverse mills ratio. The zeros are placeholders 
for the missing period specific 2, , 1,...,r t r t t T≠ = +  coefficients of the inverse mills ratios. If the 
coefficients of the inverse mills ratios are constant over time only 2 coefficients are given. 
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( ){ }322 11 , , ,K UV VT tθ ψ δ ρ ρ× Ε× −=  where 2θ  has dimension 
( ) ( ) ( )( )2 3 3 2 21 1 T t K K T t T t× + − × + + − + − . Writing D.1 in error form as 
( )3 2 * * 2,  | , 1 0it it it it it ity w v E v w yθ= × + = = , 2 1,...,t t T= +  the pooled OLS estimator 
with fixed effects and inverse mills ratios for the selected subsample is 
2 2 2 2
1
2 3
1 1 1 12
1ˆ
N T N T
it it it it
i n t t i n t t
w w w y
N n
θ
−
= + = + = + = +
   
′ ′= ×   
−    
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . The asymptotic variance 
( )2 22 0ˆN n θ θ− − is obtained with some elements of itw , namely the inverse mills 
ratios, estimated in the preliminary stage with the bivariate probit model, 
comparable to (Wooldridge, 1995), (Pagan, 1984) and (Newey, 1984).  
With the inverse mills ratios ( )itw θ  is a function of { }, , UEθ β γ ρ= , where θ  is a 
( )1 21 1K K× + +  vector of parameters estimated with the bivariate probit model. 
Let θˆ  be a N -asymptotically normal estimator of 0θ  with representation 
( ) ( ) ( )0
1
1ˆ 1
N
i p
i
N r o
N
θ θ θ
=
− = +∑  [D.2] where ( ) ( ) ( )1i ir H sθ θ θ−= −  is called 
the influence function representation of θ   (Wooldridge, 2002c). ( ) 1H θ −−  is the 
expected negative of the inverse Hessian matrix of the bivariate probit model, 
[ ]( )1E H θ −− , and ( )is θ  is the score, the transpose of gradient ( )G θ (See 
econometric appendix E.5). Evaluated at { }, , UEθ β γ ρ=  ( )ir θ  is a matrix of 
dimension ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 2 1 2 21 1 1T t T t K T t K− × + − × + + − × +  if selection equations 
[1] and [2] include fixed effects as in assumptions 2e and 2f that are themselves of 
dimension ( )2 1T t K− ×  for 2e and ( )2 2T t K− ×  for 2f, plus the multiplied 
derivatives with respect to 
UE
ρ  and stacked for 2 1,...,t t T= +  time series 
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observations for each individual i  affected by selection. ( )ir θ  is an . .i i d  sequence 
with ( )( ) 0iE r θ = , because in the maximum of the estimation of likelihood 
function ( )L θ  the gradient ( ) 0G θ = , and thus its score ( ) ( )is Gθ θ′=  as well.  
A simplifying assumption similar to (Wooldridge, 1995) is that 
( ) * 0it itE w vθ θ ′∇ =  
 where ( )itwθ θ∇  is the gradient of ( )itw θ  of structural 
equations [4] or [5] on the selected subsample 2 1ity = . The gradient is  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
1 2
it itit
UV EV
it it it it
it UV EV
it it it
UV EV
UE UE UE
w
w w
w
w
θ
λ θ λ θθ
ρ ρ
β ββ
θ θ λ θ λ θ
θ ρ ρ
θ γ γ γ
θ λ θ λ θ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
 ∂ ∂∂ 
+   ∂ ∂∂   
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  ∇ = = = +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
  ∂ ∂ ∂   +
  ∂ ∂ ∂   
 
The first order derivatives of the inverse mills ratios, with the simplified notation 
from econometric appendix E.3, are derived in their general form, because the 
inner and outer derivatives of the bivariate cumulative distribution function of two 
integrals shown in econometric appendix E.5 are cumbersome to derive by the 
Leibniz and chain rules (Zorich, 2002): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
2
2
1
22
it
θ θ
φ γ θ φ γ θ
λ θ β β
β θ
∂Φ ∂Φ
Φ − Φ
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ Φ
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
2
2
2
22
it
φ β θ θ
θ φ β θ φ β θ
β β βλ θ
β θ
∂ ∂Φ ∂Φ 
Φ + Φ − Φ 
∂ ∂ ∂∂  =
∂ Φ
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( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
2
2
1
22
it
φ γ θ θ
θ φ γ θ φ γ θ
γ γ γλ θ
γ θ
∂ ∂Φ ∂Φ 
Φ + Φ − Φ 
∂ ∂ ∂∂  =
∂ Φ
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
2
2
2
22
it
θ θ
φ β θ φ β θ
λ θ γ γ
γ θ
∂Φ ∂Φ
Φ − Φ
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ Φ
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
2
2
1
22
it UE UE
UE
θ θ
φ γ θ φ γ θ
λ θ ρ ρ
ρ θ
∂Φ ∂Φ
Φ − Φ
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ Φ
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
2
2
2
22
it UE UE
UE
θ θ
φ β θ φ β θ
λ θ ρ ρ
ρ θ
∂Φ ∂Φ
Φ − Φ
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ Φ
 
The first order derivatives of univariate inverse mills ratios ( )3itλ θ  and ( )4itλ θ  in 
the gradient similar to (Wooldridge, 1995) are  
( )3
0it
λ γ
β
∂
=
∂
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
4
2
it
φ β β
β φ β
λ β β β
β β
∂ ∂Φ
Φ −
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ Φ
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
3
2
it
φ γ γ
γ φ γ
λ γ γ γ
γ γ
∂ ∂Φ
Φ −
∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ Φ
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( )4
0it
λ β
γ
∂
=
∂
 
( ) ( )3 3
0it it
UE UE
λ γ λ β
ρ ρ
∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
 
The gradient ( )itwθ θ∇  with one of the univariate inverse mills ratios ( )3itλ γ  or 
( )4itλ β  is similar to the gradient calculated by (Wooldridge, 1995). If selection is 
insignificant the coefficients 
UV
ρ  and 
EV
ρ  are 0, such that ( ) 0itwθ θ∇ =  and the 
weighting matrix 0D =  [D.3]. With this assumption the estimation of the 
asymptotic variance becomes easier.  
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′= ∑  for 2 1,...,i n N= +  [D.4] (Wooldridge, 2002c). The 
gradient ( )ˆitwθ θ∇  is defined above. ( )ˆiˆ ir r θ=  are estimates of ir  and *itv  are the 
OLS residuals of structural equation [4] or [5]. The asymptotic variance 2θˆ  is 
estimated as ( )2 1 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆAvar N nθ − −= Α ΒΑ − . The asymptotic standard errors are the 
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square roots of the diagonal elements of the matrix. The final asymptotic variance 
is 
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The general formula of the two-step asymptotic variance is given by (Wooldridge, 
2002c). Together with the weighting matrix ( )ˆD θ  the influence function ( )ˆir θ  
determine the influence of the first step bivariate estimation of the inverse mills 
ratios on the asymptotic variance of the pooled OLS estimator. The influence of 
first step estimation of θˆ  by ( )ˆir θ  is weighted by 3 2ˆit ity w θ′=  in ( )ˆD θ , the 
simplest weight for OLS (Wooldridge, 2002c). If the coefficients of the inverse 
mills ratios are close to 0, also ( )ˆD θ  is close to 0 as ( )
, 0
ˆlim 0
UV EV
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wθρ ρ
θ
→
∇ = , which 
gives the variance estimator of regular pooled OLS. If ( )
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→
= , the 
estimate Βˆ  simplifies to 
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This gives with the asymptotic variance of the regular pooled OLS estimator 
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Statistical appendix 
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Number Financial Advisor / Investment 
Bank
Rank of total Deal 
Value
Total Deal Value in the 
Sample ($mil)
Total Number of 
Advised Deals
Average Annual SDC 
M&A League Table 
Rank
Average Annual SDC 
M&A League Table 
Market Share
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 1 7,542,979.00 4,472 2.61 27.04
2 Morgan Stanley & Co 2 4,493,730.00 2,917 3.90 22.81
3 Merrill Lynch 3 3,819,854.00 2,244 4.38 18.67
4 JP Morgan 4 2,450,899.00 1,362 10.26 14.37
5 Lehman Brothers 5 2,333,491.00 1,670 8.56 11.98
6 Salomon Smith Barney 6 1,753,543.00 778 9.21 14.23
7 Bear Stearns & Co Inc 7 1,745,598.00 1,495 12.41 6.31
8 Credit Suisse First Boston 8 1,601,761.00 1,213 12.08 9.02
9 Morgan Stanley 9 1,394,294.00 628 4.42 21.23
10 First Boston Corp 10 1,325,868.00 1,680 4.80 17.34
11 Salomon Brothers 11 1,316,876.00 1,441 4.48 14.24
12 Lazard Freres & Co LLC 12 1,269,542.00 983 8.21 10.47
13 Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette 13 1,121,381.00 1,694 15.47 4.65
14 Citigroup 14 981,919.40 497 3.79 20.95
15 Wasserstein Perella Group Inc 15 853,236.50 444 13.63 5.74
16 Banc of America Securities LLC 16 770,190.40 686 15.75 8.18
17 Lazard 17 659,317.10 398 13.76 9.53
18 Deutsche Bank AG 18 638,248.50 514 17.35 5.99
19 UBS Investment Bank 19 632,411.20 441 9.17 13.13
20 Dillon, Read & Co Inc 20 594,590.50 590 10.95 5.57
21 Drexel Burnham Lambert 21 594,360.80 903 11.32 9.12
22 Merrill Lynch Capital Markets 22 555,526.60 880 6.55 9.81
23 Shearson Lehman Hutton 23 518,539.70 701 7.26 12.46
24 Chase Manhattan Corp 24 497,187.60 194 18.08 5.85
25 Credit Suisse First Boston Int 25 470,537.30 350 18.73 4.95
The table includes the summary statistics of the Top-25 investment banks included in the annual SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables and SDC M&A sample A. The SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables from
1979 until 2006 include 395 different bank names with predecessors and subsidiaries. The investment banks are ranked by their total deal value of advised deals. The total deal value of the banks is
computed including the total deal value of their predecessors and subsidiaries. The deal values are adjusted for inflation based on the 2006 CPI deflator of the US Federal Reserve Bank.
Table A: Descriptive statistics of the Top-25 advisors
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Number Financial Advisor Average advisor 
relationship 
strength ARSD 
(number of deals)
Average advisor 
relationship 
strength ARSV 
(deal volume)
Average relative 
industry 
experience IEDT 
(deals)
Average relative 
industry 
experience IEVT 
(volume in $)
Average absolute 
industry 
experience AIEDT 
(deals)
Average absolute 
industry 
experience AIEVT 
(volume in $)
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 0.0501 0.0510 0.1308 0.2467 7.8805 15,900,000,000.00
2 Morgan Stanley & Co 0.0600 0.0607 0.1089 0.1905 5.8497 11,300,000,000.00
3 Merrill Lynch 0.0542 0.0558 0.0908 0.1426 5.8906 10,300,000,000.00
4 JP Morgan 0.0383 0.0382 0.0742 0.1111 4.6516 7,320,000,000.00
5 Lehman Brothers 0.0463 0.0470 0.1088 0.1507 5.4716 6,410,000,000.00
6 Salomon Smith Barney 0.0585 0.0591 0.1042 0.1553 5.9650 8,630,000,000.00
7 Bear Stearns & Co Inc 0.0448 0.0453 0.0532 0.0704 2.8762 4,360,000,000.00
8 Credit Suisse First Boston 0.0542 0.0554 0.1528 0.2268 9.4264 10,500,000,000.00
9 Morgan Stanley 0.0555 0.0559 0.1297 0.2184 7.1525 12,800,000,000.00
10 First Boston Corp 0.0523 0.0536 0.0698 0.1063 2.9464 3,080,000,000.00
11 Salomon Brothers 0.0363 0.0359 0.0544 0.0890 2.5045 3,020,000,000.00
12 Lazard Freres & Co LLC 0.0367 0.0370 0.0480 0.0848 1.9420 3,000,000,000.00
13 Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette 0.0418 0.0435 0.0444 0.0517 3.1585 2,670,000,000.00
14 Citigroup 0.0589 0.0593 0.1160 0.1736 6.6968 9,410,000,000.00
15 Wasserstein Perella Group Inc 0.0410 0.0410 0.0493 0.0799 2.1875 4,040,000,000.00
16 Banc of America Securities LLC 0.0350 0.0346 0.0219 0.0250 1.8312 1,320,000,000.00
17 Lazard 0.0453 0.0458 0.0561 0.0981 2.6341 4,820,000,000.00
18 Deutsche Bank AG 0.0384 0.0382 0.0519 0.0549 3.6535 2,300,000,000.00
19 UBS Investment Bank 0.0374 0.0374 0.0052 0.0099 0.3998 583,000,000.00
20 Dillon, Read & Co Inc 0.0307 0.0299 0.0305 0.0447 1.1599 1,070,000,000.00
21 Drexel Burnham Lambert 0.0508 0.0511 0.0354 0.0394 1.3649 993,000,000.00
22 Merrill Lynch Capital Markets 0.0171 0.0171 0.0415 0.0532 1.4621 1,210,000,000.00
23 Shearson Lehman Hutton 0.0283 0.0292 0.0509 0.0621 1.6086 1,510,000,000.00
24 Chase Manhattan Corp 0.0308 0.0311 0.0302 0.0318 2.0134 2,610,000,000.00
25 Credit Suisse First Boston Int 0.0073 0.0073 0.0106 0.0195 0.8636 1,280,000,000.00
Table A (cont.): Descriptive statistics of the Top-25 advisors
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Eff. Date Target Name Acquirer Name Successor Ultimate Successor 12/31/2006
1979 LaSalle National Bank (LNB) (1aab) Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN) (1aaa) ABN/LaSalle North America, Inc (1aa) ABN AMRO Bank NV (1)
1991 AMRO Bank (1ab) ABN/LaSalle North America, Inc (1aa) ABN AMRO (1a) ABN AMRO Bank NV (1)
03/01/1995 Barings Securities (1aab) ING (1aaa) ING Barings (1aa) ABN AMRO Bank NV (1)
08/10/1997 Furman Selz LLC (1ab) ING Barings (1aa) ING Barings Furman Selz (1a) ABN AMRO Bank NV (1)
04/03/2001 ING Baring - US Operations (1ab) ABN-AMRO Holding N.V. (1aa) ABN AMRO Holding N.V. (1a) ABN AMRO Bank NV (1)
12/22/1988 First Boston Corp (2ab) Credit Suisse (2aa) Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Credit Suisse First Boston (2)
03/21/1997 Volpe Brown Whelan & Co (2b) Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Credit Suisse First Boston (2)
11/12/1998 Barclays de Zoete Wedd Ltd (2b) Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Credit Suisse First Boston (2)
03/11/2000 Donaldson Lufkin & Jenerette (2b) Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Credit Suisse First Boston (2a) Credit Suisse First Boston (2)
1987 First Boston Inc. (3abb) Wasserstein Perella & Co (3aba) Wasserstein Perella & Co (3ab) Dresdner Kleinwort (3)
01/08/1995 Kleinwort Benson (3aab) Dresdner Securities (USA) Inc (3aaa) Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (3aa) Dresdner Kleinwort (3)
05/01/2001 Wasserstein Perella & Co (3ab) Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (3aa) Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein (3a) Dresdner Kleinwort (3)
01/06/2006 Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein (3a) Dresdner Kleinwort (3) Dresdner Kleinwort (3)
1981 Bache & Co (4aaab) Prudential Financial (4aaa) Prudential-Bache Securities (4aaa) Prudential Volpe (4)
1989 Thomson McKinnon Securities (4aab) Prudential-Bache Securities (4aaa) Prudential-Bache Securities (4aa) Prudential Volpe (4)
07/31/1999 Vector Securities Intl., Inc. (4ab) Prudential-Bache Securities (4aa) Prudential Securities Inc. (4a) Prudential Volpe (4)
12/31/1999 Volpe Brown Whelan & Co (4b) Prudential Securities Inc. (4a) Prudential Volpe (4) Prudential Volpe (4)
11/28/1997 Smith Barney Inc (5abab) Salomon Brothers (5abaa) Salomon Smith Barney (5aba) Citigroup (5)
08/10/1998 Travelers (5b) Citicorp (5a) Citigroup (5) Citigroup (5)
01/05/2000 Schroders-Worldwide Investment (5abb) Salomon Smith Barney (5aba) Salomon Smith Barney (5ab) Citigroup (5)
01/10/2003 Salomon Smith Barney (5ab) Citigoup Global Markets Inc (5aa) Citi Smith Barney (5a) Citigroup (5)
1986 Wertheim & Co (6bbab) J Henry Schroder & Co Ltd (6bbaa) Wertheim Schroder (6bba) Schroders plc (6)
1994 Wertheim & Co (6bbb) Wertheim Schroder (6bba) Schroder Wertheim & Co (6bb) Schroders plc (6)
1996 Schroder Wertheim & Co (6bb) Schroder & Co Inc (6ba) Schroder-Worldwide Investments (6b) Schroders plc (6)
2000 Schroder-Worldwide Investments (6b) Salomon Smith Barney (6ab) Schroders plc (6) Schroders plc (6)
Table B: Major bank mergers and name changes
The sample of 395 banks with 201 ultimate successors is taken from the SDC Top-50 M&A League T ables from 1979 to 2006. The adjustments for acquisitions, mergers, split-offs or name changes are
first taken from the bank samples of (Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013), (Corwin & Schultz, 2005) and (Ljungqvist, Marston, & Wilhelm, 2006). Further information for banks in the league tables
but missing in these samples are obtained from trade journals and business news papers (BusinessWeek, NewYork Times, WallStreet Journal, etc.) in LexisNexis, Factiva and the banks' websides and
annual reports. The methodology to track name changes and bank mergers is similar to (Ljungqvist, Marston, & Wilhelm, 2006). The assumption concerning the effective date is that given the year
only the effective date is the first of January of the respective year. The letters refer with b to the target or predecessor that is acquired, split-off or renamed to the successor marked with an a. A name
change or split-off is indicated by a missing acquirer and a changed name of the successor.
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Eff. Date Target Name Acquirer Name Successor Ultimate Successor 12/31/2006
1983 Rotan Mosle Inc (7baab) PaineWebber (7baaa) PaineWebber (7baa) UBS (7)
01/31/1995 Kidder Peabody & Co Inc (7bab) PaineWebber (7baa) Paine Webber Group Inc (7ba) UBS (7)
07/03/1995 SG Warburg Securities (7abab) Swiss Bank Corp (7abaa) SBC Warburg (Swiss Bank Corp) (7aba) UBS (7)
09/02/1997 Dillon Read & Co (7abb) SBC Warburg (Swiss Bank Corp) (7aba) SBC Warburg Dillon Read (Swiss Bank 
Corp) (7ab)
UBS (7)
08/28/1998 SBC Warburg Dillon Read (Swiss Bank 
Corp) (7ab)
Union Bank of Sitzerland (UBS) (7aa) UBS Warburg (7a) UBS (7)
06/12/2000 JC Bradford & Co (7bb) Paine Webber Group Inc (7ba) Paine Webber Group Inc (7b) UBS (7)
11/03/2000 Paine Webber Group Inc (7b) UBS Warburg (7a) UBS (7) UBS (7)
1988 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of NY (8aabb) JP Morgan & Co (8aaba) JP Morgan & Co (8aab) JP Morgan (8)
1991 Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Company 
(8aaaaabb)
Chemical Bank (8aaaaaba) Chemical Bank (8aaaaab) JP Morgan (8)
1996 F. Eberstadt (8aaabb) Robert Fleming & Co. (8aaaba) Robert Fleming & Co. (8aaab) JP Morgan (8)
03/31/1996 Chase Manhatten (8aaaaab) Chemical Bank (8aaaaaa) Chase Manhatten (8aaaaa) JP Morgan (8)
01/04/1998 First Chicago Bank (8abb) Bank One Corp (8aba) Bank One Corp (8ab) JP Morgan (8)
12/10/1999 Hambrecht & Quist (8aaaab) Chase Manhatten (8aaaaa) Chase Manhatten (8aaaa) JP Morgan (8)
04/01/2000 Robert Fleming & Co. (8aaab) Chase Manhatten (8aaaa) Chase Manhatten (8aaa) JP Morgan (8)
12/31/2000 JP Morgan & Co (8aab) Chase Manhatten (8aaa) JP Morgan Chase & Co (8aa) JP Morgan (8)
07/01/2004 Bank One Corp (8ab) JP Morgan Chase & Co (8aa) JP Morgan Chase & Co (8a) JP Morgan (8)
11/05/2004 Cazenove (8ab) JP Morgan Chase & Co (8aa) JP Morgan Cazenove (8a) JP Morgan (8)
1979 Loeb, Rhoades & Co. (9aaaaaabb) Shearson Hayden Stone (9aaaaaaba) Shearson Loeb Rhoades Inc (9aaaaaab) Lehman Brothers (9)
1981 Shearson Loeb Rhoades Inc (9aaaaaab) American Express (9aaaaaaa) Shearson/American Express Inc (9aaaaaa) Lehman Brothers (9)
1984 Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb (9aaaaab) Shearson/American Express Inc (9aaaaaa) Shearson Lehman/American Exp (9aaaaa) Lehman Brothers (9)
1985 Financo (9aaaab) Shearson Lehman/American Exp (9aaaaa) Shearson Lehman/American Exp (9aaaa) Lehman Brothers (9)
1988 EF Hutton & Co Inc (9aaab) Shearson Lehman/American Exp (9aaaa) Shearson Lehman Hutton (9aaa) Lehman Brothers (9)
1989 Shearson Lehman Hutton (9aaa) Financo (59) Lehman Brothers (9)
1990 Shearson Lehman Hutton (9aaa) Shearson Lehman Brothers (9aa) Lehman Brothers (9)
1994 Shearson Lehman Brothers (9aa) Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (9a) Lehman Brothers (9)
2003 Neuberger Berman Inc (9b) Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (9a) Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (9a) Lehman Brothers (9)
1984 Becker Paribas Incorporated (10aaab) Merrill Lynch & Co Inc (10aaaa) Merrill Lynch & Co Inc (10aaa) Merrill Lynch (10)
06/22/1998 Midland Walwyn Inc (10aab) Merrill Lynch & Co Inc (10aaa) Merrill Lynch (10aa) Merrill Lynch (10)
05/06/2000 Herzog Heine Geduld (10ab) Merrill Lynch & Co Inc (10aa) Merrill Lynch (10aa) Merrill Lynch (10)
10/23/2006 Petrie Parkman & Co Inc (10b) Merrill Lynch & Co Inc (10a) Merrill Lynch (10) Merrill Lynch (10)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Eff. Date Target Name Acquirer Name Successor Ultimate Successor 12/31/2006
1986 First National Bank of Atlanta (11aaab) Wachovia Corp (11aaaa) Wachovia Corp (11aaa) Wachovia (11)
1998 CoreStates Financial Corporation 
(11abaab)
First Union Corp (11abaaa) First Union Corp (11abaa) Wachovia (11)
09/01/1998 Principal Financial Securities (11abbb) Everen Capital Corp (11abba) Everen Capital Corp (11abb) Wachovia (11)
02/02/1998 Wheat First Butcher Singer (11abab) First Union Corp (11abaa) First Union Corp (11aba) Wachovia (11)
01/04/1999 Interstate/Johnson Lane Inc (11aab) Wachovia Corp (11aaa) Wachovia Corp (11aa) Wachovia (11)
01/10/1999 Everen Capital Corp (11abb) First Union Corp (11aba) First Union Corp (11ab) Wachovia (11)
04/09/2001 First Union Corp (11ab) Wachovia Corp (11aa) Wachovia Corp (11a) Wachovia (11)
2003 Bache & Co (11aab) Wachovia Capital Markets (11aaa) Wachovia Securities Inc (11aa) Wachovia (11)
2003 Prudential Securities (11ab) Wachovia Securities Inc (11aa) Wachovia Securities Inc (11a) Wachovia (11)
1989 Morgan Grenfell (12aab) Deutsche Bank (12aaa) Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (12aa) Deutsche Bank AG (12)
1996 James D. Wolfensohn Inc. (12abab) Bankers Trust New York Corp (12abaa) Bankers Trust New York Corp (12aba) Deutsche Bank AG (12)
09/02/1997 Alex Brown, Inc (12abb) Bankers Trust New York Corp (12aba) BT Alex Brown Inc (12ab) Deutsche Bank AG (12)
06/04/1999 BT Alex Brown Inc (12ab) Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (12aa) Deutsche Bank Allex Brown (12a) Deutsche Bank AG (12)
1988 Wood Gundy Inc (13aab) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(13aaa)
CIBC Wood Gundy Securities (13aa) CIBC World Markets (13)
11/03/1997 Oppenheimer & Co Inc (13ba) CIBC Wood Gundy Securities (13aa) CIBC Oppenheimer (13a) CIBC World Markets (13)
1983 Seafirst Corporation/Seattle First National 
Bank (14aaaaab)
Bank of America (14aaaaaa) Bank of America (14aaaaa) Bank of America (14)
1992 Securities Pacific (14aaaab) Bank of America (14aaaaa) Bank of America (14aaaa) Bank of America (14)
1994 Continental Bank (14aaab) Bank of America (14aaaa) Bank of America (14aaa) Bank of America (14)
10/01/1997 Robertson Stephens & Co (14aaab) Bank of America (14aaa) BancAmerica Roberston Stephens 
(14abbb)
Bank of America (14)
10/01/1997 Montgomery Securities (14abb) NationsBank Corp (14aba) Nationsbank Montgomery Securities Inc 
(14ab)
Bank of America (14)
09/30/1998 Nationsbank Montgomery Securities Inc 
(14ab)
Bank of America (14aa) Bank of America Securities (14a) Bank of America (14)
2004 Fleet/Bank Boston (14ab) Bank of America (14aa) Bank of America (14a) Bank of America (14)
02/02/1998 Quick & Reilly Group, Inc (14bab) Fleet Financial Group Inc (14baa) Fleet Financial Group Inc (14ba) Fleet/Bank Boston (14b)
09/01/1998 BancAmerica Robertson Stephens 
(14abbb)
Bank Boston Corp (14abba) BankBoston Robert Stephens (14abb) Fleet/Bank Boston (14b)
10/01/1999 BankBoston Robert Stephens (14abb) Fleet Financial Group Inc (14aba) Fleet/Bank Boston (14ab) Fleet/Bank Boston (14b)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Eff. Date Target Name Acquirer Name Successor Ultimate Successor 12/31/2006
09/21/1998 Nationsbank Montgomery Securities 
Inc (14ab)
Thomas Weisel Partners LLC (14aba) Thomas Weisel Partners LLC (14ab) Thomas Weisel Partners LLC (15)
05/31/1997 Dean Wittter Reynolds Inc (16ab) Morgan Stanley Group, Inc (16aa) Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (16a) Morgan Stanley (16)
1998 Barr Devlin Associates (17ab) SG Americas Securities LLC (17aa) SG Barr Devlin (17a) Societe General (17)
1998 Hambros Bank (17ab) SG Americas Securities LLC (17aa) SG Hambros Bank Ltd. (17a) Societe General (17)
06/30/1998 Cowen & Co. (17ab) SG Americas Securities LLC (17aa) SG Cowen Securities Corp (17a) Societe General (17)
Goldman Sachs (18)
Bear Sterns (19)
AG Edwards & Sons Inc (20)
Drexel Burnham Lambert (21)
LaSalle Partners (22)
Lazard (23)
Goldsmith Agio Helms & Co. (24)
05/01/1998 Piper Jaffary Companies (25baab) US Bancorp Pipper Jaffary (25baaa) US Bancorp Pipper Jaffary (25baa) US Bancorp (25)
01/04/1999 Libra Investments, Inc (25bab) US Bancorp Pipper Jaffary (25baa) US Bancorp Pipper Jaffary (25ba) US Bancorp (25)
09/01/1999 John Nuveen Co (25bb) US Bancorp Pipper Jaffary (25ba) US Bancorp (25) US Bancorp (25)
2003 US Bancorp Pipper Jaffary (26b) Piper Jaffray (26a) Piper Jaffray (26)
LF Rotschild Unterberg Towbin (27a) LF Rothschild & Co (27)
1990 LF Rotschild Unterberg Towbin (27a) Unterberg Harris (28aa) CE Unterberg Towbin (28)
1997 Unterberg Harris (28a) CE Unterberg Towbin (28) CE Unterberg Towbin (28)
01/02/1998 Equitable Securities Corp (29ab) SunTrust Banks Inc (29aa) SunTrust Equitable Securities (29a) SunTrust Robinson-Humphrey (29)
07/27/2001 Robinson-Humphrey (29b) SunTrust Equitable Securities (29a) SunTrust Robinson-Humphrey (29) SunTrust Robinson-Humphrey (29)
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin (30)
Houlihan Valuation Advisors (31)
Houlihan Smith & Co (32)
Stephens Inc (33)
Greenhill (34)
03/21/2001 Quaterdeck Investment (35aab) Jefferies (35aaa) Jefferies (35aa) Jefferies (35)
2003 Broadview Associates (35ab) Jefferies (35aa) Jefferies (35a) Jefferies (35)
2005 Randall & Dewey Inc. (35b) Jefferies (35a) Jefferies (35) Jefferies (35)
Blackstone (36)
Evercore Partners (37)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Eff. Date Target Name Acquirer Name Successor Ultimate Successor 12/31/2006
1996 Dominion Securities Pitfield (38ab) Royal Bank of Canada (38aa) RBC Dominion Securities (38a) RBC Capital Markets (38)
01/02/1998 Rauscher Pierce Refsnes (38abab) Dain Bosworth Inc (38abaa) Dain Rauscher Corp (38aba) RBC Capital Markets (38)
04/06/1998 Wessels Arnold & Henderson LLC Dain Rauscher Corp (38aba) Dain Rauscher Wessels (38ab) RBC Capital Markets (38)
09/14/2000 Branch Cabell & Co Inc (38abb) Tucker Anthony Sutro (38aba) Tucker Anthony Sutro (38ab) RBC Capital Markets (38)
01/10/2001 Dain Rauscher Wessels (38ab) Royal Bank of Canada (38aa) RBC Dain Rauscher Corp (38a) RBC Capital Markets (38)
08/01/2001 Tucker Anthony Sutro (38ab) Royal Bank of Canada (38aa) RBC Dain Rauscher Corp (38a) RBC Capital Markets (38)
Daniels & Associates Inc (39)
05/11/1998 Roney & Co (40bab) First Chicago NBD Corp (40baa) First Chicago NBD Corp (40ba) Raymond James (40)
10/02/1998 First Chicago NBD Corp (40bb) BANC ONE Corp (40ba) Roney Capital Markets (Banc One) (40b) Raymond James (40)
06/14/1999 Roney Capital Markets (Banc One) (40b) Raymond James Financials, Inc (40a) Raymond James (40) Raymond James (40)
11/20/1997 Hampshire Securities Corp (41bb) Gruntal & Co Inc (41ba) Gruntal & Co Inc (41b) Ryan Beck & Co (41)
04/29/2002 GMS Group (from Gruntal & Co) (41b) Ryan Beck & Co (41a) Ryan Beck & Co (41) Ryan Beck & Co (41)
KPMG (42)
Peter J. Solomon Co Ltd (43)
William Blair & Co (44)
1990 Deloitte Haskins & Sells (45bb) Coopers & Lybrand (45ba) Coopers & Lybrand (45b) PricewaterhouseCoopers (45)
1998 Coopers & Lybrand (45b) Pricewaterhouse (45a) PricewaterhouseCoopers (45) PricewaterhouseCoopers (45)
1989 Arthur & Young (46aab) Ernst & Ernst (46aaa) Ernst & Young (46aa) Ernst & Young (46)
1995 Kenneth Leventhal & Co. (46ab) Ernst & Young (46aa) Ernst & Young (46a) Ernst & Young (46)
2002 Arthur & Anderson (46b) Ernst & Young (46a) Ernst & Young (46) Ernst & Young (46)
Needham & Co Inc (47)
Simmons & Co International (48)
11/10/1999 Paribas SA (49b) BNP SA (49a) BNP Paribas SA (49) BNP Paribas SA (49)
Baird Patrick & Co Inc (50)
1993 Society Corporation of Cleveland (51ab) KeyCorp (51aa) KeyCorp (51a) KeyCorp (51)
09/08/1998 Essex Capital Markets, Inc (51bb) McDonals & Co Investments, Inc (51ba) McDonals & Co Investments, Inc (51b) KeyCorp (51)
10/26/1998 McDonals & Co Investments, Inc (51b) KeyCorp (51a) KeyCorp (51) KeyCorp (51)
1995 Gleacher & Co (52b) NatWest (52a) NatWest (52) NatWest (52)
Hoare Govett Ltd (53)
Nomura Securities (54)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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05/02/1997 Equity Securities Trading Co. (55ab) Southwest Securities Group Inc. (55aa) Southwest Securities Group Inc. (55a) Southwest Securities Group Inc. (55)
07/31/1997 First of Michigan Capital Corp (56aab) Fahnestock Viner Holdings Inc (56aaa) Fahnestock & Co (56aa) Fahnestock & Co (56)
09/18/2001 Josephthal Lyon & Ross (56ab) Fahnestock & Co (56aa) Fahnestock & Co (56a) Fahnestock & Co (56)
11/12/2001 Grand Charter Group Inc (56b) Fahnestock & Co (56a) Fahnestock & Co (56) Fahnestock & Co (56)
10/31/2000 Soundview Technology Group (57b) Wit Capital Group Inc (57a) Wit Soundview Group Inc (57) Wit Soundview Group Inc (57)
1999 First Marathon Securities Ltd (58ab) National Bank Financial Inc (58aa) National Bank Financial Inc (58a) National Bank Financial Inc (a unit of 
National Bank of Canada) (58)
06/19/2002 Putnam Lovell Group Inc (58b) National Bank Financial Inc (58a) National Bank Financial Inc (58) National Bank Financial Inc (a unit of 
National Bank of Canada) (58)
Financo (59) 
Brooks, Harvey & Co. (60)
AE Ames & Co Inc (61)
AGM Partners LLC (62)
AIB Capital Markets (63)
Alpine Securities (64)
American Appraisal Assoc., Inc (65)
Anestis (66)
Apollo Advisors (67)
2005 Harris Trust & Savings Bank (68b) BMO Financial Group (68a) BMO Financial Group (68) BMO Financial Group (68)
1986 James Capel & Co (69ab) HSBC (69aa) HSBC (69a) HSBC (69)
1995 Samuel Montagu & Co Ltd (69b) HSBC (69a) HSBC (69) HSBC (69)
1989 Touche Ross & Company (70b) Deloitte & Touche (70a) Deloitte & Touche (70a) Deloitte & Touche (70)
1990 Scharff & Jones Inc (71b) Morgan Keegan Inc (71a) Morgan Keegan Inc  (71a) Morgan Keegan Inc (71)
Rothschild (72)
Ardshield (73)
Argosy Group (74)
BCC Investments (75)
Bacon, Whipple (76)
Beacon Financial Services LP (77)
Berenson Minella (78)
Berkery, Noyes & Co. (79)
Berkshire Capital (80)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Black River Capital LLC (81)
Boettcher (82)
Breckenridge (83)
Brown Brothers Harriman & Co (84)
Burns Fry and Timmins (85)
Calyon (86)
Canaccord Capital Corp (87)
Carl Marks & Co. Inc. (88)
Carlyle Group LP (89)
Carolina Securities (90)
Carr Securities (91)
Cates Consulting Analysts (92)
Chicago Corp (93)
Chicago Dearborn (94)
Chilmark Partners (95)
Cleary Gull Reiland McDevitt (96)
Cohen & Steers Capital Advisor (97)
Conning & Co (98)
Corporate Capital (99)
Credit Lyonnais Investissement (100)
Cronus Partners (101)
Daniels & Associates Inc (102)
Duff and Phelps (103)
EM Warburg Pincus & Co Inc (104)
2006 Eastdil Realty Inc (105ab) Secured Capital Corp. (105aa) Eastdil Equities (105a) Eastdil Equities (105)
Eppler Guerin & Turner Inc (106)
EuroPartners Securities (107)
Euroforce Enterprises (108)
First Manhattan Co (109)
First Southwest (110)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Fuji Corporate Advisory Co Ltd (111)
GKH Partners LP (112)
GMP Securities Ltd. (113)
Genuity Capital Markets (114)
Gibbons, Green, Van Amerongen (115)
Girard Bank (116)
Global Leisure Partners LLP (117)
Golembe Associates (118)
Golenberg (119)
Grant Samuel & Associates Pty (120)
Grant Thornton (121)
Gruss & Co. (122)
Hallwood Group Inc (123)
Hellman & Friedman LLC (124)
Henry Ansbacher Holding PLC (125)
Hicks & Haas (126)
Hill Samuel & Co Ltd (127)
Insurance Capital (128)
Invemed Associates Inc (129)
JJB Hilliard WL Lyons Inc (130)
2005 Parker-Hunter Inc (131b) Janney Montgomery Scott Inc (131a) Janney Montgomery Scott Inc (131) Janney Montgomery Scott Inc (131)
John J. Ryan (132)
Keefe Bruyette & Woods Inc (133)
Keefe Managers Inc (134)
Keilin & Bloom (135)
Kelso & Co (136)
Kramer Capital Partners (137)
Ladenburg Thalmann & Co (138)
Laidlaw-Coggeshall (139)
Legg (140)
Levin Group L.P. (141)
Lewis & Company (142)
Lion Advisors (143)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Lipper and Co Inc. (144)
Lodestar Group (145)
Long Term Credit Bank of Japan (146)
M. P. Brown & Co., Inc. (147)
MTS Health Partners LP (148)
MacDonald, Krieger, Bowyer & B (149)
Macquarie Bank (150)
Fox-Pitt Kelton (151)
Madison Capital Advisors (152)
Maryland National Bank (153)
McKay (154)
MeesPierson NV (155)
Metals and Securities (156)
Mexico Finance Group Ltd. (157)
Miller Tabak Hirsch (158)
Morgan Joseph & Co Inc (159)
Morgan Lewis Githens & Ahn (160)
Morgan Schiff (161)
New Harbor Inc (162)
Nikko Securities Co Ltd (163)
Northington Capital Markets (164)
Ocean Capital Corp (165)
Orion Securities (166)
Peers (167)
Perseus Group LLC (168)
Prescott Ball & Turben Inc (169)
Printon Kane & Co (170)
Quadrangle Group LLC (171)
RCG/Hagler, Bailly, Inc. (172)
Relational Advisors LLC (173)
Resource Holding Ltd. (174)
Rhone Group LLC (175)
Robert W Baird & Co Inc (176)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Rohatyn Associates LLC (177)
S. B. Lewis (178)
SEB Enskilda (179)
Sagent Advisors Inc (180)
Sandler O'Neill Partners (181)
1987 McLeod Young Weir Intl (182bb) Scotia Capital Inc (182ab) Scotia Capital Inc (182b) Bank of Nova Scotia (182)
1995 Scotia Capital Inc (182b) Bank of Nova Scotia (182a) Bank of Nova Scotia (182) Bank of Nova Scotia (182)
Scully Brothers & Foss (183)
Shapiro & Co (184)
Simmons & Co International (185)
Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp (186)
Standard Research Consultants (187)
Stephen W Brenner Assoc (188)
Stephens Financial Group (189)
Sterling Payot Company (190)
Sullivan & Cromwell (191)
04/01/2001 Sakura Bank Ltd (192ab) Sumitomo Bank Ltd (192aa) Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation 
(192a)
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation (192)
TD Securities Inc (193)
Tarrish (194)
Tillinghast (195)
Touchstone Securities Ltd (196)
Veronis Suhler (197)
Waller Capital (198)
Walter M. Sharp (199)
William Sword (200)
Williams Securities Group (201)
Table B (cont): Major bank mergers and name changes
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Variable Source
CAR_(-2, 2)_BETA1_vw CRSP, SDC
GOODADVICE CRSP, SDC
RESOLSPEED SDC
COMPLETED SDC
SUCCESSORBID SDC
OLDADVISOR SDC
AADVISOR SDC
ADVISORCHOICE SDC
ADVISED SDC
IEDA, IEDT, IEVA, IEVT SDC
ARSD, ARSV SDC
Table C: Description of variables
This variable is adapted from (Sibilkov & McCornell, 2013) and (Forte, 
Iannotta, & Navone, 2010) and theoretically based on (Anand & Galetovic, 
2006) and (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). It measures the advisory 
relationship strength ARS of the bidder and bank over the last 3 years. 
"ARSD" and "ARSV" are the advisory relationship strength ARS by the 
bidder's number of deals (D) or deal dollar value (V) advised by the bank. 
The formula of ARS at time t of bank i for bidder j are 
ARSDt,i,j=[(advised_deals t-1,i,j/advised_bidder_deals t-1,j)+(advised_deals t-
2,i,j/advised_bidder_deals t-2,j)+(advised_deals t-3,i,j/advised_bidder_deals t-
3,j)]/3 and ARSVt,i,j=[(advised_volumet-1,i,j/advised_bidder_volumet-
1,j)+(advised_volumet-2,i,j/advised_bidder_volumet-2,j)+(advised_volumet-
3,i,j/advised_bidder_volumet-3,j)]/3.
Panel B: Definitions of the bank variables
The variables of banks' industry expertise are adopted and modified from 
(Chang, Shekhar, Tam, & Zhu, 2013) for each (Fama & French, 1997) 
industry every year and theoretically based on (Anand & Galetovic, 2006) 
and (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). "IEDT" and "IEDA" are bank's 
industry expertise IE by the number of deals (D) in the acquirer's (A) or 
target's (T) industry. "IEVT" and "IEVA" are the bank's industry expertise 
IE by the dollar volume (V) of deals in the acquirer's (A) or target's (T) 
industry. The formulas for the industry expertise IE at time t of bank i in 
industry k are IEDt,i,k=[(advised_deals t-1,i,k/advised_industry_deals t-
1,k)+(advised_deals t-2,i,k/advised_industry_deals t-2,k)+(advised_deals t-
3,i,k/advised_industry_deals t-3,k)]/3 and  IEVt,i,k=[(advised_volumet-
1,i,k/advised_industry_volumet-1,k)+(advised_volumet-
2,i,k/advised_industry_volumet-2,k)+(advised_volumet-
3,i,k/advised_industry_volumet-3,k)]/3.
Panel A: Definitions of dependent variables
Definition
This table includes the descriptions and formulas of the variables used in chapters 2 to 4. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1%
and 99%. LOGME and RDS are adjusted for inflat ion to 2006 dollars.
Dummy (0/1) if the deal is advised on the acquirer's side (Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996) .
RESOLSPEED is the time in days from 0 to 730 from the announcement to 
the completion or withdrawal date (Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003).
COMPLETED is a dummy (0/1) whether the M&A is completed, and 0 if 
withdrawn (Rau, 2000).
GOODADVICE is a dummy (0/1) whether the deal has a nonnegative CAR(-
2, 2) and is completed or is withdrawn if it has a negative CAR(-2, 2), and 0 
otherwise.
CAR from -2 to +2 trading days around the acouncement date (t=0) with 
beta=1, alpha=0, using the CRSP value weighted index as market return 
proxy, winsorized (Atkas, Bodt, & Cousin, 2007).
Ordered variable of no advisor (1), a non-bulge-bracket bank (2) or a bulge-
bracket bank (3) as the bidder's choice of his lead financial advisor with the 
highest market share.
Dummy (0/1) whether the bid or acquisition succeeds a previous one.
Dummy (0/1) if the chosen bank advised the bidder in the last three years.
Dummy (0/1) if the bank is selected as advisor in the bid-bank match y²it=1
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Variable Source
MS SDC
RELREP SDC
PASTBIDDERCAR CRSP, SDC
PASTBANKCAR CRSP, SDC
PASTBBCAR CRSP, SDC
PASTCOMPLETED SDC
PASTGOODADVICE SDC
PASTRESOLSPEED SDC
Table C (cont.): Description of variables
Panel B (cont.): Definitions of bank variables
Definition
PASTRESOLSPEED is the resolution speed if the bank advised the acquirer 
in a previous deal. It is the resolution speed of the last unadvised deal if 
the current bid is unadvised.
The adjusted bank's market share in the SDC Top-50 M&A League Tables.
The relative reputation is the bidder advisor's market share MS divided by 
the target advisor's market share MS, and just the bidder advisor's MS if 
the target is unadvised (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003)
PASTBBCAR is the winsorized CAR(-2, 2) value weighted, using the Beta-
1 model, if the advising bank advised the bidder in a previous M&A, the 
bidder-bank pairing. It is the bidder's CAR in a previously unadvised deal if 
the current bid is unadvised  (Rau, 2000, Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003). 
PASTCOMPLETED is the dummy (0/1) of the deal previously advised by 
the same bank. It is PASTCOMPLETED of the last unadvised deal if the 
current bid is unadvised.
PASTGOODADVICE is a dummy (0/1) whether the previous deal advised 
by the same bank had a nonnegative CAR(-2, 2)i-1 and was completed, or 
the deal was withdrawn and had a negative CAR(-2, 2)i-1. If unadvised it is 
the past unadvised deal's GOODADVICE dummy.
PASTBIDDERCAR is the winsorized CAR(-2, 2) value weighted, using the 
Beta-1 model, of the bidder's previous bid independent of its advisory 
status. 
PASTBANKCAR is the winsorized CAR (-2, 2) value weighted, using the 
Beta-1 model, of the bank's previously advised deal. It is the past CAR (-2, 
2)i-1 multiplied with the dummy if the CAR (-2, 2)i-1 is available.
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Variable Source
SCOPE SDC
DEALS3YEARS SDC
LOGME Compustat
LNIS Compustat
TobinsQ Compustat
ITobinsQ Compustat
ATobinsQ Compustat
ROA Compustat
IROA Compustat
AROA Compustat
LEVERAGE Compustat
ILEVERAGE Compustat
ALEVERAGE Compustat
Table C (cont.): Description of variables
Panel C: Definitions of acquirer variables
Definition
ALEVERAGE is the abnormal leverage, LEVERAGEt-1-ILEVERAGEt-1
Return on assets is defined as [EBITt-1/Book Value of Assets t-1] (Heron & 
Lie, 2002).
IROA is the industry return on assets, defined as the average of the 
industry's companies' ROA excluding the bidder's ROA in the year before 
the M&A. The industries are defined according to (Fama & French, 1997).
Leverage at year t-1 before the deal is defined as [(Long-term Debtt-1+Debt 
in Current Liabilities t-1)/Book Value of Assets t-1] (Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 
2007; Harford, 2005).
ILEVERAGE is the mean industry leverage, defined as the average of the 
industry's companies' leverage excluding the bidder's leverage in the year 
before the M&A. The industries are defined according to (Fama & French, 
1997).
LNIS is the natural logarithm of the number of companies in the bidder's 
primary (Fama & French, 1997) industry in the year before the bid or 
acquisitions (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2001, 2002).
AROA is the abnormal ROA, defined as the ROAt-1-IROAt-1
Log of the market value of equity of the bidder at the end of the fiscal year 
before the bid.  The formula is ln(Shares outstandingt-1 x Price per Sharet-1 x 
1,000,000 x CPI factor) (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004, 2005; Bao & 
Edmans, 2011; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007).
Number of the bidder's M&As in the preceeding 3 years (Servaes & 
Zenner, 1996).
Tobin's Q in year t-1 before the M&A of the bidder as [(Book Value of 
Assets t-1+Market Value of Equityt-1-Book Value of Equityt-1)/Book Value of 
Assets t-1] (Andrade & Stafford, 2004).
ITobinQ is the mean industry Tobin's Q, defined as the average of the 
industry's companies' Tobin's Q excluding the bidder's Tobin's Q in the 
year before the M&A. The industries are defined according to (Fama & 
French, 1997).
ATobinsQ is the abnormal Tobin's Q, TobinsQt-1-ITobinsQt-1
Dummy (0/1) if the acquirer was advised in a debt or equity issue in the 
three years preceeding the M&A announcement year (Golubov, Petmezas, 
& Travlos, 2012).
273 
 
Variable Source
DIVERS SDC
MAJORITY SDC
PUBLIC SDC
RDS SDC, 
Compustat
TADVISORTIER SDC
MULTIPLE SDC
HOSTILE SDC
ANTITAKEOVER SDC
FAMILY SDC
LITIGATION SDC
REGULATORY SDC
CROSSBORDER SDC
DIVERSIFICATION SDC
TOEHOLD SDC
HIGHTECH SDC
STOCK SDC
CASH SDC
MIXED SDC
OTHER SDC
FIRST SDC
SIXTH SDC
Definition
Relative Deal Size (RDS) is the transaction value divided by the bidder's 
market value of equity. It is defined as [log((Transaction Value x CPI 
factor/(Shares outstandingt-1 x Price per Sharet-1 x 1,000,000 x CPI factor))] 
(Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004, 
2005). 
Multiple Bidders is defined as the number of bidders (Boone & Mulherin, 
2008).
Panel D: Definitions of Transaction Variables
Dummy (0/1) if the target and the acquirer have different primary 2-digit SIC 
codes (Servaes & Zenner, 1996).
Dummy (0/1) if the bidder seeks a majority ownership share of more than 
50% and owns less than 50% before the deal.
Dummy (0/1) is the target is a public company (Chang, 1998).
Discrete choice variable of the target's advisor's tier (unadvised (0), non-
bulge-bracket (1), bulge-bracket (2)) (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003).
Dummy (0/1) if the bid is the sixths or later one in the sequence (Fuller, 
Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002).
Table C (cont.): Description of variables
DIVERSIFICATION is the logarithm of the number of SIC codes of the 
target (Servaes & Zenner, 1996).
TOEHOLD is the percentage of the target owned by the bidder prior the 
bid/acquisition (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003).
Dummy (0/1) if the payment is another one than stock or cash, e.g. 
convertibles (Martin, 1996).
Dummy (0/1) if the bid is the first one in the acquisition sequence (Fuller, 
Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002).
Dummy (0/1) if the target has anti-takeover measures (Comment & Schwert, 
1995).
Dummy (0/1) if a family owns more than 20% of the target (Kale, Kini, & 
Ryan, 2003).
Dummy (0/1) if the target has a pending litigation / legal issues (Kale, Kini, 
& Ryan, 2003).
Dummy (0/1) if the M&A requieres regulatory approval, e.g. from an anti-
monopoly commission (Kale, Kini, & Ryan, 2003).
Dummy (0/1) if the bidder is from a country other than the USA (Francis, 
Hasan, & Sun, 2008; Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005).
Dummy (0/1) if the target or the bidder or both are high-tech firms 
(Loughran & Ritter, 2004).
Dummy (0/1) if the payment is stock (Martin, 1996).
Dummy (0/1) if the payment is cash (Martin, 1996).
Dummy (0/1) if the payment is cash and stock (Martin, 1996).
Dummy (0/1) if the target resists the takeover (Schwert, 2000).
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEDT 1.4447*** 1.6865*** 2.1880*** 3.0243*** 2.6762***
(4.044) (6.483) (7.491) (11.268) (12.401)
ARSD 1.7619 -8.6664*** 3.4072*** 5.2786*** 3.9370***
(1.454) (-19.765) (2.803) (7.336) (5.366)
PASTBBCAR -30.8157** -357.8541*** 9.1257 7.1664* 2.4218
(-2.006) (-32.947) (0.269) (1.747) (0.369)
RDS 0.0394 0.3075** 0.0021 0.2178 0.0149 0.5892*** -0.0077 0.4047*** 0.0132 0.3749**
(1.454) (2.386) (0.217) (1.380) (0.731) (4.103) (-0.332) (3.531) (0.635) (2.517)
TADVISORTIER 0.7155*** 0.8987*** 0.7252*** 0.6115*** 0.5619***
(5.840) (7.408) (7.204) (6.620) (5.508)
SCOPE -0.6830** -0.0711 -0.1188 0.1375 0.3145
(-2.182) (-0.290) (-0.602) (0.698) (1.525)
DEALS3YEARS -1.2973*** -0.3685*** -0.1324** -0.0648 -0.0523
(-3.662) (-3.112) (-2.522) (-1.407) (-1.091)
LOGME 0.3497*** 0.0893 0.1883*** 0.1287*** 0.0193
(4.753) (1.528) (3.598) (3.116) (0.300)
ATobinsQ -0.0902 -0.0045 0.0496 0.1457* 0.2472
(-0.616) (-0.026) (0.704) (1.741) (1.503)
AROA -0.5536 0.6885 -0.9672 2.0656** 0.0745
(-0.429) (0.567) (-1.133) (2.472) (0.063)
ALEVERAGE -0.8020 -0.8757 0.4559 -0.8889* -0.4744
(-0.985) (-1.099) (0.764) (-1.733) (-0.678)
Constant -2.3789*** -7.4115*** -2.5666*** -3.5940** -2.6455*** -6.1592*** -2.7132*** -4.5442*** -2.6966*** -1.0321
(-47.907) (-4.394) (-72.904) (-2.283) (-55.036) (-4.134) (-62.703) (-4.282) (-44.153) (-0.680)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 43,444 43,444 69,144 69,144 91,800 91,800 100,860 100,860 44,844 44,844
Number of acquirers 255 255 314 314 407 407 479 479 243 243
Chi²-statistic . . 1,403.07 1,403.07 95.94 95.94 331.97 331.97 241.04 241.04
p-value . . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 2.8079 2.8079 0.6454 0.6454 0.0612 0.0612 0.0684 0.0684 0.2211 0.2211
p-value of exogeneity 0.0938 0.0938 0.4218 0.4218 0.8046 0.8046 0.7937 0.7937 0.6382 0.6382
1984 1985
Table D shows the annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection. T he years 1979 to 1981 are analyzed together because of nonconvergence of individual years
caused by to few bid-bank matches among all observations. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in table C in the statistical appendix. The standard errors are
corrected for potential heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). 
Table D: Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEDT and ARSD
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1979-1981 1982 1983
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEDT 3.3358*** 3.0012*** 3.5660*** 4.1102*** 3.8523***
(13.412) (10.237) (12.478) (13.579) (10.245)
ARSD 2.5261*** 5.5880*** 4.2118*** 4.1671*** 4.6108***
(4.354) (9.995) (5.566) (6.389) (7.058)
PASTBBCAR 8.9850 -0.8874 2.4072 -7.8826 -6.5781
(1.624) (-0.060) (0.231) (-0.805) (-0.642)
RDS 0.0161 0.0995 0.0147 0.2559* 0.0214 0.4691*** 0.0021 0.5408*** 0.0408** 0.5937***
(1.178) (0.925) (0.859) (1.840) (1.140) (3.992) (0.113) (5.459) (2.193) (4.345)
TADVISORTIER 0.4994*** 0.5342*** 0.3679*** 0.4817*** 0.5617***
(6.270) (6.088) (4.614) (6.066) (6.678)
SCOPE 0.2125 0.1473 0.3398** 0.4364*** 0.3124*
(1.406) (0.912) (2.133) (2.768) (1.672)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0839 -0.0589 -0.1097** -0.0783* -0.1048*
(-1.571) (-1.278) (-2.380) (-1.809) (-1.937)
LOGME 0.0031 0.0473 0.0960** 0.1064*** 0.1550***
(0.064) (0.890) (2.550) (3.000) (4.051)
ATobinsQ -0.1616 -0.1047* -0.0274 0.0512 -0.0963
(-1.533) (-1.801) (-0.317) (0.836) (-1.595)
AROA 0.2488 0.8731 -0.6152 0.5313 0.0071
(0.344) (1.391) (-0.900) (0.960) (0.015)
ALEVERAGE -0.3586 -0.1466 -0.5282 -0.7002** -0.4942
(-0.679) (-0.312) (-1.408) (-2.041) (-1.137)
Constant -2.7291*** -1.2262 -2.8289*** -2.8527** -2.8413*** -3.7979*** -2.8302*** -4.3498*** -2.7715*** -5.1917***
(-68.351) (-0.923) (-58.611) (-2.129) (-51.646) (-4.052) (-68.472) (-4.464) (-54.557) (-5.319)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 100,590 100,590 116,644 116,644 142,506 142,506 202,665 202,665 165,376 165,376
Number of acquirers 372 372 374 374 426 426 555 555 525 525
Chi²-statistic 215.73 215.73 242.24 242.24 231.46 231.46 292.70 292.70 206.10 206.10
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 3.5668 3.5668 0.1416 0.1416 0.3348 0.3348 0.3930 0.3930 1.1581 1.1581
p-value of exogeneity 0.0589 0.0589 0.7067 0.7067 0.5628 0.5628 0.5307 0.5307 0.2819 0.2819
1989 1990
Table D (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEDT and ARSD
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1986 1987 1988
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEDT 3.8055*** 4.1673*** 4.5489*** 4.2306*** 4.2619***
(9.287) (13.209) (12.503) (17.657) (15.477)
ARSD 5.0330*** 5.4528*** 4.2053*** 3.5182*** 3.2091***
(5.552) (11.824) (7.189) (6.797) (3.798)
PASTBBCAR 1.3275 -5.0999 18.7147*** -6.0256 -2.9139
(0.151) (-0.684) (4.936) (-0.978) (-0.847)
RDS 0.0456* 0.4552*** 0.0339 0.6153*** 0.0507 0.4991*** 0.0306 0.7043*** 0.0398** 0.6908***
(1.919) (3.540) (0.839) (4.750) (1.037) (4.343) (1.441) (6.301) (2.491) (5.944)
TADVISORTIER 0.6792*** 0.4711*** 0.6718*** 0.6095*** 0.5433***
(7.554) (6.245) (5.125) (9.020) (8.383)
SCOPE 0.6219*** 0.2434* 0.2324 0.1793* 0.2018*
(3.603) (1.780) (1.517) (1.700) (1.838)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0293 -0.0974** -0.0879** -0.0764*** -0.1112***
(-0.658) (-2.394) (-2.547) (-3.485) (-5.977)
LOGME 0.0897** 0.1689*** 0.1439*** 0.1369*** 0.1231***
(2.517) (5.115) (3.884) (5.295) (4.533)
ATobinsQ -0.1146 0.0625* -0.0167 0.0067 0.0434
(-1.305) (1.851) (-0.425) (0.183) (1.254)
AROA 0.9611 0.3615 -0.1522 0.3028 -0.3594
(1.455) (0.885) (-0.434) (0.962) (-1.366)
ALEVERAGE -0.0982 -0.7157* -0.1101 -0.4577 -0.5053**
(-0.199) (-1.870) (-0.401) (-1.606) (-1.981)
Constant -2.8608*** -3.9498*** -2.8674*** -5.3898*** -2.9822*** -4.9127*** -2.8220*** -5.5379*** -2.8682*** -4.4093***
(-45.784) (-4.279) (-53.306) (-6.041) (-19.350) (-6.927) (-98.399) (-8.107) (-112.153) (-6.362)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 192,253 192,253 261,515 261,515 345,349 345,349 552,000 552,000 564,642 564,642
Number of acquirers 584 584 726 726 854 854 1,106 1,106 1,204 1,204
Chi²-statistic 122.27 122.27 388.02 388.02 406.10 406.10 416.60 416.60 251.96 251.96
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 0.6709 0.6709 0.1119 0.1119 0.7009 0.7009 3.3752 3.3752 1.0193 1.0193
p-value of exogeneity 0.4127 0.4127 0.7380 0.7380 0.4025 0.4025 0.0662 0.0662 0.3127 0.3127
1994 1995
Table D (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEDT and ARSD
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1991 1992 1993
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEDT 4.3948*** 5.1823*** 6.4770*** 6.8948*** 6.6388***
(19.754) (21.408) (33.191) (37.616) (34.088)
ARSD 4.1390*** 3.3238*** 4.1422*** 4.6887*** 4.7157***
(5.144) (4.696) (7.276) (11.766) (10.569)
PASTBBCAR 7.4532* 2.2408 3.4342 -2.8797 7.6682***
(1.869) (0.875) (1.173) (-1.091) (2.974)
RDS 0.0458*** 0.6633*** 0.0254*** 0.7668*** 0.0378*** 0.6097*** 0.0369*** 0.5920*** 0.0178 0.5705***
(4.026) (6.770) (2.769) (7.593) (3.015) (5.884) (3.347) (7.132) (1.089) (5.717)
TADVISORTIER 0.6562*** 0.7405*** 0.6231*** 0.6333*** 0.6366***
(10.697) (13.560) (12.433) (12.078) (12.811)
SCOPE 0.0658 0.1689** 0.0519 0.1722* 0.1641*
(0.724) (2.117) (0.688) (1.957) (1.938)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0569*** -0.0755*** -0.0456*** -0.0729*** -0.0525***
(-3.511) (-4.723) (-3.712) (-4.578) (-4.890)
LOGME 0.1231*** 0.1133*** 0.0869*** 0.0408* 0.0676***
(5.199) (4.789) (4.063) (1.740) (3.404)
ATobinsQ 0.0034 0.0427** 0.0030 0.0062 -0.0067
(0.155) (2.328) (0.124) (0.382) (-0.636)
AROA 0.9774*** -0.1556 0.0310 0.2872 -0.2574
(3.284) (-0.547) (0.135) (1.444) (-1.198)
ALEVERAGE -0.3869* -0.4087* -0.2930 0.1495 0.1700
(-1.705) (-1.824) (-1.505) (0.711) (0.740)
Constant -2.9050*** -4.6072*** -2.9318*** -4.5406*** -2.9707*** -3.9368*** -2.9980*** -3.3556*** -2.9131*** -3.5605***
(-150.219) (-7.066) (-150.405) (-7.308) (-144.296) (-7.067) (-131.973) (-5.367) (-111.922) (-5.705)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 698,139 698,139 1,029,784 1,029,784 936,819 936,819 738,045 738,045 610,242 610,242
Number of acquirers 1,336 1,336 1,611 1,611 1,594 1,594 1,414 1,414 1,356 1,356
Chi²-statistic 431.29 431.29 476.34 476.34 1,126.38 1,126.38 1,680.25 1,680.25 1,566.64 1,566.64
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 0.2432 0.2432 0.2754 0.2754 0.0340 0.0340 0.1829 0.1829 0.2690 0.2690
p-value of exogeneity 0.6219 0.6219 0.5997 0.5997 0.8536 0.8536 0.6689 0.6689 0.6040 0.6040
1999 2000
Table D (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEDT and ARSD
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1996 1997 1998
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEDT 6.1924*** 6.0628*** 7.2414*** 8.5160*** 8.6164*** 7.2668***
(18.525) (14.366) (17.171) (34.873) (24.898) (29.583)
ARSD 5.0061*** 4.1744*** 6.3973*** 7.0353*** 6.5865*** 6.1364***
(9.116) (4.441) (5.535) (12.025) (11.128) (12.598)
PASTBBCAR -0.5294 2.4296 11.2497*** 0.5208 0.3798 0.8173
(-0.228) (0.564) (2.959) (0.148) (0.079) (0.121)
RDS 0.0169 0.5558*** 0.0154 0.7527*** 0.0672*** 0.6153*** 0.0355 0.8454*** 0.0110 0.8229*** 0.0744*** 0.9451***
(1.253) (5.132) (0.977) (5.276) (3.760) (4.580) (1.481) (4.401) (0.433) (4.322) (3.593) (2.931)
TADVISORTIER 0.5842*** 0.5862*** 0.5318*** 0.5457*** 0.6759*** 0.6724***
(10.654) (9.522) (8.515) (8.841) (11.103) (10.067)
SCOPE 0.2816*** 0.0613 0.0475 0.0396 0.1549 0.1366
(2.802) (0.569) (0.505) (0.418) (1.607) (1.488)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0305* -0.0608*** -0.0363** -0.0814*** -0.0914*** -0.0808***
(-1.857) (-3.168) (-2.118) (-4.223) (-4.346) (-4.294)
LOGME 0.0195 0.0755*** 0.0654** 0.0793*** 0.0910*** 0.0559*
(0.802) (2.943) (2.478) (2.812) (3.100) (1.766)
ATobinsQ 0.0349* -0.0089 0.0091 0.0204 -0.0136 0.0280
(1.756) (-0.315) (0.206) (0.652) (-0.466) (0.947)
AROA 0.2740 0.3386* 0.1080 0.1339 -0.0691 -0.2268
(1.314) (1.655) (0.458) (0.430) (-0.209) (-0.599)
ALEVERAGE -0.1872 -0.0907 0.2641 -0.2708 -0.3993 -0.2703
(-0.713) (-0.353) (0.951) (-1.063) (-1.461) (-1.127)
Constant -2.8814*** -2.5578*** -2.8620*** -4.1825*** -2.9211*** -3.3815*** -2.9194*** -4.2225*** -2.9269*** -4.3688*** -2.8848*** -3.2234***
(-114.297) (-3.602) (-96.084) (-5.502) (-74.916) (-4.820) (-89.892) (-5.479) (-101.828) (-5.521) (-88.794) (-4.256)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 435,552 435,552 388,360 388,360 377,556 377,556 466,032 466,032 551,928 551,928 523,692 523,692
Number of acquirers 1,087 1,087 1,030 1,030 1,002 1,002 1,049 1,049 1,087 1,087 1,112 1,112
Chi²-statistic 482.83 482.83 258.11 258.11 344.38 344.38 1,385.80 1,385.80 742.45 742.45 1,126.54 1,126.54
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 0.1548 0.1548 0.2348 0.2348 0.1957 0.1957 3.0161 3.0161 8.2214 8.2214 2.8095 2.8095
p-value of exogeneity 0.6940 0.6940 0.6280 0.6280 0.6583 0.6583 0.0824 0.0824 0.0041 0.0041 0.0937 0.0937
Table D (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEDT and ARSD
2004 2005 2006
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2001 2002 2003
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEVT 1.2154*** 1.4372*** 1.5614*** 1.9800*** 1.8041***
(3.484) (5.872) (7.183) (11.443) (9.515)
ARSV 1.7058 -9.7610*** 3.3607*** 5.2120*** 3.9179***
(1.407) (-20.002) (2.609) (6.537) (5.395)
PASTBBCAR -30.8472** -382.7502*** 11.1927 7.6219* 2.0327
(-2.009) (-38.505) (0.338) (1.735) (0.308)
RDS 0.0414 0.3075** 0.0050 0.2178 0.0194 0.5892*** -0.0108 0.4047*** -0.0030 0.3749**
(1.559) (2.386) (0.527) (1.380) (0.938) (4.103) (-0.412) (3.531) (-0.145) (2.517)
TADVISORTIER 0.7155*** 0.8987*** 0.7252*** 0.6115*** 0.5619***
(5.840) (7.408) (7.204) (6.620) (5.508)
SCOPE -0.6830** -0.0711 -0.1188 0.1375 0.3145
(-2.182) (-0.290) (-0.602) (0.698) (1.525)
DEALS3YEARS -1.2973*** -0.3685*** -0.1324** -0.0648 -0.0523
(-3.662) (-3.112) (-2.522) (-1.407) (-1.091)
LOGME 0.3497*** 0.0893 0.1883*** 0.1287*** 0.0193
(4.753) (1.528) (3.598) (3.116) (0.300)
ATobinsQ -0.0902 -0.0045 0.0496 0.1457* 0.2472
(-0.616) (-0.026) (0.704) (1.741) (1.503)
AROA -0.5536 0.6885 -0.9672 2.0656** 0.0745
(-0.429) (0.567) (-1.133) (2.472) (0.063)
ALEVERAGE -0.8019 -0.8757 0.4559 -0.8889* -0.4744
(-0.985) (-1.099) (0.764) (-1.733) (-0.677)
Constant -2.3768*** -7.4115*** -2.5667*** -3.5940** -2.6311*** -6.1592*** -2.6716*** -4.5442*** -2.6651*** -1.0322
(-47.544) (-4.394) (-75.742) (-2.283) (-55.793) (-4.134) (-67.748) (-4.282) (-43.916) (-0.680)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 43,444 43,444 69,144 69,144 91,800 91,800 100,860 100,860 44,844 44,844
Number of acquirers 255 255 314 314 407 407 479 479 243 243
Chi²-statistic . . 1,620.39 1,620.39 89.85 89.85 285.46 285.46 159.01 159.01
p-value . . 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 2.9958 2.9958 0.6638 0.6638 0.0194 0.0194 0.0086 0.0086 0.4605 0.4605
p-value of exogeneity 0.0835 0.0835 0.4152 0.4152 0.8892 0.8892 0.9261 0.9261 0.4974 0.4974
1984 1985
Table E shows the annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection. T he years 1979 to 1981 are analyzed together because of nonconvergence of individual years
caused by to few bid-bank matches among all observations. The variables are summarized in table 2 and described in table C in the statistical appendix. T he standard errors are
corrected for potential heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980).
Table E: Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEVT and ARSV
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1979-1981 1982 1983
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEVT 2.3345*** 2.3212*** 2.1765*** 2.5832*** 1.9408***
(16.638) (10.999) (9.763) (14.323) (10.557)
ARSV 2.6541*** 5.4896*** 4.0040*** 4.2581*** 4.8771***
(4.339) (10.455) (4.563) (6.630) (6.436)
PASTBBCAR 9.3806* -1.4090 2.7545 -8.5374 -6.4069
(1.714) (-0.094) (0.256) (-0.880) (-0.632)
RDS 0.0113 0.0995 0.0180 0.2559* 0.0241 0.4691*** 0.0074 0.5408*** 0.0401** 0.5937***
(0.805) (0.925) (1.204) (1.840) (1.320) (3.992) (0.406) (5.459) (2.038) (4.345)
TADVISORTIER 0.4994*** 0.5342*** 0.3679*** 0.4817*** 0.5617***
(6.270) (6.088) (4.614) (6.066) (6.678)
SCOPE 0.2125 0.1473 0.3398** 0.4364*** 0.3124*
(1.406) (0.912) (2.133) (2.768) (1.672)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0839 -0.0588 -0.1097** -0.0783* -0.1048*
(-1.571) (-1.278) (-2.380) (-1.809) (-1.937)
LOGME 0.0031 0.0473 0.0960** 0.1064*** 0.1550***
(0.063) (0.890) (2.550) (3.000) (4.051)
ATobinsQ -0.1617 -0.1047* -0.0275 0.0512 -0.0963
(-1.534) (-1.801) (-0.317) (0.836) (-1.595)
AROA 0.2488 0.8731 -0.6151 0.5313 0.0071
(0.344) (1.391) (-0.900) (0.960) (0.015)
ALEVERAGE -0.3587 -0.1465 -0.5282 -0.7002** -0.4942
(-0.679) (-0.312) (-1.408) (-2.041) (-1.137)
Constant -2.7050*** -1.2259 -2.8344*** -2.8527** -2.8155*** -3.7980*** -2.8167*** -4.3498*** -2.7320*** -5.1917***
(-69.083) (-0.923) (-58.954) (-2.129) (-54.281) (-4.052) (-68.009) (-4.463) (-55.070) (-5.319)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 100,590 100,590 116,644 116,644 142,506 142,506 202,665 202,665 165,376 165,376
Number of acquirers 372 372 374 374 426 426 555 555 525 525
Chi²-statistic 309.38 309.38 284.74 284.74 131.13 131.13 312.14 312.14 184.58 184.58
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 3.9084 3.9084 0.3839 0.3839 0.0062 0.0062 0.0499 0.0499 1.0713 1.0713
p-value of exogeneity 0.0480 0.0480 0.5355 0.5355 0.9370 0.9370 0.8232 0.8232 0.3007 0.3007
1989 1990
Table E (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEVT and ARSV
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1986 1987 1988
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEVT 2.0187*** 2.2497*** 2.6091*** 2.4796*** 2.5837***
(8.328) (10.328) (12.453) (16.865) (17.193)
ARSV 5.1639*** 5.2333*** 3.9839*** 3.5343*** 3.4162***
(6.085) (9.646) (6.714) (6.444) (4.271)
PASTBBCAR 2.1963 -5.0816 19.1179*** -5.9822 -2.5912
(0.250) (-0.662) (5.184) (-1.026) (-0.733)
RDS 0.0483** 0.4552*** 0.0371 0.6153*** 0.0463 0.4991*** 0.0491** 0.7043*** 0.0491*** 0.6908***
(2.026) (3.540) (0.907) (4.750) (0.946) (4.343) (2.284) (6.301) (3.301) (5.944)
TADVISORTIER 0.6792*** 0.4711*** 0.6718*** 0.6095*** 0.5433***
(7.554) (6.245) (5.125) (9.020) (8.383)
SCOPE 0.6219*** 0.2434* 0.2324 0.1793* 0.2018*
(3.603) (1.780) (1.517) (1.700) (1.838)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0293 -0.0974** -0.0879** -0.0764*** -0.1112***
(-0.658) (-2.394) (-2.547) (-3.485) (-5.977)
LOGME 0.0897** 0.1689*** 0.1439*** 0.1369*** 0.1231***
(2.517) (5.115) (3.884) (5.295) (4.533)
ATobinsQ -0.1146 0.0625* -0.0167 0.0067 0.0434
(-1.305) (1.851) (-0.425) (0.183) (1.254)
AROA 0.9611 0.3615 -0.1522 0.3028 -0.3594
(1.455) (0.885) (-0.434) (0.962) (-1.366)
ALEVERAGE -0.0982 -0.7157* -0.1101 -0.4577 -0.5053**
(-0.199) (-1.870) (-0.401) (-1.606) (-1.981)
Constant -2.8331*** -3.9499*** -2.8486*** -5.3898*** -2.9609*** -4.9128*** -2.8225*** -5.5379*** -2.8694*** -4.4093***
(-47.943) (-4.279) (-54.311) (-6.041) (-19.817) (-6.927) (-98.524) (-8.107) (-117.403) (-6.362)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 192,253 192,253 261,515 261,515 345,349 345,349 552,000 552,000 564,642 564,642
Number of acquirers 584 584 726 726 854 854 1,106 1,106 1,204 1,204
Chi²-statistic 120.07 120.07 248.13 248.13 479.41 479.41 392.04 392.04 307.75 307.75
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 0.6693 0.6693 0.2490 0.2490 0.8257 0.8257 1.9987 1.9987 0.0352 0.0352
p-value of exogeneity 0.4133 0.4133 0.6178 0.6178 0.3635 0.3635 0.1574 0.1574 0.8513 0.8513
1994 1995
Table E (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEVT and ARSV
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1991 1992 1993
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEVT 2.6727*** 3.3437*** 3.4805*** 3.4854*** 3.1468***
(20.295) (29.974) (31.437) (31.286) (30.746)
ARSV 4.2999*** 3.5311*** 4.3546*** 4.6865*** 4.7327***
(6.111) (5.918) (8.475) (12.607) (10.603)
PASTBBCAR 7.7355* 2.1435 3.9442 -1.9013 8.3206***
(1.928) (0.812) (1.345) (-0.724) (3.264)
RDS 0.0533*** 0.6633*** 0.0295*** 0.7668*** 0.0421*** 0.6097*** 0.0402*** 0.5920*** 0.0332** 0.5705***
(4.708) (6.770) (3.138) (7.593) (3.543) (5.884) (3.770) (7.132) (2.263) (5.717)
TADVISORTIER 0.6562*** 0.7405*** 0.6231*** 0.6333*** 0.6366***
(10.697) (13.560) (12.433) (12.078) (12.811)
SCOPE 0.0658 0.1689** 0.0519 0.1722* 0.1641*
(0.724) (2.117) (0.688) (1.957) (1.938)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0569*** -0.0755*** -0.0456*** -0.0729*** -0.0525***
(-3.511) (-4.723) (-3.712) (-4.578) (-4.890)
LOGME 0.1231*** 0.1133*** 0.0869*** 0.0408* 0.0676***
(5.199) (4.789) (4.063) (1.740) (3.404)
ATobinsQ 0.0034 0.0427** 0.0030 0.0062 -0.0067
(0.155) (2.328) (0.124) (0.382) (-0.636)
AROA 0.9774*** -0.1556 0.0310 0.2872 -0.2574
(3.284) (-0.547) (0.135) (1.444) (-1.198)
ALEVERAGE -0.3869* -0.4087* -0.2930 0.1495 0.1700
(-1.705) (-1.824) (-1.505) (0.711) (0.740)
Constant -2.8988*** -4.6072*** -2.9389*** -4.5406*** -2.9431*** -3.9368*** -2.9465*** -3.3556*** -2.8779*** -3.5604***
(-143.863) (-7.066) (-161.107) (-7.308) (-148.814) (-7.067) (-138.201) (-5.367) (-116.959) (-5.705)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 698,139 698,139 1,029,784 1,029,784 936,819 936,819 738,045 738,045 610,242 610,242
Number of acquirers 1,336 1,336 1,611 1,611 1,594 1,594 1,414 1,414 1,356 1,356
Chi²-statistic 495.15 495.15 911.81 911.81 1,010.02 1,010.02 1,287.98 1,287.98 1,226.71 1,226.71
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 0.0215 0.0215 0.0127 0.0127 0.2384 0.2384 0.0560 0.0560 0.0527 0.0527
p-value of exogeneity 0.8835 0.8835 0.9101 0.9101 0.6254 0.6254 0.8129 0.8129 0.8183 0.8183
1999 2000
Table E (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEVT and ARSV
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1996 1997 1998
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VARIABLES AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED AADVISOR ADVISED
IEVT 2.6662*** 2.6005*** 2.9079*** 3.0204*** 3.5282*** 3.0170***
(23.504) (21.720) (24.003) (25.702) (29.062) (25.696)
ARSV 4.8596*** 4.3229*** 6.9158*** 7.4151*** 6.9560*** 6.2553***
(8.729) (4.671) (6.758) (12.258) (14.011) (11.024)
PASTBBCAR -0.3628 2.6015 12.5698*** 0.0649 0.4407 -0.5900
(-0.151) (0.593) (3.259) (0.018) (0.087) (-0.091)
RDS 0.0411*** 0.5558*** 0.0312* 0.7527*** 0.0728*** 0.6153*** 0.0433* 0.8454*** 0.0516** 0.8229*** 0.0868*** 0.9451***
(3.454) (5.132) (1.951) (5.276) (4.117) (4.580) (1.885) (4.401) (2.175) (4.322) (4.751) (2.931)
TADVISORTIER 0.5842*** 0.5862*** 0.5318*** 0.5457*** 0.6759*** 0.6724***
(10.654) (9.522) (8.515) (8.841) (11.103) (10.068)
SCOPE 0.2816*** 0.0613 0.0475 0.0396 0.1550 0.1366
(2.802) (0.569) (0.505) (0.418) (1.607) (1.488)
DEALS3YEARS -0.0305* -0.0608*** -0.0363** -0.0814*** -0.0914*** -0.0808***
(-1.857) (-3.168) (-2.118) (-4.223) (-4.346) (-4.294)
LOGME 0.0195 0.0755*** 0.0654** 0.0793*** 0.0910*** 0.0559*
(0.802) (2.943) (2.478) (2.812) (3.100) (1.766)
ATobinsQ 0.0349* -0.0089 0.0091 0.0204 -0.0136 0.0280
(1.755) (-0.315) (0.205) (0.652) (-0.466) (0.947)
AROA 0.2740 0.3386* 0.1080 0.1339 -0.0692 -0.2269
(1.314) (1.655) (0.458) (0.430) (-0.209) (-0.599)
ALEVERAGE -0.1872 -0.0907 0.2641 -0.2708 -0.3993 -0.2703
(-0.713) (-0.353) (0.951) (-1.063) (-1.461) (-1.127)
Constant -2.8667*** -2.5578*** -2.8321*** -4.1825*** -2.9012*** -3.3815*** -2.8623*** -4.2225*** -2.9278*** -4.3690*** -2.8779*** -3.2234***
(-125.452) (-3.602) (-112.156) (-5.502) (-88.333) (-4.820) (-97.595) (-5.478) (-107.899) (-5.521) (-93.328) (-4.256)
Transaction variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 435,552 435,552 388,360 388,360 377,556 377,556 466,032 466,032 551,928 551,928 523,692 523,692
Number of acquirers 1,087 1,087 1,030 1,030 1,002 1,002 1,049 1,049 1,087 1,087 1,112 1,112
Chi²-statistic 715.11 715.11 553.49 553.49 705.22 705.22 891.77 891.77 1,111.60 1,111.60 766.33 766.33
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi²-statistic of exogeneity 2.0404 2.0404 0.9361 0.9361 0.7846 0.7846 1.0338 1.0338 1.2172 1.2172 0.1842 0.1842
p-value of exogeneity 0.1532 0.1532 0.3333 0.3333 0.3757 0.3757 0.3093 0.3093 0.2699 0.2699 0.6678 0.6678
Table E (cont.): Annual regressions of the bivariate probit model with selection using IEVT and ARSV
2004 2005 2006
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2001 2002 2003
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Source
LEVERAGE_T Target total debt / total assets (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) Amadeus & 
Orbis
ADJLEVERAGE_T Target (total debt - accounts payable(creditors) - cash) / (total assets - 
accounts receivable(debtors) - cash) (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 
2008)
Amadeus & 
Orbis
FINLEVERAGE_T Target (long-term + current financial debt (loans)) / total assets (Frank & 
Goyal, 2009)
Amadeus & 
Orbis
Panel B: Target variables
SIZE_T Natural logarithm of total assets [ln(TASSETS_T)] (Frank & Goyal, 2009) Amadeus & 
Orbis
TAR_T Tangible assets/total assets (Titman & Wessels, 1988)
CASH_T Total cash/total assets (Wald, 1999)
ROA_T EBIT / total assets (Hovakimian, Oppler, & Titman, 2001)
RnD_T R&D expenses/total assets or 0 if missing (Uysal, 2011)
MLEVERAGE_T Median industry total debt / total assets in every (Fama & French, 1997) 
industry (Frank & Goyal, 2009)
Amadeus & 
Orbis
MADJLEVERAGE_T Median industry (total debt - accounts payable - cash) / (total assets - 
accounts receivable - cash) in every (Fama & French, 1997) industry 
(Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008)
Amadeus & 
Orbis
MFINLEVERAGE_T Mean industry (long-term + current financial debt(loans)) / total assets in 
every (Fama & French, 1997) industry (Frank & Goyal, 2009)
Amadeus & 
Orbis
ASSET_GROWTH_T SIZE_Tt-SIZE_Tt-1 (Frank & Goyal, 2009) Amadeus & 
OrbisINDEPENDENT Dummy (0/1) if the target is an independent company (Erel, Jang, & 
Weisbach, 2012)
Zephyr
PRIVATE_T Dummy (0/1) if the target is a private company (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009)
Zephyr
INFLATION_T Inflation calculated from the annual consumer price index (Djankov, 
McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007)
World Bank 
AFTER_MERGER Dummy (0/1) that is 0 for the years before the M&A completion year and 
1 for it and afterwards (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012)
Zephyr
Panel C: Acquirer variables
SIZE_A Natural logarithm of total assets [ln(TASSETS_A)] (Frank & Goyal, 
2009)
Amadeus & 
Orbis
TAR_A Tangible assets / total assets (Titman & Wessels, 1988)
CASH_A Total cash / total assets (Wald, 1999)
ROA_A EBIT / total assets (Hovakimian, Oppler, & Titman, 2001)
ALEVERAGE_A Abnormal leverage as LEVERAGE_A - MLEVERAGE_A (D'Mello & 
Farhat, 2008)
Amadeus & 
Orbis
ASSETRATIO_T_A SIZE_T / SIZE_A Amadeus & 
Orbis
Table F: Definitions, references and sources of variables
All financial statement variables are deflated to 1983 dollars using the annual CPI deflator of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, stated in $1,000
and winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. The debt-to-asset ratios are bounded between 0 and 1 to avoid outliers (D'Mello & Farhat, 2008;
Frank & Goyal, 2009). The statutory corporate tax rates are from KPMG, the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) and the World Tax Database of the
University of Michigan's Office of Tax Policy Research. 
Panel A: Dependent variables
Amadeus & 
Orbis
Amadeus & 
Orbis
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Panel D: Tax variables Source
STR_T Statutory corporate tax rate in the target's country (Graham, 1996; 
2000)
STR_A Statutory corporate tax rate in the acquirer's country (Graham, 1996; 
2000)
TAXDIFF_T_A STR_T - STR_A
TAX_INCENTIVE_T_A (STR_T x TASSETS_T - STR_A x TASSETS_A) / (TASSETS_A + 
TASSETS_T) (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
TAX_TANGIBLES_T_A (STR_T x TAR_T - STR_A x TAR_A) / (TASSETS_T + 
TASSETS_A)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
TAX_ 
PROFITABILITY_T_A
(STR_T x EBIT_T - STR_A x EBIT_A) / (TASSETS_T + 
TASSETS_A)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
Panel E: Post-Merger variables
TOTAL_ 
TANGIBLES_post
(TAR_T + TAR_A) / (TASSETS_T + TASSETS_A), 0 before the 
M&A completion year
Amadeus 
& Orbis
GROWTH_ 
COLLATERAL_T
ASSET_GROWTH_T x TOTAL_TANGIBLES_post Amadeus 
& Orbis
UNRESTLOSS_T Dummy (0/1) if the target's country allows unrestricted loss 
compensation against taxes of previously accumulated losses of 
acquired companies. It is 0 before the M&A completion year (KPMG 
Taxation of Cross-Border M&A reports 2012)
KPMG 
NOLC_T Net operating loss carry forward as accumulated negative EBIT 
before the M&A completion year (Frank & Goyal, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
LOSSFORWARD_T UNRESTLOSS_T x NOLC_T Amadeus 
& OrbisNOGROUPTAX_T Dummy (0/1) if the target's country does not have group taxation 
(IBFD European Tax Handbook)
IBFD 
FININV_RATIO_A (TASSETS_T / TASSET_A) x FINANCIALINV_A Amadeus 
& Orbis
FINANCEFIRM_A Dummy (0/1) if the three digit SIC core code is 600 to 699 (Andrade & 
Kaplan, 1998)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
HOLDING_A Dummy (0/1) if the acquirer is a holding company with "Hold", 
"Holding" or "Invest" in his name (Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010; 
Hebous, Ruf, & Weichenrieder, 2011)
Zephyr
FINANCIALINV_A Dummy (0/1) if the acquirer's SIC core code is 670 to 680 and 
HOLDING_A=1 
Amadeus 
& Orbis
Table F (cont.): Definitions of Variables
KPMG, IFS, 
U Michigan
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Panel A: Leverage variables Source
LEVERAGE_T Target total debt / total assets (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2008) Amadeus 
& Orbis
FINLEVERAGE_T Target (long-term + current financial debt (loans)) / total assets (Frank 
& Goyal, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
ADJLEVERAGE_T Target (total debt - accounts payable(creditors) - cash) / (total assets - 
accounts receivable(debtors) - cash) (Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 
2008)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
LEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 LEVERAGE_Tt=1-LEVERAGE_Tt=-1 (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2009) Amadeus 
& Orbis
FINLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 FINLEVERAGE_Tt=1- FINLEVERAGE_Tt=-1 (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
ADJLEVERAGE_T_L1_F1 ADJLEVERAGE_Tt=1- ADJLEVERAGE_Tt=-1 (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
MLEVERAGE_T Median industry LEVERAGE in every (Fama & French, 1997) industry 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
MFINLEVERAGE_T Mean industry FINLEVERAGE in every (Fama & French, 1997) 
industry (Frank & Goyal, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
MADJLEVERAGE_T Median industry ADJLEVERAGE in every (Fama & French, 1997) 
industry
Amadeus 
& Orbis
LEVERAGE_T_target Target LEVERAGE estimated with adapted regressions from table H 
(Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Graham & Harvey, 2001)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
FINLEVERAGE_T_target Target FINLEVERAGE estimated with adapted regressions from table 
H (Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Graham & Harvey, 2001)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
ADJLEVERAGE_T_target Target ADJLEVERAGE estimated with adapted regressions from table 
H (Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Graham & Harvey, 2001)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
ALEVERAGE_T LEVERAGE_T-LEVERAGE_T_target (D'Mello & Farhat, 2008) Amadeus 
& Orbis
AFINLEVERAGE_T FINLEVERAGE_T-FINLEVERAGE_T_target (D'Mello & Farhat, 2008) Amadeus 
& Orbis
AADJLEVERAGE_T ADJLEVERAGE_T-ADJLEVERAGE_T_target (D'Mello & Farhat, 
2008)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
LEVERAGE_T_ 
target_L1_F1
LEVERAGE_T_targett=1-LEVERAGE_T_targett=-1 (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
FINLEVERAGE_T_ 
target_L1_F1
FINLEVERAGE_T_targett=1-FINLEVERAGE_T_targett=-1 (Harford, 
Klasa, & Walcott, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
ADJLEVERAGE_T_ 
target_L1_F1
ADJLEVERAGE_T_targett=1-ADJLEVERAGE_T_targett=-1 (Harford, 
Klasa, & Walcott, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
Table G: Definitions, sources and references of variables
The table describes the variables used in the analyses, their sources and references. Panel A shows the leverage variables. Panel B 
shows the capital structure variables. Panel C includes the control variables. Panel D includes the tax variables. All cont inuous
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. F1 refers to period t=1 and L1 to t=-1 around t=0, the M&A completion year, with F
as "future" and L as "lagged".
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Panel B: Capital structure variables Source
SIZE_T Natural logarithm of total assets [ln(TASSETS_T)] (Frank & Goyal, 
2009)
TAR_T Tangible assets/total assets (Titman & Wessels, 1988)
CASH_T Total cash/total assets (Wald, 1999)
ROA_T EBIT / total assets (Hovakimian, Oppler, & Titman, 2001)
RnD_T R&D expenses/total assets or 0 if missing (Uysal, 2011)
RISK_T Standard deviation of [ROAt - ROAt-1] (Wald, 1999)
ASSET_GROWTH_T SIZE_Tt-SIZE_Tt-1
EQUITYRATIO_T_A Target's total equity / Acquirer's total equity 
Panel C: Control variables
HOLDING_A Dummy (0/1) if the acquirer is a holding company with "Hold", 
"Holding" or "Invest" in his name
Zephyr
FINANCIALINV_A Dummy (0/1) if the acquirer's SIC core code is 670 to 680 and 
HOLDING_A=1
Amadeus 
& Orbis
FININV_RATIO_A (TASSETS_T/TASSET_A) x FINANCIALINV_A Amadeus 
& Orbis
FINANCEFIRM_A Dummy (0/1) if the three digit SIC core code is 600 to 699 (Andrade & 
Kaplan, 1998)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
INDEPENDENT Dummy (0/1) if the target is an independent company (Erel, Jang, & 
Weisbach, 2012)
Zephyr
PRIVATE_T Dummy (0/1) if the target is a private company (Harford, Klasa, & 
Walcott, 2009)
Amadeus 
& Orbis
INFLATION_T Inflation calculated from the annual consumer price index (Djankov, 
McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007)
WorldBank 
DIFF_IND Dummy (0/1) if the target and acquirer are from different industries 
(Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2012)
Zephyr
CROSSBORDER Dummy (0/1) if the target and acqurier countries differ (Erel, Jang, & 
Weisbach, 2012)
Zephyr
Panel D: Tax variables
STR_T, STR_A Statutory corporate tax rate in the target's and acquirer's countries 
(Graham, 1996, 2000)
STR_T_L1_F1 STR_Tt=1 - STR_Tt=-1
STR_A_L1_F1 STR_At=1 - STR_At=-1
TAXDIFF_T_A STR_T - STR_A
TAXDIFF_T_A_L1_F1 TAXDIFF_T_At=1 - TAXDIFF_T_At=-1
Table G (cont.): Definitions, sources and references of variables
KPMG, IFS, 
U Michigan
Amadeus 
& Orbis
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LEVERAGE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
SIZE 0.0214*** 0.0193*** 0.0270*** 0.0221*** 0.0245*** 0.0275*** 0.0282*** 0.0302*** 0.0317*** 0.0307*** 0.0293*** 0.0298*** 0.0129***
(41.585) (45.977) (119.227) (204.044) (251.797) (306.152) (322.105) (364.098) (419.616) (424.798) (407.017) (394.719) (39.265)
F1.ROA 0.0843*** 0.0986*** 0.0940*** 0.0970*** 0.0774*** 0.0617*** 0.0423*** 0.0371*** 0.0497*** 0.0866*** 0.0762*** 0.0637*** 0.1604***
(16.251) (20.296) (35.069) (78.489) (74.202) (65.541) (46.191) (43.702) (66.937) (124.176) (101.876) (81.897) (67.142)
TAR -0.0480*** -0.1380*** -0.1524*** -0.0737*** -0.0491*** -0.0459*** -0.0298*** -0.0216*** -0.0004 0.0079*** 0.0120*** 0.0182*** 0.1801***
(-12.124) (-38.887) (-75.026) (-84.160) (-63.978) (-67.490) (-45.545) (-34.954) (-0.697) (14.853) (22.935) (33.407) (78.605)
RnD -1.1236*** -1.8824*** -0.6109** -0.1888 -0.1231 -0.2176 -0.2066 -0.2328** -0.3084*** -0.1175** -0.0411** -0.0111*** 0.0217
(-2.833) (-4.109) (-1.966) (-1.163) (-1.026) (-1.474) (-1.561) (-2.117) (-3.869) (-1.962) (-1.967) (-2.918) (0.320)
-0.0361*** -0.0259*** -0.0118*** -0.0088*** -0.0121*** -0.0262*** -0.0049*** -0.0092*** 0.0029*** -0.0218*** -0.0235*** -0.0100*** -0.0479***
(-15.242) (-12.791) (-10.225) (-14.167) (-22.273) (-54.690) (-10.895) (-21.461) (7.789) (-56.168) (-58.811) (-23.867) (-24.527)
MLEVERAGE 0.6039*** 0.5121*** 0.6369*** 0.7109*** 0.7179*** 0.7245*** 0.6517*** 0.6629*** 0.6627*** 0.6422*** 0.6223*** 0.6336*** 0.6218***
(48.862) (44.001) (88.854) (205.238) (232.145) (266.513) (286.383) (322.566) (364.867) (385.014) (377.934) (366.899) (112.200)
Constant -0.0382*** 0.0915*** -0.0878*** -0.1083*** -0.1484*** -0.1948*** -0.1523*** -0.1902*** -0.2251*** -0.2021*** -0.1770*** -0.1934*** -0.0592***
(-4.241) (10.230) (-15.236) (-39.814) (-62.594) (-93.303) (-83.027) (-112.634) (-152.357) (-147.733) (-132.519) (-139.119) (-11.480)
N 81,221 106,962 324,191 1,619,462 2,127,836 2,641,255 2,897,542 3,267,292 3,873,086 4,263,648 4,354,917 4,007,372 224,541
FINLEVERAGE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
SIZE 0.0728*** 0.0544*** 0.0536*** 0.0426*** 0.0420*** 0.0459*** 0.0483*** 0.0504*** 0.0489*** 0.0495*** 0.0484*** 0.0481*** 0.0292***
(83.226) (106.986) (199.404) (352.827) (391.332) (429.943) (485.359) (532.381) (510.939) (541.705) (526.210) (495.948) (68.218)
F1.ROA -0.0079 -0.0053 -0.0587*** -0.0837*** -0.0606*** -0.0348*** -0.0557*** -0.0541*** -0.0092*** 0.0360*** 0.0223*** -0.0095*** -0.0075*
(-0.712) (-0.753) (-15.967) (-53.542) (-45.281) (-27.001) (-47.153) (-48.880) (-8.635) (37.180) (21.614) (-8.916) (-1.869)
TAR 0.1223*** 0.2027*** 0.2038*** 0.2459*** 0.2358*** 0.2577*** 0.2406*** 0.2366*** 0.2549*** 0.2617*** 0.2558*** 0.2713*** 0.4534***
(17.702) (46.050) (82.996) (230.888) (251.114) (289.378) (292.836) (299.514) (313.448) (361.704) (356.037) (362.537) (153.805)
RnD -1.4035* -2.3100** -1.3232*** -0.5447*** -0.4482*** -0.4078*** -0.9887*** -0.7994*** -0.6476*** -0.7050*** -0.4844*** -0.0227 -0.1179
(-1.939) (-2.224) (-3.636) (-3.191) (-4.327) (-3.266) (-5.808) (-4.316) (-3.450) (-5.871) (-6.619) (-1.133) (-0.854)
0.0060 -0.0214*** 0.0178*** -0.0035*** -0.0387*** -0.0351*** -0.0392*** -0.0267*** 0.0198*** -0.0314*** -0.0494*** -0.0198*** -0.0142***
(1.297) (-7.599) (11.873) (-4.459) (-55.943) (-53.575) (-67.679) (-48.188) (39.608) (-59.731) (-90.416) (-35.376) (-5.435)
MFINLEVERAGE 0.7622*** 0.3729*** 0.3246*** 0.4898*** 0.5193*** 0.4245*** 0.5141*** 0.5871*** 0.5773*** 0.5732*** 0.5329*** 0.4974*** 1.1281***
(11.367) (8.654) (13.688) (49.155) (60.561) (49.740) (76.539) (101.579) (95.692) (103.219) (94.996) (83.831) (46.722)
Constant -1.0827*** -0.7436*** -0.7175*** -0.5953*** -0.5838*** -0.6745*** -0.6555*** -0.6947*** -0.6966*** -0.6961*** -0.6804*** -0.6719*** -0.5097***
(-89.829) (-100.218) (-172.828) (-300.461) (-335.676) (-408.759) (-430.495) (-481.921) (-474.196) (-496.870) (-487.465) (-460.663) (-82.776)
N 53,832 95,265 294,343 1,393,106 1,832,660 2,392,203 2,689,244 3,031,917 3,051,845 3,632,773 3,666,001 3,311,534 164,322
Table H: Annual tobit regressions of the leverage target
The dependent variables are LEVERAGE, FINLEVERAGE, and ADJLEVERAGE regressed annually on private and public companies with complete consolidate (C1 or C2) or unconsolidated (U1 or
U2) balance sheets from the merged Amadeus and Orbis databases. Companies with negative total debt, negative total assets, total debt exceeding total assets or missing variables are excluded. T he tobit
regressions are adapated from (Kayhan & Titman, 2007) to private and public companies. The market-to-book ratio as proxy for expected growth is replaces by future expected asset growth (Graham
& Harvey, 2001). The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity with the Huber & White sandwich estimator (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). T he variables are described in table G.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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ADJLEVERAGE 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
SIZE 0.0350*** 0.0272*** 0.0392*** 0.0305*** 0.0325*** 0.0387*** 0.0389*** 0.0408*** 0.0477*** 0.0456*** 0.0429*** 0.0441*** 0.0337***
(47.377) (45.725) (118.938) (189.041) (222.186) (282.880) (290.453) (319.934) (387.627) (393.319) (370.313) (358.660) (58.768)
F1.ROA 0.0131 0.0221*** 0.0642*** 0.0534*** 0.0132*** -0.0266*** -0.0715*** -0.0876*** -0.0531*** 0.0048*** -0.0403*** -0.0591*** 0.0933***
(1.554) (2.882) (14.939) (26.173) (7.469) (-16.498) (-44.534) (-57.711) (-37.388) (3.654) (-28.531) (-39.848) (17.798)
TAR 0.1327*** -0.0399*** -0.0318*** 0.0919*** 0.1338*** 0.1265*** 0.1555*** 0.1570*** 0.1595*** 0.1720*** 0.1813*** 0.1890*** 0.4595***
(24.518) (-8.498) (-11.598) (77.082) (126.498) (134.246) (170.147) (180.696) (193.670) (222.811) (238.886) (238.009) (127.713)
RnD -12.9333 -4.0403** -0.7557** -0.8222*** -0.4862** -0.6657** -0.2440 -0.3225** -0.5054*** -0.2345** -0.0675* -0.0151 -0.1863
(.) (-2.120) (-2.188) (-2.664) (-2.232) (-2.368) (-1.318) (-2.181) (-3.240) (-2.401) (-1.692) (-1.636) (-1.536)
-0.0478*** -0.0193*** -0.0005 0.0090*** 0.0119*** -0.0130*** 0.0241*** 0.0125*** 0.0160*** 0.0063*** -0.0164*** -0.0033*** -0.0385***
(-12.962) (-6.333) (-0.279) (9.099) (13.413) (-16.549) (32.422) (17.239) (24.160) (8.927) (-22.572) (-4.330) (-9.719)
MADJLEVERAGE 0.6571*** 0.4509*** 0.6827*** 0.7024*** 0.6843*** 0.6517*** 0.5578*** 0.5692*** 0.5292*** 0.5238*** 0.4910*** 0.4895*** 0.5403***
(49.033) (34.459) (69.315) (144.318) (158.316) (190.514) (183.209) (200.444) (200.788) (214.983) (210.168) (199.849) (54.037)
Constant -0.3328*** -0.0573*** -0.3542*** -0.3187*** -0.3487*** -0.4061*** -0.3675*** -0.4035*** -0.4846*** -0.4595*** -0.4146*** -0.4337*** -0.4944***
(-32.387) (-5.878) (-51.977) (-96.943) (-123.386) (-168.459) (-165.235) (-191.304) (-248.463) (-253.574) (-235.158) (-235.032) (-60.094)
N 76,608 98,314 296,171 1,519,787 1,998,846 2,489,966 2,726,993 3,077,357 3,407,199 3,746,444 3,838,457 3,526,065 201,548
Table H (cont.): Annual tobit regressions of the leverage target
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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